Les encours de crédit à la consommation représentent 7 voire 8 % du PIB d'un État. Le cadre règlementaire dans lequel le crédit à la consommation s'inscrit a été profondément modifié par la directive européenne 2008/48/CE et par la loi n°2010-737 dite « loi Lagarde ».Notre travail vise donc à répondre à la question suivante : quel type de relation existe-t-il entre les prêteurs et les emprunteurs sur le marché du crédit à la consommation ? Ces relations sont-elles spécifiques ? Trois objectifs sont proposés, pour chacun d'eux , nous présentons un éclairage côté emprunteur et un côté prêteur. Le premier, en lien avec les évolutions réglementaires, montre que l'information est au cœur de la relation et que tout changement ou évolution de l'information impacte la relation. Le second objectif, plus stratégique, montre que la prise en considération de biais de comportement (biais de sur-confiance et d'optimisme) ou que la mise en place d'une relation durable entre le prêteur et l'emprunteur impacte les décisions d'octroi de crédit. Le troisième objectif, de nature financière, montre que la relation prêteur emprunteur amène à la détermination de voies d'endettement « optimales » pour un ménage mais, également, à la réduction du risque du prêteur dans le cadre de la théorie du portefeuille. Une méthodologie à la fois qualitative et quantitative est utilisée. Nous constatons que l'équilibre est de type mélangeant et que la relation bancaire n'impacte qu'indirectement ce marché. La prise en compte de comportements biaisés pour les emprunteurs conduit à une composition du portefeuille de crédits moins risquée pour le prêteur. La relation prêteur emprunteur est appréhendée à partir de l'analyse des systèmes de partage de l'information des 27 États de l'Union Européenne. / Consumer credit outstanding stands at 7 or 8 per cent of the GDP. The regulation frame of consumption credit was profoundly modified by the Consumer credit directive 2008/48/CE and the « Lagarde Law » n°2010-737. Consequently, the question we address in this research is: what type of relationship exists between lenders and borrowers in consumer credit market? Are these relations specific? Three objectives are proposed. In any case, we present a lender position and a borrower position. The first one, linked to regulation evolutions, shows that information is the cornerstone of such a relation and any information impacting it. The second objective, more strategic, shows those behavioral biases considerations (overconfidence and optimism bias) or the elaboration of a long run relationship banking between lenders and borrowers impacts on the decisions of granting credit. The third objective, more financial, shows that this relationship defines “optimal” ways of household's indebtedness and also reduces the loan portfolio risk of a lender. A methodology both qualitative and quantitative is used. It is shown that the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium and that the relationship banking indirectly impacts the consumer credit market. A composition involving a behavior bias yields a less risked loan portfolio for the lenders. The lender borrower relationship is analyzed from the information sharing systems in the 27 EU countries.

Submitted by Henrique Teixeira (henrique.oliv@gmail.com) on 2016-03-16T02:51:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao.pdf: 1894861 bytes, checksum: af73e440cc555c69c32dbb74b4ba3f59 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2016-03-16T21:49:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao.pdf: 1894861 bytes, checksum: af73e440cc555c69c32dbb74b4ba3f59 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-17T11:42:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao.pdf: 1894861 bytes, checksum: af73e440cc555c69c32dbb74b4ba3f59 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-18 / Starting from the idea that economic systems fall into complexity theory, where its many agents interact with each other without a central control and that these interactions are able to change the future behavior of the agents and the entire system, similar to a chaotic system we increase the model of Russo et al. (2014) to carry out three experiments focusing on the interaction between Banks and Firms in an artificial economy. The first experiment is relative to Relationship Banking where, according to the literature, the interaction over time between Banks and Firms are able to produce mutual benefits, mainly due to reduction of the information asymmetry between them. The following experiment is related to information heterogeneity in the credit market, where the larger the bank, the higher their visibility in the credit market, increasing the number of consult for new loans. Finally, the third experiment is about the effects on the credit market of the heterogeneity of prices that Firms faces in the goods market. / Partindo da ideia de que os sistemas econômicos se enquadram na teoria da complexidade, onde seus inúmeros agentes interagem entre si sem um controle central e que essas interações são capazes de alterar o comportamento futuro dos agentes e de todo o sistema, semelhante a um sistema caótico, incrementamos o modelo de Russo et al. (2014) para a realização de três experimentos com foco na interação entre bancos e empresas em uma economia artificial. O primeiro experimento diz respeito a Relationship Banking onde, segundo a literatura, a interação ao longo do tempo entre bancos e empresas é capaz de produzir benefícios mútuos, principalmente devido a redução da assimetria de informação entre eles. O experimento seguinte está relacionado a assimetria de informação no mercado de crédito, onde quanto maior o banco, maior sua visibilidade no mercado de crédito, elevando na mesma proporção as consultar para novos emprestimos. Por fim, o terceiro experimento é relativo aos efeitos no mercado de crédito da heterogeneidade de preços que as empresas se deparam no mercado de bens

Title of the thesis: Banking secrecy The paper deals with a traditional instrument dedicated to protection of client's personal data provided to the bank - banking secrecy. The instrument is analysed in connection with breaking of banking secrecy. The ways of breaking the banking secrecy are divided into two groups: (i) manners of breaking the banking secrecy regulated by law and (ii) manners of breaking the bank secrecy not specifically regulated by law where the main role is given to secondary legislation and case law. Regarding the ways of breaking regulated by law, the paper describes the Act on Banks as a general law and also regulation included in specific laws. There are two categories of specific laws: which specify the process of breaking the bank secrecy included in the Act on Banks or which regulate specific case of breaking the banking secrecy. As for the civil procedure, there is a premise of diminution of use of the Civil Procedure Act for gathering client information by authorised persons because of the Central Registry of Accounts. The important type of laws regulating the breaking of the banking secrecy is those regulating registers of client information protected by the banking secrecy. The most important development of legislation is the new regulation of non-banking registers in...

L’étude des déterminants internes du risque de crédit des banques tunisiennes est l’objetprincipal de cette thèse. Il s’agit en particulier de la gouvernance bancaire et de la relationbancaire. À partir d’un échantillon de 10 banques tunisiennes cotées durant la période 1998-2009, nous essayons de détecter l’impact de la concentration de la propriété et descaractéristiques du conseil d’administration sur le risque de crédit. Nos résultats montrent queles mécanismes internes de gouvernance n’ont pas assuré jusqu’à présent leur rôle de contrôleet de garant de la bonne gestion des banques tunisiennes et qu’ils ont contribué à une gestionimprudente du risque de crédit. À partir de l’étude de dossiers de crédits accordés par unebanque tunisienne à une clientèle d’entreprises, nous essayons de détecter l’impact del’information hard et soft sur le risque de crédit. Nos résultats plaident en faveur del’hypothèse du laxisme des banques envers certains clients importants et surtout de longuedate. Ce laxisme pourrait être la cause d’une augmentation du risque de non remboursementdes crédits accordés en Tunisie. / This research aims to analyse the internal determinants of Tunisian bank risk. We particularlyfocus on the role of bank governance and relationship banking. Based on a sample of 10Tunisian listed banks during 1998-2009, we examine the impact of ownership concentrationand board characteristics on credit risk. Our results demonstrate that the importance ofTunisian banks’credit risk is rooted in bank governance deficiency. This latter wascontributed to implement a reckless credit policy. From the analysis of credit files granted bya Tunisian bank to corporate customers, we attempt to detect the impact of soft and hardinformation on credit risk. Our results suggest a lax attitude of the bank towards someimportant clients, particularly long-standing ones. This attitude may be the root of the creditrisk increase in Tunisia.

Cette thèse examine l'impact de la structure du marché bancaire sur l’activité économique et les contraintes financières des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) et l'efficacité des banques au niveau local. Il comprend trois chapitres empiriques. Le premier chapitre s’intéresse à l’impact du relationship banking sur les contraintes financières des PME et s'appuie sur deux indicateurs alternatifs pour saisir différentes dimensions de ces contraintes. Les résultats soulignent le rôle ambigu de la proximité bancaire et de la relation client face aux contraintes financières des PME. Sur la période 2005-2013, la présence accrue de banques régionales ou géographiquement concentrées contribue à atténuer les contraintes de crédit à court terme des PME françaises mais accroît leur sensibilité aux flux de trésorerie liés aux investissements. En outre, dans les deux cas, les contraintes financières des PME sont renforcées sur des marchés distants sur le plan fonctionnel. De plus, en période de crise, les avantages de la relation bancaire sur la contrainte de crédit à court terme demeurent et, dans certains cas, sont renforcés. Nous constatons également que la présence accrue des banques régionales facilite l'accès au crédit à court terme pour les entreprises plus rentables avant la crise financière mondiale et particulièrement pour celles qui ont connu une forte baisse de leur rentabilité en période de crise. Le deuxième chapitre analyse l’impact des relations de crédit via une plus grande proximité bancaire sur l’activité économique réelle, en s’appuyant à la fois sur des données individuelles de firmes et sur des données macroénomiques au niveau des départements. Il s’intéresse également à l’impact différencié de cette proximité en fonction du degré de dépendance au financement externe des PME françaises sur la période 2005-2013. Nos résultats révèlent que la relation de crédit via une plus grande proximité bancaire est bénéfique pour l'activité économique des PME en temps normal et en période de crise. De plus, parmi ces PME, les avantages de la proximité bancaire sont les plus importants pour les micro-entreprises. De plus, nos résultats montrent une forte hétérogénéité dans l’impact de la structure du marché bancaire local en fonction du degré de dépendance vis-à-vis du financement extérieur. Notre analyse macroéconomique montre également que une plus forte proximité bancaire a un impact positif sur l’emploi et stimule la croissance de l’activité économique. Le troisième chapitre analyse l’impact l'impact des caractéristiques des banques et des marchés locaux sur l'efficacité des succursales bancaires. Cette analyse s’appuie sur un ensemble données détaillé au niveau des succursales en Chine sur la période 2008-2011. Nos résultats suggèrent que les caractéristiques des marchés tant locaux que bancaires affectent l’efficacité des succursales bancaires. Les succursales de banques appartenant à l'État ont l’efficience-profit la plus forte mais l’efficience-coût la plus faible, tandis que les succursales de banques étrangères ont l’efficience-profit la plus élevée. En outre, la concurrence des banques et le développement économique sur le marché local contribuent à promouvoir l'efficacité des succursales. De plus, l’efficacité des banques et l’efficacité du marché bancaire local peuvent influer sur l’efficacité des succursales, l’impact de l’efficacité des banques étant économiquement plus important. Nos résultats suggèrent que la structure du marché bancaire local a un impact statistiquement et économiquement significatif sur l’activité économique et les contraintes financières des PME, l'activité économique réelle et l'efficacité des banques. Les superviseurs bancaires et les régulateurs doivent veiller à maintenir un environnement bancaire diversifié, garantissant la présence de banques locales et géographiquement concentrées, et à renforcer la concurrence des banques afin de stimuler la croissance économique. / This dissertation examines the impact of banking mar ket structure on SMEs financial constraints, real economic activity and bank efficiency at a local level. It comprises three empirical essays as three chapters, the first two chapters are on French banking market and the third one is on Chinese banking mar ket. The first chapter investigates the relevance of relationship lending for SMEs and continuation lending during crisisrelying on two alternative indicators to capture different dimensions of SMEs financial constraints. The findings emphasize the ambiguous role of banking proximity and of relationship banking on SMEs financial constraints. Over the 2005-2013 period, for French manufacturing SME s, higher presence of regional banks or of geographically-focused banks help to alle viate their short-term credit constraint, while lar germarket share of national banks or stronger presence of geographically-diversified banks is beneficial to reduce their investment cash-flow sensitivity. Moreover, in both cases, SMEs’ financial constraints are strengthened in functionally-distant mar kets. In addition, during crisis times, the benefits of relationship banking on short-term credit constraint remains and, insome cases, are reinforced. We also find that these benefits differ according to SMEs pre-crisis financial health, in line with pre vious findings of continuation lending during crisis.The second chapter analyzes the impact of relationship lending through a stronger banking proximity on real economic activity at both firm le vel and county (department) level and the heterogeneity of this impact based on SMEs external financial dependence in France over the 2005-2013 period. Our results confirm the benefits of elationship banking for SMEs as highlighted in the pre vious chapter. A stronger banking proximity is beneficial to SMEs’ economic activity in both ormal and crisis times, even after controlling for times, county, industry and firm level characteristics, and these benefits are stronger for micro firms, the smallest and more informationally-opaque SMEs. In addition, our results show a significant heterogeneity in the impact of local banking market structure among small firms depending on the le vel of dependence on external finance. Further, our macroeconomic analysis also provide evidence that local banking market structure has statistically and economically significant impact on economic activity. The third chapter analyzes the finance-growth nexus from a different perspective by investigating what drives bank branch efficiency. Three efficiency measures are adopted to estimate the impact of bank and local market characteristics on bank branch efficiency using a detailed branch-level dataset in China over the 2008-2011 period. Our findings suggest that both bank and local market characteristics affect bank branch efficiency. Branches of state-own banks are the most profit efficient and least cost efficient, while branches of foreign banks are the most cost efficient. In addition, bank competition and economic development in local market help promote branch efficiency. In addition, both bank efficiency and local banking market efficiency can affect branch efficiency, and the impact of bank efficiency is econ omically more significant. Our findings suggest that local banking market structure has a statistically and economically significant impact on small business lending, real economic activity and bank efficiency, bank supervisors and regulators should pay at tention to maintain a diversified banking environment, guaranty the presence of local and geographically-focused banks, and enhance bank competition to stimulate growth.

A partire dagli anni ’80, la diffusione dei metodi statistici, abbinata ai progressi nelle capacità computazionali dei personal computers, ha progressivamente facilitato i ricercatori nel testare empiricamente le proprie teorie. Gli economisti sono diventati in grado di eseguire milioni di regressioni prima di pranzo senza abbandonare le proprie scrivanie. Purtroppo, ciò ha portato ad un accumulo di evidenze spesso eterogenee, quando non contradditorie se non esplicitamente in conflitto. Per affrontare il problema, questa tesi fornirà una panoramica dei metodi meta-analitici disponibili in economia. Nella prima parte verranno introdotte le intuizioni alla base dei modelli gerarchici a fattori fissi e casuali capaci di risolvere le problematicità derivanti dalla presenza di osservazioni non indipendenti. Verrà inoltre affrontato il tema dell’errore sistematico di pubblicazione in presenza di elevata eterogeneità tra gli studi. La metodologia verrà successivamente applicata, nella seconda e terza parte, a due diverse aree della letteratura economica: l’impatto del rapporto banca-impresa sulle prestazioni aziendali e il dibattito sulla relazione fra democrazia e crescita. Mentre nel primo caso la correlazione negativa non è influenzata da fattori specifici ai singoli paesi, il contrario è vero per spiegare l’impatto (statisticamente non significativo) delle istituzioni democratiche sullo sviluppo economico. Quali siano questi fattori è però meno chiaro; gli studiosi non hanno ancora individuato le co-variate – o la corretta misurazione di esse – capaci di spiegare questa discussa relazione. / Starting in the late 1980s, improved computing performances and spread knowledge of statistical methods allowed researchers to put their theories to test. Formerly constrained economists became able [to] run millions of regressions before lunch without leaving their desks. Unfortunately, this led to an accumulation of often conflicting evidences. To address such issue, this thesis will provide an overview of the meta-analysis methods available in economics. The first paper will explain the intuitions behind fixed and random effects models in such a framework. It will then detail how multilevel modelling can help overcome hierarchical dependence issues. Finally, it will address the problem of publication bias in presence of high between-studies heterogeneity. Such methods will be then applied, in the second and third papers, to two different areas of the economics literature: the effect of relationship banking on firm performances and the democracy and growth conundrum. Results are far-reaching. While in the first case the documented negative relation is not driven by country-specific characteristics the opposite is true for the (statistically insignificant) impact of democratic institutions on economic growth. What these characteristics are is, however, less clear. Scholars have not yet found the covariates - or their suitable proxies - that matter to explain such much-debated relationship.

This work undertakes the first comprehensive theoretical assessment of syndicated loans. It is shown that syndicated and bilateral (single lender) loans should be good substitutes in meeting a borrower's financing requirements, but that syndicated loans are more complex and impose additional risks to the parties in the way they are arranged. The existing explantions of loan syndication - that they are hybrids of private bank loans and public debt instruments, that syndication is a portfolio management tool, and that loans are syndicated where they are too large to be provided bilaterally - are unable to substantially explain both the nature of syndicated loans and practice in the loan markets. A rigorous new explanation is developed, which shows that syndication reduces the rate of lending costs, so that the return to the loan originator is greater, and the borrower's cost of financing is lower, where a loan is syndicated rather than provided bilaterally. This explanation is shown to hold in competitive loan markets and to be consistent with the observation that syndicated loans are generally larger than other loans. Incidental to this new explanation, new expressions of the return to a bank from providing a loan on a bilateral basis and from originating a syndicated loan are also developed. New algorithms are also developed for determining the distribution of the commitments from syndicate participants and thus the originator's final hold, the amount it must lend itself, where the loan is underwritten. This provides, for the first time, a rigorous basis for assessing the expected return, and the risk, for the originator of a given syndicated loan. Finally, empirical testing finds that a bank's observed lending history is significant to its decision to participate in a new syndicated loan but that predictions of participation, which are fundamental inputs into the final hold algorithms, based on this information have relatively little power. It follows that there is competitive advantage to loan originators that have access to other, private information on potential participants' lending intentions.

This dissertation collects four essays on banks, firms and real effects of bank lending. Owing to the appliance of different econometric methods on several datasets, insights in the behav-ior of and the impacts from financial markets and market participants are generated. In the first chapter, our results uncover a so far undocumented ability of the interbank market to distinguish between banks of different quality in times of aggregate distress. We show empirical evidence that during the 2007 financial crisis the inability of some banks to roll over their interbank debt was not due to a failure of the interbank market per se but rather to bank-specific shocks affecting banks’ capital, liquidity and credit quality as well as revised bank-level risk perceptions. Relationship banking is not capable of containing these frictions, as hard information seems to dominate soft information. In detail, we explore determinants of the formation and resilience of interbank lending relationships by analyzing an extensive da-taset comprising over 1.9 million interbank relationships of more than 3,500 German banks between 2000 and 2012. The second chapter examines the relationship between central bank funding and credit risk-taking. Employing bank-firm-level data from the German credit registry during 2009:Q1-2014:Q4, we find that banks borrowing from the central bank rebalance their portfolios to-wards ex-ante riskier firms. We further establish that this effect is driven by the ECB’s maturi-ty extensions and that the risk-taking sensitivity of banks borrowing from the ECB is inde-pendent of idiosyncratic bank characteristics. Finally, we show that these shifts in bank lend-ing are associated with an increase in firm-level investment and employment, but also with a deterioration of bank balance sheet quality in the following year. Once we analyze the relationship of banks as lenders vis-à-vis banks as borrowers and banks as lenders vis-à-vis non-financial companies as borrowers, we enlarge the understand-ing of non-financial companies not only in terms of being simply borrowers, respectively sub-jects exhibiting of credit risks. Instead, we try to understand the inner working of those com-panies more generally and analyze their quality not only in terms of a bank’s risk assessment but also in terms of the overall market assessment. However, this in turn can generate infor-mation useable to assess the quality of a bank’s credit portfolio in dimensions that so far are not taken into account by the current regulatory framework. Moreover, a better understanding of banks and non-banks beyond the standard lens of the banking and corporate finance litera-ture might promote new scopes for future research connecting those discrete subjects. In this regard, the third chapter analyzes the dependence of price reactions to corporate insider trad-ing on several measures of corporate governance quality. Our results strongly support the view that first, higher corporate governance levels seem to prevent or discourage insiders from engaging in insider trading as means of opportunistic rent extraction. Second, results confirm the notion of buy and sell trades not being just two sides of the same coin. That is, a higher level of corporate governance leads to a better pre-event information environment which results in less positive abnormal returns after insider buy trades as the incremental posi-tive information revealed by the trade is smaller. In contrast, sell trades in firms with better corporate governance are perceived to convey more valuable and most importantly negative information to the capital market so that prices adjust more for companies with better govern-ance schemes. Third, we show that institutional ownership even on an aggregate level is a sufficient measure to proxy a company’s corporate governance level. Hence, as information on companies’ bylaws and on investors’ investment dedication and type for example are scarce, respectively associated with higher costs because one has to gather that information one can refrain from that and instead proxy the governance level with the aggregate measure of institutional ownership. The latter result is important for carrying out future analyses merg-ing and extending the findings of the first two chapters. Last, the fourth chapter abstracts from borrowers as subjects of credit risk, as well, and most importantly extends the analysis of banks, firms and their interactions effecting each other by a macroeconomic perspective of the real effects of bank lending. That is, as capital flows and real estate are pro-cyclical, and real estate has a substantial weight in economies’ income and wealth Chapter 4 studies the role of real estate markets in the transmission of bank flow shocks to output growth across German cities. In this regard, real sector firms play a central role in the transmission mechanism we uncover. More specifically, the empirical analysis relies on a new and unique matched data set at the city level and the bank-firm level. To measure bank flow shocks, we show that changes in sovereign spreads of Southern Eu-ropean countries (the so-called PIGS spread) can predict German cross-border bank flows. To achieve identification by geographic variation, in addition to a traditional supply-side varia-ble, we use a novel instrument that exploits a policy assigning refugee immigrants to munici-palities on an exogenous basis. We find that output growth responds more to bank flow shocks in cities that are more exposed to tightness in local real estate markets. We estimate that, during the 2009-2014 period, for every 100-basis point increase in the PIGS spread, the most exposed cities grow 15-2 basis points more than the least exposed ones. Moreover, the differential response of commercial property prices can explain most of this growth differen-tial. When we unpack the transmission mechanism by using matched bank-firm-level data on credit, employment, capital expenditure and TFP, we find that firm real estate collateral as measured by tangible fixed assets plays a critical role. In particular, bank flow shocks in-crease the credit supply to firms and sectors with more real estate collateral. Higher credit supply then leads firms to hire and invest more, without evidence of capital misallocation.

科学研究費補助金 研究種目:基盤研究(C) 課題番号:14530108 研究代表者:家森 信善 研究期間:2002-2005年度