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This study investigates whether the difference in individual shareholder tax rates between dividend income and capital gain (the dividend tax penalty) affects a firm's choice between distributing funds to shareholders through dividends or share repurchases. The results of this study suggest that, in periods in which the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to distribute funds to shareholders through share repurchases as opposed to dividends. The results also indicate that the relationship between the dividend tax penalty and corporate payout choice is affected by the types of shareholders who own stock in the firm. As managerial share ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases firms are more likely to make distributions to shareholders in the form of share repurchases. As aggregate institutional ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are neither more likely to repurchase shares nor more likely to distribute dividends. Division of the institutional ownership category indicates that institutions classified as mutual funds and investment advisors (brokers) have the strongest preference for share repurchases as the dividend tax penalty increases. In contrast, institutions classified as banks, insurance companies and other institutions have the smallest preference for share repurchases as the dividend tax penalty increases. The implication of this study is that individual shareholder taxes affect firms' corporate payout choice.

Acquisition in Own Shares and Financial Assistance Abstract This thesis called "Acquisition in Own Shares and Financial Assistance" deals with the phenomenon of trading in own shares and financial assistance using a comparison of legal requirements on trading in own shares by the relatively "private" company and by the public company with listed shares with relation to the practical needs of different nature of both the types of companies and using the same sort of comparison with relation to the same sort of needs of the same types of companies in the business transactions involving financial assistance. The thesis focuses at European law approach to the phenomenon seeking to describe either the particular characteristics of the legislation either overall concept. The thesis provides with a critical evaluation of European law approach to the phenomenon based on the criticism of relative ignoring the practical characteristics and needs of the public companies with listed shares differing significantly from the practical characteristics and needs of the relatively "private" companies. Particularly, the first part of thesis deals with the market instrument - open market repurchases. It seeks to formulate fundamental characteristics including related risks to the fairness of markets. The thesis deals with a...

Securities legislation in Canada and around the world does not mandate firms to fulfill announced share repurchase programs. As such, a firms repurchase program completion rate can be interpreted as a measure of the firms voluntary compliance, which communicates to investors the degree to which the firm is responsible, reliable and makes good faith efforts to fulfill its announced programs. We therefore expect that the voluntary compliance may reduce the riskiness of a firm and thus its cost of capital. In a sample of Canadian repurchase programs announced between 1995 and 2004, surprisingly, we find little evidence to suggest that a significant relationship exists between the firms repurchase program completion rate and the cost of equity. We present a number of explanations for this result.

Securities legislation in Canada and around the world does not mandate firms to fulfill announced share repurchase programs. As such, a firms repurchase program completion rate can be interpreted as a measure of the firms voluntary compliance, which communicates to investors the degree to which the firm is responsible, reliable and makes good faith efforts to fulfill its announced programs. We therefore expect that the voluntary compliance may reduce the riskiness of a firm and thus its cost of capital. In a sample of Canadian repurchase programs announced between 1995 and 2004, surprisingly, we find little evidence to suggest that a significant relationship exists between the firms repurchase program completion rate and the cost of equity. We present a number of explanations for this result.

There are 506 announcements of stock repurchases from 1999.8.9 to the end of 2001 after Taiwan adopting the law of treasury stock. It¡¦s obviously that companies issued in the stock market need the law because the percent of applying is up to 37.23%. We study the announcements during 1999.8.9 to 2001.12.31 and try to find out the motives of stock repurchases. For understanding the effect of market prediction, we try to set up a prediction model and separate the result of market prediction to right and wrong. Regarding the factor of affecting the cumulative abnormal return after announcement, we argue that it¡¦s quite similar with cash dividend announcement as companies signal the good news of becoming better in the future. It infers that the effect of announcement relates to former accounting information. The result show as following: (1) the motives to stock repurchases are consistent with optimal leverage ratio hypothesis, dividend or tax hypothesis. The companies would intend to stock repurchase when the board of directors had higher collateral ratio or the enterprise ever used the subsidiary company to repurchase the stock. (2) we can¡¦t prove that the unexpected announcement has higher abnormal return than the expected one. (3) we also can¡¦t prove that the former accounting information affect the abnormal return, but we can see the it positively relates to the free cash flow, undervaluation, and the degree of information asymmetry.

In this paper we examine abnormal returns during active repurchasing programs and if the intensity of repurchasing programs impacts the returns. Through the Jensen’s Alpha approach our findings show us that positive abnormal returns are experienced by repurchasing firms under our study period that ranges from 2010 to 2019. The results show us that during active repurchasing programs companies have showed positive average annual abnormal returns ranging from 1,8% to 6%. We also find that the intensity of share repurchases does not have a statistically significant effect on the given abnormal returns. However, our results indicate that the abnormal returns are higher when the repurchases occurred, rather than when they are authorized.

Problem: Stock repurchases, and dividends have been a topic of academic interest for decades. Researchers have been trying to understand the determinants of payout policies and the conjunctural relationship between dividends and repurchases. That is, under which circumstances is one preferred over the other. In this paper, we make an attempt to contribute to the already existing research on the area. For this purpose, we study a specific period in time when a tax reform was enacted. That way we hope to obtain information on the payout policy that companies choose, and how the taxes influence these Purpose: In this paper our aim is to find out, by using a sample of quarterly data prior and after the implementation of the 2012 (enacted in 2012 and put into effect in January 1, 2013) tax reform (four quarters prior and four quarters after), whether the payout policies are affected by the changes in the dividend and/or the capital gain tax. This may, in turn, reveal information about the dividends and repurchases and how corporations choose to respond to adjustments in taxes as explained by the dependent variables. Method: We perform multinomial logistic, fixed and random effects regression analyses to the quarterly data of companies listed on the United States stock market benchmark index, the S&P 500. We use descriptive statistics and theoretical fundamentals to establish a relationship between the dividends and repurchases policies, as the changes in the tax code come to effect. Results and Conclusion: Despite the size of the sample, we found that firms tend to prefer; 1) to do a combination of dividend and repurchases, and 2) when taxes increase, there is a positive effect on dividend, and that repurchases are preferred over dividends.

Since the dividend irrelevance theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961), academics and practitioners still have little understanding of the managerial incentives underpinning dividend policy. Black (1976) observed, “The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don’t fit together.” <br /> <br /> This thesis aims to shed additional light on the dividend puzzle. Accordingly, two theoretical models have been developed to help explain why firms pay dividends or repurchase their own shares. The models consider the case in which the managers of a high-quality firm (firm H) and a low-quality firm (firm L) choose to use corporate cash flows to pay dividends, repurchase shares, or invest in a real project from which they can earn private benefits. I focus on the case in which firm H has a positive NPV project whereas firm L has a negative NPV project. <br /> <br /> In the first model, developed in spirit of Isagawa (2000), I show that paying dividends is a dominated strategy for firm H, regardless of the managerial weight parameter. If the manager is myopic, firm L will choose to repurchase shares at the detriment of existing shareholders. If the manager is farsighted, on the other hand, firm L will choose to pay dividends. I also consider the case in which investors are irrational in that they do not update their beliefs upon observing one firm repurchasing shares while the other firm paying dividends. The model shows that, in inefficient market, firm L will not mimic given that firm H repurchases shares since it cannot obtain any benefit from doing so. <br /> <br /> In the second model, built on Fairchild and Zhang’s (2005) work, in which the managerial payout decisions depend on the relative magnitudes of dividend and repurchase catering premia, I demonstrate that a myopic manager of firm H may pass up a positive NPV project in order to cater to investor demand for dividends or share repurchases (an adverse selection problem). In addition, I show that the agency cost of free cash flow can be mitigated if the dividend-catering premium is sufficiently high. That is, firm L’s manager will have a strong incentive to return excess cash to shareholders rather than invest it in a negative NPV project. <br /> <br /> Then, I investigate dividend changes in Thailand over the period 2002-2005. To test the signalling and free cash flow hypotheses, I first analyse profitability changes around dividend changes and benchmark them with control firms, and examine the relation between dividend changes and the past and future profitability. Consistent with Benartzi et al.’s (1997) evidence in the U.S., dividend changes in Thailand do not signal future profitability but rather the past performance. Then, I examine the determinants of dividend changes and firm’s decision to change dividends. I also investigate the short-run and long-run stock price performance of dividend-changing firms, and the relation between announcement returns and hypothesised independent variables. Finally, I examine firms’ investment behaviour following dividend changes. The results do not support the view that dividend changes signal future profitability. Overall, the findings are broadly consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis rather than the signalling hypothesis. <br /> <br /> Additionally, I provide preliminary evidence on open-market share repurchases (OMRs) in Thailand over the period December 2001 to January 2007. I find that stock prices react positively to OMR announcements and continue to increase in the longer term, suggesting that stock market underreacts to the signal conveyed by the managers of repurchasing firms. Comparing the actual repurchase cost with the costs of benchmark portfolios, I find that the actual repurchase cost is the lowest. This finding suggests that the managers of repurchasing firms have substantial ability to time the market.