Corruption is, in the last two decades, considered as one of the biggest problems within the international community, which harms not only a particular state or society but the whole world. The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. Based on this approach the strong international initiatives taken by the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe, provided various measures and tools in order to support and guide countries in their combat against corruption. These anti-corruption policies created a repression -prevention-transparency model for corruption combat. Applying this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this move show non impressive results. Critics argue that “one size does not fit all” because the institutional setting of countries around the world varies. Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market economy. The socialist past left traces on institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their interrelation, particularly in the domain of public administration. If the idiosyncrasy of these countries is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. The implementation of this model is based on three regulatory pyramids: anti-corruption, disciplinary anti-corruption and criminal anti-corruption pyramid. This approach asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds.

This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.

The analysis of tort law is one of the most influential and extensively developed applications of the economic approach in the study of law. Notwithstanding the exhaustive number of contributions on tort law and economics, several open questions remain that warrant further investigation. The general aim of this research project is to refine the traditional model of tort law in order to make it more realistic, updated with the recent technological progress and in line with the experimental results concerning prosocial behavior. This book is divided into six chapters: Chapters 1 and 6 provide an introduction and conclusions, respectively, while the remaining chapters are written in the form of separate yet related articles.

This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation research arena. It introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure the direct compliance costs of lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index (CII) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and quantitative assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the comparative and the sui generis dimension. The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the last decade, but it is the only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying regulations. Beside the qualitative contribution, the research introduces an additional theoretical framework for complementary qualitative analysis of the lobbying laws. The Ninefold theory allows a more structured assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and costs. Lastly, this research introduces the Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These labels might improve an ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, primarily in the sui generis perspective. In its final part, the research focuses on four South East European countries (Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), and for the first time brings them into the discussion and calculates their CPI and CII scores. The special focus of the application was on Serbia, whose proposal on the Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms, taking into consideration specific political and economic circumstances of the country. Although the obtained results are of an indicative nature, the CII will probably find its place within the academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of lobbying regulations worldwide.

In the first chapter we develop a theoretical model investigating food consumption and body weight with a novel assumption regarding human caloric expenditure (i.e. metabolism), in order to investigate why individuals can be rationally trapped in an excessive weight equilibrium and why they struggle to lose weight even when offered incentives for weight-loss. This assumption allows the theoretical model to have multiple equilibria and to provide an explanation for why losing weight is so difficult even in the presence of incentives, without relying on rational addiction, time-inconsistency preferences or bounded rationality. In addition to this result we are able to characterize under which circumstances a temporary incentive can create a persistent weight loss. In the second chapter we investigate the possible contributions that social norms and peer effects had on the spread of obesity. In recent literature peer effects and social norms have been characterized as important pathways for the biological and behavioral spread of body weight, along with decreased food prices and physical activity. We add to this literature by proposing a novel concept of social norm related to what we define as social distortion in weight perception. The theoretical model shows that, in equilibrium, the effect of an increase in peers' weight on i's weight is unrelated to health concerns while it is mainly associated with social concerns. Using regional data from England we prove that such social component is significant in influencing individual weight. In the last chapter we investigate the relationship between body weight and employment probability. Using a semi-parametric regression we show that men and women employment probability do not follow a linear relationship with body mass index (BMI) but rather an inverted U-shaped one, peaking at a BMI way over the clinical threshold for overweight.

In the first paper, I assess if financial incentives may be used as an effective device to induce workers to postpone retirement by evaluating the Italian so called “super bonus” reform. The bonus consisted in economic incentives given for a limited period to private sector workers who had reached the requirements for seniority pension. Crucially for this study, public workers were not entitled to the bonus. Using data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income andWealth, and exploiting the DID-Probit strategy proposed by Blundell et al. (JEEA, 2004), I assess the effect of the bonus on the decision to postpone retirement, by comparing private and public workers before and after the reform. Results suggest a reduction of 12ppt in the proportion of private workers who decided to retire among those qualifying for retirement. Results also suggest, not trivially, that most of the effect of the reform is driven by low-income workers. Finally, I propose an estimate of the extensive margin elasticity of Italian older workers. The second study estimates a structural reduced form of the “option value” model developed by Stock and Wise (1990) using Italian data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).Exploiting exogenous changes in social security wealth (SSW) results show a significant effect in the expected direction of SSW and of marginal incentives to retire. Results are robust even after controlling for individual heterogeneity and its correlation with financial incentives. Using detailed information on individuals, the results also highlights the importance of individual and job characteristics, which have been very little explored by this literature, as determinants of retirement. This suggests the potential of “tagging” in the design of social security incentives in order to reduce choice distortions and improve the overall efficiency of the system.

In this work we conduct an experimental analysis on different behavioral models of economic choice. In particular, we analyze the role of overconfidence in shaping the beliefs of economics agents about the future path of their consumption or investment. We discuss the relevance of this bias in expectation formation both from a static and from a dynamic point of view and we analyze the effect of possible interventions aimed to achieve some policy goals. The methodology we follow is both theoretical and empirical. In particular, we make large use of controlled economic field experiments in order to test the predictions of the theoretical models we propose. In the second part of the thesis we discuss the role of cognition and personality in affecting economic preferences and choices. In this way we make a bridge between established psychological research and novel findings in economics. Finally, we conduct a field study on the role of incentives on education. We design different incentive schemes and we test, on randomized groups of students, their effectiveness in improving academic performance.

This dissertation consists of three empirical studies that are believed to provide new contributions to the literature exploring the determinants of children/adolescents achievement test scores (Chapter 2), adolescent health risk behaviors (Chapter 3), and children time use patterns (Chapter 4). The second and third studies look at the separate roles of fathers and of mothers in influencing outcomes, wherein parental time is the resource input of interest quantitatively measured and directly derived from time diaries. The last chapter looks at the time allocation of children and how it varies according to child and household characteristics.

The study aims at providing a framework conceptualizing patenting activities under the condition of intellectual property rights fragmentation. Such a framework has to deal with the interrelated problems of technological complexity in the modern patent landscape. In that respect, ex-post licensing agreements have been incorporated into the analysis. More precisely, by consolidating the right to use patents required for commercialization of a product, private market solutions, such as cross-licensing agreements and patent pools help firms to overcome problems triggered by the intellectual property rights fragmentation. Thereby, private bargaining between parties as such cannot be isolated from the legal framework. A result of this analysis is that policies ignoring market solutions and only focusing on static gains can mitigate the dynamic efficiency gains as induced by the patent system. The evidence found in this thesis supports the opinion that legal reforms that aim to decrease the degree of patent protection or to lift it all together can hamper the functioning of the current system.

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.