Kepler is mainly known among historians of science due to his astronomical theories and his approaches to problems having to do with philosophy of science and ontology. This thesis attempts to contribute to Kepler studies by providing a comprehensive discussion of a topic hitherto not really considered, namely Kepler’s theory of the soul, a general theory of knowledge or epistemology whose central problem is what makes knowledge possible—rather than what makes knowledge true, as happens in the case of Descartes’s and Bacon’s epistemologies. Kepler’s theory consists of four issues: the theory of the different sorts of soul—i.e. the human soul, the animal soul, the vegetable soul, and the Earth soul—concerning their faculties, the differences and the resemblances that emerge among them, the relation they maintain with their own bodies and the world, and the distinction soul-world. The thesis discusses these issues from a historical perspective, that is, it reconstructs the way they appear in three periods of Kepler’s career: the period prior to the publication of the Mysterium Cosmographicum, the period going from 1596 to 1611, and the harmonic period. Finally, Kepler’s epistemology is briefly contrasted with Descartes’s and Bacon’s in order to suggest why Kepler’s is philosophically interesting and valuable.

In this dissertation, I argue for the philosophical consistency of Aquinas’ hybrid view of human souls - that is, the idea that human souls, and only human souls, are at once substantial forms and subsistent things. I contend that the best way to understand the ontological status of human souls according to Aquinas is by means of the concept of ‘subsistent parts’. Since Aquinas characterizes souls as parts of substances, I propose a mereological analysis of the different types of part in Aquinas, and I conclude that souls should be seen as metaphysical parts of substances. An influential contemporary view holds that Aquinas’ doctrine is inconsistent on the grounds that nothing could be an abstract (form) and a concrete (subsistent) at the same time. I respond to this view by denying the widespread notion that substantial forms are purely abstract entities. I hold that the best way to make sense of Aquinas’ twofold approach to human souls is by saying that substantial forms possess an element of concreteness which is accounted for by the fundamental relationship between form and being. Finally, I address the question of taxonomy: how can we classify Aquinas’ view of the soul-body relation in light of the concepts that are currently used in philosophy of mind. I argue that the notion of a subsistent part entails the concept of ‘part-dualism’, which I present as standing midway between substance-dualism and nonreductive materialism, and also as being ontologically richer than property-dualism. I conclude this dissertation with a refutation of the idea championed by some prominent scholars that the existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of the person.

This thesis argues that the bird depicted in art found in funerary contexts of the Greek Bronze Age is a representation of the soul released from the body. This conclusion was reached by tracing the origins of the avian qualities of the winged psyche present in Classical funerary art. The soul begins as a bird in the Bronze Age in certain funerary contexts and this continues in the Geometric period. In the Archaic period, the soul takes on human characteristics and it is represented by a figure with human head and feet but a bird body with wings. In the Classical period, the soul is mostly human with only wings remaining as a vestige of the avian origin. These soul-birds appear in art found in funerary contexts that depict some stage of the funerary ritual. The thesis begins by discussing the Greek concept of the soul and how it was first conceived as several different entities but then became unified under the term psyche. The main evidence in this first chapter is the Homeric epics, which date to the eighth century BC, the mythic cycle of Orpheus. which was popular in the sixth century BC, and the philosophy of Plato from the fourth century BC. The progression of the soul toward a unitary model is important to this argument because it complements the increasing amount of human qualities that the bird in art acquires. Chapter Two outlines the funerary customs of the ancient Greeks in order to show how the Greeks treated the dead body and to show how they may have perceived the soul. Chapter Three details some of the scholarship on the birds including early theories about the soul as a bird. The most popular theory is that the bird represents a divine epiphany, meaning a manifestation of the divine in this world, but it is applied uncritically and it is not always appropriate for the bird in funerary art. Chapters Four, Five, and Six discuss the art of the Bronze Age, Geometric period. and the Archaic and Classical periods, respectively. The overall conclusion of this thesis is that the bird in funerary art of the Bronze Age can represent the soul of the deceased in some funerary contexts and it is the antecedent of the winged souls of the art in the Classical period. The aim is not to disprove the theory of divine epiphany in bird form, but to assert and highlight another possible interpretation in order to open up other avenues of interpretation and to shed light on Greek conceptions of the soul.

Kepler is mainly known among historians of science due to his astronomical theories and his approaches to problems having to do with philosophy of science and ontology. This thesis attempts to contribute to Kepler studies by providing a comprehensive discussion of a topic hitherto not really considered, namely Kepler’s theory of the soul, a general theory of knowledge or epistemology whose central problem is what makes knowledge possible—rather than what makes knowledge true, as happens in the case of Descartes’s and Bacon’s epistemologies. Kepler’s theory consists of four issues: the theory of the different sorts of soul—i.e. the human soul, the animal soul, the vegetable soul, and the Earth soul—concerning their faculties, the differences and the resemblances that emerge among them, the relation they maintain with their own bodies and the world, and the distinction soul-world. The thesis discusses these issues from a historical perspective, that is, it reconstructs the way they appear in three periods of Kepler’s career: the period prior to the publication of the Mysterium Cosmographicum, the period going from 1596 to 1611, and the harmonic period. Finally, Kepler’s epistemology is briefly contrasted with Descartes’s and Bacon’s in order to suggest why Kepler’s is philosophically interesting and valuable.

Hegel&#039 / s system, with a purpose of being the newest philosophy, represents a turning point in the history of thought. In contrast to the philosophical thoguht of Enlightenment which seperates branches of knowledge, or that of philosophy, Hegel tries to recombine them. In this study, I intend to reveal the close connection of the concepts appeared in the two works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, namely, The Phenomenology of Spirit (Ph&auml / nomenologie des Geistes) and Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts). These concepts are consciousness, self-consciousness, desire, recognition, freedom and intersubjectivity that are very important for considering self-actualization of the individual and for understanding also the process of human socialization. In this sense, Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, in general, is an attempt to analyze modern society through the light of these conceptions which are still central to our aspirations as reflective social beings.

This thesis is based on two readings on death. The first one is Martin Heidegger&rsquo / s Being and Time chapter two, part one and the second one is Jacques Derrida&rsquo / s Aporias. The first reading is based on the phenomenological analysis of death. The line of argument of Heidegger is figured out. The second reading is based on Derrida&rsquo / s deconstruction of Heidegger&rsquo / s account of death in Being and Time. The thesis and the conclusion part is based on the idea that, on death, these philosophers are fundamentally similar and radically different. This is shown by the comparison of these philosophers.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Eberhard-Karls-Universität zu Tübingen. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 162-167).

Thesis--Universität Tübingen, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [169]-176) and index. "Liste der in der Tattvaprakāśavṛtti zitierten Texte"-p. 180.

Habilationsschrift-Bern. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (D.Min.)--Florida Center for Theological Studies, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 179-182).