Theory of mind involves the ability to take another person’s perspective in thought, emotions and intentions.  There is today a lack of instruments to assess children’s development of Theory of Mind (ToM) in Swedish. ToM is considered by many scientists to be the basis for development of pragmatic competence. The relationship between these two abilities is complex and not fully resolved. Both abilities are important components for the development of social skills.     The purpose of this study was to compare 4 and 5-year olds ToM-ability measured with a Swedish version of Wellman and Liu’s ToM-scale, Sally Anne and Social Emotional Test with estimated pragmatic competence measured with the Children’s Communication Checklist (CCC). To make this possible the study also aims to translate and evaluate a Swedish version of Wellman and Liu’s ToM-scale. In the study 39 children in the age of 4 and 5 years old participated (20 4-year olds and 19 5-year olds).     The present study can point to the relationship between the ToM1 ability false belief and pragmatic abilities, as well as different abilities related to pragmatics (conversational rapport, use of discourse context and prosody). Correlation between prosody and other measures of ToM1 abilities was also observed. The result can be linked to previous research on the relationship between pragmatics and ToM. ToM and pragmatic are two abilities that are linked to each other. But as the result is not entirely conclusive, they may also shed more light to the complexity of these abilities and their relationship.      The result of the evaluation of Wellman and Liu’s ToM-scale shows that most of the children got a result pattern that agreed with the hypothesis of a gradual acquisition of ToM-abilties. However, Swedish 4 year olds did to a greater extent passed questions in a pattern that was not compatible with the gradual acquisition claim than American children did in a previous study. One reason for this result may be cultural differences. More research is needed on a larger selection of subjects and a wider range of age groups before any conclusions can be drawn. However, the translated scale can be used in a qualitative way, to examine which aspects of a ToM a child comprehends.

Why do we defend the social conditions responsible for our injustice and exploitation? We are confused when disadvantaged women of color cite personal shortcomings rather than the social system as the source of their precarity. Yet, when social philosophers take up these questions by appealing to the concept of ideology, they turn to structural accounts and dismiss theories of false consciousness outright. Accounts of false consciousness, often understood as an epistemic failing to recognize some features of our inadequate social world, meet with a host of objections. Some argue that ascriptions of false consciousness involve authoritarianism, while others criticize the concept for commitments to an implausible correspondence picture of truth. Meanwhile, dismissal of false consciousness accounts of ideology have led to the neglect of an important feature of how ideology works: in and through our own agency. Without an account of false consciousness, critics fail to account for the fact that social structures are the result of our collective consent. They also fail to address how social structures are not analyzable without turning to the self-understandings of the participants in these very institutions. This dissertation addresses issues in ideology critique that account for our agency. By preserving what is still alive in a theory of false consciousness while addressing the long-standing concerns about authoritarianism and correspondence, this project reconstructs the notion of false consciousness. It closely engages with figures in critical social theory such as Marx, Lukacs, Habermas, Haslanger, Honneth, and Jaeggi, while widening the terms of the debate to consider the relevance, for instance, of object relations psychoanalysis for social philosophers. Beyond this, this dissertation shows that false consciousness is a damaged way of relating to ourselves, to each other, and to the social world. It is characterized, I propose, by affective investment. This move helps us clarify both the phenomenology of false consciousness and what a viable form of critique could look like. Psychoanalysis offers us a new way of understanding ideology critique by directing us beyond the model of critique as judgment as part of overcoming false consciousness.