O Realismo Científico tem sido defendido quase exclusivamente através do Argumento do Milagre, segundo o qual ou assumimos que as teorias científicas são verdadeiras ou tornamos o sucesso da atividade científica em um fenômeno misterioso e inexplicável. No primeiro momento, as principais críticas ao argumento do milagre são reunidas em cinco objeções: (i) apresenta-se uma explicação alternativa para o sucesso da ciência que não assuma a verdade das teorias científicas e que compita com a explicação realista; (ii) defende-se que a hipótese realista não é uma explicação satisfatória para o sucesso da ciência, acusando-a de vacuidade explicativa, ou (iii) acusando-a de não satisfazer os critérios de rigor metodológico científico que ela mesmo impõe à justificação de teorias; (iv) afirma-se que o argumento seja uma petição de princípio, por pressupor uma regra de inferência abdutiva aceita apenas pela posição realista; (v) propõe-se que o argumento constitua uma falácia estatística ao ignorar um índice de fundo relevante. Ao replicar às objeções apresentadas, alguns autores propõem distinguir entre uma versão semântica do argumento, baseada no sucesso empírico obtido pelas teorias científicas enquanto entidades semânticas; e uma versão metodológica do argumento, baseada no sucesso pragmático dos cientistas em escolher teorias férteis e descobrir teorias bem sucedidas. Além disso, outros autores propõem uma segunda distinção entre uma versão geral do argumento, baseada estatisticamente no sucesso generalizado das teorias científicas, e uma versão retalhada do argumento, baseada na sua aplicação específica a uma teoria tomada individualmente. Após comparar as vantagens e desvantagens de cada interpretação, critica-se a relevância das distinções propostas e defende-se uma versão do argumento que sintetize suas diferentes interpretações de modo a solucionar as objeções inicialmente apresentadas. / Scientific Realism has been defended almost exclusively by the Non-Miracle Argument, which states that either it‘s assumed that scientific theories are true or the success of the scientific enterprise becomes a mysterious and unexplainable fact. At first, the main criticisms of the Non-Miracle Argument are gathered in five objections: (i) it‘s presented an alternative explanation to the success of science that competes with the realist explanation and does not assume the truth of the scientific theories; (ii) it‘s defended that the realist hypothesis is not a satisfactory explanation to the success of science, charging it of being an empty explanation, or (iii) charging its capacities to reach the scientific methodological rigorousness that itself imposes to the warrant of theories; (iv) it‘s affirmed that the argument is a petition principii, on account of presupposing an abductive rule of inference accepted only by the realist perspective; (v) it‘s proposed that the argument constitutes a statistical fallacy on account of neglecting a relevant base rate; When replying to the presented objections, some authors come up with the distinction between a semantic version of the argument, based on the empiric success reached by scientific theories considered as semantic entities, and a methodological version of the argument, based on the pragmatic success of scientists at choosing fruitful theories and discovering succeeded theories. Furthermore, other authors offer a second distinction between a general version of the argument, statistically based on the generalized success of science, and a retail version of the argument, based on its specific application to an individual theory. After comparing the advantages and drawbacks of each interpretation, the relevance of each distinction is reanalyzed and a new version of the argument by making a synthesis of its different interpretations is defended in a way to answer the five initial objections.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(文学) / 甲第18724号 / 文博第682号 / 新制||文||617(附属図書館) / 31675 / 京都大学大学院文学研究科現代文化学専攻 / (主査)准教授 伊勢田 哲治, 教授 伊藤 和行, 准教授 出口 康夫 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Letters / Kyoto University / DGAM

I develop a framework for making visible the impacts that science has on human subjectivity, along with demonstrating how these transformations support the existing social order. In order to develop this framework, I critique the work of Wilfrid Sellars. Sellars is one of the few analytic philosophers of science who directly addresses the connections between science and subjectivity. What makes Sellars particularly interesting is the way he sought to preserve a strong conception of normativity alongside a quasi-eliminativist scientific realism. I set the stage for my critique of Sellars by contrasting two different accounts of subjectivity, one Cartesian, the other pragmatic. I argue in favor of the pragmatic because it completely grounds the subject in the world (a point with which Sellars basically agrees). I begin my critique of Sellars by explaining his scientific realism. This is then connected to his vision of the interconnections between science and subjectivity. I then argue that Sellars' scientific realism is fundamentally incoherent, which leads his system into nihilism. From this I trace out the role that science can play with respect to subjectivity in a nihilistic world. To partially counter this nihilism, I articulate an alternative to scientific realism that is based, in part, on my pragmatic account of subjectivity. I conclude by re-appropriating elements of Sellars' philosophy, routed through my alternative scientific realism, in order to complete the framework discussed above. / Ph. D.

The periodic table poses a difficulty for both scientific realists and anti-realists. The anti-realist has difficulty accounting for the success of the table during a period in chemistry when many theories and concepts changed; the spatial relations of current tables in use do not show fundamental changes from the original tables proposed by Mendeleev. Yet, most versions of scientific realism are based upon the understanding that theories are some collection of written propositions or equations. The table as an image successfully functions very much like a theory: it is an organization of known facts, has been used to make predictions, and is plastic enough to accommodate unforeseen novel facts. Assuming the truth of the representational relations between the table and the world poses interesting issues for the realist. Ian Hacking's entity realism and the structural realism of several philosophers are both possible versions of scientific realism that fail to account for the table. Hacking's version fails in this case because the role of representation is central to understanding the history of the table; structural realism fails because it diminishes to much the role that first order properties have as they relate to the formulation of the second order relationships that comprise the table. Philip Kitcher of Science, Truth, and Democracy leaves himself open to two interpretations about the metaphysics of pluralism. One of these is indefensible; the other is quite well supported by the plurality of successful periodic tables. / Master of Arts

Arguments from underdetermination take two forms, those from global sceptical underdetermination, global scientific underdetermination and local underdetermination. Arguments from global sceptical underdetermination bring into question all knowledge, they develop sceptical scenarios that purport to show that we cannot trust any knowledge that we obtain within the world. Arguments from local underdetermination aim to bring into question the nature of our knowledge and are geared against scientific realism. This thesis is an evaluation of the arguments that claim to do the latter, however it shows that these arguments are not arguments from local underdetermination but are from a type of global underdetermination that I call global scientific underdetermination. Based on this evaluation a new argument from local underdetermination is developed that attempts to show that nevertheless local underdetermination is indeed a problem for scientific realism. However, I argue that this argument also fails to undermine scientific realism. Recently Kyle Stanford has reintroduced an historical argument from underdetermination that he calls the argument from unconceived alternatives. Stanfords argument from unconceived alternatives is an inductive historical argument. It maintains that scientific theories are chosen from a non-exhaustive set of theories; claiming there is always at least one unconceived alternative that would better explain the empirical evidence. Stanfords new induction attempts to undermine scientific realism by arguing that our most successful theories will eventually be shown to be false. Various arguments against this induction will be considered. It will be shown that traditional scientific realism fails to address the argument from unconceived alternatives and the only form of scientific realism that can overcome this problem is structural realism.

Arguments from underdetermination take two forms, those from global sceptical underdetermination, global scientific underdetermination and local underdetermination. Arguments from global sceptical underdetermination bring into question all knowledge, they develop sceptical scenarios that purport to show that we cannot trust any knowledge that we obtain within the world. Arguments from local underdetermination aim to bring into question the nature of our knowledge and are geared against scientific realism. This thesis is an evaluation of the arguments that claim to do the latter, however it shows that these arguments are not arguments from local underdetermination but are from a type of global underdetermination that I call global scientific underdetermination. Based on this evaluation a new argument from local underdetermination is developed that attempts to show that nevertheless local underdetermination is indeed a problem for scientific realism. However, I argue that this argument also fails to undermine scientific realism. Recently Kyle Stanford has reintroduced an historical argument from underdetermination that he calls the argument from unconceived alternatives. Stanfords argument from unconceived alternatives is an inductive historical argument. It maintains that scientific theories are chosen from a non-exhaustive set of theories; claiming there is always at least one unconceived alternative that would better explain the empirical evidence. Stanfords new induction attempts to undermine scientific realism by arguing that our most successful theories will eventually be shown to be false. Various arguments against this induction will be considered. It will be shown that traditional scientific realism fails to address the argument from unconceived alternatives and the only form of scientific realism that can overcome this problem is structural realism.

Philosophers of science have long realized that it is not possible to decide which scientific theory is true just by relying on their empirical adequacy. That theories should possess other virtues in order to be accepted by the scientific community is well understood. Nevertheless, empirical adequacy remained as having a privileged value among these virtues. In this thesis I argue that scientific theories are accepted or rejected on the bases of an evaluation of their degree of coherence. In such a coherentist understanding, empirical adequacy still plays some role. However, this is an egalitarian approach where observational reports have no special status. By means of case studies form history of science I provided reasons to think that this coherentist approach is better suited to understanding scientific change as a rational process.

This thesis defends Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR) against both Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) and Traditional Scientific Realism (TSR). It is argued that TSR cannot properly explain what actually happens throughout radical theory changes in science / in the sense that a plausible version of Scientific Realism should, somehow, satisfy Scientific Anti-Realists&rsquo / concerns about the link between &ldquo / truth&rdquo / and &ldquo / success&rdquo / of our scientific theories. On the other hand, it is claimed that OSR is not a form of Scientific Realism but rather basically a modified form of Pragmatism. To that effect, it is further argued that Modern Physics does not provide convincing reasons to accept the conclusions that advocates of OSR derive from it. It is finally asserted that a Structural Realist understanding of Scientific Explanation is not possible. In that regard, it is argued that a defense of Structural Realism by No Miracle Argument (NMA) against Pessimistic Meta Induction Argument (PMIA) will be effective if and only if the NMA is formulated by the predictive success of scientific theories, rather than constructing it on the explanatory power of them.

The debate between Arthur Fine and Alan Musgrave is well known amongst those involved in the scientific realism debate and centres upon two papers that are quite often found together in philosophy of science anthologies. Reading them like this gives the very strong impression the Musgrave is the victor which is the commonly held view. In this thesis, I wish to overturn this view by placing Fine's paper in context, namely as part of a larger work on the history and philosophy of quantum physics. Fine's book, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and Quantum Theory, gives us good reason to believe that quantum physics significantly undermines the whole scientific realism debate, and as such, has strongly influenced Fine's development of the Natural Ontological Attitude, which is as Fine believes a middle ground between realism and anti-realism. The present thesis evaluates the Natural Ontological Attitude from a physicist's perspective and defends Fine against Musgrave's reply to the extent that it demonstrates that Musgrave would do well to read Fine's paper in context. That said, just as Fine in his youth hoped that a quantum realist position will one day be found, so I also possess this aspiration; and so, despite my concluding that Fine is justified in holding to NOA, I argue furthermore that NOA is but a precursor to a potential quantum structural realist position. After showing that structural realism is worthy of consideration by using it to counter Fine's objections to scientific realism, I analyse the results of quantum physics in an attempt to understand what it can tell us about reality in the quantum realm. Eliminativist Ontic Structural Realism holds great promise as a quantum realism contender, and as such, it inspired the questions regarding individuality and reality that are discussed in the final main chapter. I thus resuscitate hope that the cause of the quantum realist is not yet lost.

Russell’s claim that only structural knowledge of the world is possible was influentially criticized by Newman as rendering scientific discoveries trivial. I show that a version of this criticism also applies to the “structural realism” more recently advocated by Worrall, which requires continuity of formal structure between predecessor and successor scientific theories. The problem is that structure, in its common set-theoretical construal, is radically underdetermined by the entities and relations over which it is defined, rendering intertheoretic continuity intolerably cheap. I show that this problem may be overcome by supplementing the purely formal relation of intertheoretic isomorphism with the semiformal “Ontological Reductive Links” developed by Moulines and others of the German “structuralist” approach to the philosophy of science.