Contrary to common folk and expert theory, the human self is not unitary. There is no Cartesian theatre or homunculus functioning as a metaphorical overlord. Rather, it is an abstractum gleaned from a person�s experiences-a centre of narrative gravity (Dennett 1991). Experiences are a person�s cognisance of her ventures in life from a particular unique perspective. In perspectivising her experiences, the person imputes a certain structure, order, and significance to them. Events are seen as unfolding in a certain inherently and internally coherent way characterised by causality, temporality, or intentionality, etc. In other words, a person�s self emerges out of her innumerable narrativisations of experience, as well as the different protagonist roles she plays in them. Her behaviours in different situations can be understood as different life-narratives being foregrounded, when she is faced with different stimuli different experiences/events present. In real life, self-reflective discourse frequently alludes to a divided, partitive self, and the experiences/behaviours that it can engage in. In academic study, this concept of the divided and narrative-constructivist self is well-represented in disciplines ranging from philosophy (e.g., Dennett 1991, 2005), developmental psychology (e.g., Markus & Nurius 1986; Bruner 1990, 2001; Stern 1994), cognitive psychology (e.g., Hermans & Kempen 1993; Hermans 2002), neuropsychology (e.g. Damasio 1999), psychiatry (e.g., Feinberg 2001), to linguistics (e.g., McNeil 1996; Ochs & Capps 1996; Nair 2003). Depending on the particular theory, however, emphasis is often placed either on its divided or its narrative-constructivist nature. This thesis argues, however, that the two are coexistent and interdependent, and both are essential to the self�s ontology. Its objectives are therefore: (i) to propose a partitioned-narrative model of the self which unifies the two perspectives by positing that the partitioned-representational (Dinsmore 1991) nature of narratives entails the partitioned structure of the self; and (ii) to propose that the partitioned-narrative ontology of the self is what enables and motivates much of our self-reflective discourse and the grammatical resources for constructing that discourse. Partitioning guarantees that a part of the self, i.e., one of its narratives, can be selectively attended to, foregrounded, objectified, and hence talked about. Narrativity provides the contextual guidance and constraints for meaning-construction in such discourse. This claim is substantiated with three application cases: the use of anaphoric reflexives (I found myself smiling); various usages of proper names, including eponyms (the Shakespeare of architecture), eponymic denominal adjectives (a Herculean effort), etc.; and partitive-self constructions which explicitly profile partitioned and selectively focal narratives (That�s his hormones talking). When analysed using the proposed model, these apparently disparate behaviours turn out to share a common basis: the partitioned-narrative self.

Thesis (DPsych) -- School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Swinburne University of Technology, 2004. / "... submitted in partial requirement for the degree of the Professional Doctorate in Psychology, School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Swinburne University of Technology, 2004". Includes bibliographical references (p. 238-274).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 170-176).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 183-186).

Thesis (M.Ed.)--Acadia University, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-95). Also available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, March 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-184) Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S.)--Northern Illinois University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [82]-85).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. / Isbell, Charles, Committee Member ; Lipkin, Harvey, Committee Member ; Balch, Tucker, Committee Member ; Bobick, Aaron, Committee Member ; Arkin, Ronald, Committee Chair.

M.A. / The present study examined the relationship between shyness and self-conscious emotions in terms of attribution style. Participants were administered questionnaires and then categorized into fearful shy, self-conscious shy, undifferentiated shy and non-shy groups. These four groups were then compared in terms of shyness, shame, guilt, embarrassment, and attribution style. Furthermore, the relationships between shame, guilt, and embarrassment and the different attribution styles were examined. The fearful shy, self-conscious shy and undifferentiated shy groups differed from the non-shy group in terms of the attribution styles of context and luck. The fearful shy group was found to score higher than the non-shy group in terms of context, in addition to the fearful shy as well as the self-conscious shy groups scoring higher than the non-shy groups in terms of luck. However no differences were found in terms of ability and effort between the four groups. With regards to experiencing self-conscious emotions, the fearful shy, self-conscious shy, and the undifferentiated shy groups differed from the non-shy group by scoring higher on shame. The fearful shy, self-conscious shy, and the undifferentiated shy groups also scored higher in terms of embarrassment from the non-shy group, with the fearful shy group scoring the highest followed by the self-conscious shy group and then the undifferentiated shy group. Furthermore, the fearful shy and undifferentiated shy differed from one another with the fearful shy group scoring higher in terms of embarrassment. The four groups, however, did not vary in terms of guilt. In terms of the relationship between attribution styles and self-conscious emotions, positive correlations were found between ability and shame and ability and embarrassment. A positive correlation was found between effort and guilt. Positive correlations between luck and shame and luck and embarrassment were also found. Self-conscious emotions were found to be highly correlated with shyness. Attribution styles may play a significant role in terms of an individual experiencing these emotions. Shy individuals may differ from non-shy individuals with regards to the attributions they engage in, causing them to experience self-conscious emotions to a higher extent. This may suggest a cognitive component that may be associated with self-conscious emotions. Therefore, shy individuals may be predisposed to experiencing self-conscious emotions more frequently than non-shy individuals. It is suggested that future research focus on this cognitive component in the experience of self-conscious emotions.