During the third year of the Great War 1914-1918 Russia experienced the upheaval of revolution, precipitating the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and installation of the Provisional Government in March, and culminating in the Bolshevik takeover of November, 1917. Due to the political, military, and economic chaos which accompanied the revolution Russia was unable to continue the struggle on the eastern front. Russia was not fighting the war against the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary alone, however, and her threat to capitulate was of the gravest concern to her Allies, Great Britain and France. In fact the disintegration of Russia's war effort was the pivotal issue around which Anglo-Russian relations revolved in 1917. Britain's war policy was dominated by the belief that the eastern front had to be maintained to achieve victory. It appeared that any interruption to the eastern front would allow Germany to reinforce her lines on the western front, then to win and control the economic destiny of Europe. Britain could not allow this to happen. This study focuses on the reportage from British diplomats and representatives in and outside of Russia to their superiors at the Foreign Office in London from December 1916 to December 1917. A vast wealth of documentation is available in the Foreign Office Correspondence. Analysis of these notes reveals certain trends which were dictated by the kaleidoscopic turn of events in Russia and the national ethos of these representatives. A minute analysis demonstrates a great diversity of opinion regarding the situation in Russia, ranging from optimism to pessimism and objectivity to prejudice in all phases of the year 1917. To a limited degree this diversity can be correlated with the geographical location and diplomatic status of the individual representatives. Above all it is clear that when historians quote from these sources, they choose the quotations which support the conclusions they have already reached because they know the outcome of the developments that they are describing. The individuals on the spot at the time were far less prescient and insightful. They were much more affected by their own historical prejudices and rumours, as well as the vagaries and short-term shifts of their immediate environment. Many of them believed in the great-man theory of history; a number attributed all developments and difficulties to some aspect of the Russian national character; some explained certain events during the year by conspiracies, especially of the Jews, with whom they tended to equate the Bolsheviks. Only a few were consistently solid and realistic in their appraisal of events, attributing them to factors favoured by our most respected historians. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Studies of the role of East-West trade in Soviet economic development often assume that Siberia and the Far East play an important role in trading relations, but few studies have examined the extent of that role and the relationship between trade and economic development within the region. This study addresses two interrelated questions: firstly, what is the role of Siberia and the Far East in trade with the West, and secondly, what is the role of East-West trade in Siberian development. Regional trade participation data are not available. The study therefore examines the composition of Soviet trade with the West and the industrial structure of the Siberian economy, in order to deduce the extent of regional participation in trade. Soviet exports to the West are dominated by natural resources, while imports from the West comprise machinery and equipment, manufactured goods and agricultural products. Analysis of the Siberian economy reveals a specialisation in the production and processing of natural resources. Estimates of export participation show that since the late 1970s the region has become the Soviet Union's most important source of foreign currency. Imports of Western technology are shown to play an important part in natural resource production and in the creation of Siberia's Territorial-Production Complexes. In many instances compensation agreements tie the use of imports to export production. Overall the value of Siberian exports exceeds the cost of imports of Western technology, so that the region generates a sizeable foreign currency surplus. In conclusion, a simple model of the trade and development process is presented which relates the pattern of foreign trade participation to the process of regional development. The impact of Western imports is felt mainly in the European core region where they provide additional resources to feed the population and renovate the industrial base; the impact of exports to the West is felt mainly in Siberia and the Far East where they increase demands for natural resource production. Thus, East-West trade serves to perpetuate the existing core-periphery pattern of Soviet regional development. / Arts, Faculty of / Geography, Department of / Graduate

The Indian Ocean has experienced a process of profound change in its political and strategic map since World War II. This began with the British withdrawal from East of Suez, and was followed by the entry of the superpowers into the Indian Ocean, the growth of superpower naval rivalry, and the proliferation of security problems of the states in the region. The essence of these developments is the transformation of the Indian Ocean from the stability of one-power domination to the instability of superpower rivalry. The thesis examines the process of this transformation and the Sri Lankan response from a historical perspective. The transformation of the power structure in the Indian Ocean was essentially an outcome of the changes in power configurations in world politics. The growth of superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean must be understood in relation to the evolution of political, economic, and strategic interests of the superpowers, advances in weapons systems and naval technology, and political developments in the region. The superpower naval rivalry has three interrelated elements, viz, naval deployments, weapons deals, and jockeying for bases/logistic support in the region. It evolves in three phases: from 1968 to the 1973 oil crisis; from the oil crisis to 1978; and since 1978. There are definite linkages between superpower naval rivalry and the conflict patterns in the region. The states in the region count on the superpowers for their security because of the inherent weaknessess of the ruling elites in the region, the limits of their security options, and economic dependence. The invariable outcome is a chain reaction resulting in military pacts, puppet governments, political supression, and proxy war, which forms the texture of the international politics of the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lankan responses to superpower naval rivalry can be explained in relation to the geo-political framework of her strategic thinking, and her internal political and economic processes. In the period 1948-56, Sri Lanka identified herself with the British defence structure in the Indian Ocean. With the changes introduced by the M.E.P. regime, non-alignment became the foreign policy approach of Sri Lanka after 1956. In accordance with the growth of superpower naval presence, Sri Lanka became more sensitive to Indian Ocean strategic issues in the 1960s. After 1970, Sri Lankan policy towards the Indian Ocean took a more coherent form and was designed to balance two considerations - first, at the sub-regional level, how to deal with India; and at the Indian Ocean level, how to check superpower naval rivalry and the increasing militarization of the Indian Ocean. This was reflected in Sri Lanka's proposal for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ). After 1977, under the changed internal and international situation, Sri Lanka soft-pedalled her earlier more articulated position regarding superpower naval riavlry in the Indian Ocean. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This study traces the career of Robert Francis Kelley and his influence on American-Russian Relations during the nonrecognition period (1917-1933). The focus of this examination is Kelley's role in formulating, implementing, and sustaining America's anti-communist policy developed and solidified during the 1920s and 1930s. Particular attention is given to the senate recognition hearing of 1924, Kelley's training of future diplomats (George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, et al.), and his contributions to the preparations leading to the United States' recognition of Russia in 1933. Using Kelley's papers and personal correspondence, this study shows the growth of a man and the evolution of a policy.

On August 19, 1991, government hard-liners overthrew the Soviet Union for a period of 72 hours. Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russia, staged a protest on the steps of the Russian White House, where he gave speeches against the coup d'etat, releasing these speeches for dissemination between the hard-liners and the masses gathered to support Yeltsin. Yeltsin 's protest created a constituted identity amongst the people gathered who became part of the protest against the government. This created a confrontation between the two publics, where the state message developed a narrative involving a glorified past to which they wished to return, while the counter-public created a counter-narrative that argued a future of continued reforms would benefit the people of Russia and the Soviet Union. In the end, the counter-narrative achieved stronger approval from the masses, essentially replacing the state's narrative with its own. As a result, the hard-liners lost their grab for power, and Yeltsin emerged the winner in an ideological struggle for the future of the Russia and the Soviet Union.

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This study has been made to ascertain the strength and basis of the Russo-American friendship of former days.

This thesis is an examination of the relationship between the Ukrainian nationalists, led by Petliura (The Ukrainian People’s Republic) and both Germany and Poland in the period 1918-1922. Although the thesis addresses primarily the situation after World War I and the military collapse of Germany in Eastern Europe, I also examine the historical relationship between Germany and Ukraine, which came to the fore in the period of World War I, and especially following the treaties of Brest Litovsk. This period involved the German recognition of Ukrainian independence, and the German intervention in Ukrainian internal political and economic affairs.

This study is concerned with the influence of regionalism in the Congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR and Russia between 1989 and 1993 and its implications for future reform including the development of federal relations in Russia. In particular, emphasis will be placed on regionalist tendencies developed in Siberia and the Russian Far East. After perestroika, the discussion of federal relations showed varieties of possible developments, ranging from a unitary system to a confederation. Despite these varieties, it appears to be generally perceived that stable and 'genuine' federal relations are required in Russia. However, little attention has been paid to the role of the newly re-emerging political actor, the deputies of the central legislature, who are directly engaged in the establishment of such federal relations. This study reaches three main conclusions. First of all, regional socio-economic disparities affected the attitudes of deputies towards reform, including changes in centre-periphery relations. Secondly, the analysis suggests that at least two main streams of regionalism were developed during 1989-1993: one developed in the Congress by the regional deputy groups, and the other outside the Congresses by regional political leaders. Thirdly, despite growing regionalist tendencies in Russia at that time, regional political actors were not strong enough to initiate a federal structure of their preference, lacking horizontal and vertical coordination. This discussion of regionalism in the Congress leads us to a further conclusion that regional interest articulation was rather chaotic, hampering legislation of policies and thus facilitating the regionalisation of reform. Despite strong regionalist tendencies in some sub-national units, particularly based on ethno-nationalist sentiments, such a development may erode the legacy of reform as well as regional autonomy itself.