Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): David C. Tucker. Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-143). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Lawrence R. Jones, Jerry L. McCaffery. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-95). Also available online.

Thesis advisor: Timothy W. Crawford / Images of burly men painted in green, outfitted in camouflage and a Rambo-esque bandana, donning night-vision goggles, and armed with the newest weaponry are drawn forth when thinking of the phrase "Special Operations." There is a certain myth surrounding the community: Special Operators are the greatest warriors in the world. The use of these warriors is usually only thought of in a tactical context. This thesis, in looking beyond the battlefield adventures of Special Operators, asks the question: "How do these warriors do this job, and what ends do they serve in greater US security strategy?" The thesis discusses the development of the special operations capability since World War II and shows that special operations forces can be precisely tailored by U.S. policy-makers to meet specific high-level strategic objectives. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2006. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations. / "Final Report."--Rept. document page. "4 February 2002"--P. ii. Description based on title screen as viewed on Aug. 18, 2003. Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-25). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Subject: An analysis of whether Special Operations Forces should use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to support intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and re-supply capability deficiencies. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

The intention of this thesis is to investigate the circumstances and background surrounding the early development and deployment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), Britain's clandestine secret service created by Winston Churchill in 1940 to 'set Europe ablaze.' It will examine the climate in which SOE was created, the feasibility of the tasks it was expected to perform and the relationships it established with Churchill, the Cabinet Office, the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and Army, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Combined Operations. It will examine how these organisations succeeded or failed to work towards a common wartime objective. The focus of the thesis is concerned primarily with the political moves and counter-moves in London that dominated the early years of SOE's six year existence. It will concentrate therefore upon 1940-1942, the critical early years before planning for the Second Front 'militarised' SOE's clandestine role. There is thus little reference to SOE in The Balkans, in Holland or the Middle East or to the actual deployment and modus operandi of SOE agents in the field. Their stories of courage and betrayal, of penetration, capture or evasion are mentioned only in so far as they illuminate the struggle to establish a wider SOE credibility in London. The single exception to this is Operation Frankton, the 'Cockleshell Heroes' raid on Bordeaux shipping in December 1942. The planning, execution and result of this raid were determined by Combined Operations' relationship with SOE and led to an outcome that was shaped by SOE's sense of secrecy, rivalry and political encirclement. This thesis will attempt to unravel those critical and complex relationships.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis develops a theory to determine the best execution time to conduct a hostage rescue attempt. It does so by explaining the phenomenon of a hostage crisis biorhythm and proposing four principles essential for success. The principles of hostage rescue operations presented in this thesis and used in the biorhythm model-surprise, intelligence, operator's skill, and deception-are derived from looking at numerous planning models from special operations, from personal experience, and the thorough analysis of six historical cases. The historical cases show that in every instance any one of these four principles was overlooked, the operation was doomed. These principles have been determined to be the most critical factors that change as the crisis develops throughout the hostage ordeal. A thorough understanding of this biorhythm will provide planning guidelines to assess the best windows of opportunity for a proposed rescue attempt. One main focus of this work will be an in-depth case study of the hostage rescue operation "CHAVIN DE HUANTAR". This case study will present compelling evidence to reinforce my hypothesis, and serves as a template model for successful rescue operations. The analysis of this single case will provide a wealth of information on the success of this remarkable operation. Another main focus of this thesis will be strategic thinking of a hostage crisis using game theory analysis. The findings of this thesis will enable decision-makers to plan and organize hostage rescue forces to act at the appropriate time (window of opportunity), maximizing their chances of success. Additionally, it will provide a useful planning model that can be implemented effectively and accurately, presenting a clear picture of possible outcomes throughout a hostage crisis. Furthermore, this thesis will help the reader become a better strategist during the planning, preparation, and execution of a hostage rescue operation. It will provide a thorough understanding of how these operations work, how to solve them successfully, and how to predict possible outcomes at different stages of the operation applying the principles of game theory. / Major, United States Army

This thesis researches the elements of the art of influence in an unconventional warfare environment to develop a model of influence that can be utilized by Special Forces conducting unconventional warfare. The research was based on several premises: (1) the strategic utility of Special Forces (SF) lies in its ability to influence a target audience in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment; (2) the nature of UW necessitates a bottom up and nonkinetic approach to influence in order to have lasting effective results. Chapter II focuses on the elements of influence derived from the academic literature and from commercial and political applications of cognitive and social psychology. Chapter III examines key elements of influence derived from the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. Chapter IV reviews several relevant models and uses them, along with the analysis of the key elements of influence identified in prior chapters, to develop a new grassroots influence model The results of the research are eight principles of grassroots psychological operations. The GRP model is intended to work in conjunction with or in support of other models that encompass the entire spectrum of activities in an UW conflict.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): David Tucker. Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-198). Also available online.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1994-95. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 28, 2003). "February 1996." Includes bibliographical references.