The dissertation is aimed at the analysis of various strategies and approaches of the international community in solving conflicts having originated due to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia since 1991. It is divided into two sections - the former being devoted to the historiographical description of events taking place in the particular countries with main focus on various peace plans and other initiatives proposed and suggested by the international community, while the latter emphasizes potential security threats that might be faced by the region. At the same time it is trying to offer lessons from the mistakes and failures made in the past, since these could become relevant for the international community when dealing with potential new conflicts. Current probability of the origin of new security threats in the form of ethnic conflicts was selected as the main criterion for the selection of countries analyzed in the dissertation - this is also why Croatia is excluded; although it was a significant player of ethnic conflict in 1991-95, due to considerable elimination of Serbian minority representation as a result of the Operation Storm this country does not further constitute a relevant melting pot, where ethnically motivated tensions could rise again. Hence, the analysis is targeted at two...

The struggle of the Kurdish nation in Iran entered a new phase of modern nationalist movement since World War II, especially since the establishment of the Society for the Revival of Kurdistan (J.K.) in 1942. The J.K. was then transformed into the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which later changed its name to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) in 1945. This dissertation addresses a major gap in the existing research about the study of Iranian Kurdish nationalism spearheaded by the PDKI. Offering a historical sociology, the dissertation argues that this movement should be understood within the context of the state-building process in Iran and nationalist and national liberation movements in the world. It offers, for the first time and in any language, the most extensively researched and detailed history of the PDKI, its struggles for Kurdish national rights, its programs, organizational structure, political strategies, achievements, internal conflicts, numerous splits and unifications, women’s status within it, and its relations with other parties. It critically analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the PDKI. The methodological components include: literature review, discourse analysis, content analysis, snowball sampling, in-depth, open-ended interviews with 29 high-ranking activists, archival research, fieldwork conducted in the Iraqi Kurdistan and in Europe, Internet research, and statistical data. Sources used were in English, Persian, Kurdish, and Turkish. While the PDKI has championed a democratic Kurdish nationalist movement, it has heavily undermined the democratic principles within and outside the party and underestimated women’s potential within the movement. In order for the PDKI to re-emerge as a party in sync with our times, it needs to undergo a radical reform and democratize its internal and external relations. / Graduate / 2023-08-22

Text in Afrikaans / Die basiese tese voortspruitend uit hierdie ondersoek is dat wetenskapsbeoefening binne bepaalde terreine van die regswetenskap ondemeem word ooreenkomstig 'n verswee staatlike paradigma wat deurlopend streef na die instandhouding van die politieke status quo. Die territoriale staat is die hoeksteen van die bestaande politieke orde en terselfdertyd die meester-konsep van die staatlike paradigma. Wetenskapsbeoefening volgens hierdie paradigma is gemik op die instandhouding van die territoriale staat en funksioneer dus as 'n defensief-konserwatiewe politieke projek. Uitsluitsel oor welke vrae en antwoorde as wetenskaplik ter sake kwalifiseer, word gegee aan die hand van die behoeftes van die bestaande territoriaalstaatlike orde. Antwoorde kwalifiseer as wetenskaplik houdbaar alleenlik indien dit met die belange van die bestaande territoriale staat vereenselwigbaar is en nie die staatlike status quo sal ontwrig nie. Intellektuele aktiwiteit wat nie die staatlike gebaseerde status quo ter wille is nie en dit moontlik mag ontwrig, haal in terme van hierdie paradigma moeilik die drumpel van wetenskaplikheid. In die ondersoek word die vestiging van die staatlike paradigma histories nagegaan en daama word die hoofmomente van die paradigma blootgele. Die belangrikste produkte van wetenskapsbeoefening kragtens die staatlike paradigma word daama uitgepluis. Benewens die feit dat die produkte deurlopend die staatlike orde onderskraag, vervul dit ook die strategiese funksie om uitdagers van die staatlike orde te domestiseer en in die diens van die staatlike orde te plaas. Die prominentste produkte van wetenskapsbeoefening volgens die staatlike paradigma word ontleed: - staatsbou, dikwels verkeerdelik voorgehou as nasiebou; - demokrasie wat onderhewig aan die dissipline van die staatlike paradigma tot staatlike demokrasie omvorm is; - menseregte wat burgerlike afhanklikheid van die staat bevorder en die staat sodoende teen opposisie vrywaar; - die misdaad, hoogverraad en die intemasionaalregtelike figuur van selfbeskikking wat deur die staatlike paradigma tot 'n staatsdienende staatlike selfbeskikking omvorm is. Die staatlike paradigma word egter onder toenemende spanning geplaas en daar bestaan die moontlikheid van 'n rewolusionere herwaardering van verskeie sleutel-konsepte wat deur die staatlike paradigma gevange gehou en in diens van die bestaande staatlike status quo gedomestiseer is. Die rewolusionere vrystel van hierdie konsepte kan die weg baan na 'n nuwe politokrasie anderkant die staatlike orde. / The basic thesis emanating from this research holds that scientific enterprises within certain fields of the legal science are undertaken in pursuance of a tacit statist paradigm which consistently preserve the political status quo. The territorial state is both the keystone of the existing political order and the master concept of the statist paradigm. Scientific activity according to this paradigm seeks to protect the territorial state and functions as a defensive conservative political project. The scientific relevance of questions and answers is determined by the exigencies of the existing order composed of territorial states. Answers are viewed as scientifically authentic only if they are compatible with the interests of the prevailing territorial state and when they do not pose a threat of disruption to the existing statist status quo. Intellectual activity that does not affirm the statist predicated status quo and which poses the risk of disruption of the this order would seldom qualify as scientific in terms of this paradigm. This study examines the historical establishment of the statist paradigm and debunks the main pillars of the paradigm. The foremost products of scientific activity in accordance with the statist paradigm are then analyzed. These products invariably safeguard the statist order and also succeed in domesticating the challengers of the statist order and placing them in the service of this order. The most outstanding developments of the scientific endeavour in pursuance of the statist paradigm are analyzed, which are: - state building, often inaccurately portrayed as nation building; -democracy which, subjected to the discipline of the statist paradigm, had been transformed into statist democracy; - human rights which cultivate civic dependence upon the state, thus safeguarding the state against opposition; -the crime ofhigh treason and the international law concept of self-determination which was transfigured by the statist paradigm into a state serving statist self-determination. The statist paradigm is however placed under increasing tension and there is a possibility of a revolutionary reappraisal of several key concepts which the statist paradigm has kept in captivity and which have been domesticated and placed in the service of the statist status quo. By releasing these revolutionary concepts, the way to a new politocracy, beyond the statist order, may be paved. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

本文主要探討蔣中正於1930～1937年之間如何型範其建構現代國家的模式。此期間在完成北伐後對中共展開軍事圍剿，他試圖融合中國傳統社會控制方法與現代西方觀念，展開一連串政治、社會、經濟等層面的改革，從中體現了現代國家的建構過程。江西省作為對中共軍事圍剿的中心，在熊式輝主政下施行一系列地方政治改革措施，其中包含了許多傳統的中國社會控制方式，而正也體現了蔣中正其有關地方政治改革觀念。同時，江西省的農村與同時期中國其他省份農村，均面臨了嚴重的經濟與社會危機，江西農村在當時更成為毛澤東建立革命根據地並成功動員農民的大本營，並且展現了毛澤東建構現代國家的另一種模式。所以分析江西為何能夠成為中共進行武裝革命的重要根據地，以及其能成功動員農民的主要動力何在，成為理解蔣中正據以提出其著名的「三分軍事，七分政治」策略的重要原因。因此，江西省政府於1930年代進行一連串的地方政治改革，分析其方案內容以理解蔣中正對於地方政治改革與建構現代國家之間的關係。對蔣中正而言，進行地方政治改革的主要目的是為了擴張與強化國家對基層社會之基礎控制能力，借以強化對農村社會的控制。但為使改革成功而必須適應中國之國情，因此蔣中正採借了中國傳統帝國時期有關農村社會控制與動員的手段，例如保甲制度、團練與強調恢復傳統道德精神的新生活運動等。其後，蔣中正以江西省的實際作法與成功經驗作為其掌握國家權力後的具體施政參照，例如1939年對日抗戰期間國民政府毅然決定全面革新進行縣政制度，也反映了相同的政治改革邏輯。在蔣中正的政治改革理念中，不僅反映了傳統與現代性之間的掙扎、反抗與妥協，衝突、轉化與融合，並且有意或無意地採取了中國特有的習慣與制度，從而體現了現代性的多元特性。 / This dissertation focuses on the ideas and mode of how Chiang Kai-shek build the modern state in 1930-1937. In this period, he tried to integrate traditional Chinese social control methods and modern Western concepts, and launched a series of political, social, economic and other aspects of the reform. However, in the period of 1930-1937. Which embodies the construction of the modern state process. Jiangxi Province as the center of the Chinese military siege before 1935, Xiong Shi-hui implement a series of local political reform measures which contains many of the traditional Chinese social control, Chiang Kai-shek is the best embodiment of the concept of local political reform. At the same time, rural areas in Jiangxi Province and other provinces in China in the same period were facing serious economic and social crises. At that time, the rural areas in Jiangxi Province became Mao Zedong's revolutionary base areas and the headquarters where successfully mobilized the peasants, moreover, Mao Zedong to show the construction of a modern state of another model. Therefore, the analysis of why Jiangxi could become an important base for the armed revolution in China, its main motivation to mobilize the peasants, became an important reason for Chiang Kai-shek to put forward his famous "three points military, seven political" strategy. Therefore, the Jiangxi provincial government in the 1930s to carry out a series of local political reform, analysis of its program content to understand the Chiang Kai-shek for local political reform and the construction of the relationship between the modern state. For Chiang Kai-shek, the purpose of local political reform is to expand and strengthen the country's basic control of grass-roots level of social control, but to make the success of the reform must adapt to China's national conditions, so he adopted the traditional society of social control and mobilization means, such as the system of “Bar-jia”, “Tuan-Lian”(militia) and the new life movement which that emphasizes the restoration of the traditional moral spirit. The practices and successful experience of Jiangxi become an important reference after Chiang Kai-shek take the political power of nation, for example, he decided to conduct a comprehensive reform of the county system during the Sino-Japanese war in 1939, which that also reflects the same logic of political reform. In Chiang Kai-shek's ideas of political reform, not only reflects the struggle between tradition and modernity, resistance and compromise, bat also conflict, transformation and integration. At the same time, in his ideas had adopted China's unique habits and institutions intentionally or unintentionally, thus reflecting the characteristics of modernity multivariate.

En 1991, suite à la fin de la deuxième guerre du Golfe, un État de facto a été établi au Kurdistan irakien. Cette mutation d’un acteur contestataire kurde en un État de facto s’est avérée un gain sans précédent pour le « mouvement nationaliste kurde ». Néanmoins, malgré son importance historique, ce gain d’autonomie ne permit pas pour autant de dépasser les divisions présentes au sein du mouvement nationaliste kurde. Ce mémoire tente ainsi de comprendre les raisons du maintien de ces divisions. L’hypothèse proposée est que la raison pour laquelle la création d’un État de facto kurde en Irak n’a pas permis de dépasser les divisions du mouvement nationaliste est que ce dernier a poursuivi un projet de construction étatique similaire aux États de facto. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, la recherche fait le lien entre la littérature sur les États de facto, le comportement du Kurdistan irakien et les divisions du mouvement nationaliste kurde. La recherche démontre dans un premier temps que la poursuite d’un projet de construction étatique a amené le Kurdistan irakien à prioriser sa légitimation interne plutôt que l’unité du mouvement nationaliste kurde. Elle démontre dans un deuxième temps qu’afin de réaliser ce projet, le Kurdistan irakien a employé des stratégies externes qui ont nui au reste du mouvement nationaliste kurde. / In 1991, following the end of the Second Gulf War, a de facto state has been established in Iraqi Kurdistan. This transformation of a protest actor into a de facto state has been an unprecedented gain for the « Kurdish nationalist movement ». However, despite his historic importance, this gain has failed to overtake divisions within the « Kurdish nationalist movement ». This thesis attempts to identity the reasons why the divisions have not faded away. The assumption is that the reason why these divisions have not been overtaken is because Iraqi Kurdistan has pursued a state-building project similar to those of de facto states. To test this hypothesis, this research links de facto state’s literature, Iraqi Kurdistan behaviour and the divisions of the « Kurdish nationalist movement ». This thesis first demonstrate that this project has led Iraqi Kurdistan to establish other priorities that the « Kurdish nationalist movement » unity. It then shows that to realize this state-building project, Iraqi Kurdistan has used external strategies that have affected the rest of the movement.

Cette thèse analyse les relations de pouvoir qui se jouent autour des enjeux environnementaux (gestion de l'eau et changement climatique) dans le processus de construction étatique de l'Autorité palestinienne, entité gouvernementale sous régime d'aide et marquée par l'occupation israélienne. Elle mobilise la sociologie de l'action publique, la political ecology et les science and technology studies afin d'étudier les processus multi-échelles de co-construction de l'ordre social et de l'environnement à travers les savoirs, la définition des problèmes et les politiques adoptées pour y répondre. Cette recherche analyse les liens entre l'aide internationale, le développement, l'environnement et la volonté de consolidation du pouvoir de l'Autorité palestinienne. Elle se penche sur la circulation et l'hybridation des savoirs et des solutions d'action publique. En dehors de l'action des décideurs nationaux et internationaux, d'autres acteurs (ONG, organisations humanitaires) interviennent et mobilisent d'autres représentations des problèmes environnementaux et des solutions à apporter en interactions avec leurs représentations du territoire et du conflit. Cette thèse se fonde sur une série d'entretiens et de discussions informelles, la littérature grise sur le sujet et de nombreuses observations participantes. / This thesis analyses the power relations involved in environmental issues (water management and climate change) and the process of state building of the Palestinian Authority, an entity dependent on international aid and under israeli occupation. This thesis mobilises sociology of public action, political ecology and science and technology studies in order to examine the multi-level processes of co-construction of social order and environment through knowledges, problems definition and public policies adopted to tackle them. This research analyses the interactions between international aid, development and environment and the objective of empowerment of the Palestinian Authority. It focuses on the circulation and hybridisation of knowledge and public policy solutions. Beyond national and international decision makers, other actors such as NGOs or humanitarian organisations participate and mobilise other representations of environmental problems and solutions in relation with their representations of the territory and the conflict. This thesis is based on a series of interviews, informal discussions, grey literature dealing with the subject and observational work.

Cette thèse se propose d’étudier le gouvernement collaborateur dirigé par Wang Jingwei (1940-1945) à la croisée de deux trajectoires : celle de l’État chinois moderne et celle de l’Empire japonais. Au-delà d’un approfondissement des connaissances sur l’occupation japonaise en Chine, mon travail ambitionne d’enrichir le champ des études sur l’État lui-même. Une telle approche ne va pas de soi, tant le caractère « fantoche » attribué à ce régime par l’historiographie chinoise l’a longtemps isolé du reste de la période et cantonné à une histoire des tenants idéologiques de la collaboration. Sans évacuer cet aspect, mon approche consiste à l’inscrire dans une étude politique et sociale du gouvernement et de l'administration, afin de saisir le fonctionnement réel de la machine étatique en zone occupée. Pour ce faire, je développe le concept d’État d’occupation, qui désigne l’ensemble formé par les organisations japonaises (institutions militaires et civiles) et chinoises (gouvernements collaborateurs locaux), établies afin d’administrer la Chine occupée. La construction de cet État, qui visa, à partir de 1940, à intégrer ces organisations derrière la façade du gouvernement de Wang Jingwei, fut détournée par des logiques de formation, nées des contradictions entre ses différents acteurs. Ce processus est examiné en adoptant des focales différentes. La première partie étudie la mise en place de l’État d’occupation du point de vue japonais, en montrant l’impact qu’eurent, l’un sur l’autre, centre et périphérie au sein de l’Empire nippon. Je reviens ensuite sur la genèse de cet État d’occupation, jusqu’à la formation du gouvernement de Wang Jingwei. La deuxième partie réduit la focale pour s’intéresser à l’organisation particulière de ce dernier, dont la spécificité, par rapport aux autres régimes collaborateurs, provenait de l’ambition qu’avait le groupe de Wang de restaurer le Gouvernement nationaliste légitime dans le cadre d’un « retour à la capitale ». La troisième partie, enfin, se penche sur le cas de la fonction publique en zone occupée, dont le cadre institutionnel et idéologique est mis en regard avec les conditions de vie des agents. / This dissertation studies the collaboration government headed by Wang Jingwei (1940-1945) at the crossroads of two trajectories: those of China’s modern state and Japan’s Empire. More broadly, my work aims at enriching the field of state-building research. Such an approach may seem counter-intuitive, as this regime is still labelled a "puppet" by Chinese historiography, which has cast it aside from the rest of the period and confined it to an ideological history of collaboration. I consider it within the context of a political and social study of government and administration, which tries to grasp the real functioning of the state machine in the occupied zone. For this purpose, I develop the concept of occupation state, i.e. a larger apparatus than the sole collaboration regimes, which included Japanese military and civilian agencies as well as Chinese local governments. From 1940 on, the state-building process aimed at integrating these organizations behind the façade of the Wang Jingwei government. However, it was diverted by a formation process, which resulted from the contradictions between its different actors. I explore this process from three different angles. The first part studies the establishment of the occupation state from the Japanese point of view, showing the mutual impact of centre and periphery within the Japanese Empire. Then, it follows the genesis of the occupation state up to the establishment of the Wang Jingwei government. The second part focuses on the experience of the latter, whose specificity, compared to other pro-Japanese regimes, was the ambition of the Wang group to restore the legitimate nationalist government as part of a "return to the capital". Thirdly, I look at the administrative personnel’s institutional and ideological framework as well as their living conditions.

Nach dem Oslo prozess im Gaza-Streifen und Westjordanland (weiter WJGS), die palästinensische Selbstverwaltung eingesetzt wurde. Die wichtigste Frage, eine Antwort auf die diese Dissertation zu geben versucht, ist: Hat es diese Regierung geschafft, sich in ihrem ersten Jahrzehnt (1994 - 2004) zu einer staatlichen, im Sinne von einer differenzierten, zentralisierten und autonomen Organisation zu entwickeln, die das Gewaltmonopol innehat und in der Lage ist, landesweit verbindliche Gesetze zu etablieren? Die Realität nach dem Oslo-Prozess: Tatsächlich fand eine Konzentration der Macht in den Händen Arafats und einer kleinen regierenden Elite in seinem Umkreis statt. Dies geschah auf Kosten der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung, welcher der Zugang zu staatlichen Institutionen auf nationaler Ebene verwehrt wurde. Dieser Zustand der Marginalisierung der Bevölkerungsmehrheit hemmte die Durchsetzung eines demokratischen Systems nach den Prinzipien Gewaltenteilung, Verantwortlichkeit und Transparenz und erstickte die rechtsstaatlichen Ansätze im Keim. Arafat und die kleine Elite in seinem Gefolge verhinderten nicht nur den Aufstieg eines demokratischen und rechtsstaatlichen Systems, sondern auch das Aufkommen eines Verwaltungssystems, das nach fairen Prinzipien (Leistung, Kompetenz) und nicht nach informellen/persönlichen Kriterien besetzt wurde, klare Spezialisierungen und Hierarchien aufwies sowie durchschaubar war, wie Max Weber vorschlägt. Näher betrachtet, erschwerten der Friedensprozess von Oslo und seine Vereinbarungen den Aufbau von stabilen und reaktionsfähigen politischen Institutionen genauso wie den eines professionellen Verwaltungssystems. Dies geschah, da der Prozess Menschen demobilisierte (aus der Unfähigkeit heraus, die Bestrebungen Palästinas, ein selbstbestimmter souveräner Staat zu werden, wahrzunehmen), außerdem ermöglichte er Arafat und dessen kleiner Machtelite, die Macht bei sich zu konzentrieren und ein halbautokratisches, von patrimonialen Zügen gekennzeichnetes Regime einzuführen, das dem Machthaber ermöglichte, öffentliche Fonds und Institutionen auszunutzen, um sich Loyalität zu sichern und seinem Regime Legitimität zu verschaffen. Als Antwort darauf stärkten die Gegner des Prozesses von Oslo und Arafats, also die Hamas, der Islamische Djihad und PFLP ihre Institutionen und begannen parallel zu den Institutionen der Autonomiebehörde parastaatliche Funktionen auszuüben. Am wichtigsten ist die Tatsache, dass diese Institutionen von den Milizen der politischen Parteien, denen sie angegliedert sind, beschützt werden. Zum Beispiel wird die Al Salah Islamic Society von den Izz El Din El Kassam Brigaden dem militärischen Flügel derHamas beschützt. Die 'Freunde der Märtyrer' sind dem Islamischen Djihad angegliedert und werden vom militanten Flügel der Gruppe, den Al Quds Brigaden beschützt. Dementsprechend ist der Staat - im Sinne einer zentralen Organisation mit Macht zur Autoritätsausübung und einem Gewaltmonopol (wie Joel Migdal vorschlägt) nicht präsent auf der politischen Bühne in Palästina. / In 1994, the Palestinian self-government was established on the Gaza Strip and West Bank (hereinafter WBGS) as result of Oslo process. One of its main challenges of that government was how to deal with this debilitating heritage whilst promoting institutions and institutional capacity building, both of which began gaining momentum from 1994 onwards. However, the reality of the Oslo process has meant that in fact what has occurred is a concentration of power into the hand of the ruling elite (Arafat and the small elite around him) at the expense of the majority of population who were denied access to national level institutions of state functions. This state of the political marginalization (or denationalization) of the majority of population hindered the emergence of a democratic political system based on the principles of the separation of powers, accountability, and transparency, and stifled the emergence of the rule of law. Arafat and the small elite around him had not only hindered the emergence of a democratic political system, and stifled the emergence of the rule of law, but also the emergence of a bureaucratic system with a recruitment system based on achievement rather than informal/irrational criteria (competence), highly specialized and differentiated administrative role of civil servants (differentiation), and well established and thoroughly understandable system of super-ordination and sub-ordination (hierarchy) as Max Weber suggests. In response, the opponents of Oslo process & Arafat- Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and PFLP-had strengthened their institutions, and started to practice Para-state functions parallel to PA institutions (as chapter V shows). These instituions are protected by the militia of the political party with which it is affiliated, like Izz El Din El Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, and others. Accordingly, State- in the term of central organization with the power of issuing authoritative binding legal rules and monopolizing coercion (as Joel Migdal suggests)- was absent from the Palestinian scene.

長久以來，政治學慣於將企業畫歸為私領域活動，鮮於對企業組織及權力進行系統性分析。然而，正是這樣的忽視，使我們難以掌握後全球化時代，面對企業權力的崛起，國家政經結構將何去何從。 緣此，本研究回歸歷史，將長期遭政治學忽視的「企業」，重新置放於現代國家形成的歷史過程中，分析企業與政府，如何在競逐有限資金的過程中，建立起合作關係與制度，進而形成現代民族資本主義國家。並藉由先進/後發、東方/西方四個案例）尼德蘭聯省共和國、英國、日本、中國）的交互比較，進一步探問：為何有些國家由企業主導，形成「企業國家」，如尼德蘭、英國？又為何有些國家最終形成由政府主導的「國家企業」，如日本、中國？ 經過四個案例分析後，本研究提出了一個新的國家建構過程：先是財務需求促成強制權力及資本權力的法人化，形成「政府」與「企業」組織；而後，由於政府與企業在融資上的競合，促成了政府與企業透過財務機制）持股、債務、董事連結），進一步連結成為「國家法人」。而這個由政府與企業組成的國家法人，因成立動機起始於財務需求，因此首先被建立起來的是金融制度。接著，受國際政治及市場競爭壓力，軍事外交部門開始組織化。再者，為獨佔境內資金，政府與企業聯手建立國內政治/市場的統一/壟斷制度。而後，為消弭因不公平分配所導致的叛亂）抗稅、罷工），出現了公共/公司福利制度。現代國家的政經制度：財政金融、軍事外交、社會福利，於焉建立。且正由於國家法人組建的基礎在於財務，因此導致國家走向「企業國家」或「國家企業」的分殊關鍵，即在於政府與企業兩大法人的相對融資能力（financing capacity）。

Text in Afrikaans / Die basiese tese voortspruitend uit hierdie ondersoek is dat wetenskapsbeoefening binne bepaalde terreine van die regswetenskap ondemeem word ooreenkomstig 'n verswee staatlike paradigma wat deurlopend streef na die instandhouding van die politieke status quo. Die territoriale staat is die hoeksteen van die bestaande politieke orde en terselfdertyd die meester-konsep van die staatlike paradigma. Wetenskapsbeoefening volgens hierdie paradigma is gemik op die instandhouding van die territoriale staat en funksioneer dus as 'n defensief-konserwatiewe politieke projek. Uitsluitsel oor welke vrae en antwoorde as wetenskaplik ter sake kwalifiseer, word gegee aan die hand van die behoeftes van die bestaande territoriaalstaatlike orde. Antwoorde kwalifiseer as wetenskaplik houdbaar alleenlik indien dit met die belange van die bestaande territoriale staat vereenselwigbaar is en nie die staatlike status quo sal ontwrig nie. Intellektuele aktiwiteit wat nie die staatlike gebaseerde status quo ter wille is nie en dit moontlik mag ontwrig, haal in terme van hierdie paradigma moeilik die drumpel van wetenskaplikheid. In die ondersoek word die vestiging van die staatlike paradigma histories nagegaan en daama word die hoofmomente van die paradigma blootgele. Die belangrikste produkte van wetenskapsbeoefening kragtens die staatlike paradigma word daama uitgepluis. Benewens die feit dat die produkte deurlopend die staatlike orde onderskraag, vervul dit ook die strategiese funksie om uitdagers van die staatlike orde te domestiseer en in die diens van die staatlike orde te plaas. Die prominentste produkte van wetenskapsbeoefening volgens die staatlike paradigma word ontleed: - staatsbou, dikwels verkeerdelik voorgehou as nasiebou; - demokrasie wat onderhewig aan die dissipline van die staatlike paradigma tot staatlike demokrasie omvorm is; - menseregte wat burgerlike afhanklikheid van die staat bevorder en die staat sodoende teen opposisie vrywaar; - die misdaad, hoogverraad en die intemasionaalregtelike figuur van selfbeskikking wat deur die staatlike paradigma tot 'n staatsdienende staatlike selfbeskikking omvorm is. Die staatlike paradigma word egter onder toenemende spanning geplaas en daar bestaan die moontlikheid van 'n rewolusionere herwaardering van verskeie sleutel-konsepte wat deur die staatlike paradigma gevange gehou en in diens van die bestaande staatlike status quo gedomestiseer is. Die rewolusionere vrystel van hierdie konsepte kan die weg baan na 'n nuwe politokrasie anderkant die staatlike orde. / The basic thesis emanating from this research holds that scientific enterprises within certain fields of the legal science are undertaken in pursuance of a tacit statist paradigm which consistently preserve the political status quo. The territorial state is both the keystone of the existing political order and the master concept of the statist paradigm. Scientific activity according to this paradigm seeks to protect the territorial state and functions as a defensive conservative political project. The scientific relevance of questions and answers is determined by the exigencies of the existing order composed of territorial states. Answers are viewed as scientifically authentic only if they are compatible with the interests of the prevailing territorial state and when they do not pose a threat of disruption to the existing statist status quo. Intellectual activity that does not affirm the statist predicated status quo and which poses the risk of disruption of the this order would seldom qualify as scientific in terms of this paradigm. This study examines the historical establishment of the statist paradigm and debunks the main pillars of the paradigm. The foremost products of scientific activity in accordance with the statist paradigm are then analyzed. These products invariably safeguard the statist order and also succeed in domesticating the challengers of the statist order and placing them in the service of this order. The most outstanding developments of the scientific endeavour in pursuance of the statist paradigm are analyzed, which are: - state building, often inaccurately portrayed as nation building; -democracy which, subjected to the discipline of the statist paradigm, had been transformed into statist democracy; - human rights which cultivate civic dependence upon the state, thus safeguarding the state against opposition; -the crime ofhigh treason and the international law concept of self-determination which was transfigured by the statist paradigm into a state serving statist self-determination. The statist paradigm is however placed under increasing tension and there is a possibility of a revolutionary reappraisal of several key concepts which the statist paradigm has kept in captivity and which have been domesticated and placed in the service of the statist status quo. By releasing these revolutionary concepts, the way to a new politocracy, beyond the statist order, may be paved. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.