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Selon Thomas Szasz, exister, c'est être aux prises avec autrui, quelquefois pour sa survie biologique, le plus souvent pour «avoir sa place au soleil». La rhétorique - manipulation du langage - occupe une place importante dans les conflits. Les luttes entre les personnes peuvent également se transformer en antagonismes État-individu. Pour Szasz, la psychiatrie devient l'instrument de l'État pour réprimer une partie des individus qui dérangent. Contrairement à Szasz qui défend le sens commun, la psychiatrie dont la fonction s'apparente à la morale et à la politique, justifie son contrôle en prenant les apparences de la science dont le concept de maladie mentale est issu. D'une manière plus large, la notion de maladie mentale transforme les libres choix de l'humain en déterminismes. C'est fondamentalement contre cette tendance sociale contemporaine que Szasz, ardent défenseur de la liberté et de l'autonomie de l'humain, lutte avec conviction.

Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2017-2018 / Dans ce mémoire, j’examine à travers les travaux du juriste et psychologue Stephen J. Morse la prétention selon laquelle les nouvelles connaissances issues des neurosciences sont appelées à transformer radicalement le droit criminel en fournissant des raisons d’abandonner la notion de responsabilité pénale. Le premier chapitre présente et critique l’idée que ces prétentions réformistes reposeraient sur des erreurs conceptuelles ou logiques. J’aborde aussi la thèse selon laquelle l’évaluation de la responsabilité criminelle repose sur des critères comportementaux insensibles aux données neuroscientifiques. Les chapitres suivants explorent deux manières par lesquelles les neurosciences transformeraient radicalement nos conceptions juridiques en mettant en doute la notion de responsabilité criminelle : par leur réfutation du libre arbitre et par leur conception de l’être humain comme un mécanisme biologique. Le deuxième chapitre s’interroge à savoir si le droit criminel présuppose le libre arbitre dans sa conception de la personne responsable. Je réponds négativement à cette question et argumente plutôt en faveur d’une conception de la responsabilité pénale fondée sur la possession de certaines capacités. Le troisième chapitre porte sur le rapport entre le droit et les explications mécanistes formulées en neurosciences. Certains craignent que si l’humain n’est qu’un mécanisme biologique, alors l’explication de l’action en termes d’états mentaux ne réfère à aucune réalité (éliminativisme par rapport aux états mentaux), ou du moins que les états mentaux ne figurent pas parmi les véritables causes de l’action (épiphénoménisme). Or, la réalité des états mentaux et leur efficacité causale sont des présupposés essentiels du droit criminel. Je soutiens que la solution de Morse, ancrée dans une théorie non réductionniste de l’esprit, repose sur une confusion et ne permet pas de répondre à ces défis. Le droit criminel devrait plutôt miser sur une approche réductionniste, non éliminative, s’il entend entretenir une relation harmonieuse avec les neurosciences. / Some argue that neuroscience will have radical implications for the law. For instance, by identifying the brain-based causes of behaviour, neuroscience would rule out free will and consequently, make moral and criminal responsibility concepts and practices obsolete. In this MA thesis, I tackle this issue through the work of legal scholar and psychologist Stephen J. Morse. Chapter 1 critically assesses the “hard conservative” theses that reformist assumptions rely on conceptual and logical mistakes such as the naturalistic fallacy, the mereological fallacy or category errors, and that behavioral evidence always prevails over neuroscientific evidence. Subsequent chapters explore two ways neuroscience is taken to imply radical modifications to our legal responsibility concepts and practices: through its denial of free will and through its depiction of human beings as natural, biological mechanisms. Chapter 2 addresses the question whether the legal conception of a responsible person presupposes free will. I answer this question negatively and further argue that responsibility tracks mental capacity, not free will. Chapter 3 focuses on the mechanistic explanations in neuroscience and their implications for the law. The challenge is that, allegedly, if we humans only are biological mechanisms, then either mental states and agency more generally are not real (eliminativism) or they are real but have no causal power (epiphenomenalism). In both case, the legal conception of the responsible person is thoroughly problematic since it presupposes that persons really have intentions, desires, beliefs, and the like, and that these mental states can cause actions. I argue that Morse is wrong in relying on a non-reductionist theory of mind in his answer to this challenge since it rests on a confusion concerning reductivism. Thus, criminal law’s conception of a responsible person would be better defended through a reductionist, non-eliminative approach.

The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the formative import of the relationships between adults and the young in their corresponding roles as teachers and students between the first year of kindergarten and the last grade of high school (K-12 education). My approach to this issue is twofold: First, I argue that it is imperative that educators effectively recognize the personhood of students within K-12 schools. Second, I define schools as formative communities organized for the purpose of furthering the moral growth of students. These arguments will be supported by a theoretical framework articulated around the concepts of the personhood of students, the interpersonal stance in education, moral growth, and schools as formative communities. I propose a characterization of these four interrelated concepts based on an analysis of Stephen Darwall’s philosophical work on respect, dignity, and the second-person standpoint; Aristotelian virtue ethics and character education; and John Dewey’s philosophy of education, especially in his conceptions of growth, community, participation, and the moral nature and aims of education. I conclude by theorizing schools as communities organized towards the fundamental purpose of fostering the moral growth of students, and argue that this purpose requires engaging students to fully participate of school life as persons. In studying some of the most basic questions about K-12 schooling from the perspective of philosophy of education, it is my intent to produce a framework that is conceptually well-grounded and clear enough to provide practical guidance for school teachers and leaders.

Risken för krig ökar om stater inte vidtar åtgärder mot hot från andra stater. Samtidigt finns en otydlighet i form av att forskare har kommit till delvis kontrasterande slutsatser om vad stater verkligen gör när de utsätts för militära hot. Två välkända teorier på området säger emot varandra. Stephen Walts teori säger att stater rustar militärt och ingår allianser för att stå emot hotande stater-de hotbalanserar. Randall Schwellers teori kontrasterar mot detta och säger att staters inrikes motstånd mot att satsa på sitt militära försvar många gånger leder till att de inte hotbalanserar på ett effektivt sätt- de underbalanserar. Båda teorierna har av efterföljande forskare kritiserats men även fått stöd. Denna studie använder tidigare forskning om de två teorierna för att pröva dem på ett sätt som tar hänsyn till kritiken i denna. Adam Liffs analysverktyg används därför att mäta åtgärder som vidtas i fallet Sverige mot det ryska militära hotet. Studiens visar att de prövade teorierna får stöd på olika sätt. Sverige hotbalanser genom att vidta åtgärder för att stå emot de Rysslands offensiva militära kapaciteter först efter att den ryska ledningens intentioner uppfattas som skadliga för Sveriges intressen. Underbalanseringsteorin får starkast stöd genom Sverige att inte ingår bindande försvarsöverenskommelser.

This thesis examines the use of irony in Joyce’s Portrait, claiming that it has the effect of deconstructing common notions of maturity that are engrained within the Bildungsroman tradition, and that this was Joyce’s intention. In Portrait, irony plays the role of psychological reality, undercutting Stephen’s unrealistic expectation to see his life follow a traditional path of teleological progression. This essay proceeds by looking at the novel’s symbolic, thematic and literary cues, as well as through an analysis of its structure, and Stephen’s psychological and behavioral tendencies throughout the novel. This interpretation of the irony as bearing deconstructive meaning comes from the essay adopting a static, as opposed to a kinetic, apprehension of Stephen in Portrait.

On the assumption that there are no objective normative facts, what is the best theory of normative language? I try to answer this question. Chapter 1 argues for a presumption against noncognitivism and explains why error-theories are of limited interest: they concern adverbs and adjectives like ‘moral’, but not words like ‘ought’, ‘good’ and ‘reason’. This narrows down the options: the best subjectivist theory of normative language is a truth conditional, non-error-theoretic account. Chapter 2 argues for contextualism about normative statements. Contextualists hold that their truth conditions (can) vary with the context of utterance. Chapter 3 starts the assessment of contextualist theories. It looks into Humean accounts. Problems are revealed with both Harman’s and Schroeder’s versions. Chapter 4 develops a form of indexical relativism according to which the truth of normative statements depends on contextually salient rules. I present imperative-based analyses of ‘ought’ and ‘reason’ and show how they can explain why ‘A ought to X’ entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es. Chapter 5 further develops the theory of chapter 4 and applies it to the words ‘good’ and ‘must’. It turns out to be hard to analyse ‘good’. It also emerges that ‘must’ and ‘ought’ cannot be given different truth conditions. Chapter 6 explains Stephen Finlay’s end-relational theory. On this account, normative statements concern the relation in which acts or objects stand to contextually salient ends. In the case of ‘ought’ and ‘good’, this relation is one of probability raising. Chapter 7 discusses and answers some familiar objections to Finlay’s view. Chapter 8 raises some new problems, related to the fact that normative judgments are often made in the light of several ends. Chapter 9 explains why the end-relational theory is nonetheless the best subjectivist theory of normative language.

This study is an examination of the beast motif associated with Stephen Dedalus in Joyce's Ulysses. The motif has its origins in Joyce's earlier novel, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. In Ulysses the beast motif is related to Stephen's feelings of guilt and remorse over his mother's death and includes characterizations of Stephen as a fox, a dog, a rat, and a vampire. The motif consistently carries a negative connotation. Several literary sources for the imagery of the beast motif are apparent in Ulysses, including two plays by John Webster, a poem by Matthew Prior, medieval bestiaries, and a traditional Irish folk riddle. The study of the continuity of the beast motif in Ulysses helps to explain the complex characterization of Stephen Dedalus.

This dissertation examines a range of politicized artistic practices in Great Britain during the 1970s, a decade marked by economic decline and social fragmentation. The artists I primarily focus on in the pages that follow—William Furlong, Stephen Willats, Mary Kelly, and Conrad Atkinson—all appeared on Audio Arts, a “spoken magazine” distributed on audiocassette that was founded by Furlong in 1973. During the 1970s, Furlong, Willats, Kelly and Atkinson renegotiated their relationship to art institutions, expanded the role of the artist in society, and conceived of art as a form of political praxis, and this dissertation explores the strategies these artists devised to connect to publics outside the elite, bourgeois audience of art.