Ma Yue. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 31-36). / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

by Wong Kar Shun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 252-164). / Abstract also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.i / PREFACE --- p.ii / Chapter chapter i --- introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Questions and Objectives --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Background of Study --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- The Importance of Corporate Disclosures --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- The Nature of Corporate Disclosures in Hong Kong --- p.5 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- A Brief Review of Previous Empirical Voluntary Disclosure Studies --- p.9 / Chapter 1.2.3.1 --- Agency-Theory Based Studies --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.4 --- Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosures --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Model and Hypotheses --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4 --- Research Approach and Design --- p.23 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- The Postal Survey --- p.24 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Annual Reports --- p.24 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Variables Measurement --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.3.1 --- The Measurement of Dependent Variables --- p.25 / Chapter 1.4.3.2 --- The Measurement of Independent Variables --- p.27 / Chapter 1.4.4 --- Data Analysis --- p.30 / Chapter 1.5 --- Justifications of the Study --- p.30 / Chapter 1.6 --- Significance and Potential Contributions of the Study --- p.32 / Chapter 1.7 --- Organization of the Thesis --- p.35 / Chapter chapter ii --- literature review on corporate disclosure / Chapter 2.1 --- Scope of Review --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2 --- Theoretical Literature Review on Corporate and Voluntary Disclosure --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Overview --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Agency theory of Disclosure --- p.39 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Signaling Theory --- p.42 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Contingency Theory --- p.45 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- Capital Need Theory --- p.46 / Chapter 2.2.6 --- Proprietary Cost Theory --- p.47 / Chapter 2.2.7 --- Other Theories or Justifications for Corporate and Voluntary Disclosure --- p.48 / Chapter 2.2.8 --- Conclusion of Disclosure Theories --- p.49 / Chapter 2.3 --- Empirical Literature Review of Corporate Disclosure --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Corporate Disclosure Surveys --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3.1.1 --- The Usefulness and Information Value of Annual Reports as Perceived by External Users --- p.51 / Chapter 2.3.1.2 --- External Users' Information Requirements --- p.54 / Chapter 2.3.1.3 --- Corporate Preparers' Attitudes to Disclosure / Comparison of the Perceptions between Preparers and Users --- p.55 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Studies --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- The Independent Variables Used in Empirical Disclosure Studies --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1 --- "Agency Theory, Signaling Theory and Political Cost Related Variables" --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.1 --- Firm Size --- p.60 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.2 --- Listing Status --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.3 --- Raising Capital --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.4 --- Assets-in-Place --- p.63 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.5 --- Leverage --- p.64 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.6 --- Size of Auditor --- p.64 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.7 --- Industry Type --- p.65 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.8 --- Ownership Structure --- p.66 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.1.9 --- Independent Non-executive Directors --- p.66 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.2 --- Proprietary Cost Variables --- p.67 / Chapter 2.3.2.2.3 --- Contingency Variables --- p.68 / Chapter 2.3.2.3 --- The Dependent Variables Used in Disclosure Studies --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3.2.3.1 --- Disclosure Index Studies --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3.2.3.2 --- Specific Disclosure Choice Studies --- p.75 / Chapter 2.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.79 / Chapter chapter iii --- literature review on corporate governance / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2 --- Theoretical Literature Review on Corporate Governance --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The Definition and Scope of Corporate Governance --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- The Theoretical Context of Corporate Governance --- p.83 / Chapter 3.2.2.1 --- Agency Theory of Corporate Governance --- p.84 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- The Evolution and Functions of Various Corporate Governance Structures --- p.86 / Chapter 3.2.3.1 --- The Board of Directors --- p.86 / Chapter 3.2.3.2 --- Independent Non-Executive Directors --- p.88 / Chapter 3.2.3.3 --- Board Committees --- p.88 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.1 --- Audit Committee --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.2 --- Remuneration Committee --- p.90 / Chapter 3.2.3.3.3 --- Non-executive Chairman --- p.91 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Corporate Governance Movement in Various Parts of the World --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2.4.1 --- Corporate Governance in U.K --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2.4.2 --- Corporate Governance in the USA --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.4.3 --- Corporate Governance in Continental Europe --- p.94 / Chapter 3.2.4.4 --- Corporate Governance in the Far East --- p.95 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.1 --- Corporate Governance in China --- p.95 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.2 --- Other Asian Countries --- p.96 / Chapter 3.2.4.4.3 --- Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.96 / Chapter 3.3 --- Empirical Literature Review of Corporate Governance --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Corporate Governance Surveys --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1.1 --- Price Waterhouse Survey in 1995 --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.1.2 --- HKSA's surveys in 1995 and 1997 --- p.102 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance --- p.104 / Chapter 3.3.2.1 --- Independent Non-executive Directors --- p.105 / Chapter 3.3.2.2 --- Ownership structure --- p.106 / Chapter 3.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.106 / Chapter chapter iv --- hypotheses development / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.108 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Research Model I: The Relationship between Corporate Governance / Specific Firm Attributes and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosures --- p.109 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Corporate Governance Structures Variables --- p.111 / Chapter 4.2.1.1 --- The Ratio of Independent Non-executive Directors to Total Directors on Board (INDs) --- p.111 / Chapter 4.2.1.2 --- The Existence of Audit Committee --- p.113 / Chapter 4.2.1.3 --- The Existence of Dominant Personality --- p.114 / Chapter 4.2.1.4 --- The Percentage of Family Members on Board --- p.115 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Corporate Ownership Structures --- p.116 / Chapter 4.2.2.1 --- Family's Share Ownership --- p.116 / Chapter 4.2.2.2 --- Concentration of Share Ownership / The Existence of a Non-director Dominant Shareholder (s) --- p.117 / Chapter 4.2.2.3 --- Directors' Personal Share Ownership --- p.119 / Chapter 4.2.2.4 --- Independent Non-executive Directors' Personal Share / Chapter 4.2.2.5 --- Ownership --- p.120 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Controlling Variables --- p.121 / Chapter 4.2.3.1 --- Firm Size --- p.121 / Chapter 4.2.3.2 --- Assets-in-Place --- p.122 / Chapter 4.2.3.3 --- Financial Leverage --- p.123 / Chapter 4.2.3.4 --- Profitability --- p.123 / Chapter 4.2.3.3 --- Industry Type --- p.124 / Chapter 4.2.3.6 --- Excluded Variables --- p.125 / Chapter 4.3 --- Research Model II (The Relationship between Disclosure Strategy adopted by firms and Corporate Governance/Specific Firm Attributes) --- p.126 / Chapter 4.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.126 / Chapter chapter v --- research methodology and design / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.129 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Research Approach --- p.129 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- The Postal Survey --- p.130 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The Empirical Testing of Hypotheses --- p.130 / Chapter 5.3 --- Survey Design and Data Collection --- p.131 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- The Development of the Survey Instrument --- p.131 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Pilot Study --- p.132 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Questionnaire Contents --- p.133 / Chapter 5.3.4 --- Sample of Main Survey --- p.136 / Chapter 5.3.5 --- Questionnaire Distribution and Response Rate --- p.136 / Chapter 5.3.6 --- Testing for Non-Response Bias --- p.139 / Chapter 5.3.7 --- Characteristics of Sample Preparer Firms --- p.139 / Chapter 5.3.8 --- Respondent Titles --- p.141 / Chapter 5.4 --- The Measurement of the Research Models --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- The Measurement of Variables in the First Research Model --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1.1 --- The Measurement of the Dependent Variable --- p.143 / Chapter 5.4.1.2 --- The Measurement of the Independent Variables --- p.144 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- The Measurement of Variables in the Second Research Model --- p.146 / Chapter 5.4.2.1 --- The Measurement of the Dependent Variables --- p.146 / Chapter 5.4.2.2 --- The Measurement of the Independent Variable --- p.146 / Chapter 5.5 --- Data Analysis Tools --- p.147 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Descriptive Analysis of the Survey Data --- p.147 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Multivariate Analysis --- p.148 / Chapter 5.6 --- Summary --- p.156 / Chapter chapter vi --- field survey findings / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.151 / Chapter 6.2 --- "Analysts Users' Perceived Importance, Attributes and Usage Behaviour of Annual Reports" --- p.152 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Major Sources of Corporate Communication --- p.152 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Attributes of Annual Reports (vs Other Source of Information) --- p.154 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Preparers' Perceived Importance of Different Types of Annual Report Users --- p.155 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Number and Time Spent on Reading Annual Reports by Users --- p.157 / Chapter 6.2.5 --- Extent of Usage of Various Types of Information in the Annual Reports by Users --- p.158 / Chapter 6.3 --- Disclosure Process and Strategy --- p.160 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- The Extent that Users' Information Needs are Considered as a Top Priority in the Disclosure Process --- p.160 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Disclosure Strategy/Process of Firms --- p.161 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- External Factors Affecting Corporate Disclosure Strategy --- p.164 / Chapter 6.3.4 --- Internal Participants Affecting Corporate Disclosure Strategy --- p.166 / Chapter 6.3.5 --- Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on Corporate Disclosures Strategy --- p.167 / Chapter 6.4 --- Costs/Benefits and Importance of Different Voluntary Disclosure Items Perceived by Preparers and Users --- p.169 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.171 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- Costs of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.172 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- Net Benefits and Costs of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.173 / Chapter 6.4.4 --- Perceived Importance of Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure Items by Users --- p.176 / Chapter 6.5 --- Preparers' and Users' Perceptions of Capital Market Functioning and the Effectiveness of Corporate Disclosure --- p.178 / Chapter 6.5.1 --- The Short Term/Long Term Efficiency of Hong Kong Capital Market --- p.178 / Chapter 6.5.2 --- The Impression of Share Values --- p.179 / Chapter 6.5.3 --- The Qualitative Characteristics of Financial Reportingin Hong Kong --- p.180 / Chapter 6.5.4 --- The Existence of Communication Gap and its Impact on Share Values --- p.182 / Chapter 6.5.5 --- Adequacy and Effectiveness of Current Corporate Disclosure in Hong Kong --- p.183 / Chapter 6.5.6 --- The Need of More Disclosure Requirements and Types of Information Disclosures --- p.185 / Chapter 6.6 --- Summary --- p.188 / Chapter chapter vii --- hypothesis testing / Chapter 7.1 --- Introduction --- p.190 / Chapter 7.2 --- Descriptive Analysis of the Variables in the Research Model --- p.190 / Chapter 7.3 --- Test for the First Research Model (Extent of Voluntary Disclosures as the Dependent Variable) --- p.195 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- Bivariate Analysis --- p.195 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- Multiple Regression Models and Assumption Testings --- p.198 / Chapter 7.2.3 --- Test of Violation of Multiple Regression Assumptions --- p.199 / Chapter 7.2.4.1 --- Linearity --- p.200 / Chapter 7.2.4.2 --- Normality --- p.201 / Chapter 7.2.4.3 --- Constant Variance of Residuals --- p.201 / Chapter 7.2.4.4 --- Non-Multicollinearity --- p.202 / Chapter 7.2.4.5 --- Log Transformation of the Model --- p.203 / Chapter 7.2.4.6 --- Multivariate Empirical Results --- p.204 / Chapter 7.2.4.7 --- Extent of Voluntary Disclosure --- p.205 / Chapter 7.4 --- Testing of the Second Research Model --- p.207 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- The Testing of Assumptions of the Second Research Model --- p.208 / ANOVA Results --- p.208 / Chapter 7.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.212 / Chapter CHAPTER VIII --- "SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION" / Chapter 8.1 --- Overview of the Study --- p.214 / Chapter 8.2 --- The Current State and Effectiveness of Corporate Disclosure in Hong Kong --- p.217 / Chapter 8.3 --- Discussion of the Current State of Annual Report Disclosure and the Corporate Governance --- p.220 / Chapter 8.4 --- Discussion of Hypotheses Testing Results --- p.221 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Hypothesis Related to Corporate Governance --- p.221 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- Hypothesis Related to Other Specific Firm Attributes --- p.226 / Chapter 8.5 --- Limitations of the Study --- p.228 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- Limitations of the Survey Questionnaires --- p.228 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- Credibility of Disclosures --- p.229 / Chapter 8.6 --- Contributions of the Study --- p.230 / Chapter 8.1 --- Recommendations for Further Study --- p.231 / Chapter 8.2 --- Conclusions --- p.233 / appendix --- p.235 / Chapter 1. --- Mailed Survey Instrument (Corporate Report Preparers' Version) --- p.235 / Chapter 2. --- Mailed Survey Instrument (Financial Analysts' Version) --- p.244 / REFERENCE --- p.252

by Wang Xiao Ling. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-73). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgment --- p.ii / Table of Contents --- p.iii / List of Tables --- p.v / List of Figures --- p.vi / Chapter I --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Objective of the Study --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Outline of the Study --- p.4 / Chapter II --- Background --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- China's Enterprise Reform and the Development of Capital Markets --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Board of Directors in China --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Legislation on Board - The Company Law --- p.13 / Composition of the Board of Directors --- p.16 / Functions and Powers --- p.18 / Regulations and Requirements --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Board of Chengdu Brilliant Development Inc --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Difference between Board in China's Company Law and that in Hong Kong Company Ordinance --- p.24 / Chapter 2.3 --- Chapter Summary --- p.26 / Chapter III --- Literature Review --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1 --- Theoretical Background --- p.27 / Chapter 3.2 --- Empirical Studies --- p.30 / Takeover Evaluation --- p.30 / Management Buyout --- p.31 / Adoption of Poison Pills --- p.32 / CEO Turnover --- p.32 / Financial Performance --- p.33 / Chapter IV --- Testable Hypotheses --- p.35 / Chapter V --- Research Methodology --- p.37 / Chapter 5.1 --- Variables and Sample --- p.37 / Chapter 5.2 --- Empirical Results --- p.43 / Board Composition and Corporate Performance with Full Sample --- p.43 / Excluding IPO Firms --- p.51 / Insider Dominated Board and Outsider Dominated Board --- p.51 / Alternative Measures for Firm Performance --- p.55 / Cross-sectional Test --- p.58 / Financial Distress --- p.60 / Industry Classification --- p.62 / Chapter 5.3 --- Discussion --- p.64 / Chapter VI --- Conclusion and Implications --- p.67 / Chapter 6.1 --- Conclusion and Implications --- p.67 / Chapter 6.2 --- Suggestions for Further Research --- p.69 / Bibliography --- p.70 / Appendix Legislation on the Board (The Company Law in PRC) --- p.74

by Lan Yat Si, Wong Tai Chun, Mark. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-37). / ABSTRACT --- p.iii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.vii / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Problem --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Overview --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- Different Perspectives Explanation --- p.2 / Chapter 1.4 --- Earnings Management Explanation --- p.3 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Big-bath Hypothesis --- p.3 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Blaming Hypothesis --- p.3 / Chapter 1.5 --- Difference between Big-bath and Blaming Hypotheses --- p.4 / Chapter 1.6 --- Motivation and Potential Contributions of Study --- p.4 / Chapter 1.7 --- Chapter Summary --- p.5 / Chapter II. --- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK / Chapter 2.1 --- Earnings Management --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Definition --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Overview --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Motivations --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Patterns of Earnings Management --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Executive Succession --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Accounting Change --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Definition --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Accounting Policies --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Accounting Bases --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- Accounting Estimates --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.5 --- Disclosure Requirements --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.6 --- Discretionary Changes --- p.12 / Chapter 2.4 --- Summary of Related Empirical Research --- p.12 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Copeland and Moore (1972) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Moore (1973) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Strong and Meyer (1987) --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4.4 --- DeAngelo(1988) --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4.5 --- Elliot and Shaw (1988) --- p.15 / Chapter 2.4.6 --- Lilien et al (1988) --- p.15 / Chapter 2.4.7 --- Chen and Lee (1990) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.8 --- La Salle (1990) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.9 --- Walsh et al (1991) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.10 --- La Salle et al. (1993) --- p.17 / Chapter 2.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.17 / Chapter III. --- RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY / Chapter 3.1 --- Development of Hypothesis --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2 --- Sample --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3 --- CEO Change and the Likelihood of Accounting Change --- p.21 / Chapter 3.4 --- CEO Change and the Directional Effect on Earnings --- p.22 / Chapter 3.5 --- Statistical Test and Employed --- p.22 / Chapter 3.6 --- Chapter Summary --- p.22 / Chapter IV. --- RESEARCH FINDINGS / Chapter 4.1 --- Officer Titles for CEOs --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2 --- Accounting Changes --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3 --- Income Effect on Accounting Changes --- p.24 / Chapter 4.4 --- CEO Change and Accounting Change --- p.25 / Chapter 4.5 --- CEO Change with Positive and Negative Accounting Changes --- p.27 / Chapter 4.6 --- Chapter Summary --- p.28 / Chapter V. --- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION / Chapter 5.1 --- Summary of Key Findings --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2 --- Implications and Discussion --- p.30 / Chapter 5.3 --- Concluding Summary --- p.31 / APPENDIX --- p.32 / BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.35

This study investigates reputational penalties for two main types of corporate scandals in China: accounting scandal vs. corruption. Compared with U.S. firms that experienced an average of 41% drop in firm value if accounting scandal was disclosed, I find that accounting scandals are less destructive to firm value in a relationship-based economy such as China. However, while pure accounting scandals are relatively innocuous in China, I find that corruption charges against the firms' senior executives have serious consequences. I explore several explanations for such difference in market reaction to the two types of scandals, including political network effect, accounting write-off effect, corporate governance effect, incentive effect, and executive turnover effect. My empirical evidence provides consistent support to the political relationship explanation which indicates that the damaged social and political networks and the ability to contract caused by the corruption charges would have a more negative impact on firms' operations and performances. Although my results do not fully eliminate all the other alternative explanations, they are likely to be a less important reason for the stronger reputation penalties for corruption charges than accounting scandals in China. / Zhang, Fang. / Adviser: T.J. Wang. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-11, Section: A, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-61). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

In essay two, I study top executive compensation and CEO turnover and their relationship to firm performance in business groups in China, using a sample of listed subsidiaries and their parent companies in China. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (CEO turnover) in a listed firm is positively (negatively) related to the accounting performance of its parent company. In addition, I find a stronger relationship between the compensation (turnover) in a listed subsidiary and the performance of its parent company when the controlling shareholder's ownership is high. Using related party transactions to proxy for the correlation between the two firms, I find that management compensation in a listed firm is related to the performance of its parent company if related party transactions exist between them. Using brand name as a proxy for reputation, I find that management compensation and CEO turnover in group firms are more likely to be sensitive to the performance measures in their parent companies if both use the same brand name. In conclusion, the association between the listed subsidiary and its parent company may affect the pay-for-performance sensitivity to a parent company. / Keywords: Communist Party of China (CPC), party secretary, performance; management compensation, business group, China / My dissertation includes two essays. In essay one, I investigate the party control in China's listed firms. Along with state shareholding and government administration, the third source of political control of Chinese listed firms is the Communist Party of China (CPC). Using a unique hand-collected dataset that includes the party secretaries' information for listed firms between 2000 and 2004, I examine the existence and power of the party secretaries in companies and their influence on performance. The party secretary is the leader of party committee and exercises the power of the CPC at firm-level. Power is assessed by whether the party secretary concurrently holds another key management position, such as chairman or CEO, thus allowing him or her to exert influence on the managerial decisions of the firm. I find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with many employees are more likely to have a party secretary or a powerful party secretary than are other firms. Party secretaries are more likely to have political reliability but less professionalism than are CEOs or other senior managers. The existence of a party secretary is negatively associated with a firm's performance, but only in SOEs. Non-state firms with a party secretary are more likely to have senior managers with political connections, but less professionalism, but I find no such significant results for SOEs. The firms with a party secretary or a powerful party secretary have lower labor productivity than do other firms, especially in SOEs and in regions with high unemployment rates. Overall, the results of this study suggest that the CPC has great influence over listed firms in China and that this influence should not be neglected in Chinese studies. / Yu, Wei. / Adviser: P. H. Joseph Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-01, Section: A, page: 0239. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-88). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

A quality corporate disclosure environment is vital for an efficient market. The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to study the information environment of the Chinese capital market. There are different types of participants playing equally important roles in the smooth functioning of the Chinese capital market. I attempt to study the information issue from three different perspectives using three separate essays. / Apart from raising the awareness on the importance of quality corporate disclosure in the smooth functioning of a capital market, this study provides evidence supporting the importance of a transparent information environment for analysts' earnings forecast accuracy and how opinion dispersion among financial analysts and investors at large affects subsequent stock returns. Allowing investors a thorough understanding of the Chinese capital market mitigates misconception and can help foreign funds and local investors to make investment decisions in the China capital market. / In my second essay, my focus is on financial analysts; examining the role of information disclosure and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Using all the Chinese firms included in the I/B/E/S files, I evaluate the predictive accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Apart from examining the relative forecast errors of the analyst vis-a-vis a naive forecast model as well as studying the determinants and explanatory variables of the differential analysts' forecast errors between groups of firms, regression analysis is also conducted to evaluate such determinants. / In my third essay, I recognize that investors at large react differently to information disclosed and my focus is on the dispersion of opinion among financial analysts. I examine the role of such differences in opinion in relation to the cross section of future stock returns in the Chinese capital market. Results show that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts' earnings earn lower return than otherwise similar stocks. Results also suggest that a more correct interpretation of dispersion in analysts' forecast is as a proxy for investors' opinion differences about a stock rather than as a proxy for risk. / In the first essay, my focus is on a general information user level, looking at what information is available in the capital market as disclosed by firms. My first essay analyzes the firm-specific news announcements for Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges with foreign ownership (firms issuing B shares) to gain an understand of the current information disclosure environment in the China stock market. I establish a news database which permits an examination of the distributional characteristics of the news items by categories, firm nature and timing. This essay also reports a positive relation between frequency of news disclosure and the total market capitalization, the total asset and the percentage of tradable share of a firm. / Lui Man Ching Gladie. / "August 2003." / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-09, Section: A, page: 3409. / Supervisor: In-Mu Haw. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Lau Yuen-ke. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-123). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Abstract in Chinese --- p.iii / Acknowledgements --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / List of Tables --- p.vi / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Hypothesis --- p.24 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Methodology --- p.43 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- Sample Description --- p.53 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Empirical Results --- p.61 / Chapter Chapter 7. --- Conclusion --- p.72 / Appendix 1. Definitions and calculations of variables --- p.75 / Appendix 2. Piecewise linear regression model suggested by Morck et al(1988) --- p.82 / Appendix 3. Tables --- p.87 / Bibliography --- p.122

Tam Wai-man Grace. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-77). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 序言 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Dividend Irrelevance Theory --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Bird-in-the-hand Theory --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Clientele Effect Theory --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4 --- Signaling Theory --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5 --- Agency Cost Theory / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Theoretical Models --- p.15 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- The Latest Agency Cost Model --- p.19 / Chapter 2.6 --- Residual Theory --- p.24 / Chapter 2.7 --- Other Studies on Dividend Policy / Chapter 2.7.1 --- Low-Regular-Dividend-Plus-Extras Policy --- p.26 / Chapter 2.7.2 --- Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms --- p.27 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Methodology / Chapter 3.1 --- Model --- p.28 / Chapter 3.2 --- Anti-Signaling Hypothesis --- p.29 / Chapter 3.3 --- Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.30 / Chapter 3.4 --- Residual Hypothesis --- p.31 / Chapter 3.5 --- Investment Opportunities Hypothesis --- p.32 / Chapter 3.6 --- Industry Control --- p.33 / Chapter 3.7 --- The Four-Hypothesis Model --- p.34 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Sample and Data Description / Chapter 4.1 --- Sample Description --- p.35 / Chapter 4.2 --- Variable Description --- p.36 / Chapter 4.3 --- Limitations --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4 --- Descriptive Statistics --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 5 / Chapter 5.1 --- Regression Results and Implications --- p.42 / Chapter 5.2 --- Alternative measurement for Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3 --- Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Hong Kong and the World --- p.47 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.49 / Tables / Table 1 Summary of the Four-Hypothesis Model --- p.50 / Table 2 Construction of Variables --- p.51 / Table 3 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from1992 to 1999 --- p.52 / Table 4 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996to 1999 --- p.54 / Table 5 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.55 / Table 6 Regression Results for Raw Data --- p.55 / Table 7 Regression Results using Substantial Shareholders Concentration as Proxy for Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.57 / Table 8 Summary of Regression Results --- p.58 / Charts / Chart 1 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from1992 to 1999 --- p.59 / Chart 2 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.60 / Chart 3 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.60 / Appendices / Appendix 1 The Complete Dataset --- p.61 / Appendix 2 Definition of Variables in Different Sectors --- p.63 / Appendix 3 Non-Nested Tests --- p.54 / Table A3.1 Non-Nested Tests Results --- p.65 / Table A3.2 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria - Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.66 / Table A3.3 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria - Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Residual Hypothesis --- p.67 / Table A3.4 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 一 Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.68 / Table A3.5 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Residual Hypothesis vs Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.69 / Table A3.6 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.70 / Table A3.7 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Residual Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.71 / Table A3.8 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis --- p.72 / Table A3.9 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Residual Hypothesis --- p.73 / Table A3.10 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.74 / Table A3.11 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 一 Technology Industry Phenomenon vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis --- p.75 / Bibliography --- p.76

Wang, Zhuojun. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 46-47). / Abstract also in Chinese.