Literature on climate policy of political parties’ points to an emerging congruence between populist radical right parties and scepticism toward climate change and climate policy. This thesis explores this nexus via a case study of the Sweden Democrats (SD) climate policy over a period of twelve years (2010-2022). It examines if the Sweden Democrats have expressed variations of climate scepticism and whether this has varied over time. Idea analysis and a taxonomy of three categories of climate scepticism are used for analysing official policy material of the Sweden Democrats. This thesis finds that the Sweden Democrats have outcomes on all three categories of climate scepticism: evidence (i.e., whether human caused climate change is happening), process (related to bureaucratic and scientific processes, e.g., scepticism against dominant research paradigms and bureaucratic decision making), and response scepticism (related to policy choices dealing with climate change). Over time there has been a gradual migration of scepticism from evidence and process related scepticism toward more policy-oriented forms of scepticism that concerns type of policy and attitudinal responses to climate change. Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is primarily anchored in arguments related to desired levels of national response and issues of trade/offs, with climate scepticism frequently constructed through frameworks of the potential harm that climate mitigation may do to national sovereignty, national economy, and industries. Another finding is that the Sweden Democrats overall have a lower salience and prioritization of climate issues compared to other parties represented in parliament whose climate policy they criticize, presenting their climate policy as alternative to these parties. This thesis concludes that the Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is closer to an unconvinced stance toward climate change rather than strictly denialistic, with evidentiary sceptic arguments over time becoming less frequent and decreasing in the degree of scepticism.

This study aims to analyze whether an ideological resemblance has occurred between the Moderate Party and the Sweden Democrats during the electoral periods 2018 and 2022. As such, an ideology focused systematic qualitative analysis has been applied with the additional lens of ideal type Liberal, Conservative and Nationalist values. The research questions for this study are: (1) What are differences and similarities between the Moderate Party and the Sweden Democrats in terms of Liberal, Conservative and Nationalist values during the two electoral periods? (2) Did an ideological resemblance occur between the two parties in two measuring points? The main findings of the study points to the implication that there is some degree of pathological normalcy when it comes to the Moderate Party’s election manifestos as there is a widespread use of all three ideal type ideologies in the election manifestoes from both chosen years. At the same time one could argue to a lesser extent that the Sweden Democrats have neared the Moderate Party as the ideal type Liberal values can be found abate to a far lesser extent compared to the the ideal type Nationalist and Conservative values in the election manifestos. As such, one can argue that an ideological resemblance between the two parties is apparent to a degree in the chosen measuring points though differences can also be found within the study between the two parties.

Explaining the rising support for right-wing populist parties in Europe during the last decade is an issue that interests both economists, sociologists and political scientists. A number of theories suggest that the rising inflow of migrants to Europe has had an important causal effect on right-wing populist support. However, as migration patterns generally are not exogenous to right-wing populist support, it is difficult to interpret the estimates of a correlation study causally.  In this paper, I exploit a Swedish refugee dispersal program as a natural experiment to estimate the effect of refugee inflow on the support for the right-wing populist party the Sweden Democrats using an instrumental variable strategy. Despite detailed institutional knowledge, I am not able to find support for any short-term effects of refugee inflow on the self-reported preferences for the Sweden Democrats. This goes against the findings of most previous studies.  However, the multicollinearity of some of my covariates are high. In addition, as the program was introduced in 2016, there are few years available for identification. Thus, the precision of the estimates is relatively low and the study would benefit from adding more years to the panel data set.

Studien “Vi gör det för att vi älskar Sverige” syftar till att belysa hur en politikers diskurstillämpning i en svensk valrörelse kan exkludera etniska och kulturella grupper. Specifikt studeras hur Sverigedemokraternas partiledare Jimmie Åkesson tillämpar en etno-nationalistisk diskurs i sina tal på Långholmen, i Almedalen och i Sölvesborg under valrörelsen 2018. Studien undersöker därmed hur etno-nationalism kommer till uttryck i Åkessons tal och hur den etno-nationalistiska diskursen förändras utifrån kontexterna rumslig dimension, målgrupp och historia. Det teoretiska ramverket utgår från kritisk diskursanalys (CDA) där även begreppen diskurs, nationalistisk diskurs samt den retoriska aspekten förklaras. Studiens metod och analysbegrepp utgår från CDA och Norman Faircloughs tredimensionella modell, som gör det möjligt att identifiera underliggande maktstrukturer och bidra till kritisk språkmedvetenhet kring exkluderande diskurser i svensk politik. Samtliga tal analyseras på Norman Faircloughs textnivå, för att sedan jämföras på den diskursiva och sociala nivån i hans tredimensionella modell. Analysresultatet visade att Åkessons etno-nationalistiska diskurs förändras efter vilken kontext talen gavs i. Gemensamt för samtliga tal var att Åkesson förespråkar assimilering eller exkludering när han tillämpar en tydlig etno-nationalistisk diskurs. Resultatet visade också att en etno-nationalistisk diskurs inte nödvändigtvis behövde uttryckas tydligare inför en redan ideologiskt övertygad publik.

AbstractMedia presents hate crimes and nationalism as phenomenon that has increased both internationally and nationally in recent years. Further media largely pair these phenomenon together. The groups mostly exposed to hate and nationalism are people of different ethnic origin and LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bi, trans and queer) people. In Sweden's general election in 2010 a RHP-party, Sweden Democrats, made it in to Parliament. The purpose of this study was to examine how hate crimes and nationalism, in the form of the Sweden Democrats, has increased in Sweden and if there was any link between them. By mapping the proportion of reported hate crimes and the proportion of eligible voters who voted for the Sweden Democrats in Sweden between 1997 and 2009 the study's main aim was to investigate whether there was any link between the proportion of reported hate crimes and the proportion of voters for Sweden Democrats in Sweden. The results question whether an actual increase of hate crime occurred due to methodological changes in the Swedish Security Service, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention and the police. Also the dark figure is large regarding this crime. Sweden Democrats has had strong success in recent years, but whether this is a sign of increased nationalism can’t be impugned. 1998 and 1999 revealed a relationship between hate crime complaints and voting on the Sweden Democrats, but after 1999 the relationship is weak.

Syftet med studien är att utifrån Sverigedemokraternas valkampanjfilm undersöka hur de planerade kommunikationsverktygen profil, identitet och image tolkas utifrån tre olika perspektiv. Under studiens gång har vi genomfört strukturerade intervjuer med tre medlemmar inom Sverigedemokraterna, en semiotisk filmanalys av partiets valkampanjfilm och utfört enkätundersökningar med 100 röstberättigade elever vid Erik Dahlbergsgymnasiet.   Studiens resultat visar att Sverigedemokraternas profil stämmer överens med valkampanjfilmens identitet. Gällande image anser partiet att allmänhetens tolkning inte stämmer överens med partiets profil. Ett problem som Sverigedemokraterna säger sig ligga i att media har kommunicerat en felaktig bild av partiet.   Vår semiotiska filmanalys visar att Sverigedemokraternas budskap framgår tydligt i valkampanjfilmen genom att visa hur invandringen kostar mycket, samtidigt som pensionärerna blir drabbade. Studiens resultat visar även att mer än hälften av eleverna på Erik Dahlbergsgymnasiet hade en negativ inställning till Sverigedemokraterna och 70 procent ansåg att individerna i valkampanjfilmen framställs orättvist. / This study will investigate how the Sweden Democrats' use the planned communication tools: profile, identity and image in their election campaign film. We have during the study used three different perspectives: structured interviews with three members of the Sweden Democrats, a semiotic film analysis of the party's election campaign film and performed a survey of 100 voting students at Erik Dahlbergsgymnasiet.   The results of the study have demonstrated that the Sweden Democrats' profile is consistent with the campaign film's identity. The Sweden Democrats believes that the image of the party is not consistent with the party's profile. The problem that the Sweden Democrats claim to be medias fault. Our semiotic film analysis shows that the Sweden Democrats' message is clear in the election campaign by showing how immigration is expensive, while pensioners are affected. Our results also show that more than half of the students at Erik Dahlbergsgymnasiet had a bias against the Sweden Democrats and 70 percent felt that the individuals in the election campaign film were represented wrong.

The purpose of this essay is to analyse the Christian democrats and the Sweden democrats’ ideological changes regarding their law and order and migration policies based on their election manifests from 2002-2018. The aim is then to explain these changes with the help of Downs (1957) based on cooperation, ideological superiority, and internal party changes. The question is whether the political parties have become ideologically and politically similar and if Downs (1957) theory will be able to explain this. The chosen method for the study is a theory testing case-study with an ideological analysis compared over time. The political parties’ ideological changes are shown in a descriptive analysis upon which Downs (1957) theory is applied. The study’s conclusion is that the theory can be used to explain the political parties ideological and political convergence. However, it cannot conclude which aspect that has been the most significant to explain the ideological changes that have occurred.

Den eviga debatten kring public service roll i svensk demokrati har under vintern blossat upp rejält på nytt i och med Sverigedemokraternas utspel om att kalla in bolagens chefer till Kulturutskottet och Linus Bylunds uttalanden om att straffa partiska och osakliga journalister. Denna studie syftar till att utröna vad Sverigedemokraternas vision för public service är och hur den förhåller sig till övriga politiska partier, det förvaltningsrättsliga systemet och normativa teorier om medier. Studien undersöker detta genom en kvalitativ textanalys som inledningsvis fokuserar på Sverigedemokraternas vision av public service för att därefter även gå vidare och undersöka public service ur de tre andra perspektiven i syfte att ta reda ta reda på hur Sverigedemokraternas vision förhåller sig till dessa. Analysen ger för handen att den Sverigedemokratiska visionen – i komprimerat format – handlar om ett public service-bolag som i grunden behövs för att fylla viktiga funktioner i termer av demokrati och samhällsnytta som marknaden inte kan tillhandahålla. Bolaget ska ha ett grundläggande samhällsuppdrag och ett brett kulturuppdrag med storslagna svenska dramaproduktioner. Bolaget ska ha ett högt förtroende bland allmänheten, vara underställd omfattande granskning och bedriva ett extensivt nordiskt samarbete. Till en av de mest intressanta kontrasterna som uppstår kan nämnas hur det hos Sverigedemokraternas ledamot i förvaltningsstiftelsen, Linus Bylund, går att se likheter med det normativa sovjet-kommunistiska perspektivet. Det framgår även att Bylund konsekvent ger uttryck för en mer radikal och kollektivistisk linje jämfört med partiet. Detta är något som väcker stora frågor kring huruvida detta är att anse som en mer oslipad version av partiets syn på public service eller om Bylund driver public service i en egen riktning. / The perpetual debate concerning the role of public service broadcasting in Sweden has once again resurfaced. This time as a result of the Sweden Democrat’s request to summon the directors of the public service companies to the Parliament’s Committee on Cultural Affairs and Linus Bylund’s comments about punishing biased and unobjective journalists. The aim of this study is to examine the Sweden Democrat’s vision for public service broadcasting and how it relates to other political parties, administrative law and normative theory. The study examines this by a qualitative analysis of a wide range of documents including parliamentary bills, broadcasting licenses and academic literature containing normative media theories. The analysis shows that the Sweden Democrat’s vision – in summary – is about a public service company needed for fulfilling important functions in terms of democracy and public welfare that the private market is not capable of providing. The company shall have a basic societal mission and a wide cultural mission with grand productions of Swedish drama. The company shall have high trust among the public, be under comprehensive scrutiny and conduct an extensive Nordic cooperation. One of the most interesting findings when comparing the different perspectives is the similarities between Linus Bylund, who is the Sweden Democrats commissioner in the foundation that owns the public service companies, and the normative Sovjet-communist perspective. It is also apparent that Bylund seems to be constituting a more radical and collectivistic view compared to the party. This raises questions as to whether this is a cruder version of the party’s view or if Bylund is moving Swedish public service broadcasting in a direction of his own.

This paper examines the Church of Sweden’s changing approach to same-sex marriage from a queer theoretical and queer theological perspective. A discourse analytical method examines the previous discourse and how it has come to change over time. The analysis takes place among the statements that priests, bishops, and other theologians have expressed in the public debate, the Church’s theological committee and the church meetings that take place every year. The study also addresses the changes and explanations of the new Church Handbook based on a theological statement. The queer theoretical basis is based on Michel Foucault and Judith Butler's foundations for the theory and culminates in two explanatory models. The study's stated aim of investigating the Discourse of the Church of Sweden also lands in how the Swedish Church responds to National Socialist and value conservative forces in society such as the Sweden Democrats.The Church of Sweden’s policy to flag with the rainbow flag and meet homophobic expressions in both the society as in its own ranks.

An experimental survey (N = 415) is used to evaluate fascist qualifications within party preference groups, regarding susceptibility to a neofascist communication style and gravitation toward fascist ideas. Testing the notion by fascism expert Roger Griffin, that the influence of the neofascist intellectual movement the New Right (la Nouvelle Droite) is successfully shaping the 21st century wave of right-wing populism, it is hypothesized that sympathizers of the Swedish right-wing populism equivalent (the Sweden Democrats) are more susceptible to a neofascist communication style and more preconditioned to agree with covertly fascist ideas (as based on the writings of the Nouvelle Droite). The results strongly support this hypothesis, although the potential for generalizability beyond the collected sample is limited. Using a causal networks approach, the failure to falsify the hypothesis is however considered a small but valid observation that bolsters its probability. The study contributes to the current research by further strengthening the bridge between the fields of populism and fascism.