Thesis. 1979. M.Arch.A.S.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Bibliography: p. 70. / M.Arch.A.S.

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Inaug.-diss.--Greifswald. / Lebenslauf. "Literaturyerzeichnis": p. ix-xii.

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It is the contention of this thesis that the Tripartite Alliance came at the end of a period during which Britain and Turkey attempted to reconcile their often conflicting interests in order to ensure common security in the Near East. Between 1934-1939, contrary to the usual belief, the dynamics of Anglo-Turkish relations most often led Turkey to seek a formal relationship, which Britain, for reasons of its own, was reluctant to grant. Once conceded, in May 1939, with the proclamation of the Joint Guarantee, the fledgling Anglo-Turkish condominium promptly began to sicken, and by June 1940, had failed altogether. The primary reasons for this collapse were four. Firstly, the political under-pinnings of the alliance never seemed sufficient to permit either partner to consider advantageous the activation of the alliance once made. Secondly, the Alliance was afflicted by certain powerful dilemmas within Britain's global strategy which prevented British planners from coming to any lasting consensus regarding Turkey's role in imperial defence. Thirdly, if the alliance were to be made effective, sufficient and timely assistance--chiefly, material and economic assistance--would have to be provided the Turkish partner. During this early period, both Britain and France remained unable or unwilling to provide anything like the level of assistance required. Finally, the numerous inter-allied Staff conversations, which were a principle feature of the Alliance's early years, failed to produce a single viable option for the fruitful deployment of common forces against any possible enemy. Without such a plan, the entry of Turkey to the war would have been worse than ill-advised; it would have been pointless. / Once the Alliance had definitely foundered on these rocks, in the infinitely more menacing conditions existing after June 1940, it was entirely unlikely that Turkey would permit the activation of an alliance no longer consistent, by any reading, with its essential interests. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

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This study asks how national power capacity and state structures are reconfigured when faced simultaneously with the power diffusion impact of political globalization---defined as a consensus of ideas and subsequent pressure on states for further democratization and liberalization---and the power maximization demands of internal and external security dilemmas. Hypothesizing a resulting bifurcation of such state structures, this study identifies and explores the transformation dynamics of states being pressured by these two forces through an in-depth analysis of the Turkish case. First, the roots of the two pressures are explored from the late Ottoman and early Republican eras, and a pendulum period is observed, in which the incompatibility of the two drives becomes accepted. As the inevitability of the transformation from more authoritarian to more liberal regimes is realized, a resulting gradual development and institutionalization of a dual state structure into hard and soft agendas and, eventually, realms is shown. Within such a structure, a compromised governance system emerges, in which both a form of democracy and democratization is maintained for legitimacy purposes, and a strong power-holding mechanism, unaccountable to the public, is preserved as an ultimate guard to maintain control over the transformation process. An analysis of changes in the Turkish constitutions is used to reveal traceable reflections of the gradual expansion and consolidation of the hard realm. The actual workings of a dual state structure, revealing the realms' actors, their domestic and external allies, their positions, arguments and rhetoric, is provided by focusing on the clash in the Turkish case over the issue of minority rights in relation with the country's application process for European Union membership. The study identifies the new security dilemma of these countries as being the challenge of securing the inevitable transformation, including the