This study seeks to estimate and compare tax burdens for hypothetical families assumed to reside in each of the eleven contiguous Western states--Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. The estimates are made for a wide range of incomes--from $3,500 to $50,000--in each state. The taxes are allocated employing various shifting assumptions based on economic and tax incidence analysis. The tax exporting issue is acknowledged, and the estimates of burden adjusted to account for this phenomena. As a result, the rankings of states by level of tax burden shown in this study differ from those yielded by the more usual taxes per capita and taxes per $1,000 of personal income measures. The procedure used in this study allows for interstate comparisons of tax burden at each of the ten income levels considered. As a by-product, it gives an estimate of the distribution of the tax burden within each of the eleven states. / Graduation date: 1973

Thesis (Ph. M. in history)--University of Chicago, 1908. / Typewritten (carbon copy). Bibliography: 3 leaves at end.

This paper presents a model of the determination of excise tax rates by studying the substantial variation in the state excise taxes in the U.S. brewing industry. Two approaches are used. First, assuming that the government is only interested in the public interest, a socially optimal tax rate is derived. The magnitude of the tax rate is determined by the negative externalities of drinking behavior imposed on nondrinkers. Second, a special interest group that engages in lobbying activity and makes campaign contributions is introduced into the model. The government not only cares about the welfare of the society, but is also concerned about the abundance of its campaign contributions. The lobbying activity by the interest group causes the tax rate to deviate from the social optimum. Data from the beer industry in 1992 and 1995 are employed in the estimation. Instrumental variable techniques are used to deal with endogenous consumption and heteroscedasticity. The estimation indicates that states with a production capacity one barrel per person higher than the average state will have a beer tax 20 cents per barrel lower than average. The paper provides evidence that the power of interest group hampers the economic efficiency of the local tax system. / Graduation date: 1999

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1967. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, 1981. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Bibliography: leaves BIB 1-BIB 6. / by F. Ron Jones. / Ph.D.

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Transfer prices are the prices charged by one party for goods and/or services transferred to a related party. While transfer prices are essential to the goal of profit maximization within the enterprise, difficulties arise over how to establish the "correct" transfer price. For the global enterprise this problem is more acute because different segments of the enterprise operate under different political jurisdictions and are subject to taxation by different political entities. Concerns have been raised by Congress and the Internal Revenue Service regarding whether multinationals, especially foreign-owned multinationals, are using transfer-pricing and cost-allocation policies across international borders to avoid United States income taxes. Generally, testimony before the hearings, limited anecdotal studies, and court case findings have suggested that multinationals do not pay their "fair share". An examination of 336 companies in the chemical industry (STC codes 2800-2899) provided mixed support for the position that multinationals are paying less than their "fair share" of U.S. income taxes. While statistically significant differences were found among the three groups for the cost-ofgood-sold (COGS) ratio (after developmental stage enterprises were removed) and for the worldwide net-profit ratio, no Statistically significant differences were found for tax-rate measures (worldwide effective income tax rate, worldwide effective operating income tax rate, and U.S. effective operating income tax rate) or for the return measures (worldwide return on assets, worldwide operating return on assets, and U.S. operating return on assets). When multinationals (U.S.-controlled and foreign-controlled combined to form a single group) were compared to domestic companies, statistically significant differences were found only for the COGS ratio. When U.S. multinationals were restricted to those companies with 50% or more of both their net sales and average total assets abroad, statistically Significant differences were found for the operating income ratios (both U.S. and worldwide) and for the worldwide net profit ratio, but such differences were found neither for the COGS ratio, the effective-income-tax-rate measures, nor for the return measures. Complicating the issue were: (1) the presence of developing stage enterprises and foreign parent companies among the total group; (2) the use of a 10% cutoff in ownership and operations to determine whether a company is or is not a multinational; and (3) the absence of access to tax or accounting records, resulting in the need to use secondary sources for data. One suggestion for simplifying the transfer-pricing issue is the adoption of a method of formulary apportionment. Ina comparison of the amount of income allocated to U.S. operations under current methods (either specific allocation Or separate accounting) and the amount that would have been allocated under formulary apportionment methods no significant differences were found, suggesting that such a method is worthy of further study. / Ph. D.

This dissertation examines the relationship between debt and investment-related tax shields using changes in these classes of tax shields scaled by expected operating earnings following the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act(ERTA) in 1981. The substitution effect predicts that a negative relationship between changes in the two classes of tax shields will be observed in response to the increased investment-related tax shields offered by ERTA. Debt tax shields should decrease following ERTA since the probability of losing the tax benefit of tax shields would rise as investment-related tax shields increased following ERTA. Firms' probability of losing the deductibility of tax shields is used to segregate the sample into two groups. For the group of firms with a low probability of losing the deductibility of tax shields, the substitution effect is inapplicable and the relation between changes in the two classes of tax shields simply represents the debt securability effect. Since fixed assets can be used as collateral for debt, the debt securability hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between changes in debt and investment-related tax shields after the passage of ERTA. The model developed to segregate debt securability from the substitution effect reveals that, as predicted, the debt securability effect is positive for all firms and that the substitution effect is negative for those firms with a large probability of losing the benefits of tax shields. This reverses the findings of prior research. Controls for pecking order theory effects are introduced into the model to assure that the substitution effect observed is not due to debt ratio as predicted by Myers (1984). The findings described above remain intact except that the debt securability effect does not exist and the substitution effect is weaker for high-debt firms. Furthermore, support is offered for the pecking order theory. These results are robust to alternate specifications of time periods tested, variable definitions, data screening criteria and model specifications.

No description available.