Thesis--University of Utrecht, 1942. / "Translation by Dr. A. Fontein."

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1983. / Vita. Bibliography: leaves [271]-277.

手抄本. / 論文(碩士) - 香港中文大學. / 參考文獻: leaves 192-197. / Shou chao ben. / Lun wen (shuo shi) - Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / Can kao wen xian: leaves 192-197. / Chapter 第一章： --- 西方形上學傳統之大流（代序） --- p.1 / Chapter 第二章： --- 巴門尼德殘篇之要旨及疑團 --- p.23 / Chapter 第三章： --- 古希臘之心靈及其思想氛圍　 --- p.37 / Chapter 第四章： --- 巴門尼德殘篇譯述 --- p.94 / Chapter 第五章： --- 巴門尼德之真正信息 --- p.151 / Chapter 第六章： --- 巴門尼德之掙扎及希臘哲學之悲劇 --- p.162 / 註釋 --- p.178 / 參攷書目 --- p.192

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stony Brook University, 2008. / This official electronic copy is part of the DSpace Stony Brook theses & dissertations collection maintained by the University Libraries, Special Collections & University Archives on behalf of the Stony Brook Graduate School. It is stored in the SUNY Digital Institutional Repository and can be accessed through the website. Presented to the Stony Brook University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy; as recommended and accepted by the candidate's degree sponsor, the Dept. of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 180-186).

Thesis--Tuebingen, 1970.

Since Forms and particulars are separate, Plato is left with the task of describing the way in which they are related. One possible way of construing this relation is to suppose that particulars resemble Forms. Socrates proposes this and is refuted by Parmenides in the so-called Likeness Regress (Parmenzdes 132c12-133a7). This work comprises both an exposition and an analysis of the Likeness Regress. In the exposition, I work out the argument-form of the Likeness Regress in second-order logic (and later, show that first-order logic is sufficient). This symbolisation provides a baseline for the balance of the exposition, which has two focuses: first, I define what it means for particulars to resemble Forms, with the help of D. M. Armstrong's account of resemblance in A Theory of Unwersals; second, I demonstrate that the infinite regress argument of the Likeness Regress is indeed vicious, with the help of T. Roy's theory of regress arguments. In the analysis, I proceed with the premiss that an asymmetrical account of the resemblance relation would allow Socrates to escape Parmenides' refutation. I examine various accounts of asymmetrical resemblance (including those accounts put forward by R. E. Allen, P. T. Geach and G. Vlastos), but reject these in favour of my own account. My account of asymmetrical resemblance is based on understanding the resemblance relation as a function that is not self-inverse. Finally, I argue that the Likeness Regress need not be considered definitive, since we find in the ontology of the Timaeus a conception of resemblance that fits my account of asymmetrical resemblance. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Habilitationsschrift--Cologne. / Includes text of the fragments in German and Greek on opposite pages. Bibliography: p. [253]-259.

Zugl. überarb. Fassung von: Toruń, Univ., Diss., 2007

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The purpose of this thesis is to understand and evaluate, in the context of his monism, the meaning and implications of Fragment Three of Parmenides' poem. This fragment, itself incomplete, reads as follows: ... tò γáp αùtò voεîV εótiv tε Kαi εîvαi Which can be translated as: . . . for this is the same, to think and to be There is no disagreement that in Fragment Three Parmenides is in some way relating voεîv ("thinking") to εîvαi ("being"). The primary, but not the only problem which it poses is this: in the identification between thinking and being, are these words a mere statement that being is intelligible, or are they an assertion that Being is intelligent? Most modern commentators side with the former interpretation which accords with the view that reality/being is ultimately objective and impersonal. To maintain this position they are forced to construe the active infinitive voεîv as passive in meaning, with the further corollary that this verb-form implies mere possibility. The first proponent of this interpretation, Eduard Zeller, provided no justification for it. Post factum attempts by John Brunet and Uvo Holsher to provide the needed justification have proven to be groundless. The linguistic and literary evidence points overwhelmingly to the active meaning. Further, the prima facie interpretation of the parallel texts within the poem, as well as all the extant ancient testimonia (Clement of Alexandria, Plotinus, Proclus) support the active meaning. This thesis differs, then, from those interpretations which assume that Fragment Three distinguishes (thinking) subject from (inanimate) object; as well as from the view adopted by Heidegger that it means merely that being is the only possible object of knowledge. The conclusion of this thesis is that for Parmenides "to think" is identical with "to be" absolutely, that Being is not only one, but is alive and the center of consciousness, i.e. is Mind. Hence the fundamental question which Parmenides' poem answers is not "What is being?" but rather, "What is the way to the One-Who-Is?" / 2031-01-01

In this thesis this writer explores first-hand via a participative hermeneutics from an objective idealist perspective the relationship between consciousness, language and the world by reconstructing the seminal philosophy contained in the fifth century poem of Parmenides of Elea--first, in dialogue format, secondly through an essay in which two men, one last and one higher, are each respectively de- and reconstructed for the purpose of indicating, in that final section of the essay, how they each define their own paradigm of education in comparison to M. J. Adler and Carl Rogers.