控制公司與從屬公司在法律面各具有獨立法人格，但在經濟面共同為聯盟經濟體。法律上允許控制公司與從屬公司不對等的控制支配關係存在，控制公司對從屬公司之財務、經營或人事具有控制支配力，可使從屬公司為或不為一定行為，當該行為不合於一般營業常規（本研究簡稱非常規交易）時，從經濟學角度，非常規交易或因集團整體運作需要，或因風險彼此瞭解或共同承擔等，致交易條件與一般常規不同，並非絕對無效率或涉有不法目的，完全禁止反有礙市場效率，故先進國家如美國、德國及我國等，對於非常規交易行為立法採不禁止，只是管制方式不同。我國公司法重視從屬公司權益之保障，制約控制公司適當補償或損害賠償責任；證券交易法則就行為致公司遭受重大損害，以刑責相繩；所得稅法基於租稅公平，按營業常規予以調整納稅，所謂不同法律立法目的所欲保護的法益不同，對於非常交易行為課以的法律效果也不同。 　　本研究以公司法第369條之4規定作為探討主軸，除認識、剖析我國公司法、證券交易法及所得稅法對非常規交易的規範目的及構成要件外，釐清控制關係、非常規交易等意涵也是很重要的，概實務案例上，非常規交易的確是不法利益輸送或掏空公司資產行為最常藉用的手法，主要原因除了控制與從屬關係外，非常規交易複雜難辨亦是原因之一。又控制公司支使從屬公司為非常規交易行為可能產生三種法律後果，一為直接損害從屬公司的權益；二為直接損害控制公司少數股東或債權人權益；三為同時損害從屬公司少數股東及其債權人權利。我國公司法、證交法及所得稅法基於不同立法目的而律定規範制約控制者責任，引進控制股東之受託義務、公司法人格否認、揭穿公司面紗原則、深石原則及代位訴訟等法理基礎與實務判例來作制約，保障受害者權益，立法意義值得肯定。但沒有一種責任機制能夠在所有情況下都發揮作用，水能載舟，亦能覆舟，加強控制公司責任，並賦予從屬公司或少數股東相對應的防衛工具，某種程度也影響了企業集團整體利益之運作，又法律正義權益平衡的設計，恐因舉證責任的關係，而難以落實。國內非常規交易規範行之有年，但商業交易行為推陳出新，以及跨境交易查證困難等，法制上及實務上面臨一些問題，本研究試著歸納並提出建議意見，希望法律正義得以伸張，經濟發展與利益保護得以衡平。 / The controlling company and the subsidiary company is independent in law, but in the economic side together for the Union economy. The law allows them to non-arm’s length transactions. From an economic perspective, it is not absolute inefficiency, so the advanced countries does not prohibit, but different control mode. Different legal legislative purpose is seeking to protect legal interests of different, so legal effect is different. 　　In this study, First, introducing and analyzing the legislative purposes and constituent elements of non-arm’s length transactions in the Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Act and the Income Tax Act. Second, understanding and clarifying the meaning of control relationship, non-arm’s length transactions, etc. Third, jurisprudencing fiduciary duty, disregard of the corporate fiction, piercing the corporate veil, doctrine of deep stone and derivative suit. Finally, summarizing cases from the substantive issues, concludes with recommendations observations.

中國大陸經濟體制改革中最為重要的是對國有企業的改革，而企業集團（關聯企業）的產生與發展，就可以追溯到20世紀80年代對國有企業的一系列改革。1993年《公司法》的制定主要目的和功能是爲了進行國有企業股份制改革，因此並未對企業集團（關聯企業）有所規定。最近20年來，中國大陸經濟飛速發展，企業集團化非常普遍，關聯企業在中國大陸的經濟活動中有著舉足輕重的地位。 臺灣公司法1997年修正時，新增關係企業專章，以保障從屬公司少數股東及其債權人之權益，並促進關係企業之健全運營。而中國大陸《公司法》幾次修正卻從未將關聯企業納入其中。本文認為，在中國大陸，如何規範關聯企業之發展，如何保護從屬公司少數股東及其債權人之利益，已經成為一個迫切需要進行立法規範的議題。 因此，本文會對臺灣公司法關係企業章進行研究，尋求中國大陸《公司法》可以借鑑之處，同時亦會分析中國大陸在關聯企業形成過程中的不同之處，以提出適合中國大陸環境之立法建議。 / The reform of State-owned enterprises has been the top priority in China for the economic reform. The formation and development of enterprise group (affiliates enterprises) can be traced back to the enterprise system reform in 1980s. The China Corporate Act 1993 focus on the reform of State-owned enterprises but not the enterprise group (affiliates enterprises). The following amendments still did not regulate the enterprises group (affiliates enterprises). In the last two decades, the economy developed rapidly and enterprise group is very common. Affiliated enterprises play an important role in China's economic activities. Taiwan amended its Corporate Law in 1997, adding Affiliated Enterprises chapter to protect the minority shareholders and the creditors of the affiliated company. The purpose is to promote the sound operation of the affiliated enterprises. There are some substantial developments from the practical experience and legal inquiry for the relevant operations. This paper argues that in order to protect the transaction safety, improve the regulations and development for affiliates enterprises, ensure the interests of minority shareholders and creditors of affiliated companies, we should clarify the forms, types, legal operation background, and difficulties of affiliated enterprises in China. Based on the examination and analysis of Taiwan Corporate Law, and learning from the China Corporate Act at the same time, this paper hopes to propose appropriate legislation fit to China's corporate structures and environments.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

The issue of a Muslim woman‟s dress code has been debated for centuries. This is of great importance as it is widely used as a criterion to measure the extent of a woman‟s piety or devotion to Allah. A study of the religious texts on the issue is essential. Therefore, Qur‟anic text, Prophetic Traditions and Qur‟anic exegesis of both classical and modern scholars would have been used in determining the correct dress code for Muslim women. While all research indicates that women dress conservatively, in order not to attract the attention of the opposite sex. The extent to which a woman must be covered has not been agreed upon. Even if what has to be covered is established by scholars, the manner in which this is to be done and the type of colours and fabric to be used needs further clarification. The issue of the female dress code needs to be presented from a female perspective. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Islamic Studies)

At first, the thesis aims at general definition of {\clq}qjustice``, it presents principles and typology of justice. Next, it explores a historical-social background of these conceptions of justice in an outline of historical eras. The second chapter introduces principles and distribution of property in social reality. The third chapter offers an overview of John Rawls´ conception of justice, which is one of the most important contemporary accounts. The fourth chapter deals with a social justice on an international level and enlarges upon Rawls´ theory discussing questions of global justice posed by other authors.

LLM / Department of Mercantile Law / This research examined the mechanisms that were employed by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in order to protect the interests of creditors in company affairs. At the preamble of the aforementioned Act lies an undertaking from legislature to provide appropriate redress to investors and third parties/creditors. It was on that basis that the researcher sought to establish whether legislature had indeed fulfilled its commitment to provide appropriate redress to creditors. Traditionally, companies have been run to promote the interests of shareholders with little attention given to the interests of other stakeholders such as creditors. It is this research`s findings that South African company law has moved from the traditional view, that is the shareholder value approach, to the enlightened shareholder value approach: a model of corporate governance which permits directors to have regard, where appropriate, to the interests of other stakeholders but with shareholders’ interests retaining primacy. It is thus found that creditors cannot be protected by contract laws alone but that their protection should be enhanced by mandatory corporate laws which regulates the manner and conduct of company controllers in a way that ensures that the interests of all stakeholders, including creditors, are given due regard. Finally, it has been found that much work has been done by legislature in developing the re-enacted creditor protective mechanisms and also in statutorily adopting new mechanisms which are aimed at advancing creditor interests. Recommendations have thus been made to legislature for possible amendments to refine its corporate laws. / NRF

Les entreprises sont aujourd’hui au coeur des échanges économiques mondiaux. Ces échanges se traduisent par la mise en place de relations commerciales desquelles peuvent émerger des structures souvent complexes et difficilement saisissables par le droit : les entreprises transnationales. Aucune réponse juridique satisfaisante n’a encore été trouvée pour les encadrer, alors que paradoxalement, la RSE donne naissance à des normes, des outils et des instruments pour les responsabiliser. L’étude de la responsabilité sociétale des entreprises transnationales à travers le prisme du droit révèle en réalité l’émergence d’un cadre de régulation hybride : les normes de RSE s’immiscent dans le droit, conduisant celui-ci à s’emparer de ces normes à son tour. Cet échange permet d’aborder l’entreprise transnationale à travers une approche nouvelle, tirée des normes de RSE, c’est-à-dire à travers son organisation et ses fonctions. Les relations de l’entreprise avec ses partenaires commerciaux deviennent alors une assise potentielle pour le droit, davantage que son statut ou que sa structure juridique, à partir desquelles peuvent être imputées des obligations, aujourd’hui inexistantes. Une fois l’entreprise transnationale saisie, c’est un cadre juridique adapté à son organisation complexe qui peut être mis à jour. L’étude des normes de RSE dévoile un enrichissement des règles applicables à l’entreprise transnationale et un renforcement potentiel de sa responsabilité juridique, fondée sur une approche préventive mais également solidaire du droit de la responsabilité. Passant outre les problèmes posés par l’absence de statut juridique, la RSE permet de saisir les entreprises transnationales par le biais de leurs relations commerciales, et d’envisager la conception d’un nouveau standard juridique de conduite sociétale, générateur d’une responsabilité individuelle et collective fondée sur une obligation de vigilance. / Companies are now at the heart of global trade. These economic exchanges result in the establishment of commercial relationships, from which may emerge structures that are often complex and difficult to grapple with under the law: transnational corporations. While no satisfactory legal framework has yet been established to frame their work, paradoxically CSR gives rise to standards, tools and instruments to ensure their accountability. The study of the social responsibility of transnational corporations through the prism of the law actually reveals the emergence of a hybrid framework of regulation: CSR standards influence the law, forcing the law in turn to take note of these standards. This exchange allows us to handle a transnational business through a new approach derived from CSR standards, essentially through its organisation and functions. The relationship between a company and its business partners then becomes a potential basis for the law, rather than its status or its legal structure, from which can be derived responsibilities. Once a transnational corporation is seized, a legal framework adapted to its complex structure can come to light. The study of CSR standards reveals an enrichment of the rules applicable to transnational corporations and a potential strengthening of their legal liability, based on a preventive and joint and several approach of the law of responsibility. Ignoring the problems posed by the lack of legal status, CSR allows for the regulation of transnational enterprises through their commercial relations and provides a basis for the development of a new legal standard of social conduct, giving rise to individual and collective liability based on a duty of care.