王睿智. / 論文(哲學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院歷史學部, 1997. / 參考文獻: leaves [213-218]. / Wang Ruizhi. / Chapter 第一章： --- 「三角政治」的締造者及六九年中蘇衝突 帶來的契機 / Chapter 第二章： --- 六十年代蘇聯開始在冷戰取得優勢 / Chapter 第三章： --- 七三至七六年：中美關係停滯不前及蘇聯 加緊擴張 / Chapter 第四章： --- 「三個世界」理論：七十年代中國的新 「世界觀」及毛澤東逝世後的中蘇關係 / Chapter 第五章： --- 七七年至七九年：中美走向建交及其合作 的局限 / Chapter 第六章： --- 蘇聯入侵阿富汗帶來地緣政治衝擊，成 爲「三角關係」的轉捩點 / Chapter 第七章： --- 七九年至八二年：蘇聯入侵阿富汗推動中 美合作以及中美關係的新危機 / Chapter 第八章： --- 中國採取新外交姿態以及對美國、蘇聯關 係的變化 / 餘論 / 參考書目

伍德昌. / 論文(碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院歷史學部,1995. / 參考文獻: leaves 89-101. / Wu Dechang. / Chapter 第一章 --- 導論 / Chapter (1) --- 前人論點的反思 --- p.1 / Chapter (2) --- 問題的提出 --- p.5 / Chapter (3) --- 研究方向的設定 --- p.7 / 註釋 --- p.13 / Chapter 第二章 --- 國家建構與清末的軍事發展 --- p.18 / Chapter (1) --- 何謂國家 --- p.18 / Chapter (2) --- 清末的國家建構 --- p.19 / Chapter (3) --- 軍事制度的建設 --- p.20 / Chapter (4) --- 後備軍事力量的建立 --- p.24 / Chapter (5) --- 清末軍事改革的局限 --- p.27 / Chapter (6) --- 小結 --- p.28 / 註釋 --- p.29 / Chapter 第三章 --- 豫西南的地理和社會狀況 --- p.32 / Chapter (1 ) --- 研究範圍一一豫西南 --- p.32 / Chapter (2) --- 地理環境 --- p.34 / Chapter (3 ) --- 交通運输 --- p.34 / Chapter (4) --- 經濟狀況 --- p.36 / Chapter (5) --- 社會狀況 --- p.38 / Chapter (6) --- 盜匪、暴力與社會 --- p.44 / Chapter (7) --- 註釋 --- p.47 / Chapter 第四章 --- 辛亥革命前後河南的陸軍、革命派和盜匪 --- p.50 / Chapter (1 ) --- 辛亥革命前的軍事部署 --- p.50 / Chapter (2) --- 同盟會與盜匪 --- p.54 / Chapter (3 ) --- 辛亥革命在河南 --- p.58 / Chapter (4) --- 盜匪與革命軍的關係 --- p.59 / Chapter (5) --- 小結 --- p.62 / 註釋 --- p.63 / Chapter 第五章 --- 民初豫西南的軍事發展 --- p.68 / Chapter (1) --- 民初河南的軍事控制和兵匪結合 --- p.68 / Chapter (2) --- 民初軍隊與盜匪的關係 --- p.72 / Chapter (3) --- 軍隊與白朗起義 --- p.74 / Chapter (4) --- 小結 --- p.81 / 註釋 --- p.81 / Chapter 第六章 --- 結論 --- p.81 / 註釋 --- p.87 / 參考資料 --- p.89

Master of Arts / Department of History / Andrew Orr / Women have been in integral part of history that has been decidedly left out of the picture until the last few decades. As history has been re-casted to include the contributions of women, this work examines the struggles endured by the American women who joined the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps and/or the Women’s Army Corps during World War II. Using a limited investigation into the newspaper coverage in the New York area and personal comments WAAC/WAC veterans, this report argues that early press coverage of women soldiers belittled and humiliated them, thus discouraging women from enlisting. Over time, coverage became more positive as journalists gradually accepted the importance of women’s contributions to the military. By 1943, coverage was increasingly positive and articles about WACs received more prominent placement in newspapers. This shift occurred at the same time the number of women enlisting grew, suggestion the two are related. It was through the changes in the expected traditional proper place of women to a more realistic acknowledgment of the legitimacy of women’s work in the military that helped lay the platform to more permanent positive changes for women in the workplace, society, and at home.

The United States commands the most powerful conventional military in the world. This extraordinary advantage in conventional power should enable the United States to coerce target states without having to fire a single shot. Yet, over the past two decades, leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed U.S. threats and invited military clashes with the world's sole superpower. What explains the United States' inability to coerce many of the world's weakest targets with compellent military threats? I argue that the United States' compellent threats fail more frequently in the post-Cold War period because they are costly neither to issue nor to execute. That is, because it is not risky for the United States to issue compellent threats, and because it is relatively cheap for the United States to use military force, the threat of force does not signal to target states that the United States is highly motivated to defeat them. For this reason, a target will resist a U.S. threat that is immediately credible in the belief that the United States will apply limited force, but will not apply decisive force if the target continues to resist after the United States executes its threat. The costly compellence theory asserts that only threats that are costly for the unipole to issue and to execute will be effective in compelling target states to yield before the application of force. To illustrate this logic, I present a basic formal model of a unipole that issues a compellent threat against a weak target state. The model suggests that both unipoles that are highly motivated to prevail over targets and those that are not will behave identically in the early stages of a crisis, i.e., they are both willing to execute military threats in many equilibria. The model suggests that, under many conditions, the target cannot infer from the willingness to issue and to execute a compellent threat that the United States is highly motivated to defeat it, and consequently, it is likely to resist. I then argue that the United States has developed a model of warfare that dramatically limits the human, political, and financial costs of employing force. As the unipole, it is not costly for the United States to issue compellent threats in the post-Cold War period. The United States has also pursued many strategies that limit the costs of force: it relies on an all-volunteer military increasingly supplemented by private contractors; it has developed a force structure based on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) thesis that relies increasingly on airpower and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); it employs force in conjunction with allies who contribute money and troops to U.S. coercive campaigns; it employs deficit spending to pay for its military operations; and, it actively limits collateral damage inflicted on target states. In combination, these strategies both lower the costs of employing force and undermine the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats. To evaluate the logic of the costly compellence theory, I present a new dataset on the United States' use of compellent threats 1945-2007. I demonstrate that the United States has employed compellent threats more frequently since the end of the Cold War, and that these threats have been less effective on average in the post-Cold War period. These observations are consistent with the logic of the costly compellence theory. I also evaluate four cases in which the United States issued compellent threats against weak opponents. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 2011 threat against Libya constitute "most-likely" cases for the costly compellence theory. The theory accurately predicts that the Soviets would concede in 1962 and that Qaddafi would resist the United States' demands in 2011. I also compare the United States' 1991 and 2003 threats against Saddam Hussein. Saddam's resistance in 1991 is consistent with the logic of costly compellence. I evaluate sources captured after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to evaluate why Saddam Hussein chose to resist the more costly threat in 2003. Finally, I argue that the United States is likely to continue its efforts to minimize the costs of employing force and to emphasize the use of technology over ground troops. My study suggests that these strategies will both enhance the ease with which the United States can employ force and decrease the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats, because they suggest to potential targets that the United States lacks the motivation to defeat them.

Chan, Tze Wai. / "August 2011." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / List of Illustrations --- p.iv / Note on Abbreviation --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1: --- Prologue --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- Homeric War and the Greek Military Culture --- p.12 / Homeric Age and the Study of Greek Warfare --- p.12 / Metallurgy --- p.18 / The Inception of the Greek Way of War --- p.30 / The Idea of Warfare --- p.44 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- The Emergence of the Greek Way --- p.52 / The Hoplite Warfare and the Greek Essences --- p.52 / Homeric Tradition and Hoplite Warfare --- p.59 / Encountering Foreigners --- p.73 / The Greek Way of War --- p.87 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- The Transformation of Greek Warfare --- p.92 / The Legacy of the Persian Wars --- p.92 / The Introduction of New Elements --- p.98 / Response of the Hoplite Tradition --- p.113 / Militarization of the Greek Way --- p.121 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- Epilogue --- p.130 / Bibliography --- p.133

This dissertation is a study of Plutarch's portrayal of military leadership in his Parallel Lives. I investigate Plutarch's use of extended military narrative to provide examples of good generalship for his readers, his conception of the importance and dangers of a military education, his attitude toward the moral use of deception in warfare, and the importance of synkrisis to the reader's final assessment of a general's military ability. I conclude with a case study of the Pyrrhus-Marius, in which I examine how Plutarch uses military narrative throughout the pair to compare the generalship of the two men. I demonstrate that Plutarch's conception of generalship in the Parallel Lives is nuanced, consistent, and often significant to the interpretation of a pair. Plutarch constructs his military narratives in such a way as to identify specific acts of generalship through which the military leaders among his readership could evaluate and improve their own generalship. Plutarch's treatment of the morality of generalship is consistent with his views on education and character; while he accepts the necessity and appreciates the effectiveness of military deception, he also recognizes its limitations and holds up for criticism those generals who do not use it appropriately. I also examine the importance of the formal synkrisis at the end of each pair of Lives to the structural integrity of the Plutarchan book and the evaluation of military leadership in each pair. These concluding synkriseis demonstrate that Plutarch had a consistent set of criteria for evaluating the generalship of his subjects, and encourage the reader to make similar judgments on military ability themselves. This process of evaluation and comparison of military leadership is particularly important to my reading of the Pyrrhus-Marius, as comparing the military careers of its subjects allows for a more complete reading of the pair than is otherwise possible.

Military mutinies are occurring more frequently in the last two decades than ever before. Mutinies impact every region of the world. Given that they are occurring more frequently, impact every region, and often have disastrous implications, scholars must answer the foundational question: why do mutinies occur? What are the proximate domestic conditions that give rise to military mutinies? This project makes three contributions. First, I set out to formally define mutinies and collect a new dataset that will allow scholars to examine mutinies empirically. Second, I present a theoretical framework that explains when and why mutinies will occur. Finally, I present three novel empirical tests of the theory. The first portion of this dissertation defines mutinies and describes the data collection process. I present the Military Mutinies and Defections Databases (MMDD). Using news articles from various sources, I code 460 mutiny events from 1945 – present day. I code a number of other variables that give users details about the event, such as: whether or not violence was used, whether or not civilians were killed, and whether or not soldiers defected from the military apparatus. Next, I utilize a nested principal agent model to describe when mutinies are likely to occur. Agent models describe hierarchical relationships of delegation. A nested structure allows for multiple agents and multiple principals in a given model. I apply this nested structure to the military to generate three various nests. The first examines foot soldiers as an agent of the military leadership. In this nest, policy failures (e.g., bad strategy) secured by the military leadership will drive foot soldier mutinies. The second nest explores foot soldiers as agents of the executive, a civilian principal. In this nest, I expect that situations that place soldiers in conflict with the executive will generate shirking. The final nest considers foot soldiers and military leadership as collective agents of the executive. I theorize that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking, or mutinies, in this nested structure. The final nest presents an interesting trade-off for a coup-worried leader. I argue that while executives can utilize regime securing strategies, such strategies might actually agitate the military and drive low level military rebellions. Coup proofing, a common practice among executives that are worried they will be ousted by the military, effectively wards of coups but can generate unintended consequences. Specifically, I expect that counterbalancing measures and other coup proofing tactics should spur mutinies because the intended purpose of these measures is to create coordination challenges which likely spur military splintering. The first empirical chapter sets out to explore the relationship between civil conflict and the likelihood of mutinies. I expect that when civil wars are extremely bloody or long lasting, mutinies will be more likely as war-weary soldiers no longer want to invest in the war effort. I find evidence that indeed civil war intensity and duration contribute to the probability of a state experiencing a mutiny. The second empirical chapter explores scenarios that pit foot soldiers preferences against the executive’s. I expect that scenarios that impose steep costs on foot soldiers, yet provide some benefit to the executive are likely to spur mutinies. I find evidence that protest events and divisionary conflict spur mutinies. The final empirical chapter explores the military apparatus as a whole. I find that coup proofing measures increase the likelihood of mutinies. Additionally, I find that scenarios that are likely to spur widespread dissent among military actors will increase the likelihood of a mutiny in the context of steep coordination challenges that stifle coup activity. The final chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations. I offer recommendations for leader states (e.g., major powers and democratic leaders in the international system) and for states experiencing mutinies. I conclude by discussing the many possible extensions for this project. This section seeks to emphasis the fact that this is a young, novel research program with many promising avenues for future research.

Troops, requested by the federal government for the security during the Civil War of the overland mail, telegraph, and emigrant routes, were provided by California for those portions of the routes which crossed the territories of Utah and Nevada. A force, never exceeding 1, 200 in strength, commanded by Patrick Edward Connor, was assigned a geographic responsibility, the Military District of Utah. Connor's California Volunteers established principal troop locations at Fort Churchill and Fort Ruby in Nevada, and at Camp Douglas and Fort Bridger in Utah Territory during mid-1862. Major actions were conducted against the Indians at the battle of Bear River and by the campaign of Spanish Fork canyon, both in early 1863. Thereafter, a series of treaties achieved peace with various Indian tribes. Connor also utilized his troops in a variety of activities peripheral to his primary military mission. Important examples were a colonization effort at Soda Springs, continued and thorough area reconnaissance, and early efforts to develop the territorial mineral resources. Considerations of Mormon intentions, often believed by Connor to be inimical to Union interests, occupied much of Connor's time. Many writers record a generally unfavorable impression of Connor in Utah. However, it is the view of this author that the missions assigned to the federal troops in the District of Utah during the Civil War were important and were effectively carried out.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Full text release at OhioLINK's ETD Center delayed at author's request

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, 1972. / "April 1972." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in microfiche.