<p>This thesis studies the design of Bayesian revenue-optimal auctions for a class of problems in which buyers have general (non-linear and multi-parameter) preferences. This class includes the classical linear single-parameter problem considered by Myerson (1981), for which he provided a simple characterization of revenue proving optimality of a mechanism, leading to numerous applications in theory and practice. However, for fully general preferences no generic and practical solution is known (various negative computational or structural results exist for special cases), even for the problem of designing a mechanism for a single agent. This thesis sets to identifies key conditions implying that the optimal mechanism is practical. Our main results are different in that they identify different conditions implying different notions of practicality, but are all similar in adopting a modular view to the problem that separates the task of designing a solution for the single-agent problem as the main module, from the task of combining these modules to form an optimal multi-agent mechanism. For multi-parameter linear settings, we specify a large class of distributions over values that implies that the optimal single-agent mechanism is posted pricing, and the optimal multi-agent mechanism maximizes \emph{virtual values} for players' favorite items (e.g., when agents are identical, second price auction with reserve for favorite items). More generally, we specify a condition called revenue-linearity (defined beyond multi-parameter linear settings) that implies that optimizing agents' marginal revenue maximizes revenue. Finally, adopting efficient computability as the notion of practicality, we show that for any setting in which single-agent solutions are efficiently computable, multi-agent solutions are also computable.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 328-343).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1936. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. [41]-43).

<p> This dissertation consists of three essays on information aggregation in committees and its application. </p><p> The first essay analyzes how the distribution of votes affects the accuracy of group decisions. In a weighted voting system, votes are typically assigned based on the criteria that are unrelated to the voters' ability to make a correct judgment. I introduce an information aggregation model in which voters are identical except for voting shares. If the information is free, the optimal weight distribution is equal weighting. When acquiring information is costly, by contrast, I show that the accuracy of group decisions may be higher under some weighted majority rules than under unweighted majority rule. I characterize the equilibrium and find the optimal weight distribution to maximize the accuracy of group decisions. Asymmetric weight distributions may be optimal when the cost of improving signal is moderately high. </p><p> The second essay analyzes how intergenerational family transfers can be sustained. Why are generous transfers from the younger to the older generations made in some families and not in others? My paper argues that differences in intergenerational dependence are due to variation in community networks. My analysis of the sustainability of intergenerational transfers posits game theoretical models of overlapping generations in which breadwinners make transfers to their parents and children. A novel feature of my models is that there is a local community that may supply information about its members' past behaviors. I demonstrate that an efficient level of intergenerational transfers can be sustained if neighbors "gossip" about each other. </p><p> The third essay, co-authored with Fuhito Kojima, investigates a jury decision when hung juries and retrials are possible. When jurors in subsequent trials know that previous trials resulted in hung juries, informative voting can be an equilibrium if and only if the accuracy of signals for innocence and guilt are exactly identical. Moreover, if jurors are informed of numerical split of votes in previous trials, informative voting is not an equilibrium regardless of signal accuracy.</p>

Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Auburn University, 2007. / Abstract. Includes bibliographic references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Economics, 2005. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Dec. 8, 2008). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-05, Section: A, page: 1898. Chair: Eric B. Rasmusen.

<p> Prison reformists, lawmakers, human rights activists, lobbyists, investors, government agencies, and other civil and government actors play a large role in the state of the private prison industry&rsquo;s rate of growth, especially in the past 15-20 years. A 2001 Bureau of Justice Statistics study concluded that big cost savings promised by the private prison industry in the United States &ldquo;have not materialized.&rdquo; Corrections Corporation of America&rsquo;s stock price took its largest plunge in 2000 and never bounced back to its late 90s high. However, despite successful divestment campaigns and legislation against prison privatization after reports of irresponsibility, CCA stock has issued dividends to their investors since 2012, and several analysts currently list CXW (CCA stock) as a recommended buy and hold. Although the United States federal prison population dropped in 2014 for the first time since 1980 (along with private populations), CCA&rsquo;s stock price remains relatively the same today as the day Attorney General Eric Holder made the announcement. Since the fall of share prices, CCA has converted to a REIT in order to avoid corporate taxes and focused heavily on litigating and lobbying to influence voting decisions on sentencing, regulations, and law enforcement. This lobbying assists in filling prison beds and winning government contracts, with lobbying expenditures over $3.3 million in 2005. With respect to economic, social, and political indicators and by juxtaposing the theories of Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, and Karl Polanyi this study will focus on whether CXW investors can influence the re-embedding of the economy (the subordination of the markets to social relations), with a quantitative focus on the fluctuation of CXW stock prices and their relationship to reports of CCA irresponsibility in the media.</p>

<p> This thesis investigates the influence of business on the public policymaking process in the United States. A framework is proposed for categorizing policymaking contexts and mechanisms of influence, synthesized from previous literature on structural versus institutional power, automatic versus instrumental influence, arenas of power, and on the opportunity structures pertaining to distinct varieties of capitalism. Much of the literature on business' influence on policy performs analyses at the corporation level, resulting in the limited consideration of firms as formal-legal entities, as rational "black-box" actors, or as ensembles of resources. This thesis proposes an assemblage-theoretic approach to conceptualizing the firm and its position within political institutions and political-economic structures. It is argued that firms' preferences and capacities for influence are properties emergent from the extrinsic relations among actors and resources within the firm, as well as from firms' extrinsic relations with other actors in broader structural and institutional networks. This framework is demonstrated through an analysis of the Department of Energy's Loan Guarantee Program (LGP), including an institutional and structural history of the program, a quantitative analysis of the program's portfolio, and a qualitative analysis of two high-profile cases: Tesla and Solyndra. The qualitative analysis illustrates the instrumentalization of automatic pathways of influence, the transformation of transactional mechanisms into relational pathways, and the interaction of formal and informal pathways. The multivariate regression analyses show a significant positive relationship between lobbying and loan size, reinforcing the notion that relational pathways are instrumentalized effectively by firms at the stage of distribution. Political contributions were not found to be statistically significant, but were negatively associated with loan size, suggesting that the impact of contributions may be indirect through their transformation into relational pathways over time. It is proposed that additional emergent properties captured by the mapping of firm assemblages, such as mediated relational pathways, may be modeled using the framework developed and quantified using network analysis. It is argued that the conception of firms as assemblages comprising larger institutional and structural networks is a promising inroad to future study of business' influence on policymaking, with broader implications for policy studies and political economy.</p><p>

Thesis--M. Phil., University of Hong Kong.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005. / (UnM)AAI3187317. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 3044. Adviser: Benjamin Van Roy.