My dissertation gives the first analysis of misery in the thought of Aquinas and Teresa of Ávila, providing new insight into their ideas of happiness through means of contrast. I use the terms “misery” and “happiness” in a traditional sense to indicate life lived poorly or well, respectively, and I investigate these notions in Aquinas’ and Teresa’s principal texts, especially the Summa Theologiae and The Interior Castle. Both thinkers identify misery as a privation of God: a lack of the share in God’s goodness that one ought to have. Both see the escape from misery as a process of perfecting the soul’s faculties of intellect and will to unite one to God. For Aquinas, happiness is essentially an intellectual perfection: knowledge of God. Conversely, misery is an intellectual defect: lack of the knowledge of God that one ought to have. Moreover, Aquinas so analyzes “ought” that misery is a lack of what is naturally desired. Perfect happiness comes with the full understanding of God that one can only attain in heaven, but a middle ground exists between perfect happiness and misery. Even in this life, one can attain “imperfect happiness,” and the analysis of misery helps to clarify this obscure notion. The imperfectly happy have not acquired their consummate perfection, but understand as much about God as nature presently compels them to desire to know. A right will is both necessary and sufficient for escaping misery and obtaining happiness. The will depends on the intellect in such a way that it cannot desire correctly unless the intellect understands correctly. Moreover, sin colors one’s perception of reality, so that evil desire in the will causes error and ignorance in the intellect. Thus, one escapes misery if and only if one chooses to love God as one’s ultimate end. For Teresa, happiness is the union with God through knowledge and love for which the soul was made, and misery is the lack of this union. The soul escapes misery by developing a relationship with God in contemplative prayer, and Teresa illustrates happiness and misery through the titular metaphor of The Interior Castle. Notably, happiness requires that one’s union with God become perfectly secure, and I identify an intellectualist strain in Teresa that implies that the will cannot become perfectly committed to God unless the intellect can become perfectly firm in its certainty that God is the sole good. The quest for certainty is difficult, since like Descartes who will follow her, Teresa posits the existence of a deceiving demon with considerable influence over all the soul’s powers. Against that threat, Teresa claims to find certainty through mystical experience. God is Truth, containing and grounding all other truths. In the “spiritual marriage,” the soul sees God’s Triune nature as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, really three distinct persons yet one substance. The directness of this vision provides a certainty which no deception can overcome.

A sound theory of adjudication and of judicial duty requires or presupposes a sound theory of law and of legal argument. Jurisprudential inquiry is properly grounded not in reflections on conceptual properties of law but in reflections on human goods and needs as understood in a morally articulated theory of practical reason and compactly expressed in the normative concept of the common good. Such reflections confirm that law exists, in its central case, as a means to various types of authoritative co-ordination solutions. The underdetermined nature of (a) the positive requirements of practical reasonableness and the common good and of (b) the appropriate means of enforcing compliance and remedying non-compliance with either these requirements or the determinate negative precepts of practical reasonableness entails that a practically necessary aspect of the positive law’s role is constituting the requirements of justice, i.e. of what is due to whom generally and in particular situations (including situations where an injustice has been or is alleged to have been done). As a distinct and practically necessary mode of legal co-ordination for the common good, adjudication, in its central case, answers litigated questions of justice by applying all relevant law in accordance with the legal system’s practice of legal argument. Thus adjudication is performed by authoritative law-applying institutions precisely because it is about answering questions of justice, and not despite that fact. Theories of law developed on the assumption that it is possible to understand the ‘what’ of law without reliance on any moral judgments deny any practically necessary connection between (a) the promotion of justice and the common good and (b) the nature of law, in its central case, and, hence, the adjudicative application of the law. In the absence of this connection a judicial duty to do justice according to law is unintelligible.

The aim of this study is twofold: to identify the theological purpose underlying the depiction of angels at certain key points in the history of their use, and to explore how far that deeper theological rationale can be re-appropriated for our own day. This study first traces the progression of the angelic motif in the Hebrew Scriptures. By examining numerous pericopes in the Pentateuch, major prophets and Daniel, I demonstrate that the metamorphosis of higher-order beings like the angel of the Lord, cherubim and seraphim, is directly related to the writers' desire to enhance God's transcendence. Next, I evaluate pseudo-Denys' hierarchical angelology, which prominent theologians like Luther and Calvin condemned as little more than a Neoplatonic scheme for accessing God through angels. I propose that not only has pseudo-Denys' Neoplatonism been overstated, but that his angelology is particularly noteworthy for the way it accentuates Christ's eucharistic immanence to the Church. Then I maintain that because assessments of Aquinas' angelology are often based upon the Summa Theologiae, his views are wrongly portrayed as overtly philosophical, rather than biblical and exegetical. In his lesser-known biblical commentaries, however, Aquinas pushes the semantic range of the word ‘angel' to include aspects of the physical world, which unveils an imaginative, Christocentric, and scriptural dimension of his angelology that is rarely acknowledged. The conclusion considers how contemporary figures and movements relate to these three angelologies. Barth emphasises the transcendent God but unlike Hebrew Scripture, weakens connections between God and angels. New Ageism affirms the immanent angel but unlike pseudo-Denys, does so at the expense of Christology and ecclesiology. Contemporary ecological discourse generally lacks Aquinas' appreciation for an imaginative, supernatural approach to the world. Finally, I ground the angels' relationship to transcendence, immanence and imagination in an experiential, eucharistic context.

Malgré l’acceptation théorique et pratique que l’astrologie médiévale rencontre au 13e siècle latin, son statut philosophique ambigu tient, au moins en partie, à son double partage en art mécanique et en science libérale. Plus mystérieux encore reste le fait qu’elle apparaisse en Occident sans devoir violenter les cadres philosophiques où elle s’inscrit, aussi chrétiens soient-ils. Du point de vue de l’histoire de la philosophie, ce que cette arrivée en douceur passe sous silence, c’est l’enracinement conceptuel toujours déjà préétabli du projet astrologique à l’intérieur d’un contexte philosophique plus global, dans et par lequel l’idée d’influence astrale valide sa raison d’être. En passant par la philosophie naturelle et la métaphysique de Thomas d’Aquin, ce travail veut montrer comment l’astrologie médiévale survient en terres chrétiennes à partir de la rencontre de la hiérarchie causale de l’être propre à l’arabo-aristotélisme néo-platonisant avec une théologie de la providence divine. D’aporie en aporie, la déconstruction de ce que toute astrologie présuppose prend place, de sorte qu’il devient possible de comprendre l’aspect rationnel et proprement philosophique de l’entreprise astrologique au Moyen Âge. / In spite of the theoretical and practical acceptation that medieval astrology is greeted with during the 13th century in the Latin world, its philosophically ambiguous nature is due, at least partly so, to the distinction made between mechanical arts and liberal sciences. Even more mysterious is the fact that it appears in Occident without having to violate the peripheries of Latin philosophy, as Christian as it could be. From a history of philosophy point of view, this rather smooth entrance seems to imply that the astrological project is always-already conceptually rooted in a philosophical context larger than itself, by which it validates its raison d’être. Through the study of Thomas Aquinas’ natural philosophy and metaphysics, this work demonstrates that medieval astrology could occur among the Christian world whenever the causal hierarchy of being brought forth by Arabic aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism walked hand in hand with the Christian theology of divine providence. From an aporia to another, the deconstruction of what any astrology presupposes therefore takes place, from which it becomes possible to properly understand both the rational and philosophical aspect of the astrological enterprise during the Middle Ages.

Ma thèse montre la présence et le rôle de la métaphysique dans Vérité et méthode. Elle tente de démontrer que Gadamer s'inspire du néoplatonisme pour surmonter le subjectivisme de la modernité et propose une métaphysique à cette fin. Après avoir expliqué comment Gadamer se réapproprie l’héritage de la pensée grecque pour critiquer la modernité en situant son interprétation de Platon par rapport à celle de Heidegger, je montre que Gadamer s’approprie la conception de l’être de Plotin de façon telle qu’il peut s’y appuyer pour penser l’autoprésentation de l’être dans l’expérience herméneutique de la vérité. L’art va, pour ce faire, redevenir sous la conduite du néoplatonisme source de vérité. Gadamer redonne en effet une dignité ontologique à l’art grâce à la notion d’émanation, notion qui permet de penser qu’il y a une présence réelle du représenté dans sa représentation, celle-ci émanant du représenté sans l’amoindrir, mais lui apportant au contraire un surcroît d’être. La notion d’émanation permet ensuite à Gadamer d’affirmer le lien indissoluble qui unit les mots aux choses. En effet, la doctrine du verbe intérieur de Thomas d’Aquin implique ce lien que Platon avait occulté en réduisant le langage, comme la logique, à n’être qu’un instrument de domination du réel. L’utilisation de la notion néoplatonicienne d’émanation permet donc de dépasser la philosophie grecque du logos et de mieux rendre compte de l’être de la langue. Je montre ensuite comment Gadamer radicalise sa pensée en affirmant que l’être qui peut être compris est langage, ce qui veut dire que l’être, comme chez Plotin, est autoprésentation de soi-même. Pour ce faire, Gadamer rattache l’être du langage à la métaphysique néoplatonicienne de la lumière. Les dernières pages de Vérité et méthode rappellent en effet que la splendeur du beau est manifestation de la vérité de l’être. On rattachera alors le concept de vérité herméneutique à ses origines métaphysiques. La vérité est une manifestation de l’être dont on ne peut avoir part que si on se laisse submerger par sa lumière. Loin d’être affaire de contrôle méthodique, l’expérience de la vérité exige de se laisser posséder par ce qui est à comprendre. Je démontre ainsi que Gadamer a découvert dans le néoplatonisme des éléments permettant de s’opposer à la dictature du sujet moderne, dictature qui doit être renversée, car elle masque le réel rapport de l’homme à la vérité en faisant abstraction de la finitude de son existence concrète. La critique du subjectivisme moderne sous la conduite du néoplatonisme ouvre ainsi le chemin vers une métaphysique de la finitude. / My thesis shows the presence and role of metaphysics in Truth and Method. It attempts to show that Gadamer builds upon Neoplatonism to overcome the subjectivism of modernity and offers a metaphysics in this regard. It explains how Gadamer reclaims the legacy of Greek thought to criticize modernity, placing his interpretation of Plato compared to that of Heidegger, I argue that Gadamer appropriates Plotinus’ concept of being in such a way that it may lean to think of self-presentation of being in the hermeneutic experience of truth. In that sense, art is going to be a source of truth under the leadership of Neoplatonism. Gadamer gives an ontological dignity to art through the concept of emanation, a concept which suggests that there is a real presence of the represented in its representation, the latter derived from the represented without weakening it, providing it instead with more being. The concept of emanation then gives Gadamer an opportunity to affirm the indissoluble bond that unites words and things. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of the inner word indeed implies the link that Plato had covered up by making language, like logic, a mere domination instrument of the real. The use of the Neoplatonic concept of emanation makes it possible to overcome the logos of Greek philosophy and to better account for the being of language. I then show how Gadamer radicalized his thinking as he says that the being that can be understood is language, which means that being, as in Plotinus, is self-presentation. To this end, Gadamer links the being of language to Neoplatonic metaphysics of light. The last pages of Truth and Method recall indeed that the splendor of beauty is an expression for the truth of being. The concept of hermeneutic truth is then connected to its metaphysical origins. Truth is a display for the being in which we can partake only if one gets overwhelmed by its light. Far from being a matter of methodical control, the experience of truth requires to be possessed by what must be understood. In this way, I demonstrate that Gadamer found in Neoplatonism elements to challenge the dictatorship of the modern subject, which must be reversed because it hides the real relationship of man with truth by ignoring the finitude of its concrete existence. The criticism of modern subjectivism led by Neoplatonism opens the way to a metaphysics of finitude.

Segundo Tomás de Aquino, a forma é o que instancia a substância em determinada natureza; sem ela, a substância não seria o que é. Saliente-se que definir o que é (quid est) algo não é o mesmo que afirmar que ele é, pois, neste caso, o que é afirmado é sua existência, não sua natureza. Isso indica que a existência não é posta pela forma da substância, mas por algo outro, que, em sua Exposição aos Ebdomadibus de Boécio, Tomás chama de ato de ser (actus essendi). Imiscuído na substância que é seu sujeito , o ato de ser concede-lhe existência, tornando-a um ente, o qual possui um vínculo com o próprio ser (ipsum esse), que é deus. O aquinatense chama esse vínculo de participação, donde o ente participa do ser tal como o efeito de sua causa. O problema é instaurado quando se passa do plano ontológico ao gnosiológico, isto é, quando o intelecto busca inteligir a participação do ente no ser. Nessa intelecção, a limitação do intelecto humano se evidencia: a participação do ente no ser é entendida não como tal, mas como a do concreto no abstrato. O ente é significado em concreto, pois nele o ato de ser se encontra concretizado; a dificuldade, contudo, apresenta-se quando o intelecto tenta abstrair o ato de ser do ente: nessa abstração, o ato de ser não é inteligido enquanto tal, mas enquanto abstrato. Diante disso, torna-se inevitável levantar as seguintes questões: qual o modo de abstração que tenta obter o ato de ser do ente? Por que o intelecto não é capaz de inteligir o ser enquanto ser, mas apenas enquanto abstrato? O ato de ser, inconcebível pelo intelecto humano, é de fato superior à forma substancial? A participação do concreto no abstrato corresponde à do ente no ser? São estas as principais questões que, neste estudo, buscaremos responder. / According to Thomas of Aquinas, form is that which instantiates substance in a determinate nature; without it, substance would not be what it is. It should be emphasized that defining what something is (its quid est) is not not the same as to assert that it is, for in this case what is asserted is its existence, not its nature. That indicates that existence is not given by the form of the substance, but by something else, which in his Exposition to the Boethius\'s Ebdomadibus, Thomas calls act of being (actus essendi). Mingling in the substance its subject , the act of being gives it its existence, turning it into an entity, which is vinculated to being itself (ipsum esse), or God. The Aquinate calls this nexus participation, whence the entity participates in being as the effect of its cause. The problem is set when one traverses the ontological level to the gnoseological, that is, when the intellect tries to grasp the participation of the entity in being. In this intellection, the limits of the human intellect become clear: the participation of entity in being is understood not as such, but as the concrete in relation to the abstract. The entity is signified in concrete, for in it the act of being is found concretized; the difficulty, however, reveals itself when the intellect tries to abstract the act of being from the entity: in this abstraction, the act of being is not grasped as such, but as abstract. Thus it becomes inevitable to formulate the following questions: which is the mode of abstraction which tries to obtain the act of being of the entity? Why is the intellect not able to grasp being as being, but only as abstract? Is the act of being, inconceivable to the human intellect, in fact superior to the substantial form? And does participation of the concrete in the abstract correspond to that of the entity in being? These are the main questions that this study aims to answer.

Submitted by Mariana Dornelles Vargas (marianadv) on 2015-05-19T15:21:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 fe_razao.pdf: 608760 bytes, checksum: 1d986a346585d2023d5a07faac9f7ba6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-19T15:21:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 fe_razao.pdf: 608760 bytes, checksum: 1d986a346585d2023d5a07faac9f7ba6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-12-20 / Nenhuma / Analisa-se a relação entre a razão e a fé, e como a filosofia poderia auxiliar algumas disposições religiosas. Buscam-se os limites da ação do religioso e as condições mínimas para a sua atuação como civil, isto é, a defesa da fé como certa razoabilidade nas relações éticas. Inicialmente, investiga-se a abertura da filosofia a um conhecimento comum, que atinge uma elevada sistematização em Aristóteles, o que permite um diálogo, como um discurso comunicativo, sob aspectos estritamente humanos, na consideração de mundos possíveis. Nesta parte, se estabelece a máxima potência do intelecto, o que possibilita a abertura do mito e da religião como objetos. Em seguida, estuda-se o primeiro pensador que estabeleceu uma conexão entre o pensamento grego e o religioso: Filo de Alexandria; e a experiência cultural desta visão: o helenismo cristão. Sem Filo, não seria possível a concepção teórica de união entre as visões de razão e fé; e, no helenismo cristão, encontramos a vivência, a experiência da concepção filoniano aplicada no início do cristianismo. Depois, procura-se destacar o elemento da fé, sob o ponto de vista racional, enquanto proposições não contraditórias, destacando certo aspecto da visão de Tomás de Aquino. Aqui, utiliza-se Tomás como pensador de síntese entra a razão e a fé, que estabelece as bases racionais para uma adesão razoável à religião. Por fim, analisam-se dois estudos de caso: o apelo racional de Justino ao imperador Tito; e uma comparação entre Abraão e Ájax da peça de Sófocles. Ambos são exemplos de casos em que a filosofia pode auxiliar a relação do religioso com a política. No primeiro, em função do discurso platônico de Justino, em defesa dos cristãos. E no segundo, para que haja certo ceticismo em algumas disposições religiosas. Conclui-se que as ações do religioso devem ser justificadas na lógica do discurso, para que não se estenda a uma posição além do bem e do mal, mas antes, considere os princípios éticos, sem negar a sua religião, antes, como um complemento de auxílio e reciprocidade. / The first matter of analysis is the relation between reason and faith, and how can philosophy serve to some religious dispositions. The limits of the religious person?s doings and the minimal conditions for his/her civil role are outlined, that is, the defense of faith as an element of reasonability within ethical relations. First, an investigation is made regarding the openness of philosophy to a common knowledge which reaches an elevated systematization in Aristotle, which allows a dialogue as a communicative discourse under strictly human aspects, considering possible worlds. In this part, the maximum potence of the intellect is established, enabling the interpretation of myth and religion as objects. Next, a study is developed on the matter of the first thinker to establish the link between the Greek and the religious lines of thought: Philo of Alexandria; and the cultural experience of such view: Christian helenism. But for Philo, it would not be possible to theoretically conceive the union between the views of reason and faith; and, within Christian helenism, the experience of the Philonian conception applied at the start of Christianism can be found. Then, an attempt is made to highlight the element of faith under a rational point of view, considering non-contradictory propositions, stressing a particular aspect of Thomas Aquinas view. Here, Thomas is taken up as a thinker of synthesis between reason and faith, which sets up the rational basis for a reasonable adhesion to religion. Lastly, two case studies are presented: the rational appeal of Justin to Emperor Titus; and a comparison between Abraham and Ajax, from Sophocles play. Both are examples of cases in which philosophy can be of help to the relation of the religious person to politics. In the first one, due to Justins platonic discourse, in defense of the Christians. And in the second, in order to a certain skepticism in some religious dispositions to exist. The conclusion is reached by infering that the actions of the religions individual must be justified in the logic of discourse, so that the matter does not extends itself to stances beyond good and evil. Instead, it must take into account the ethical principles without denying its religion; as a complement of assistance and reciprocity.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-11T12:02:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Antônio Ilário Felici.pdf: 1156061 bytes, checksum: 451df83f6d6c1f8d624e46e7f3eb33cf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-11T12:02:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Antônio Ilário Felici.pdf: 1156061 bytes, checksum: 451df83f6d6c1f8d624e46e7f3eb33cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-30 / The present research of philosophy deals with the presuppositions of social justice in the Summa of Theology of Thomas Aquinas in question 58 about the justice. It begins the reflection by a study of the Summa as contextualization of the subject. The study of the Summa of Theology, even in its form, allows us to understand its content as a manual of catholic doctrine for students of theology, the point of arrival of the author's theological thought, but a starting point for further study, a task assumed by the present study. Thus, it examines the articles of the question, the author's related writings and their sources in other authors as foundations for social justice, especially those that are most inclined to that direction, such as general or legal, distributive and commutative justice. Based on these bases, the research intends to infer what can be said of social justice in Thomas Aquinas / A presente pesquisa de filosofia trata dos pressupostos da justiça social na Suma de Teologia de Tomás de Aquino na questão 58 sobre a justiça. Inicia a reflexão por um estudo da Suma como contextualização do tema. O estudo da Suma de Teologia, mesmo na sua forma, permite entender o seu conteúdo, como manual de doutrina católica para os estudantes de teologia, ponto de chegada do pensamento teológico do autor, mas ponto de partida para ulteriores aprofundamentos, tarefa assumida pelo presente estudo. Assim, examina os artigos da questão, os escritos afins do autor e suas fontes em outros autores como fundamentos para uma justiça social, especialmente os que mais se inclinam para essa direção, a exemplo dos temas como justiça geral ou legal, distributiva e comutativa. Partindo dessas bases, a pesquisa pretende inferir o que se pode afirmar de justiça social em Tomás de Aquino

Comentadores de várias tendências se dividem quanto a como situar o pensamento político do Doutor de Aquino frente à religião. Seria possível fazer uma interpretação naturalista da política em Tomás de Aquino? Ou o seu pensamento político se encontra influenciado por uma esfera superior necessária para que se possa compreender em profundidade o que o autor propõe? No intuito de se posicionar sobre esse antigo debate, pretendemos pesquisar o pensamento de Tomás para buscar entender o conceito de lei, e daí os limites para a lei humana e alguma possível influência do elemento religioso. Para lançar luz sobre o problema, analisaremos as questões sobre o conceito de lei, a lei eterna, a lei natural e a lei humana presentes na Primeira Parte da Segunda Parte da Suma de Teologia, em comparação com outros escritos de Tomás, notadamente a Primeira Parte da Suma de Teologia, a Suma Contra os Gentios e o opúsculo De Regno. Os comentadores divergem a respeito e a pesquisa busca, a partir da releitura das obras de Tomás e dos principais comentadores do século XX e XXI, uma clara tomada de posição clara a respeito, concluindo pela dependência do pensamento político de Tomás de Aquino de uma ordem superior à esfera humana. / Commentators of several trends split themselves as how to situate the political thought of Doctor Aquinas regarding religion. Would it be possible to do a naturalistic interpretation of politics in Thomas Aquinas? Or is his political thought under the influence of a superior sphere necessary to understand in depth what the author proposes? Aiming to set a position about this ancient debate, we attempt to research the thought of Thomas in order to search understanding of the concept of law, and so forth the limits for the human law and any possible influence of the religious element. To bring light on this matter, we will analyse the questions about the concept of law, the eternal law, the natural law and the human law which are enclosed in the First Part of the Second Part of The Summa Theologica, in comparison with the other writings of Thomas, mainly the First Part of the Summa Theologica, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the opuscule De Regno. The commentators disagree in this respect and the research aims, through the carefull reading of the works of Thomas and of the main commentators of the XX and XXI centuries, a clear view in this respect, concluding for the dependency of the political thought of Thomas Aquinas of a superior order above the human sphere.

This thesis addresses the historic debate between natural law theorists and positivists. After providing a foundation for the debate by discussing the thirteenth century natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas and the criticisms of it by positivist philosopher John Austin, this thesis turns to the theory of H.L.A. Hart. My primary aim is to outline a defense of the soft positivism of H.L.A. Hart in face of the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin by appealing to two nonexclusive roots of moral principles in the law: justice and criminal law.