Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-08-20T18:35:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 21e.pdf: 842719 bytes, checksum: f885499467398d7aa85ae5191a1cd896 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-20T18:35:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 21e.pdf: 842719 bytes, checksum: f885499467398d7aa85ae5191a1cd896 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-11-01 / Nenhuma / Vida e morte são dois componentes de uma mesma fórmula. Contudo, jurídica e paradoxalmente, somente a vida é protegida. As preocupações sociais, filosóficas e jurídicas, quando da proteção do direito à vida - em especial, a fim de estabelecer o que vem a ser uma vida digna, de acordo com os moldes preconizados pelas normas programáticas que constam na Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil - não refletem as mesmas preocupações, no que concerne ao direito de morrer dignamente. Os seres humanos são os únicos viventes que conseguem compreender e questionar a sua existência. Todavia, essa categoria diferenciada de seres, mesmo diante de tal condição, ainda não consegue assimilar e aceitar serenamente a única das certezas da vida: a morte. Ademais, é preciso depreender que vida e morte são dois processos que se complementam, pois sem a noção de um, não existiria a noção de outro. A vida representa uma prerrogativa protegida legalmente, pois, se de outro modo não fosse, não faria qualquer sentido a garantia de quaisquer direitos. A proteção do direito à vida abarca várias acepções, destacando-se, no presente trabalho, a necessidade de preservação da dignidade humana em seu decorrer, como princípio esculpido na Constituição Federal Brasileira, que o posiciona como um dos fundamentos da República Federativa do Brasil, em seu artigo primeiro. Entretanto, não se observa, em quaisquer dos princípios elencados, a garantia de direito à morte digna. Se vida e morte compõem a mesma fórmula, questiona-se: porque o ordenamento jurídico assegura o direito à vida digna, mas não o faz com relação à morte? Dessa feita, a presente dissertação objetiva discorrer sobre o direito à morte digna, buscando evidenciar que, como decorrência natural da vida, deve ser um processo conglobado também pela dignidade. O estudo objetiva tratar acerca da terminalidade da vida, especialmente para demonstrar que o pensamento jurídico brasileiro deve evoluir para a construção de uma legislação que possibilite a abreviação da vida do paciente que se encontra incuravelmente doente - como já o fizeram outros países, como a Bélgica e a Holanda. Ressalte-se que o estudo se desenvolve de forma transdisciplinar, procurando mostrar a importância social, jurídica, ética, moral, filosófica e religiosa do presente tema. Visa ainda correlacionar o tema às disposições penais e civis que criminalizam as práticas de abreviação da vida e sujeitam os médicos a sanções criminais e civis decorrentes de tais atos. Embora se proceda a análise de legislações estrangeiras acerca do tema, importa salientar que a pesquisa se desenvolve principalmente sob a perspectiva do Direito brasileiro. / Life and death are two components of a same formula. However, juridically and paradoxically only life is protected. Social, philosophical and juridical preoccupations do not reflect the same preoccupation about the right to die with dignity, when it comes to protect the right to life, specially about stablishing what would be a dignified life, in the molds exposed by the programmatic rules in the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Human beings are the only living beings that can comprehend and question their existence. However, this distinct category of beings, even with this condition, still can not comprehend and accept in a calm way the only certainty of life: death. Moreover, it is necessary to understand that life and death are two complementary processes, because without the notion of life we would not have the notion of death. Life is a legally protected right, for if it was not, it would not make any sense the guarantee of any rights. The assurance of the right to life involves many interpretations, and in the present work we emphasize the need of preserving human dignity through life. Human dignity is a present principle in the Brazilian Federaral Constitution, that puts it as one of the fundaments of the Federative Republic of Brazil in its first article. Nevertheless, it is not observed in any of the listed rights/principles the guarantee of a dignified death. If life and death are components of a same formula, we question why the legal system guarantees the right to life, but does not do it in relation to death. Therefore, the present thesis aims to discuss about the right to a dignified death, attempting to demonstrate that death, as a natural result of life, must also be a process embraced by dignity. The study aims to discuss the terminally of life, specially to demonstrate that brazilian legal thought must evolve to raise a legislation that enables the abbreviation of a patient’s life who is incurably ill, as other countries already did, such as Belgium and Holland. We enhance that this research will be developed in a transdisciplinary way, searching to emphasize the social, juridical, ethical, moral, philosophical and religious importance of the present theme. Moreover, this research will also seek to correlate the theme to civil and penal provisions that criminalizes the practices of abbreviation of life and subject physicians to criminal and civil sanctions arising from such acts. Although we analyse foreign laws about the theme, it is importante to enhance that the research will be mainly developed under the brazilian laws perspective.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-30T12:39:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Andréia Maura Bertoline Rezende de Lima.pdf: 927723 bytes, checksum: e2f2c00cf085602c81a7f01aa3d15f06 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-30T12:39:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andréia Maura Bertoline Rezende de Lima.pdf: 927723 bytes, checksum: e2f2c00cf085602c81a7f01aa3d15f06 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-20 / The fundamental social right to health, which is inseparable from the right to life, must receive the protection of the State through health promotion, whose prevention of diseases is inserted in the strategies and guidelines articulated to promote a decent quality of life and social well-being. To promote health is to promote the improvement of the living conditions of citizens, considering the peculiarities and priorities of the community, inserted in a systemic context of integration with the public and private sectors, which must allocate resources with rationality and efficiency, giving priority to meeting the interests of the collectivity. Health care begins with conception and must accompany all stages of life until its termination. It is a continuous process of individual and collective education and motivation directed to the co-responsibility of each individual for the lifestyle choice, within the context of the environment in which it is inserted, respecting its autonomy, beliefs, and moral values. Based on the dignity of the human person, health promotion is directed at primary care, which consists in meeting the vital needs of the person, aiming at the universal access to health services or appropriate treatment, with equity and efficiency, in the face of the diagnosed disequilibrium. The patient is not a mere object of scientific study and of the latest technology. The doctor, for his part, is not just a technician with scientific knowledge and skills to treat the patient. Starting from the promotion of health through the primary care, we analyze the clinical encounter of the patient with the physician, the main protagonists of an interpersonal relationship that cherishes life, has solidarity with others, and welcomes a vulnerable and fragile being facing the unknown. It is at this moment that humanized medical care, centered on the patient's person and not on his pathology, is a contributory factor to the rationalization of health judicialization, the subject of this analytical and reflexive study, whose legal basis is the right to health and to life with dignity. Rationalizing the judicialization of health is not restricted only in the criticism of the judicial control of public health policies and compliance with the procedures of the National Supplementary Health Agency (ANS). Rationalizing the judicialization of health consists, above all, in the valuing of the human being in its entirety, establishing with it a relationship of empathy, trust and dialogue / O direito fundamental social à saúde, indissociável do direito à vida, deve receber a proteção do Estado através da promoção da saúde, cuja prevenção de doenças encontra-se inserida nas estratégias e diretrizes articuladas para promover a qualidade de vida digna e o bem-estar social. Promover a saúde é favorecer a melhoria da condição de vida dos cidadãos, ponderando as peculiaridades e prioridades da comunidade, inserida num contexto sistêmico de integração com os setores público e privado, que devem alocar recursos com racionalidade e eficiência, dando primazia ao atendimento dos interesses da coletividade. O cuidado em saúde inicia-se com a concepção e deve acompanhar todas as etapas da vida até a sua terminalidade. É um processo contínuo de educação, motivação individual e coletiva direcionado à corresponsabilidade de cada indivíduo, pela escolha do estilo de vida, dentro do contexto do ambiente em que está inserido, respeitando a sua autonomia, crenças e valores morais. Alicerçada na dignidade da pessoa humana, a promoção da saúde direciona-se à atenção primária, que consiste no atendimento das necessidades vitais do ser, visando o acesso universal com equidade e eficiência aos serviços de saúde ou ao tratamento adequado ante o desequilíbrio diagnosticado. O paciente não é um mero objeto de estudo científico e da tecnologia de última geração. O médico, por seu turno, não é apenas um técnico dotado de conhecimento científico e habilidades para tratar do paciente. Partindo da promoção da saúde, através da atenção primária, analisa-se o encontro clínico do paciente com o médico, protagonistas principais de uma relação interpessoal de valorização da vida, de solidariedade ao próximo e de acolhimento de um ser vulnerável e fragilizado diante do desconhecido. É nesse momento que a atuação médica humanizada, centrada na pessoa do paciente e não na patologia, constitui fator contributivo para a racionalização da judicialização da saúde, tema do presente estudo analítico e reflexivo, cujo fundamento legal é o direito à saúde e à vida com dignidade. Racionalizar a judicialização da saúde não se restringe tão somente na crítica ao controle jurisdicional de políticas públicas de saúde e na observância do rol de procedimentos da Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar (ANS). Racionalizar a judicialização da saúde consiste, acima de tudo, na valorização do ser humano na sua integralidade, estabelecendo, com este, uma relação de empatia, confiança e diálogo

Univ., Diss.--Köln, 2003. / Literaturverz. S. 225 - 270.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Consider a couple planning to have children. There are many reasons one could offer these potential parents for reconsidering bringing new people into existence. One could for instance say to them that they currently lack the finances, or maturity, to adequately take care of any children they produce. If it were almost certain that this couple would pass on a terrible genetic disease to their offspring, one could see it as one’s duty to warn them against reproduction. One could even draw attention to the plight of orphans, and suggest to these (and other) potential parents that a more pressing responsibility lies not in planning to give homes to persons not yet in existence, but in attempting to give homes to those already in existence. However, when deciding whether or not to create children, rarely does one consider, over and above the preceding considerations, whether there might be some fundamental wrongness to the very act of procreation. In other words, rarely does one consider the possibility that creating people might, all things considered, never be permissible. At its extreme, “anti-natalism” implies the view that coming into existence is always a harm that outweighs any of its benefits. This position is defended by David Benatar (Benatar 1997, 2006). However, one need not believe that coming into existence is always an overall harm in order to favour an anti-natal perspective; one need only believe that it is morally problematic to inflict serious, preventable harms upon others without their consent. Such a consent-based anti-natal position can be derived from the argument put forth by Seana Shiffrin (1999). To be clear, according to either of these versions of anti-natalism, creating a new person is considered an impermissible harm. When I refer to “anti-natalism” in this dissertation, I will be referring to this negative judgement regarding procreation. Anti-natalism has a rich philosophical heritage, with its roots stretching back to antiquity. For instance, Ecclesiastes (1:1-18) of the Hebrew Bible bemoans the apparent meaninglessness and futility of existence—a state of affairs with which any number of generations of humans must cope. Not until very recently, however, has the anti-natal position been given due consideration by philosophers. Arthur Schopenhauer (1851), for instance, is perhaps best known for advocating a pessimistic philosophy that is, broadly speaking, anti-natal in its implications. The key figure in this field, however, is Benatar, who defends an unequivocally anti-natal position.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda hur rätten till liv har ett samband med tvångsförsvinnande enligt den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter. För att uppnå uppsatsens syfte genomförs en rättsutredning kring gällande rätt, där en rättsdogmatisk metod och fallstudie applicerats. Uppsatsen kommer vidare att analyseras mot bakgrund av en rättsvetenskaplig teori, där relevant rättspraxis som den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter bemött samt en kortfattad genomgång av kontexters påverkan. Under utredningen av de konventionella källorna finns vissa krav för att uppfylla om en stat kan hållas ansvarig. Utifrån det och med de grova mänskliga rättighets kränkningarna staten utfärdat i åtanke, är bevisbördan och statsansvar av stor relevans för att klargöra sambandet mellan rättigheten och handlingen. Uppsatsen avslutas med att konkludera att det råder brister i hur den Inter-Amerikanska Domstolen om Mänskliga Rättigheter arbetar mot att förvara och skydda Mänskliga Rättigheter i fall som berör tvångsförsvinnande. / The aim of this paper is to evaluate how the right to life has a connection with the forced disappearance of persons, according to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. In order to reach this purpose, a legal dogmatic approach and a case study is used, in the light of a legal theory. The research concerns relevant cases that the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has been confronted with, and, to clarify the contextual importance, a brief explanation on the surroundings is provided. With the grave human rights violations committed by State authorities in mind, the thesis shows that the standard of proof, and principle of state responsibility, becomes of importance, in order to be able to determine whether the right to life is violated in cases of forced disappearance. The essay will conclude that the issue prevails defectiveness in relation to preventing and protecting human rights in cases of forced disappearance of persons.

Since humans have existed on Earth, the environment has been one of the primary resources contributing to humans' ability to live life adequately. Pollution has not only destroyed natural life, but it has also diminished humans' right to life. The United Nations 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees "every human being has the inherent right to life," but how can one exercise this right in an environment that is degrading through pollution? This is the basis of which this thesis is surrounded; the issue of environmental pollution hindering humans' right to life. Thus, this thesis aims to show how legal action can be taken under the substantive right to life when environmental pollution occurs and negatively impacts humans and their surroundings. Specifically, this thesis shows how the right to life has been used in courts around the world through three primary approaches – State Constitution approach, Regional Treaty approach, and Blended approach – when environmental pollution has occurred. The different approaches will show different ways a court can come to the conclusion that there has been a violation of the right to life in the occurrence of environmental pollution. Through a comparative-analysis of the different approaches, this thesis presents yet another way to protect not only the environment, but also the rights of humans who have been negatively affected by environmental pollution.

No description available.

El objetivo de esta investigación fue precisar el verdadero sentido de la dignidad humana en el sistema jurídico peruano desde un aspecto ius-filosófico. En la actualidad se evidencia una divergente concepción de la dignidad humana originada por el desarrollo de corrientes filosóficas equivocadas que ponen en riesgo a la persona humana, ocasionando excepciones en la aplicación normativa, como en el caso Ana Estrada, a quien se declaró la inaplicación del homicidio piadoso para que pueda morir dignamente con el apoyo del sistema sanitario, el cual, será eximido de responsabilidad penal si interviene en el procedimiento para ayudarla a “morir con dignidad”; pese a que, la dignidad humana es reconocida en el sistema jurídico peruano como un principio-derecho que se aplica como parámetro normativo de toda disposición legal e interpretación jurídica, ya que, consiste en un valor intrínseco del ser humano, quien lo posee más allá de las situaciones externas o internas. Esta investigación demuestra que, frente al antecedente jurisprudencial de Ana Estrada, es necesario precisar el verdadero sentido de la dignidad humana acogido en el sistema jurídico peruano, desde un aspecto iusfilosófico, según el cual se concibe a la dignidad humana como un principio ético-jurídico que responde a una dignidad ontológica, lo cual a su vez evitará evidenciar un “derecho la muerte digna”. / The objective of this research was to specify the true meaning of human dignity in the Peruvian Legal System from a legal-philosophical aspect. Currently, a divergent conception of human dignity is evident, caused by the development of erroneous philosophical currents that put the human person at risk, causing exceptions in the normative application, as in the case of Ana Estrada, to whom the non-application of the mercy killing so that she can die with dignity with the support of the health system, which will be exempt from criminal responsibility if it intervenes in the procedure to help her “die with dignity”; Although human dignity is recognized in the Peruvian Legal System as a law-principle that is applied as a normative parameter of all legal provisions and legal interpretation, since it consists of an intrinsic value of the human being, who possesses it beyond of external or internal situations. This research will demonstrate that, given the jurisprudential background of Ana Estrada, it is necessary to specify the true meaning of human dignity accepted in the Peruvian Legal System, from a legal-philosophical aspect, according to which human dignity is conceived as an ethical principle. -legal that responds to an ontological dignity, which in turn will avoid evidencing a “right to a dignified death.”

Text in Afrikaans / Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Die doel van hierdie studie was om die verwantskap tussen persoonlikheidstipes en 'n salutogeniese konstruk naamlik sin vir koherensie te ondersoek. Persoonlikheid is vanuit 'n behavioristiese sowel as humanistiese paradigma ondersoek en sin vir koherensie vanuit 'n salutogeniese paradigma. Die studie is uitgevoer onder middelvlak bestuurders in 'n finansiele instelling waarvan die totale populasie in 'n gegewe geografiese gebied betrek is. Twee meetinstrumente, naamlik die lewensorientasievraelys (OLQ) en die Myers-Briggs tipe indikator (MBTI) is gebruik op die populasie van 57 bestuurders. Pearson produkmoment-korrel asiekoeffisiente is bereken en 'n variansie-ontleding is gedoen. Die resultate van hierdie studie toon dat daar nie 'n beduidende verband is tussen persoonlikheidstipes en sin vir koherensie nie. Die aanname word gemaak dat 'n verwantskap tussen die twee konstrukte moontlik gevind kan word indien 'n meer geografies verspreide en heterogene proefgroep gebruik word waarin al die persoonlikheidstipes verteenwoordig is. / The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between personality types a11d a salutogenic construct, namely sense of coherence. Personality has been investigated from a behaviouristic as well as a humanistic paradigm and sense of coherence from a salutogenic paradigm. This study has been done on persons on middle management level in a financial institution of which the total population has been approached in a given geographical area. Two measuring instruments, namely the Orientation To Life Questionnaire (OLQ) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) have been used on the population of 57 managers. Pearson product moment correlation coefficient has been calculated and a variation analysis has been done. The results of this study show that there is no significant relation between personality types and sense of coherence. It is supposed that a relationship between the two constructs might be found if a more heterogenic and geographically spread experimental group is used in such a way that all the personality types are represented. / Psychology / M.A. (Bedryfsielkunde)

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline. / À la suite d'attaques terroristes massives est apparue une motivation féroce qui risque d'être manipulée pour justifier des excès de force. Voulant prévenir des attaques armées contre leurs intérêts, certains États ont adopté des politiques de « tuerie ciblée » pour éliminer de façon permanente des terroristes en sol étranger qui menacent leur sécurité. II est pourtant illégal de tuer des individus en l'absence de conflits armes sans égard au droit à la vie. La présente recherche tient à déterminer si, en vertu du droit international, des États peuvent neutraliser par force des individus dangereux ou bien venir au secours d' otages en sol etranger. En étudiant l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, un certain nombre de conclusions sont apparues, notamment que des opérations pour « arrêter ou neutraliser » ne peuvent avoir lieu que dans des États qui supportent des terroristes ou qui restent indifférents face à leur présence, et que I'expression « guerre contre Ie terrorisme » ne peut permettre des «tueries ciblées » sans avoir à considérer les droits à la vie et à la légitime défense. Puisque toute division entre les membres de la communauté internationale peut venir limiter la prévention d'attaques, le fait que la coopération entre les États ayant abolis la peine de mort et ceux ayant recours aux « tueries ciblées » puissent en souffiir fait l'objet de cet ouvrage. Ladite recherche conclue que l'utilisation de « tueries ciblées » en dehors du contexte de conflits armés ne peut être permis qu'en dernière mesure lorsque réellement nécessaire pour prévenir des attaques armées et protéger la vie. / From the ashes of devastating acts of terrorism has arIsen a resolve so powerful that measures of counterterrorism risk being manipulated by states to justify excess. In an attempt to prevent armed attacks against their interests, a number of states have adopted policies of targeted killing to permanently incapacitate terrorists on foreign soil. The intentional killing of suspected offenders, however, cannot be lawfully carried-out by states in the absence of armed conflict without regard for the right to life. The following research attempts to determine whether it is permissible for nations to use force on foreign soil to . incapacitate dangerous individuals or rescue hostages under international law. By studying article 51 selfdefense of the United Nations charter, a number of conclusions are asserted, namely that operations to "arrest or neutralise" can only be carried-out in states that support terrorists or are complacent to their presence, and that declaring "war on terrorism" cannot allow governments to kill suspected terrorists in countries where there is no war, except in a manner that is reconcilable with the rights to life and selfdefense. Since division among members of the international community may ultimately diminish their ability to collectively suppress international terrorism, the potential for hindered cooperation between abolitionist states and those that carry-out targeted killings is also addressed. The current research concludes that targeted killings can only be justified outside the context of armed conflict when they are truly necessary as a last resort to prevent armed attacks and save lives.