This thesis considers two allegations which conservatives often level at no-fault systems — namely, that responsibility is abnegated under no-fault systems, and that no-fault systems under- and over-compensate. I argue that although each of these allegations can be satisfactorily met – the responsibility allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that to properly take responsibility for our actions we must accept liability for those losses for which we are causally responsible; and the compensation allegation rests on the mistaken assumption that tort law’s compensatory decisions provide a legitimate norm against which no-fault’s decisions can be compared and criticized – doing so leads in a direction which is at odds with accident law reform advocates’ typical recommendations. On my account, accident law should not just be reformed in line with no-fault’s principles, but rather it should be completely abandoned since the principles that protect nofault systems from the conservatives’ two allegations are incompatible with retaining the category of accident law, they entail that no-fault systems are a form of social welfare and not accident law systems, and that under these systems serious deprivation – and to a lesser extent causal responsibility – should be conditions of eligibility to claim benefits. / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2007.

this article analyzes the causal element of torts from the perspective of comparative law, focusing on the field of tort liability. Thus, it specifies both the particular aspects of the investigation as well as each legal system studied. then, the article discusses the differences and similarities of each system. Later, it stops on the dominant approaches examining its success on facing the tort phenomenon in order to highlight the essential characteristics that determine the various approaches tort liability can assume. / El presente artículo analiza el elemento causal de la responsabilidad civil desde una perspectiva de derecho comparado, haciendo énfasis sobre el campo de la responsabilidad aquiliana. Así, precisando tanto los aspectos particulares de la propia investigación como de cada Ordenamiento Jurídico estudiado, el artículo aborda las diferencias y similitudes de cada Ordenamiento. De esta forma, se detiene sobre los enfoques dominantes examinando la capacidad de los mismos. Ello con la finalidad de evidenciar las características esenciales que determinan los diversos alcances que puede asumir la responsabilidad aquiliana.

In Tort Law, it is said that an individual mustrepair the damage he causes.  What is the extention of this maxim? Is this affirmation accurate? What is considered damage for Law?Jean-Sebastién Borghetti answers this and other questions as understood by French Law, seeking to delimit the French system of civil liability. In that sense, through this  article, the author proposes that not all affronts constitute a damage as understood by Law, and that not every damage can be repaired. / En la Responsabilidad Civil, se afirma que todoaquel que causa un perjuicio debe repararlo. ¿Cuál es el alcance de esta máxima? ¿Qué tan exacta es esta afirmación? ¿Qué es un perjuicio para el Derecho?Jean-Sebastién Borghetti responde estas y otras preguntas desde el Derecho francés, buscando delimitar el sistema francés de la responsabilidad civil. En ese sentido, a través del presente artículo, el autor propone que no todo agravio constituye un perjuicio para elDerecho, y que no todo perjuicio es reparable.

O estudo em comento tem por objetivo analisar se o instituto jurídico dos punitive damages, oriundo da Common Law, tem aplicabilidade no ordenamento jurídico nacional, particularmente no âmbito das relações de consumo. Para tanto, a presente obra, além de apresentar um panorama histórico da responsabilidade civil punitiva, expõe como tal responsabilidade vem sendo aceita no Brasil e conclui como sendo dois os seus principais instrumentos de atuação: a indenização punitiva e os punitive damages. Diferenciando-os, entendemos que os punitive damages eram os mais adequados a atual sociedade de consumo brasileira, por constituir-se um valor fixado em separado, com o intuito específico de punir e avaliado conforme a complexidade do caso pelo magistrado, conferindo dinamismo e eficiência às punições. Nesse sentido, propusemos os critérios que em nosso sentir seriam os mais adequados para a aplicação dos punitive damages e a fixação do quantum punitivo no âmbito das relações de consumo, bem como os fatores que justificam a aplicação do referido instituto jurídico nestas relações. Apresentamos, ademais, uma análise da aplicabilidade dos punitive damages nos ordenamentos jurídicos de Common e Civil Law que mais influenciam o ordenamento jurídico nacional. / This study aims to examine whether the legal institution of punitive damages, coming from the Common Law, is applicable in national law, particularly in the context of consumer relations. This essay, besides presenting historical overview of punitive liability, explains how this responsibility is being accepted in Brazil and concludes that there are two main instruments of action. The first instrument is based on the increase of the compensatory damages to punish the defendant. The other one is the punitive damages. We believe that punitive damages were more suitable to the current consumer society in Brazil, because it represents a value that is set apart, with the purpose of punishing and evaluated according to the complexity of the case by the magistrate, giving dynamism and efficiency to the punishment. In this sense, we proposed rules that in our opinion would be most suitable for the application of punitive damages and setting of the punitive quantum under products liability, as well as factors warranting the application of this legal institution in these relationships. We present, moreover, analysis of the applicability of punitive damages in the legal systems of Common and Civil Law that most influence Brazilian Law.

Le quasi-contrat est consacré comme une source autonome d’obligation dans le code civil. Pourtant, l’unité de la notion est problématique. En effet, la loi définit le quasi-contrat comme un fait volontaire dont il résulte un engagement alors que la doctrine le présente comme une notion à mi-chemin entre le contrat et la responsabilité civile extra-contractuelle en raison de l’application du régime contractuel en dehors d’un accord de volontés des parties. Or, en pratique, hormis la gestion d’affaires qui obéit au régime du mandat sans pouvoir exprès, l’enrichissement sans cause, (désormais enrichissement injustifié) et la répétition de l’indu n’obéissent pas à un régime contractuel. Si la doctrine a tenté de proposer le critère du transfert de valeurs dépourvu de cause pour justifier l’unité de la notion, ce critère se trouve mis à mal par la jurisprudence sur les loteries publicitaires. La thèse tente ainsi de rechercher une nouvelle unité, recherche qui s’avère difficile, voire impossible, dans la mesure où chaque quasi-contrat répond à des règles tantôt propres au contrat, tantôt propres à la responsabilité civile extra-contractuelle, ce qui vient alors fausser l’autonomie du quasi-contrat / Quasi-contracts are set as an autonomous part of the civil code, yet the notion answers to no unity. Law defines the notion as a voluntary fact leading to bind its author but scholars are considering quasi-contracts to be halfway between contract law and tort law due to the lack of will leading nevertheless to binding obligations. Practice shows that, except for the business management based on a mandate without any express will, the other quasi-contracts, unjust enrichment and repetition of undue do not follow any contractual regime. Scholars have attempted to propose the transfer of value for explaining the unity of the notion but this criterion is no longer relevant since cases creating a new quasi-contracts: lotteries. This work aims to discover a new criterion to find back unity of quasi-contracts. Impossible task as each quasi-contract shares common aspects of contract law and of tort law

The Economic Analysis of Tort Law Abstract In the presented thesis I discuss the economic analysis of tort law. The economic analysis of law can be described as the application of economic theory - primarily microeconomics and the basic concepts of welfare economics - to examine the formation, structure, processes, and economic impact of law and legal institutions. The economic analysis of tort law can help understand the impact of tort liability on individuals' behavior, why some areas of human activity are governed by negligence or strict liability, or why, in some cases, the amout of damages is limited. First two chapters describe the economic approach to law as such, they serve as an introduction into this field of study and present the most important methodological approaches. In the first chapter, I also discuss the basic tendencies that have shaped the economic analysis of law throughout its development. Second chapter then discusses some of the fundamental concepts of the economic analysis of law, namely the assumption of rational action, the concept of transaction costs, the efficiency criterion, the importance of the Coase theorem, and the distinction between property rules and liability rules. Following the examination of the concept of economic efficiency, an alternative approach based on the...

Este trabalho trata da relação entre a teoria formalista do direito elaborada por Ernest Weinrib e sua teoria de fundamentação da responsabilidade civil derivada do formalismo. O objetivo do trabalho é mostrar que, apesar de o formalismo apresentar uma formulação distintiva e inovadora de racionalidade jurídica, que enfatiza a relação entre forma e conteúdo do direito, o modelo de racionalidade jurídica do formalismo não fornece uma explicação adequada para algumas áreas do direito e, especificamente no caso da responsabilidade civil, da responsabilidade objetiva, que, nessa visão, é considerada um erro jurídico. O formalismo jurídico weinribiano é um projeto teórico ambicioso que a um só tempo procura rechaçar posições céticas como os estudos críticos do direito (critical legal studies) e posições instrumentalistas, especialmente a análise econômica do direito e o positivismo jurídico. Ele apresenta uma teoria geral que mostra o direito como um lócus de racionalidade moral imanente e um método, fundado na inteligibilidade imanente, para compreender essa racionalidade e ver o direito como um fenômeno autônomo em relação à política e a outras esferas de racionalidade. O método formalista permite a intelecção do direito como um fenômeno imanentemente coerente por meio da apreensão das estruturas organizadoras e justificadoras implícitas nos arranjos jurídicos, isto é, as formas da justiça corretiva e da justiça distributiva. Com base nisso, o formalismo sustenta que a forma imanente ao direito privado e, consequentemente, à responsabilidade civil é a justiça corretiva. Este trabalho reconstrói criticamente as principais teses que integram o formalismo e que são fundamentais para entender a rejeição à responsabilidade objetiva, considerada uma monstruosidade conceitual, com especial ênfase na premissa epistemológica formalista da inteligibilidade imanente como a melhor maneira de se compreender o direito e na premissa da coerência estrutural que os arranjos jurídicos devem apresentar. A tese discute o modo como o formalismo jurídico se insere no debate metodológico contemporâneo, definindo o formalismo jurídico como uma teoria de avaliação e justificação jurídica e, portanto, dotada de uma dimensão prescritiva, e apresentando o impacto dessa definição na postura que o formalismo assume em relação à responsabilidade objetiva. A tese ainda analisa a relação entre essa dimensão prescritiva e o posicionamento do formalismo em relação à responsabilidade objetiva, rotulando-a de erro jurídico, e conclui com uma discussão sobre as razões desse posicionamento que, argumentase, é equivocado , que se baseiam na assunção das premissas da inteligibilidade imanente e do critério de coerência estrita que marcam o método de conhecimento formalista. / This dissertation focuses on the relationship between juridical formalism as elaborated by Ernest Weinrib and his theory of the foundation of tort law. The dissertation argues that despite formalisms distinctive and innovative account of legal rationality that emphasizes the relationship between laws form and substance, this account does not provide an adequate explanation for specific areas of law. Particularly in the case of tort law it does not adequately explain strict liability, which is deemed a juridical error. Weinribs juridical formalism is an ambitious theoretical project that challenges: skeptical accounts of law, such as critical legal studies; instrumentalists account of law exemplified by economical analysis of law; and juridical positivism. Weinribs theory attempts to explain law as a locus of immanent moral rationality. The theory is based on a methodology that adopts the premise of immanent intelligibility as a way to comprehend this rationality. This approach allows the theorist to grasp law as a phenomenon autonomous from politics and other spheres of rationality. The formalist method allows the intelligibility of law as an immanently coherent phenomenon through the apprehension of the organizing and justifying structures implicit in juridical arrangements, i.e., the forms of corrective justice and distributive justice with which formalism argues that the immanent form of private law and, therefore, of tort law is corrective justice. This dissertation reconstructs critically the main theses that support formalism, which are essential to understanding its rejection of strict liability considered a conceptual monstrosity. This dissertation focuses on the formalist epistemological assumption of immanent intelligibility as the best way of comprehending law and on the premise of internal structural coherence that juridical arrangements should display. This thesis discusses the way in which juridical formalism can be located within the contemporary methodological debate, and defines formalism as an evaluative and justificatory juridical theory. As such, formalism encompasses a prescriptive dimension. This dissertation also identifies how the definition of formalism as a prescriptive theory impacts on its analysis of strict liability. The dissertation then analyses the relationship between this prescriptive dimension and the formalist position regarding strict liability. It concludes that formalisms mistake regarding strict liability can be traced back to its epistemological assumptions regarding immanent intelligibility and coherence.

Este trabalho trata da relação entre a teoria formalista do direito elaborada por Ernest Weinrib e sua teoria de fundamentação da responsabilidade civil derivada do formalismo. O objetivo do trabalho é mostrar que, apesar de o formalismo apresentar uma formulação distintiva e inovadora de racionalidade jurídica, que enfatiza a relação entre forma e conteúdo do direito, o modelo de racionalidade jurídica do formalismo não fornece uma explicação adequada para algumas áreas do direito e, especificamente no caso da responsabilidade civil, da responsabilidade objetiva, que, nessa visão, é considerada um erro jurídico. O formalismo jurídico weinribiano é um projeto teórico ambicioso que a um só tempo procura rechaçar posições céticas como os estudos críticos do direito (critical legal studies) e posições instrumentalistas, especialmente a análise econômica do direito e o positivismo jurídico. Ele apresenta uma teoria geral que mostra o direito como um lócus de racionalidade moral imanente e um método, fundado na inteligibilidade imanente, para compreender essa racionalidade e ver o direito como um fenômeno autônomo em relação à política e a outras esferas de racionalidade. O método formalista permite a intelecção do direito como um fenômeno imanentemente coerente por meio da apreensão das estruturas organizadoras e justificadoras implícitas nos arranjos jurídicos, isto é, as formas da justiça corretiva e da justiça distributiva. Com base nisso, o formalismo sustenta que a forma imanente ao direito privado e, consequentemente, à responsabilidade civil é a justiça corretiva. Este trabalho reconstrói criticamente as principais teses que integram o formalismo e que são fundamentais para entender a rejeição à responsabilidade objetiva, considerada uma monstruosidade conceitual, com especial ênfase na premissa epistemológica formalista da inteligibilidade imanente como a melhor maneira de se compreender o direito e na premissa da coerência estrutural que os arranjos jurídicos devem apresentar. A tese discute o modo como o formalismo jurídico se insere no debate metodológico contemporâneo, definindo o formalismo jurídico como uma teoria de avaliação e justificação jurídica e, portanto, dotada de uma dimensão prescritiva, e apresentando o impacto dessa definição na postura que o formalismo assume em relação à responsabilidade objetiva. A tese ainda analisa a relação entre essa dimensão prescritiva e o posicionamento do formalismo em relação à responsabilidade objetiva, rotulando-a de erro jurídico, e conclui com uma discussão sobre as razões desse posicionamento que, argumentase, é equivocado , que se baseiam na assunção das premissas da inteligibilidade imanente e do critério de coerência estrita que marcam o método de conhecimento formalista. / This dissertation focuses on the relationship between juridical formalism as elaborated by Ernest Weinrib and his theory of the foundation of tort law. The dissertation argues that despite formalisms distinctive and innovative account of legal rationality that emphasizes the relationship between laws form and substance, this account does not provide an adequate explanation for specific areas of law. Particularly in the case of tort law it does not adequately explain strict liability, which is deemed a juridical error. Weinribs juridical formalism is an ambitious theoretical project that challenges: skeptical accounts of law, such as critical legal studies; instrumentalists account of law exemplified by economical analysis of law; and juridical positivism. Weinribs theory attempts to explain law as a locus of immanent moral rationality. The theory is based on a methodology that adopts the premise of immanent intelligibility as a way to comprehend this rationality. This approach allows the theorist to grasp law as a phenomenon autonomous from politics and other spheres of rationality. The formalist method allows the intelligibility of law as an immanently coherent phenomenon through the apprehension of the organizing and justifying structures implicit in juridical arrangements, i.e., the forms of corrective justice and distributive justice with which formalism argues that the immanent form of private law and, therefore, of tort law is corrective justice. This dissertation reconstructs critically the main theses that support formalism, which are essential to understanding its rejection of strict liability considered a conceptual monstrosity. This dissertation focuses on the formalist epistemological assumption of immanent intelligibility as the best way of comprehending law and on the premise of internal structural coherence that juridical arrangements should display. This thesis discusses the way in which juridical formalism can be located within the contemporary methodological debate, and defines formalism as an evaluative and justificatory juridical theory. As such, formalism encompasses a prescriptive dimension. This dissertation also identifies how the definition of formalism as a prescriptive theory impacts on its analysis of strict liability. The dissertation then analyses the relationship between this prescriptive dimension and the formalist position regarding strict liability. It concludes that formalisms mistake regarding strict liability can be traced back to its epistemological assumptions regarding immanent intelligibility and coherence.

This thesis explores the status of a specific subset of absent characters within twentieth century American drama. By borrowing the term “proximate cause” from tort law and illuminating its intricacies through David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, this thesis re-appropriates proximate cause for literary studies. Rather than focus on characters whose existence remains the subject of critical debate, this set of absent characters presumably exists but never appear onstage. Despite their non-appearance onstage, however, these absent characters nonetheless have a profound effect upon the action that occurs during their respective plays. Highlighting the various ways in which these characters serve as the proximate cause for the onstage action of a given play will expand the realm of drama and literary studies in myriad ways.

With the arrival of the Economic Analysis of Law, some scholars began to consider Law as a set of “official prices” given by the legislature or the courts. Such change of perspective created some ius-economic inconsistencies because  a  large segment of the doctrine didn’t realize the impossibility of efficiently regulating the economy by recurring only toorders and mandates.In this article, the author argues that it is necessary to establish the ius-economic differences between sanctions and prices, i.e. between those hypotheses in which Lawsets a price on a behavior and those cases which Law looks forward to impose a sanction. Such ideas should be applied to Tort Law, specifically in the definition and understanding of allocation criteria. / Con la llegada del Análisis Económico del Derecho se pasó a considerar el Derecho comoun conjunto de “precios oficiales” dados por ellegislador o por los jueces. El cambio de perspectiva creó algunas incoherencias ius-econó-micas, ya que un amplio sector de la doctrinano cayó en la cuenta de la imposibilidad deregular eficientemente la economía usando sólo órdenes y mandatosEn el presente artículo, el autor sostiene que resulta necesario establecer las diferencias ius-económicas entre las sanciones y los pre- cios; es decir, entre aquellas hipótesis en que el Derecho atribuye un precio sobre un com- portamiento y aquellos supuestos en que el Derecho se ocupa de imponer una sanción, ideas que deberán ser aplicadas a la responsabilidad extracontractual, específicamente a la delimitación y comprensión de los criterios de imputación.