Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 124-130).

Thesis (M. S.)--Michigan State University. Construction Management Program , 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on June 19, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-150). Also issued in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2008. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.M.E.)--University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2009. / Open access. "This protocol is the basis of an ongoing pilot study in conjunction with Cooley Dickinson Hospital, Northampton, MA."--P. vii. Includes bibliographical references (p. 118-121).

Thesis (M. Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 192-195). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Alberta, 2009. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on Sept. 3, 2009). "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Applied Mathematics, Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Alberta." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 413-421). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 1995. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2010. / Title from PDF t.p. Release of full electronic text on OhioLINK has been delayed until July 1, 2011. Includes bibliographical references.

When groups of individuals make choices among several alternatives, the most compelling social outcome is the Condorcet winner, namely the alternative beating all others in a pair-wise contest. Obviously the Condorcet winner cannot be overturned if one sub-group proposes another alternative it happens to favor. However, in some cases, and especially with haphazard voting, there will be no clear unique winner, with the outcome consisting of a triple of pair-wise winners that each beat different subsets of the alternatives (i.e. a “top-cycle”.) We explore the sensitivity of Condorcet winners to various perturbations in the voting process that lead to top-cycles. Surprisingly, variations in the number of votes for each alternative is much less important than consistency in a voter’s view of how alternatives are related. As more and more voter’s preference orderings on alternatives depart from a shared model of the domain, then unique Condorcet outcomes become increasingly unlikely.