Thesis (M.A.)--Humboldt State University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57). Also available via Humboldt Digital Scholar.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1991. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [482]-498).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1955. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliographical essay: leaves i-viii.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1965. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliographical essay: l. 209-222.

This work is concerned with the development of the Progressives, a political faction of the Republican Party which was active in Wisconsin during the first half of the 20th century, throughout the Great Depression, and the Post-War era. It was during this period that the Progressives broke with the Republican Party, formed the Progressive Party and gained control of the state from 1934 through 1938, before finally dissolving in 1946, with many members moving into the Democratic Party, where they rejuvenated that moribund state party. This work, furthermore, focuses on the those Progressive leaders who operated in Wisconsin’s northern counties, a region which had a long tradition of Progressivism, the influence they had upon the creation of the Progressive Party and the political realignment which followed its dissolution.

The year had opened with bright expectations, but 1914 quickly tumbled into disillusionment and violence. For John Purroy Mitchel, New York City's new "boy mayor," the trouble started in January, when a crushing winter caused homeless shelters to overflow and dozens of the city's homeless froze to death. By April, anarchist throngs had paraded past industrialists' mansions, and tens of thousands filled New York's Union Square demanding "Bread of Revolution." Then, on July 4, 1914, a bomb destroyed a six-story Harlem tenement. It was the largest explosion the city had ever known. Among the dead were three bomb-makers; incited by anarchist Alexander Berkman, they had been preparing to dynamite the estate of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., son of a plutocratic dynasty and widely vilified for a massacre of his company's striking workers in Colorado earlier that spring. More Powerful Than Dynamite charts how anarchist anger, progressive idealism, and plutocratic paternalism converged in that July explosion.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boise State University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-130).

The focus of my research is dynamic macroeconomics and how the economy responds to changes in government policy. During the last 30 years, the sovereign bond market in emerging economies has grown considerably and many large scale defaults were observed. Existing models of sovereign debt are unable to jointly explain the debt to output ratios and the default frequency in these countries. In the first chapter, to address this puzzle, I propose a standard small open economy model with the addition that the government transits through different political states and these transitions cannot be directly observed by lenders. Moreover, after a default, the government chooses when to renegotiate and it bargains with the lenders over the recovery rate. I show that government reputation and endogenous periods of exclusion and recovery rates play a crucial role in explaining this phenomenon. In the second chapter, I use a dynamic political economy model to evaluate whether the observed rise in wage inequality and decrease in median to mean wages can explain the increase in transfers to low earnings quintiles and increase in effective tax rates for high earnings quintiles in the U.S. over the past several decades. I conduct a welfare analysis by contrasting the solution from the political mechanism with those from a sequential utilitarian mechanism, as well as mechanisms with commitment. Finally, the third chapter focuses on explaining the dynamics of firms. I ask whether an entry/exit model like that pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992, Econometrica) with a capital accumulation decision and non-convex costs of adjustment can generate size and age dependence like that found in the data. In particular, conditional on age, growth, employment creation and destruction and volatility are decreasing in size. Moreover, conditional on size, growth, employment creation and destruction and volatility are decreasing in age. The main point of this chapter is to demonstrate that a model with no financial frictions parameterized to match the investment regularities of U.S. establishments is able to account for the simultaneous dependence of industry dynamics on size (once we condition on age) and on age (once we condition on size). To explain how the economy responds and conduct welfare analysis either one has to find natural experiments or one has to build computational models and run counterfactual experiments. My research follows the latter strategy. / text

No description available.