Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2004. / Adviser: Robert V. Kohn. Includes bibliographical references.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1981. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 317-341). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Thesis (M.S. in M.E.)--School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004. Directed by Farrokh Mistree. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 247-249).

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Thesis (licentiat)--University of Copenhagen, 1981. / "Licentiatafhandling nr. 13." Includes bibliographical references.

This study investigates some behavioral aspects and properties of eliciting utility. Previous investigations devoted to empirical utility measurement have stemmed from the work of experimentalists who have applied various utility models in an effort to measure utility. However, empirical studies devoted to investigation into behavioral factors which may bias the measurement are lacking and it is this gap in the utility literature that prompted our empirical study. We chose to examine the standard gamble method for deriving von Heumann-Morgenstern cardinal utility and the MacCrimmon-Toda method for deriving indifference curves. The domain of choice involved hospital days in bed with risk of additional days. The analysis consisted of identifying relationships between behavioral factors and properties of choice predictions obtained by the methods. Furthermore, the study also provided a means for comparing properties of the two methods for eliciting utility. Among other findings, the results show that not all subjects expressed agreement with the appropriateness of specific axioms of behavior which underly some methods for eliciting utility and that not all people express constant sensitivity over all stimuli levels. The two results in themselves suggest that a priori assumptions regarding "rationality" and infinite sensitivity may have to be reexamined. The preferences elicited by both methods seem to suggest that the subjects follow a linear rule to trade-off sure outcome and risk. Although correspondence between test-retest preferences predicted by the standard gamble was generally closer than that for the MacCrimmon-Toda method, the MacCrimmon-Toda method had generally better predictive ability. Our results also indicate that certain behavioral factors seem to affect preferences predicted by the methods as we hypothesized. This observation has implications for practical measurement of utility since "successful" application of methods for eliciting preferences depends upon our awareness of which behavioral factors may bias the measurement. / Business, Sauder School of / Operations and Logistics (OPLOG), Division of / Graduate

Since vonNeumann and Morgenstern made their contributions, the expected utility criterion (EUC) has been the most accepted criterion in decision theory. Following their axiomatic approach justifying EUC, several other studies have been made suggesting the same criterion but under slightly different axiomatic systems. However, critics have found several simple decision problems (called paradoxes) which seem to contradict the conclusions of EUC; that is, the paradoxes contradict one or more of the axioms made to support EUC. The criticisms are based on empirical studies made in regard to the paradoxes. It is not always obvious, however, which axiom(s) is not accepted, since each approach to EUC gives a set of sufficient rather than necessary assumptions for EUC to hold. In Part I of the thesis a set of axioms which are necessary for EUC to hold is specified. Each of these axioms contains a basic assumption of a decision maker's behaviour. Therefore by considering the paradoxes in terms of these axioms, a better understanding is obtained with regard to which properties of EUC seem to be contradicted by the paradoxes. The conclusion of this study shows that most people contradict EUC because it does not differentiate between a "known" risk and an "unknown" risk. In Knight's terminology, there is a distinction between decision making under risk and uncertainty. Most empirical studies show that these differences are of such substantial proportions that there is a questionable justification for using the expected utility criterion for decision making under uncertainty. Although many alternatives to EUC for decision making under uncertainty exist, there are very few criteria for decision problems which fall between risk and uncertainty, that is, partial risk problems. Those existing are of an ad hoc nature. As a normative theory the EUC is far superior to any of these criteria in spite of its lack of distinction between risk and uncertainty. In the second part of the thesis an alternative normative criterion is suggested for decision making under partial risk and uncertainty. As an extension of EUC, this criterion distinguishes between risk and uncertainty. This theory expands on Ellsberg's suggestion that "ambiguity" influences one's preference among a set of alternatives. In this extension a more precise definition of "ambiguity" is needed and one is suggested here as a relation on the inner and outer measure of an event. The extension of EUC is then obtained by considering a more general set function, termed P-measure, which would depend on a set's ambiguity rather than a probability measure on the sets of rewards. It is concluded by an axiomatic development that the P-measure must be a non-negative mono-tonic set function which is not necessarily additive. It is also shown that the standard paradoxes related to paradoxes based on "known" versus "unknown" probabilities may be explained by this method and would therefore suggest an alternative to EUC for decision making under partial risk and uncertainty. / Business, Sauder School of / Unknown

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