No description available.

We develop a detailed, large-scale, airspace planning and collaborative decision-making model (APCDM), that is part of an $11.5B, 10-year, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-sponsored effort to increase U.S. National Airspace (NAS) capacity by 30 percent. Given a set of flights that must be scheduled during some planning horizon, we use a mixed-integer programming formulation to select a set of flight plans from among alternatives subject to flight safety, air traffic control workload, and airline equity constraints. Novel contributions of this research include three-dimensional probabilistic conflict analyses, the derivation of valid inequalities to tighten the conflict safety representation constraints, the development of workload metrics based on average (and its variance from) peak load measures, and the consideration of equity among airline carriers in absorbing the costs related to re-routing, delays, and cancellations. We also propose an improved set of flight plan cost factors for representing system costs and investigating fairness issues by addressing flight dependencies occurring in hubbed operations, as well as market factors such as schedule convenience, reliability, and the timeliness of connections. The APCDM model has potential use for both tactical and strategic applications, such as air traffic control in response to severe weather phenomenon or spacecraft launches, FAA policy evaluation, Homeland Defense contingency planning, and military air campaign planning. The model is tested to consider various airspace restriction scenarios imposed by dynamic severe weather systems and space launch Special Use Airspace (SUA) impositions. The results from this model can also serve to augment the FAA's National Playbook of standardized flight profiles in different disruption-prone regions of the National Airspace. / Ph. D.

Dans cette thèse, nous nous intéressons à des sujets différents en mathématiques financières, tous liés aux imperfections de marché et à la technique fondamentale de la maximisation d'utilité. Elle comporte trois parties. Dans la première, qui se base sur deux papiers, nous considérons le problème d'investissement optimal sur un marché financier avec coûts de transaction proportionnels. On commence par étudier le problème d'investissement dans le cas où la fonction d'utilité est multivariée (ce qui s'adapte particulièrement bien aux marchés des devises) et l'agent a une dotation initiale aléatoire, qui peut s'interpréter comme une option ou un autre contrat dérivé. Après avoir analysé les propriétés du problème et de son dual, nous utilisons ces résultats pour examiner, dans ce contexte, certains aspects d'une technique de pricing devenue populaire dans le cadre des marchés incomplets, l'évaluation par indifférence d'utilité. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous étudions le problème d'existence d'un ensemble de prix (appelés "prix fictifs" ou "shadow prices") qui offrirait la même utilité maximale à l'agent si le marché n'avait pas de frictions. Ces résultats sont utiles pour clarifier le lien entre la théorie classique des marchés sans frictions et la littérature en croissance rapide sur les coûts de transaction. Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, nous considérons le problème d'évaluation de produits dérivés par indifférence d'utilité dans des marchés incomplets, où la source d'incomplétude provient du fait que certains actifs ne peuvent pas être échangés sur le marché, ce qui est le cas par exemple dans le cadre des modèles structurels pour le prix de l'électricité. Sous certaines hypothèses, nous dérivons une caractérisation en terme d'équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades (EDSR) pour le prix, et nous nous concentrons ensuite sur les options européennes en établissant en particulier l'existence d'une stratégie de couverture optimale, même lorsque le payoff présente des discontinuités et est éventuellement non borné. Dans la dernière partie, nous analysons un simple problème de principal-agent à horizon fini, où le principal est essentiellement interprété comme un régulateur et l'agent comme une entreprise qui produit certaines émissions polluantes. Nous traitons séparément les problèmes du principal et de l'agent et nous utilisons la théorie des EDSR pour fournir des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes d'optimalité. Nous effectuons également des analyses de sensibilité et nous montrons des résultats numériques dans le but de fournir une meilleure compréhension du comportement des agents. / In this thesis we deal with different topics in financial mathematics, that are all related to market imperfections and to the fundamental technique of utility maximization. The work consists of three parts. In the first one, which is based on two papers, we consider the problem of optimal investment on a financial market with proportional transaction costs. We initially study the investment problem in the case where the utility function is multivariate (which is particularly suitable on currency markets) and the agent is endowed with a random claim, which can be interpreted as an option or another derivative contract. After analyzing the properties of the primal and dual problems, we apply those results to investigate, in this context, some aspects of a popular pricing technique in incomplete markets, i.e. utility indifference evaluation. In the second contribution to the transaction costs literature, we investigate the existence problem for a set of prices (called shadow prices) that would provide the same maximal utility to the agent if the market did not have frictions. These results shed some light on the link between the classical theory of frictionless markets and the quickly growing literature on transaction costs. In the second part of this thesis we consider the utility indifference pricing problem in incomplete markets, where the source of incompleteness comes from the fact that some assets in the market cannot be actively traded, which is the case for example in the framework of structural models for electricity prices. We provide a BSDE characterization for the price under mild assumptions, and then focus on the case of European claims by establishing in particular the existence of an optimal hedging strategy even when the claim presents discontinuities and is possibly unbounded. In the last contribution we analyze a simple principal-agent problem in finite time horizon, where the principal is mainly interpreted as a regulator and the agent as a firm producing some kind of polluting emissions. We separately treat both the agent's and the principal's problems and use the BSDE theory for providing necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. We also perform some sensitivity analyses and give numerical results in order to provide a better understanding of the agents' behavior.

In diesem Buch schlage ich eine radikal neuartige Sicht auf den Utilitarismus vor. Meine Hauptthese ist, dass der Utilitarismus selbst keine vollständige normative Theorie ist, aus der sich per se Handlungsbewertungen ableiten ließen, sondern normativ untersättigt und neutral ist. Sein normativer Gehalt ist vollständig abhängig von angenommenen Nutzenfunktionen. Jede konsistente Menge von moralischen Regeln (Moralsystem) kann, wie ich im Anhang beweise, als ein Spezialfall des Utilitarismus interpretiert werden. Um dies zu explizieren, stelle ich utilitaristische Interpretationen verschiedener Moralpositionen vor: Zwei alltagsmoralische Regeln (das Gebot, Versprechen zu halten und das Tötungsverbot), egalitäre Positionen zu Verteilungsfragen sowie die Rawls’sche Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Hierbei gebe ich stets korrespondierende Nutzenfunktionen an, deren Vorliegen Utilitaristen auf die interpretierten moralischen Positionen verpflichtet. Die Frage nach dem normativen Gehalt des Utilitarismus schlechthin ist somit falsch gestellt. Ein Großteil der Kritik des Utilitarismus als moralische Theorie läuft ins Leere, denn sie kritisiert einen solchen nur scheinbar eigenständigen normativen Gehalt des Utilitarismus, den sie selbst durch unterstellte Nutzenfunktionen erst erzeugt. Die Verteidigung des Utilitarismus verfehlt ebenso oft das Ziel, wenn sie zur Rettung des Utilitarismus an sich konkurrierende Nutzenfunktionen ins Feld führt, ohne die normative Neutralität des Utilitarismus generell zu thematisieren. Diese normative Neutralität macht den Utilitarismus gleichsam zur Normalform der Ethik, denn jeder moralische Disput lässt sich in einen Disput über korrespondierende Nutzenfunktionen überführen. Der Utilitarismus ist also nicht moralische Theorie, sondern vielmehr die Methode der Ethik. / In this book I suggest to look at utilitarianism in a radical new way. My key starting point is that utilitarianism in itself is not a complete normative theory from which judgements of actions could be drawn but instead that utilitarianism is normatively undersaturated and neutral. Its normative content is entirely dependent on assumed utility functions. Every consistent set of moral rules (moral system) can, as I prove in the appendix, be interpreted as a special case of utilitarianism. To explicate this, I give utilitarian interpretations of a number of different moral positions: two everyday moral rules (the rule to keep promises and the prohibition of killing), egalitarian positions on distribution, and the Rawlsian theory of justice. In each case I propose corresponding utility functions that commit utilitarians to the interpreted moral position. Thus, asking about the normative content of utilitarianism in itself is meaningless. Much of the critique of utilitarianism as a moral theory misses the point as it criticizes such an assumed normative content of utilitarianism in itself while imputing the existence of certain utility functions. Many defendants of utilitarianism fall for the same mistake, as they propose rival utility functions to rescue their assumed normative content of utilitarianism without addressing the general normative neutrality of utilitarianism. For this normative neutrality, utilitarianism can be viewed as the normal form of ethics, because every moral dispute can be translated into a dispute over corresponding utility functions. Therefore, Utilitarianism is not a moral theory, but rather the method of ethics.

Recentemente, várias tarefas tem sido delegadas a sistemas computacionais, principalmente quando sistemas computacionais são mais confiáveis ou quando as tarefas não são adequadas para seres humanos. O uso de extração de preferências ajuda a realizar a delegação, permitindo que mesmo pessoas leigas possam programar facilmente um sistema computacional com suas preferências. As preferências de uma pessoa são obtidas por meio de respostas para questões específicas, que são formuladas pelo próprio sistema computacional. A pessoa age como um usuário do sistema computacional, enquanto este é visto como um agente que age no lugar da pessoa. A estrutura e contexto das questões são apontadas como fonte de variações das respostas do usuário, e tais variações podem impossibilitar a factibilidade da extração de preferências. Uma forma de evitar tais variações é questionar um usuário sobre a sua preferência entre dois comportamentos observados por ele. A questão de avaliar relativamente comportamentos observados é mais simples e transparente ao usuário, diminuindo as possíveis variações, mas pode não ser fácil para o agente interpretar tais avaliações. Se existem divergências entre as percepções do agente e do usuário, o agente pode ficar impossibilitado de aprender as preferências do usuário. As avaliações são geradas com base nas percepções do usuário, mas tudo que um agente pode fazer é relacionar tais avaliações às suas próprias percepções. Um outro problema é que questões, que são expostas ao usuário por meio de comportamentos demonstrados, são agora restritas pela dinâmica do ambiente e um comportamento não pode ser escolhido arbitrariamente. O comportamento deve ser factível e uma política de ação deve ser executada no ambiente para que um comportamento seja demonstrado. Enquanto o primeiro problema influencia a inferência de como o usuário avalia comportamentos, o segundo problema influencia quão rápido e acurado o processo de aprendizado pode ser feito. Esta tese propõe o problema de Extração de Preferências com base em Comportamentos Observados utilizando o arcabouço de Processos Markovianos de Decisão, desenvolvendo propriedades teóricas em tal arcabouço que viabilizam computacionalmente tal problema. O problema de diferentes percepções é analisado e soluções restritas são desenvolvidas. O problema de demonstração de comportamentos é analisado utilizando formulação de questões com base em políticas estacionárias e replanejamento de políticas, sendo implementados algoritmos com ambas soluções para resolver a extração de preferências em um cenário sob condições restritas. / Recently, computer systems have been delegated to accomplish a variety of tasks, when the computer system can be more reliable or when the task is not suitable or not recommended for a human being. The use of preference elicitation in computational systems helps to improve such delegation, enabling lay people to program easily a computer system with their own preference. The preference of a person is elicited through his answers to specific questions, that the computer system formulates by itself. The person acts as an user of the computer system, whereas the computer system can be seen as an agent that acts in place of the person. The structure and context of the questions have been pointed as sources of variance regarding the users answers, and such variance can jeopardize the feasibility of preference elicitation. An attempt to avoid such variance is asking an user to choose between two behaviours that were observed by himself. Evaluating relatively observed behaviours turn questions more transparent and simpler for the user, decreasing the variance effect, but it might not be easier interpreting such evaluations. If divergences between agents and users perceptions occur, the agent may not be able to learn the users preference. Evaluations are generated regarding users perception, but all an agent can do is to relate such evaluation to his own perception. Another issue is that questions, which are exposed to the user through behaviours, are now constrained by the environment dynamics and a behaviour cannot be chosen arbitrarily, but the behaviour must be feasible and a policy must be executed in order to achieve a behaviour. Whereas the first issue influences the inference regarding users evaluation, the second problem influences how fast and accurate the learning process can be made. This thesis proposes the problem of Preference Elicitation under Evaluations over Observed Behaviours using the Markov Decision Process framework and theoretic properties in such framework are developed in order to turn such problem computationally feasible. The problem o different perceptions is analysed and constraint solutions are developed. The problem of demonstrating a behaviour is considered under the formulation of question based on stationary policies and non-stationary policies. Both type of questions was implemented and tested to solve the preference elicitation in a scenario with constraint conditions.

Recentemente, várias tarefas tem sido delegadas a sistemas computacionais, principalmente quando sistemas computacionais são mais confiáveis ou quando as tarefas não são adequadas para seres humanos. O uso de extração de preferências ajuda a realizar a delegação, permitindo que mesmo pessoas leigas possam programar facilmente um sistema computacional com suas preferências. As preferências de uma pessoa são obtidas por meio de respostas para questões específicas, que são formuladas pelo próprio sistema computacional. A pessoa age como um usuário do sistema computacional, enquanto este é visto como um agente que age no lugar da pessoa. A estrutura e contexto das questões são apontadas como fonte de variações das respostas do usuário, e tais variações podem impossibilitar a factibilidade da extração de preferências. Uma forma de evitar tais variações é questionar um usuário sobre a sua preferência entre dois comportamentos observados por ele. A questão de avaliar relativamente comportamentos observados é mais simples e transparente ao usuário, diminuindo as possíveis variações, mas pode não ser fácil para o agente interpretar tais avaliações. Se existem divergências entre as percepções do agente e do usuário, o agente pode ficar impossibilitado de aprender as preferências do usuário. As avaliações são geradas com base nas percepções do usuário, mas tudo que um agente pode fazer é relacionar tais avaliações às suas próprias percepções. Um outro problema é que questões, que são expostas ao usuário por meio de comportamentos demonstrados, são agora restritas pela dinâmica do ambiente e um comportamento não pode ser escolhido arbitrariamente. O comportamento deve ser factível e uma política de ação deve ser executada no ambiente para que um comportamento seja demonstrado. Enquanto o primeiro problema influencia a inferência de como o usuário avalia comportamentos, o segundo problema influencia quão rápido e acurado o processo de aprendizado pode ser feito. Esta tese propõe o problema de Extração de Preferências com base em Comportamentos Observados utilizando o arcabouço de Processos Markovianos de Decisão, desenvolvendo propriedades teóricas em tal arcabouço que viabilizam computacionalmente tal problema. O problema de diferentes percepções é analisado e soluções restritas são desenvolvidas. O problema de demonstração de comportamentos é analisado utilizando formulação de questões com base em políticas estacionárias e replanejamento de políticas, sendo implementados algoritmos com ambas soluções para resolver a extração de preferências em um cenário sob condições restritas. / Recently, computer systems have been delegated to accomplish a variety of tasks, when the computer system can be more reliable or when the task is not suitable or not recommended for a human being. The use of preference elicitation in computational systems helps to improve such delegation, enabling lay people to program easily a computer system with their own preference. The preference of a person is elicited through his answers to specific questions, that the computer system formulates by itself. The person acts as an user of the computer system, whereas the computer system can be seen as an agent that acts in place of the person. The structure and context of the questions have been pointed as sources of variance regarding the users answers, and such variance can jeopardize the feasibility of preference elicitation. An attempt to avoid such variance is asking an user to choose between two behaviours that were observed by himself. Evaluating relatively observed behaviours turn questions more transparent and simpler for the user, decreasing the variance effect, but it might not be easier interpreting such evaluations. If divergences between agents and users perceptions occur, the agent may not be able to learn the users preference. Evaluations are generated regarding users perception, but all an agent can do is to relate such evaluation to his own perception. Another issue is that questions, which are exposed to the user through behaviours, are now constrained by the environment dynamics and a behaviour cannot be chosen arbitrarily, but the behaviour must be feasible and a policy must be executed in order to achieve a behaviour. Whereas the first issue influences the inference regarding users evaluation, the second problem influences how fast and accurate the learning process can be made. This thesis proposes the problem of Preference Elicitation under Evaluations over Observed Behaviours using the Markov Decision Process framework and theoretic properties in such framework are developed in order to turn such problem computationally feasible. The problem o different perceptions is analysed and constraint solutions are developed. The problem of demonstrating a behaviour is considered under the formulation of question based on stationary policies and non-stationary policies. Both type of questions was implemented and tested to solve the preference elicitation in a scenario with constraint conditions.

[pt] No mundo inteiro o Setor Elétrico têm passado por mudanças radicais. A principal meta desse processo de restruturação foi promover a competição nos segmentos de geração, distribuição e comercialização energia elétrica e a participação de agentes privados no processo de produção. Essa reestruturação está baseada em uma otimização centralizada e nas seguintes premissas: Geradores ofertam sua produção em um Mercado Atacadista de Energia - MAE . Os agentes privados são livres para decidir sobre a construção de novas usinas e para competir por contratos de energia vendas com empresas distribuidoras e clientes individuais.O novo ambiente competitivo permite, no entanto, que em cenários de preços spots elevados as empresas Distribuidoras de energia elétrica possam vender as diferenças entre os valores de demanda contratados e consumidos. A possibilidade de retração de carga por meio de negociações com clientes pode resultar em sobras de energia que poderão ser vendidas diretamente no Mercado Spot. Por outro lado, a reação dos Geradores através de instrumentos financeiros adequados (como contratos bilaterais, contratos futuros e de opção) ou de políticas operacionais (via Operador do Sistema) podem resultar em um -jogo- de estratégias no MAE. Esta tese investiga alguns conceitos, metodologias e ferramentas computacionais desenvolvidas para a operação e comercialização da energia elétrica envolvendo análise de riscos e instrumentos financeiros. O problema de gerenciamento e retração forçada da demanda (elasticidade forçada) é decomposto em dois subproblemas:Subproblema de operação: usando programação dinâmica dual estocástica . Subproblema de análise de riscos: usando a teoria da utilidade O modelo proposto é avaliado através de um estudo de caso considerando os dados do sistema interligado Sul-Sudeste, para o qual são simuladas ações de retração da demanda. / [en] Electricity utilities all over the world have been undergoing radical changes in their market and its regulatory structure. A basic trend in this restructuring process has been to promote competition in generation, distribution/retailing segments and participation of private agents in the energy production process. This restructuring is based on centralized optimization, by market-oriented approaches: Generators bid prices for their energy in a Wholesale Energy Market - WEM. Instead of following an expansion schedule produced by a central planning agency, private agents are free to decide about the construction of generator units and to compete for energy sales contracts with utilities and individual customers.The competitive environment permits, however, which in high spot prices scenarios the electric utilities sell some differences between bilateral contract and real consumption. The possibility of load retraction by means of negotiations with clients would result in surplus generation which could be sold directly to the spot market. On the other hand, the reaction of the Generators via financial means (such as bilateral contracts, forward contracts and option prices) or operational policies from System Operator can result in a WEM -gaming-. This thesis investigates some conceptual issues, methodologies and computational tools developed to operation and commercialization of the electrical energy considering risk analysis and financial instruments. The demand side and retraction management problem is decomposed in two sub-problems: Operation sub-problem: uses stochastic dual dynamic programming (SDDP)tools Risk analysis sub-problem: uses utility theoryThe approach will be illustrated with a case study with data taken from the Brazilian system, where the demand side management is simulated and the numerical results are presented.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / As medical data continues to transition to electronic formats, opportunities arise for researchers to use this microdata to discover patterns and increase knowledge that can improve patient care. Now more than ever, it is critical to protect the identities of the patients contained in these databases. Even after removing obvious “identifier” attributes, such as social security numbers or first and last names, that clearly identify a specific person, it is possible to join “quasi-identifier” attributes from two or more publicly available databases to identify individuals. K-anonymity is an approach that has been used to ensure that no one individual can be distinguished within a group of at least k individuals. However, the majority of the proposed approaches implementing k-anonymity have focused on improving the efficiency of algorithms implementing k-anonymity; less emphasis has been put towards ensuring the “utility” of anonymized data from a researchers’ perspective. We propose a new data utility measurement, called the research value (RV), which extends existing utility measurements by employing data constraints rules that are designed to improve the effectiveness of queries against the anonymized data. To anonymize a given raw dataset, two algorithms are proposed that use predefined generalizations provided by the data content expert and their corresponding research values to assess an attribute’s data utility as it is generalizing the data to ensure k-anonymity. In addition, an automated algorithm is presented that uses clustering and the RV to anonymize the dataset. All of the proposed algorithms scale efficiently when the number of attributes in a dataset is large.

A dissertação aborda e compara as características dos índices de Sharpe (SR) e suas variantes, SRc e SRd, Sharpe generalizado (GSR ) e potencial de investimento (IP), sendo os índices GSR e IP associados a alguma função de utilidade. Pelo fato de o GSR e o IP serem idênticos, testes empíricos foram realizados entre SRc e o GSR. Ambos foram avaliados teoricamente sob dois aspectos, o que definimos de análise retrospectiva, i.e., análise de séries de log-retornos mensais observados, e a análise prospectiva, i.e., séries a ocorrer. No âmbito prospectivo, ex ante facto, o SRc (índice de Sharpe com variável de estado normal) e o SRd (índice de Sharpe com variável de estado lognormal), por estarem associados à função de utilidade quadrática, apresentam distorções como o ponto bliss e o agente econômico bomba de dinheiro. O mesmo ocorre no âmbito retrospectivo, ex post facto, com o GSR (potencial de desempenho de ativos de risco para indivíduos com função de utilidade HARA) quando o coeficiente de aversão ao risco é igual a um negativo, gama=-1. No entanto, o GSR pode ser associado a funções de utilidade diferentes da quadrática evitando seus efeitos indesejáveis. Sob a suposição de movimento browniano geométrico (MBG) e da utilidade HARA para o preço mensal ajustado de ações brasileiras e americanas e para pontos mensais de índices brasileiros e americanos, entre janeiro de 2000 e março de 2008, obtivemos os seguintes resultados: (1) o índice GSR para utilidade quadrática apresentou elevada correlação com o SRc; (2) a menor correlação de GSR com SRc ocorreu para utilidade logarítmica; (3) para a utilidade exponencial, o GSR apresenta elevado grau de correlação com o SRc. Os resultados mostraram que o GSR com utilidade exponencial é o índice que menos se aproxima do comportamento do GSR com utilidade quadrática. Sabendo-se das distorções da utilidade quadrática, a adoção do GSR com gama=1 parece mais adequado para a classificação de ativos de risco. / This master dissertation studies and compares the characteristics of Sharpe ratio and its variants, SRc and SRd, generalized Sharpe ratio (GSR) and investment potential (IP), both GSR and IP associated to any utility function. By the fact that GSR and IP are identical indexes, empiric tests were conducted between SRc and GSR. The indexes were evaluated theoretically under two different aspects: retrospective analysis, i.e., analyze the observed monthly log-returns, and prospective analysis, i.e., series to occur. Under prospective view, ex ante facto, SRc (Sharpe ratio with normal state variable) and SRd (Sharpe ratio with lognormal state variable), for being associated to the quadratic utility function, show the inherent problems to utility functions such as the bliss point and the pump money economic agent. The same happens in a retrospective view, ex post facto, with the GSR (performance potential with HARA utility function family) when the risk aversion coefficient equals minus one, gama=-1. Therefore, the GSR can be associated to different utility functions avoiding the undesirable effects. Under the GBM (geometric Brownian motion) condition and HARA utility function for the Brazilian and American adjusted monthly stock prices and indexes monthly points during January 2000 and March 2008, we reached the following: (1) results indicate that GSR for quadratic utility has high correlation level with SRc; (2) while the logarithmic utility showed lowest correlation level between GSR and SRc; (3) exponential utilities showed a high level of correlation between GSR and SRc. The results showed that GSR with exponential utility kept the biggest behavior difference for the GSR with quadratic utility. Based on the knowing problems of the quadratic utility, GSR with gama=1 seems to be a better index choice for risk assets classification.

Made available in DSpace on 2009-11-18T19:01:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2003 / Auctions are secular institutions used in the commercial relationships among individuaIs and organizations. They provi de greater flexibility to the processes of determination of prices and allocation of goods, increasing the space for negotiations among buyers and sellers. In the Internet, they have been used, in a growing way, in B2B and G2B electronic commerce, mostly through the model of reverse auctions. However, its unidimensional aspect reduces the negotiations to the variable price, producing, many times, bad results. In the Brazilian case, the Federal Government launched Comprasnet, an Internet public emarketplace, through which public organizations acquire goods and services from registered suppliers. Considering alI the available bidding modalities, 'Electronic Pregão' stands out, as an unidimensional reverse auction, based on price, through which suppliers dispute for contracts of the public administration. In the present work, the author proposes a multicriteria decision-making approach, based on Multi-attribute Utility Theory, as an alternative for the adoption of multi-attribute reverse auctions, adding value to Brazilian Public Buying Organizations. / Leilões são instituições seculares utilizadas nas relações comerciais entre indivíduos e organizações. Provêem maior flexibilidade aos processos de determinação de preços e alocação de bens, aumentando o espaço para negociações entre compradores e vendedores. Na Internet, têm sido empregados, de maneira crescente, em atividades de comércio eletrônico B2B e G2B, em sua maioria, através da modalidade de leilão reverso. No entanto, seu aspecto unidimensional reduz as negociações à variável preço, produzindo, muitas vezes, resultados aquém do desejado. No caso brasileiro, o Governo Federal instituiu o Portal Comprasnet, através do qual, as organizações públicas adquirem bens e serviços de fornecedores cadastrados. Dentre as modalidades de licitação disponíveis, destaca-se o Pregão Eletrônico, um mecanismo de leilão eletrônico reverso baseado no atributo preço, através do qual, fornecedores submetem lances decrescentes, na disputa por contratos do setor público. No presente trabalho, o autor propõe uma abordagem de decisão multicritério, baseada na Teoria da Utilidade Multiatributo, como uma alternativa para a adoção de leilões reversos baseados em múltiplos atributos e, consequentemente, para uma maior agregação de valor pelas organizações compradoras do setor público brasileiro.