This essay conducts a qualitative text analysis on the Swedish foreign policy debates held in February 2015 and 2023. The study aims to enhance understanding of the shift in Swedish security policy following the Swedish NATO application. Using an ideal-type analysis, the occurrence of realistic and liberal assumptions is compared in the two debates. The study reveals that both debates are characterized by liberal assumptions. Additionally, it is evident that the Swedish foreign policy debate in 2023 is characterized to a greater extent by realistic assumptions than the debate in 2015. This difference becomes apparent as the debaters in 2023 more frequently and elaborately discuss the consequences of the international situation for security in Sweden and its vicinity. At the same time, the threat is more extensively linked to states, and a certain skepticism is expressed towards international institutions and their ability to uphold international laws. This enhances understanding of the shift in the Swedish security policy debate, indicating a change in how Swedish politicians talk about security concerns.

There has been a turning point in Germany’s foreign policy since the Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine in 2014. This study aims to investigate how Germany’s foreign policy has changed from 2014 until 2022. This thesis is relevant due to the uncertain development of the security of Germany and the rest of Europe. Additionally, it is important because the major changes in Germany’s foreign policy have not been analyzed by the theory Foreign Policy Change (FPC). The methodology that has been chosen for this thesisis case study and the research material has been based on primary and secondary sources. The conclusions that can be drawn from this thesis are that Germany’s foreign policy changed minimally after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the most significant changes happened after theRussian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Digital undervisning har blivit alltmer vanligt i skolans värld vilket har många fördelar. Tillgängligt undervisningsmaterial, öppet för alla att ta del av, består bland annat av videor på YouTube. Däremot finns det inte mycket forskning kring lärare och undervisningsmaterial på sociala medier som YouTube då dessa tillvägagångsätt fortfarande är väldigt nya, med tanke på teknologins snabba utveckling. Denna studie ämnar ta reda på hur lärare framställer undervisningsinnehåll om EU, närmare bestämt om EU-undervisningen ges en inrikespolitisk eller utrikespolitisk inramning. Studien syftar även till att ta reda på hur EU integreras i undervisning om nationell politik. Materialet består av ett flertal videor uppladdade av tre olika lärare på YouTube vars undervisningsinnehåll analyseras. Undersökningen kommer fram till att lärare tar upp olika ämnesinnehåll kring EU och därför inramas det också på olika sätt när det kommer till inrikespolitiska och utrikespolitiska kännetecken. Denna studie kan bidra till att hjälpa lärare förstå hur de kan lägga upp undervisningen om EU med hjälp av YouTube som ett digitalt verktyg. Studien kan även ge blivande och erfarna lärare verktyg att ge undervisningen en inrikespolitisk inramning med rätt förutsättningar att främja en politisk deltagarkompetens på EU-nivå hos eleverna.

<p>The aim of this paper is to describe which view the Chinese government in connection with the Olympics wants to display for the natural world and analyze if this view coincide with China’s foreign-policy goals. A qualitative content analysis is used. By using the theory of rational choice and a model with three different political approaches I want to examine whether or not the foreign-policy goals of the Chinese regime comport with the view that displays in two major newspapers in China. Since the runoff voting in Moscow in 2001 for the 2008 Olympics the Chinese government has been able to act rational and to compose different strategies to use the Games in Beijing for political propaganda. The analysis show that the governing in China make use of domestic media to put across their political message and some of the most important foreign-policy goals also occur in articles that handle the Olympic Games of 2008.</p>

Sweden has a long tradition of participation in different kinds of peacekeeping missions. During the Cold War, Sweden’s troop contributions were exclusively focused on UN operations, but in the early 1990s Sweden’s official troop contribution policy changed from an “only under the UN flag” position to one of “only under UN Security Council mandate”. It is fair to say that Sweden’s foreign policy has undergone fundamental changes and the country has been contributing military forces to both EU and NATO missions for quite some time. Swedish foreign policy debate has largely been characterized by a sense of political unity or consensus. Despite this, there have been occasions when the political parties have been in disagreement. There are studies that confirm that the level of conflict in the foreign policy debate has increased over time. Political and ideological disagreements do exist and the political landscape has changed during the last 10 years. These changes should also have an impact on foreign policy decisions. The aim of this study is to investigate the political decision making process regarding Swedish military international missions. It will examine the political unity in the decisions concerning eight different cases; Kosovo (1999-2010), Congo (2003) , Liberia (2003-2006), Afghanistan (2004-2014), Chad (2007), Somalia (2009-2017), Libya (2011) and Mali (2015 à).  The focus for the study will be the political unity regarding the decision process within Parliament and, more specifically, the work of the combined Foreign affairs and Defence committee, and the debates in Parliament. The empirical analysis reveals that the rate of political controversy has increased. However, there is still a great sense of unity and broad agreement among the political parties on the main question regarding troop contributions.  In many cases any conflict and debate concern side issues such as timings, personnel and finance. The two main parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party, are generally in agreement. They also conduct negotiations before a proposition becomes official, which leads to less conflict in the subsequent debate. The study also reveals a higher level of opposition from the Left party and from the Sweden Democrats. Some of their opposition can have ideological explanations. The Left party is mainly critical about participation in NATO missions.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om det går att rättfärdiga militära interventioner med stöd i klassisk liberal politisk teori. För ändamålet har de klassiskt liberala filosoferna John Locke och John Stuart Mill analyserats. Undersökningen är utförd medelst en text- och idéanalys av några av filosofernas portalverk. Resultatet av studien visar ett tydligt stöd för vissa sorters militära interventioner och att det faktumet är djupt rotat i flera etiska och moraliska överväganden som Locke respektive Mill gör. Slutsatsen i uppsatsen är därav att det finns klassiskt liberala argument för att genomföra militära interventioner.

In late 2014, Sweden became the first country in the world to adopt what it described as ”feminist foreign policy”. This was immediately met by both praise and criticism. While those who praised pointed to its relevance given the current state of global affairs; those who criticized it, did so because of its near utopian fantasies of global politics. While it has, since then, received mixed reviews in both media reporting and in academic reviews, it has never been investigated and compared to what should be perceived as the control — the feminist theory in international relations. This study aims to do so. It will, therefore, investigate the Swedish foreign policy and compare it to the feminist theory in international relations. In order to keep the study manageable, four separate branches of the Swedish foreign policy will be investigated. These are; migration, arms export, aid and diplomacy. While migration and aid are more generalized, arms exports and diplomacy are specifically investigating the United arab emirates, and Palestine, respectively. The outcome of the study was that all areas, except arms exports and aid, are both in keeping with, and against, the feminist theory in international relations. Arms exports, on the other hand, is not in keeping with the feminist theory at all. Aid is, in contrast to this, fully in keeping with the feminist theory. This creates a difficult situation when deciding wether or not the feminist foreign policy really is feminist. Sweden’s position as a weapons exporter causes severe friction with the feminist theory because of its recognition of female suffering during war. The way in which Sweden’s foreign policy aim to help women while also, in some way, perpetrating the suffering of women, creates a double standard. This double standard is what finally decides that the Swedish feminist foreign policy, even though it has many feminist leanings, is not feminist according to the feminist theory of international relations.

The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand whyRussia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.  The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand whyRussia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.  The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand why Russia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.

This dissertation contributes to an increased understanding of democracy promotion. Empirically, the study focuses on the multi-faced democratisation process in Macedonia; the official Swedish policy for democracy promotion; and actual Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia in the period 2000–2006. Theoretically, the study advances an analytical framework, which serves to bring clarity to democracy promotion as a concept. It is argued that democracy promotion embodies six structural components, and should be understood as activities adopted and/or supported by foreign actors, as part of a relationship between the democracy promoter and the recipient country, based on a set of motives and shaped through the use of different strategies, methods and channels. Moreover, the issue of impact is investigated. The analytical framework is used to investigate the character of Swedish democracy promotion, and to develop a typology of the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. It is argued that the Swedish policy for democracy promotion is permeated by a Swedish democratic self-image, eclectic theoretical reflection, and flexibility. In addition, it is argued that Sweden is primarily driven by altruistic and ideological motives, and acts to promote legal and societal democracy, and that the allocation of democracy promotion resources is based on theoretical as well as practical considerations. Macedonia’s democratisation process is analysed, and on the basis of the Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia, the study advances a typology of the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes, these being: educator, initiator, and supporter. Together with the analytical framework, this role typology provides new possibilities to study, and understand, democracy promotion. / Denna avhandling bidrar till ökad förståelse av demokratifrämjande aktiviteter. Empiriskt fokuserar studien på den flerdimensionella demokratiseringsprocessen i Makedonien, den officiella svenska policyn för demokratifrämjande aktiviteter, och de faktiska svenska försöken att främja demokratiutvecklingen i Makedonien under perioden 2000-2006. Teoretiskt bidrar studien med ett analytiskt ramverk, som ämnar ge ökad insikt om demokratifrämjande aktiviteter som begrepp. Det hävdas att dessa aktiviteter är uppbyggda av sex beståndsdelar, och bör förstås som aktiviteter verkställda eller understödda av utländska aktörer, som del av en relation mellan den demokratifrämjande aktören och mottagande land, baserat på en uppsättning motiv och format genom olika strategier, metoder, och kanaler. Betydelsen av effekt inkluderas även i studien. Det analytiska ramverket används för att undersöka den svenska policyn för demokratifrämjande aktiviteter, samt för att utveckla en typologi av de roller som sådana aktiviteter har i demokratiseringsprocesser. Studien visar att den svenska policyn för demokratifrämjande aktiviteter är genomsyrad av en svensk demokratisk självbild, eklektisk teoretisk resonerande, samt pragmatism. Studien visar även att Sverige som demokratifrämjare primärt driva av altruistiska och ideologiska motiv, och strävar efter att främja etableringen av en konstitutionell och samhällelig demokrati, samt att fördelning av demokratifrämjande resurser görs utifrån teoretiska såväl som praktiska överväganden. Makedoniens demokratiseringsprocess analyseras, och med utgångspunkt i de svenska försöken att främja demokratiutvecklingen i Makedonien utvecklas en typologi över de roller som demokratifrämjande aktiviteter kan ha i demokratiseringsprocesser, nämligen: pedagog, initierare, och understödjare. Tillsammans med det analytiska ramverket, skapar denna roll typologi nya möjligheter att studera, och förstå, demokratifrämjande aktiviteter.

Med anledning av den förändrade säkerhetsmiljön i Europa startade en process som syftade till att öka samarbetet inom säkerhets- och försvarsområdet inom EU. Detta försvarssamarbete kallas det Permanenta strukturerade samarbetet (Pesco) och innebär ett mer upptrappat och konkret militärt samarbete än tidigare inom EU. Genom ett medlemskap i Pesco förbinder sig medlemmarna till att mer intensivt utveckla sin egen försvarskapacitet inom forskning och anskaffning av försvarsmateriel, men även att uppbringa och bibehålla en stark försvarsbudget. Vidare ska även medlemstater bidra med stridsgrupper i beredskap för insatser inom EU:s ram. Hur kan vi förstå logiken i att Sverige ingår med i ett mer bindande försvarssamarbete som Pesco. Syftet med denna studie är att identifiera bakomliggande drivkrafter för att förstå varför Sverige beslutade att ingå i Pesco. Denna fallstudie har nyttjat ett teoretiskt perspektiv som utgått ifrån Graham Allisons konceptuella modeller för att identifiera dessa bakomliggande drivkrafter. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys studeras materialet i denna fallstudie bestående av regeringens proposition gällande deltagande i Pesco, Försvarsutskottets betänkande gällande Pesco och förvarspolitisk inriktning 2016-2020. För att komplettera textmaterialet har även mailintervjuer genomförts med strategiskt utvalda informanter i form av riksdagsledamöter och stabsofficerare i Försvarsmakten. Studiens slutsatser påvisar att de bakomliggande drivkrafterna för beslutet var flera. Den främsta drivkraften var att Sverige sedan tidigare ratificerat EU:s solidaritetsklausul och uttalat en solidaritetsförklaring gentemot övriga medlemstater i EU. Genom att ingå i Pesco förväntas det öka Sveriges trovärdighet som medlemsstat i EU. En ytterligare drivkraft var att ingå i Pesco i ett tidigt skede i syfte att forma samarbetet och ha inflytande i den riktning som Sverige anser var förenliga med militär alliansfrihet, samt att fortsatt driva den mellanstatliga prägel som samarbetet nu innehar. En drivkraft var också att bygga upp det nationella försvaret, öka den operativa förmågan och stärka totalförsvaret genom försvarssamarbetet. En majoritet av Riksdagens partier var överens om Sveriges ingående i Pesco, detta på grund av tidigare beslutad Försvarsinriktningsperiod 2016-2020 som också var en bärande drivkraft till varför Sverige valde att ingå i Pesco. / In response to the changing security environment in Europe a process started aimed at increasing cooperation in the security and defence area within the EU. This defence cooperation is called the Permanent structured cooperation (Pesco) and means a more gradual and substantial military cooperation than before in the EU. Through a membership in Pesco, the members commit to more intensively develop of its own defence capabilities in research and acquisition of defence equipment, but also to obtain and maintain a strong defence budget. In addition, the member states should also contribute with battle groups ready for military missions within the framework of the EU. How can we understand the logic of Sweden joining more binding defence cooperation like Pesco. The purpose of this study is to identify the underlying driving forces to understand why Sweden decided to join Pesco. This case study uses a theoretical perspective based on Graham Allison's conceptual models to achieve this purpose. Through a qualitative text analysis, the data that is studied in this case study consisting of Swedish government proposition and Defence committee report regarding Pesco and Defence bill 2016-2020. In order to widen the study, mail interviews were conducted with strategically selected informants. Those were members of the Swedish parliament and staff officers in the Swedish Armed Forces. The study concludes that the underlying driving forces for the decision were several. The main driving force was that Sweden previously ratified the EU solidarity clause and stated a declaration of solidarity in relation to other member states of the EU. By joining Pesco is also expected to boost Sweden's credibility as a member state of the EU. An additional driving force was to join Pesco at an early stage in order to forge cooperation and have influence in the direction in which Sweden considers compatible with own military nonalignment, and also to continue to drive the intergovernmental nature that Pesco now holds. An additional driving force was also building up the national defence, increase the operational capacity and strengthen the armed forces through the defence cooperation. A majority of the parliamentary parties agreed on joining Pesco because of the previously decided defence bill 2016-2020, which also considers as a driving force for why Sweden chose to join Pesco.