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Conventional interpretations regarding the role of the Political Warfare Executive during the Second World War have concentrated almost exclusively on the propaganda output of the organisation. The role of the intelligence sections working for and within the organisation have been largely disregarded or overlooked in the existing history of Executive. This thesis offers a re-evaluation of the PWE which includes this `missing dimension', specifically here the intelligence work of the German Section of the Executive. This approach widens the scope of enquiry to include an exploration of the links between intelligence and propaganda, subversion and sabotage and considers the importance of this relationship for the way in which the PWE emerged. The examination of the Weekly Reports of the German Section identifies a different `type' of intelligence which can be described as `social political' intelligence, which provided the British government with a unique view of the social and political conditions in Germany throughout the duration of the war. The thesis concentrates on the period after the announcement of Unconditional Surrender in January 1943 to the early months on 1946, when the personnel and expertise of the German Section were transferred to the Foreign Office. The analysis of the intelligence reports of the German Section is focussed on three particular issues of interest to government at the time and to historians today. These are German resistance and public opinion, British occupational rule, and the emergence of the perception of the Russian `threat' in Whitehall which signalled the beginning of the Cold War. Taken together these illustrate the way in which the PWE incrementally expanded it's activities over this period of time, and provide the basis for the re- evaluation of the Executive.

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The thesis is concerned with a specific example of misunderstanding as a factor in international crisis leading to war. The example is the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 and the thesis gives special importance to the mistranslation and misinterpretation of "Magic" (Magic, as the thesis explains, was the name given to the American decoding of the secret Japanese codes). The argument is that misunderstanding was a cumulative factor in relations between the United States and Japan, and that in the final negotiations mistranslation of Magic was a significant factor in the failure to reach an agreement. The thesis argues that as late as the last week in November 1941 the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been averted. The thesis opens with an introduction referring to the literature on the causes of war and misunderstanding in international politics. A brief comparison is made with crises which did not lead to war, such as the Cuban missile crisis. Part I is entitled "The Historical Legacy" and surveys briefly the period from the Spanish-American war to 1940. It does not claim to be a comprehensive account of U.S.-Japan relations. It is designed to show how successive crises increased misunderstanding. It emphasises the importance, for Japan, of the danger from Russia and demonstrates the lack of control in Japanese foreign policy. Part II opens with an examination of the way policy was formed and decisions made in the United States and Japan, discussing the role of Roosevelt, Hull and other influential members of the Administration in the United States, and the lack of a central core of decision-making in Japan. It then proceeds with a chronological study of negotiations from November 1940 to October 1941. Part III examines in detail the mistranslations from Magic, including the technical problems of coding and decoding and linguistic factors and problems of translation. Part IV studies chronologically the final negotiations, including Proposal B and the Hull Note, up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. It shows in detail the synchronisation and lack of synchronisation between the two sides and demonstrates the points at which accurate translation and clear understanding might have altered the course of events. The brief conclusion explains how the thesis adds to existing literature, notes the present state of archival material and speculates on the possible course of events had the attack on Pearl Harbor not occurred. There are five appendices: (i) Magic materials; (ii) List of Important Magic Misinterpretations; (iii) Historiographic Developments; (iv) Bibliography; (v) Maps.

The following thesis is an examination of the establishment and initial development of a British airborne force. Beginning with an examination of airborne development outside the UK up to 1940, it traces the growing British use of air transport as a tool for imperial policing in the inter-war period, and examines why this did not lead to the logical step of creating a dedicated British airborne force. The impact of German airborne operations and the defeat at Dunkirk in 1940 on British attitudes is then analysed, followed by a detailed examination of the mechanics of the establishment of a British airborne force, ending with the British 1st Parachute Brigade attaining operational status in January 1942.

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No description available.