This dissertation consists of three essays devoted to the general problem of combining various criteria for evaluating the collective desirability of social states. The first essay discusses the problem of combining a quasi-ordering of some set of alternatives (interpreted as a criterion for an increase in actual social welfare) with an extension of this quasi-ordering to the power set of this set (interpreted as a criterion for an increase in potential social welfare) to obtain a quasi-ordering of some subset of the Cartesian product of this set and its power set lexicographically based on the criterion for an increase in actual welfare. The main result of this essay is that, in order for such a quasi-ordering to exist, it is necessary and sufficient that the subset to which it is applied is such that the extension subsumes the original criterion. When applied to the standard Pareto quasi-ordering and its extension defined by the Chipman-Moore (1971) - Samuelson (1950) quasi-ordering, and under standard assumptions on the economic domain, this result is shown to imply Gorman’s (1955) conjecture for the transitivity of the Compensation criterion a la Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky. The second essay examines Sen's (1991) suggestion that preference information be used to supplement the criterion of freedom of choice for ranking opportunity sets. This paper shows, with some generality, that, in order for this supplementation to produce a transitive ranking of the opportunity sets, it is necessary and sufficient to assume that the domain ranked is such that the individual preference ordering encompasses the criterion of freedom of choice. However, it is also shown that the quasi-transitivity of such a ranking can be obtained without further assumption. The lesson of this paper is thus that there is little room for constructing a ranking of opportunity sets that attaches value to their freedom of choice while giving some weight to individual preferences. If freedom of choice is to have any value in the ranking, then in order for the ranking to be transitive, this value will have to be instrumental rather than intrinsic (using Sen's (1988) terminology). Finally, the third essay tries to make sense of the notion of exploitation set forth by Marxists and others and to relate it to that of bargaining power. For this task, a definition of exploitation is proposed which, it is contended, captures the intuitive meaning of the word as the act of taking unfair advantage of someone. More precisely, the definition considers a relationship between two agents to be exploitative if one agent (the exploiter) obtains an advantage from this relationship which can be shown to depend upon the initial deprivation of the other (the exploited) with respect to some poverty threshold. To assess whether the advantage of the exploiter is indeed due to the deprivation of the exploited, the definition considers a counterfactual experiment in which the state of deprivation of the exploited is eliminated and examines the welfare consequences of this experiment for the presumed exploiter. If the latter becomes worse off from this elimination of the other's deprivation, then it is asserted that the presumed exploiter is indeed taking an advantage of the other’s deprivation. The problem of specifying an "adequate" poverty threshold is also examined by appealing to bargaining theory. This examination is based upon the somewhat intuitive idea that exploitation is related to an "excessive" bargaining power on the part of the exploiter. The definition of the poverty threshold should therefore be made in such a way as to make exploitation a good measure of the bargaining power of the exploiter in the bargaining game representation of the relation between the exploited and the exploiter.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1984. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 167-174).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1983. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-142).

This dissertation consists of three essays devoted to the general problem of combining various criteria for evaluating the collective desirability of social states. The first essay discusses the problem of combining a quasi-ordering of some set of alternatives (interpreted as a criterion for an increase in actual social welfare) with an extension of this quasi-ordering to the power set of this set (interpreted as a criterion for an increase in potential social welfare) to obtain a quasi-ordering of some subset of the Cartesian product of this set and its power set lexicographically based on the criterion for an increase in actual welfare. The main result of this essay is that, in order for such a quasi-ordering to exist, it is necessary and sufficient that the subset to which it is applied is such that the extension subsumes the original criterion. When applied to the standard Pareto quasi-ordering and its extension defined by the Chipman-Moore (1971) - Samuelson (1950) quasi-ordering, and under standard assumptions on the economic domain, this result is shown to imply Gorman’s (1955) conjecture for the transitivity of the Compensation criterion a la Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky. The second essay examines Sen's (1991) suggestion that preference information be used to supplement the criterion of freedom of choice for ranking opportunity sets. This paper shows, with some generality, that, in order for this supplementation to produce a transitive ranking of the opportunity sets, it is necessary and sufficient to assume that the domain ranked is such that the individual preference ordering encompasses the criterion of freedom of choice. However, it is also shown that the quasi-transitivity of such a ranking can be obtained without further assumption. The lesson of this paper is thus that there is little room for constructing a ranking of opportunity sets that attaches value to their freedom of choice while giving some weight to individual preferences. If freedom of choice is to have any value in the ranking, then in order for the ranking to be transitive, this value will have to be instrumental rather than intrinsic (using Sen's (1988) terminology). Finally, the third essay tries to make sense of the notion of exploitation set forth by Marxists and others and to relate it to that of bargaining power. For this task, a definition of exploitation is proposed which, it is contended, captures the intuitive meaning of the word as the act of taking unfair advantage of someone. More precisely, the definition considers a relationship between two agents to be exploitative if one agent (the exploiter) obtains an advantage from this relationship which can be shown to depend upon the initial deprivation of the other (the exploited) with respect to some poverty threshold. To assess whether the advantage of the exploiter is indeed due to the deprivation of the exploited, the definition considers a counterfactual experiment in which the state of deprivation of the exploited is eliminated and examines the welfare consequences of this experiment for the presumed exploiter. If the latter becomes worse off from this elimination of the other's deprivation, then it is asserted that the presumed exploiter is indeed taking an advantage of the other’s deprivation. The problem of specifying an "adequate" poverty threshold is also examined by appealing to bargaining theory. This examination is based upon the somewhat intuitive idea that exploitation is related to an "excessive" bargaining power on the part of the exploiter. The definition of the poverty threshold should therefore be made in such a way as to make exploitation a good measure of the bargaining power of the exploiter in the bargaining game representation of the relation between the exploited and the exploiter. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

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As offshore installations in the North Sea near the end of their economically viable life they will be decommissioned. There is limited experience of decommissioning the structures in the Northern North Sea. When decommissioning is being considered studies are undertaken to assess each option on such criteria as: environmental impact, technical feasibility, cost, health and safety and public acceptability. This thesis aims to explore the contribution that economics can make to the debate surrounding decommissioning with the introduction of a cost benefit analysis framework within which to compare each decommissioning option. Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) considers the economic costs and benefits from any change in resource allocation within an economy. This would provide a structured assessment of all the impacts of decommissioning in monetary terms. CBA also allows social desirability to be considered. The CBA framework involves valuing costs and benefits. Whilst estimating costs raises important questions, the identification, measurement and valuation of (dis)benefits represents one the greatest challenges facing economists. This thesis will focus on how economics can be applied to this problem to obtain monetary valuations of the benefits of decommissioning. Two methods of valuing the (dis)benefits of decommissioning are considered - Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) and Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE). These are applied to valuing of one impact of decommissioning (drill cuttings) and the value of alternative decommissioning policies. As well as addressing the issue of decommissioning, these experiments also consider methodological issues in the application of CVM (dealing with Don't Know and Protest responses) and DCE (testing for compensatory decision making). Following this the costs of decommissioning are estimated using an existing financial simulation model developed for oil industry use. Recommendations are made for policy and future methodological work.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 113 p. : col. map. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-101).

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