Scholarly accounts of the history of civic virtue in the modern era have with few exceptions been wholly secular, discounting, ignoring, or even outright rejecting the role religious thought has played in shaping the civic tradition. In this dissertation, I focus on the influence of religion on the civic tradition, specifically in the eighteenth century in Scotland and America. I examine the ways in which the religious traditions of each nation shaped the debate surrounding the viability of civic virtue, the place of religious virtues among the civic tradition, and the tensions between using religion to promote civic virtue while protecting individual religious liberty. In the Scottish Enlightenment, I examine the influence of Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense philosophy and Adam Ferguson’s providential theology. In the American Founding, I contrast the New England religious tradition exemplified by John Witherspoon and John Adams with the public religious tradition advocated by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson. This work demonstrates not only that religion influences the civic tradition, but also that this influence is neither monolithic nor self-evident. In order to understand how religion shaped this tradition, it is necessary to take into account that different conceptions of religion produce different understandings of what it means to be a good citizen.

This study in constitutional history argues that the American framers created the Constitution of 1787 to address the problem of coercion in American society. It demonstrates that the framers’ antecedent commitment to a conception of the law that made coercion its sine qua non best explains why they sought fundamental reconstitution rather than amendment in 1787, and why they made certain choices and not others in establishing and administering the first federal government in the decade after ratification. The research revolves around two central questions. First, why did coercion concern the framers? Certainly a number of concrete policy-related failures coming to a head in 1787 starkly illuminated both the Continental Congress’s want of enforcement powers and the foundering magistracies in the states. Part I, however, situates the coercion problem in a deeper historico-intellectual context. The American Revolution produced a constitutional discourse that made the consent of the governed its essential ingredient and government by coercion ipso facto illegitimate and unrepublican. At the same time, the Revolution unleashed egalitarian social thinking predicated on the belief in an absolute equality of mind, ability, and opportunity among individuals. Part I shows that the principles of popular consent and individual equality had real legal consequences in the decade after Independence that scholars have overlooked. Specifically, the principle of consent produced a revolution against independent judicial power and the principle of equality produced a revolution against professional lawyers and the common law. Both insurgencies posed special threats to legal professionalism as such and both advanced upon a single shared legal ideal: law without force. Fearing anarchy and seeking to secure their own place within the constitutional order, American lawyers calling themselves Federalists waged a counterrevolution against this conception of law in 1787. But how? Those few historians who have acknowledged the Federalists’ stated commitment to the principle of coercion in 1787 have downplayed its practical significance in the early republic. They have suggested that Federalist legislators and administrators ultimately bowed to the strong anti-statist currents in American society and avoided coercive enforcement measures in the 1790s. Part II shows otherwise. The analysis recovers an originally understood constitutional structure of coercion that included military, magisterial, and judicial sanctions, to operate in accordance with a priority scheme that partially accommodated the inherited republican aversion to the deployment of military force in domestic affairs. It further demonstrates that in the decade after ratification the Federalists brought the constitutional structure of coercion to bear on individuals and states within the union in every area that concerned the framers and nothing in either the Jeffersonian ascendancy or the Revolution of 1800 immediately compromised the Federalists’ achievements in this regard. The constitutional structure of coercion’s effective implementation in the 1790s best explains why the first federal government succeeded where the Continental Congress had failed.

James Madison wrote four accounts of faction, the most public and famous of which was Federalist 10. By examining all four accounts, I undertake to develop a more capacious understanding of the design and purpose of Madison’s vision for American constitutional politics than can be extracted from an examination of Federalist 10 alone. I attempt to collate the unique insights of each account of faction into a coherent unity, with special attention to Madison’s rhetoric. I conclude that the three least famous accounts of faction, correctly read, perfect and extend the account in Federalist 10 by offering a more candid window into Madison’s thought on human beings and the political life for which he thought them fit. / text

abstract: Virtue was a concept of paramount importance in the American founders' republican thought. Without virtue, there could be no liberty, no order, no devotion to the common good, and no republican government. This dissertation examines the concept of virtue at the American founding, particularly virtue in the political thought of Mercy Otis Warren (1728-1814). The most important female intellectual of the Revolutionary generation, Warren wrote passionately about liberty and the beauty of republican ideals. Most important to this study, she consistently advocated the central place of virtue in a free and well-ordered republic. I argue that Warren incorporates three distinct philosophical threads - classical, bourgeois-marketplace, and Christian ideals - in her conception of virtue. I first analyze how Warren uses each of these three threads of virtue throughout her writings. I then examine how she synthesizes these individual threads into a single, cohesive conception of virtue. I argue that Warren consistently merges these ideals into a conception of virtue that she employs to address three pressing political problems of her day: How to motivate reluctant colonists to seek independence; how to check various forms of corruption spreading among the people; and how to counter corruption arising from commercial growth in the new nation. Modern political theorists often argue that these three threads, especially the classical republican and Christian ideals of virtue, are irreconcilable. My analysis shows that to divorce virtue from Christianity in Warren's conception is to rob it of its corrective vigor within republican government. I argue that what Machiavelli and Rousseau wrote out of republican virtue Warren writes back in. In Warren's political thought, virtue serves as the foundation for a stable enduring political system, provides the necessary informal ordering principle for the emerging republic, and offers the means by which the new nation could achieve its millennial destiny. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Political Science 2011

As a classical scholar and prominent founding father, James Wilson was at once statesman, judge, and political thinker, who read Cicero as an example worthy of emulation and as a philosopher whose theory could be applied to his own age. Classical reception studies have focused on questions of liberty, civic virtue, and constitutionalism in the American founding, and historians have also noted Wilson’s importance in American history and thought. Wilson’s direct engagement with Cicero’s works, however, and their significance in the formulation of his own philosophy has been long overlooked. My thesis argues that Wilson’s viewpoint was largely based on his readings of Cicero and can only be properly understood within this context. In the first two chapters of my thesis I demonstrate that Wilson not only possessed a wide-ranging knowledge of the classics in general, but also that he borrowed from Cicero’s writings and directly engaged with the texts themselves. Building upon this foundation, chapters three and four examine Cicero’s perspective on popular sovereignty and civic virtue, situate Wilson’s interpretations within contemporary discussions of Roman politics, and analyse the main ways in which he adapts Cicero’s arguments to his own era. Wilson retains a broader faith in the common people than seen in Cicero’s opinions, and he abstracts from Cicero a doctrine of sovereignty as an indivisible principle that is absent in the text; nevertheless, Cicero’s conception of a legitimate state and his insistence on the role of the people provided the foundation for Wilson’s thought and ultimately for his legitimization of the American Revolution. At the same time, like Cicero, Wilson views the stability of the state as resting in the personal virtue of the individual. While his enlightenment philosophy imparts optimism to his conception of the good citizen, his definition of virtue closely follows that of Cicero. As the final chapter of my thesis concludes, their individual interpretations of these theories of popular consent and virtue were instrumental in forming Cicero’s and Wilson’s justifications of civil disobedience.

La tesi si occupa di verificare l’influenza che i classici greci e latini hanno esercitato su i padri fondatori americani e più in particolare su Thomas Jefferson. La prima sezione tratteggia il contesto universitario e lo studio delle lingue classiche tra seicento e settecento, comprendendo non solo le università inglesi (Oxford e Cambridge) e scozzesi, ma anche i nuovi college nati nelle colonie americane. Tale analisi dei modelli e delle pratiche educative ha permesso, in effetti, di comprendere meglio l’influenza dei classici sui rivoluzionari americani. Nello specifico viene scandagliata a fondo l’educazione ricevuta da Jefferson. Tra i numerosi spunti di studio aperti da codesto argomento, il lavoro si concentra sulle modalità con cui i classici gli furono insegnati, sul suo Commonplace Book (una raccolta di brani tratti in parte da autori antichi letti in giovinezza) e su documentazione epistolare. Quest’ultima è oggetto particolare di studio, allo scopo di scoprire quali opere antiche Jefferson, in età adulta e durante la vecchiaia, lesse e apprezzò. Essendo un collezionista di libri, comprò moltissimi testi classici come dimostrano alcuni suoi manoscritti. Nonostante manchino dati precisi a riguardo, risulta inoltre che Jefferson, benché facesse largo uso di traduzioni, preferiva leggere in originale e che probabilmente abbia letto la maggior parte di questi libri durante il ritiro dalla vita politica. La seconda parte della tesi si concentra, invece, a indagare quanto la sua educazione classica abbia contributo alla formazione della sua personalità e delle sue idee, nonché alla forma stessa del suo pensiero in merito ad alcune tematiche. Lo studio è di conseguenza dedicato all’esperienza umana di Jefferson, in particolare alla sua riflessione sulla morte e sull’eternità, temi fortemente legati alla sua ricezione di idee epicuree e stoiche. Epicureismo e Stoicismo rappresentano, in definitiva, i due sistemi filosofici antichi che hanno maggiormente influenzato la sua personalità e il suo pensiero. / The aim of the present work is to evaluate the impact of the ancient classics on the American Founding Fathers, with a particular focus on Thomas Jefferson. The first section gives a wide portrait of the academic context in which the Founders were educated, comprising not only of Oxford, Cambridge, and the Scottish universities, but also the colonial colleges. The evaluation of the educational practices in use at the time makes it possible to understand better the classical impact on revolutionary Americans. In particular, this analysis studies in depth Jefferson's education. Of the many possible perspectives and approaches to this topic, the present work focuses on the way ancient classics were taught to him, his Commonplace Book, which reports part of the ancient classics he read during his youth, and his correspondence. The latter has been studied especially to understand which other ancient writers he read, valued, and esteemed in his adulthood and old age. As book collector, Jefferson bought an incredible number of ancient classics, as attested by a few manuscripts of his book lists. Despite the dearth of sure evidence, it is very likely that he read the ancient works largely during his retirement. He loved reading them in the original, though he made great use of translations. The second part of this work is dedicated to investigating how Jefferson's classical education contributed to the building of his personality and ideas, as well as how he elaborated specific classical themes in his own life. The study is thus focused on Jefferson's personal human experience, specifically on his reflection on human mortality and the afterlife. These themes, indeed, are strictly linked to his reception of Epicurean and Stoic tenets, the two ancient philosophical systems which had the greatest and most profound impact on Jefferson's personality and thought.