The phenomenon of addiction has been a subject of investigation for a number of academic disciplines, but little has been written about addiction from a philosophical perspective. This dissertation inserts philosophy into the conversations taking place within the multi-disciplinary field of “Addiction Studies.” It contends that the philosophical accounts of human action given by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas provide means for an analysis of many of the conceptual confusions in the field of Addiction Studies, including those surrounding the concepts of choice, compulsion, and habit. It argues that the category of habit in these two thinkers is richer and more complex than contemporary conceptions of habit and that the category of habit in its Aristotelian and Thomistic guises is indispensable for charting an intelligible path between the muddled polarities that construe addiction as either a disease or a type of willful misconduct. Furthermore, it suggests that recognizing the distance between Aristotle’s social context and the modern social context affords powerful insight into the character of modern addiction, and that an exploration of the parallels between the habit of addiction and Aquinas’s development of the habit of charity offers suggestive inroads for thinking about addiction as a moral strategy for integrated and purposive action.

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-81).

Thesis (M.A.) -- University of Texas at Arlington, 2008.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin. / "Die ganze Abhandlung beabsichtige ich später unter dem Titel "Platos Ideenlehre in der Kritik des Aristotels zu veröffentlichen": t.p. verso. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Academisch proefschrift--Amsterdam. / Summaries in French and German. "Literatuur": p. [321]-328.

Edition commerciale de : Dissertation : Philosophie : Freiburg : 1982-1983. / Bibliogr. p. 440-448. Index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2004. / Thesis directed by Phillip R. Sloan and Michael J. Loux for the Program in History and Philosophy of Science. "January 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 278-285).

Dissertatio inauguralis--Academia Georgia Augusta (Göttingen?).

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies three conditions that are necessary in order for a virtuous act to have been done as a virtuous agent: the act must be done (1) knowingly, (2) for itself, and (3) from a steady disposition. I examine previous interpretations of the second item, and then offer my own: a virtuous act is chosen for itself if it is chosen for its virtue-making features that are also reasons to do the act, and these features motivate the agent to such an extent that the agent would do the act even if there were no other reason to do it. / text

I show how Aristotle’s theory of the priority of actuality and his theory of non-correlative actuality help prepare the way for his own positive account of the separate, non-sensible substances. Aristotle argues that actuality is prior to potentiality in Metaphysics [Theta]8, and in particular that actuality is prior in substance and in a more authoritative kind of way. I show how both of these arguments are to be understood, and how the more authoritative kind of priority (which is not substantial priority, as usually thought) is again appealed to in Metaphysics [Lamda]6 in order to draw important inferences about the primary principles. I also show how the theory of non-correlative actuality used in [Theta]8 is, just like the more authoritative kind of priority, again applied in [Lamda]6 in parallel kinds of ways. It turns out that the traditional interpretation which ascribes the notion of “pure actuality” to Aristotle is mistaken, and this comes to light once Aristotle’s theory of non-correlative actuality is properly understood and the texts are properly interpreted. / text