An attentional bias to threatening stimuli is associated with greater anxiety in children (see Puliafico & Kendall, 2006 for a full review). Attentional control is one factor that may influence the relationship between attentional bias and anxiety in children (Susa, Pitică, Benga, & Miclea, 2012). This current study focused on further exploring the relationship between attentional bias, attentional control, and anxiety. Participants (N = 46) completed a self-report measure of attentional control and anxiety, and an attentional bias task (i.e., the Emotional Go/No-Go). Two models were examined. First, attentional control was examined as a potential moderator in the relationship between attentional bias and anxiety. Second, attentional bias was examined as a potential mediator of the relationship between attentional control and anxiety. The moderation model was significant. However, the findings were not consistent with the literature, as results indicated attentional bias was associated with anxiety only for children with higher attentional control abilities. The moderation model was further examined with different dimensions of anxiety and attentional control. The mediation model was not significant. Explanation of the findings and future directions are discussed.

The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between rumination and selective attention, in particular, whether the tendency to ruminate is associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information. It is well-established that the tendency to ruminate in response to negative mood is a key vulnerability factor in the development of depression (Nolen-Hoekseman, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 2008), but attempts to understand the underlying processes contributing to heightened ruminative disposition have been relatively limited. Recently, a number of researchers have suggested that rumination may be characterised by biased attentional processing of negative information, particularly that individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition may have difficulty disengaging their attention from negative information (e.g., Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). Studies One and Two each investigated the relationship between individual differences in ruminative disposition and selective attention for negative information, using a modified dot-probe task designed by Grafton, Watkins, and MacLeod (2012) to enable the discrete assessment of biases in attentional engagement and disengagement. Study One found that heightened levels of dispositional ruminative brooding, as assessed by both the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and an in-vivo assessment of ruminative disposition, were associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive information. Similarly, Study Two also found that heightened levels of ruminative disposition were associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information, particularly for depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms. Study Three sought to extend these findings using an eye-tracking assessment of selective attention to measure the spontaneous allocation of attention between stimuli. However, ruminative disposition was not significantly associated with any index of attentional bias during the eye-tracking assessment, neither with biased attentional disengagement, nor with biased attentional engagement or maintenance of attention. Study Four then sought to replicate findings from Study Two using a selected sample of individuals with high and low levels of ruminative disposition. Participants in the high rumination group demonstrated greater attentional bias for depression relevant negative stimuli presented for 1000ms in comparison to those in the low rumination group. However, this between group difference reflected a general attentional preference for negative relative to positive stimuli (i.e., composite of attentional engagement and disengagement bias), but no specific difference in attentional disengagement bias or attentional engagement bias was observed. Finally, Study Five took a first step towards investigate the causal relationship between rumination and selective attention by investigating the causal effect of rumination on attentional bias. Although there no main effect of induced rumination on attentional bias was observed, the effect of induced rumination on attentional bias was found to be moderated by ruminative disposition. However, contrary to hypotheses, individuals with low levels of ruminative disposition demonstrated an attentional bias for valence-incongruent stimuli, which shifted to a bias for valence-congruent stimuli as ruminative disposition increased. Overall, there was support across the studies for the primary hypothesis that heightened ruminative disposition is associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information. However, the findings do not suggest that ruminative disposition is exclusively associated with attentional disengagement bias, but instead indicate that facilitated attentional engagement may also be involved under some circumstances.

Attentional control and attentional bias are important factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). However, the effects of attentional control and attentional bias on the relationship between anxiety and stress response is understudied. Further, much of the research to date has relied on self-report measures of attentional control and stress response, representing a significant limitation. The current study addressed these problems and examined the relationship between attentional control, attentional bias, anxiety, and stress response. First, this study examined the relationship between self-report and performance-based measures of attentional control and stress response with anxiety. Study results found poor agreement between attentional control measures, good convergence between self-reported distress and physiological distress, and a negative association between anxiety and self-reported attentional control and stress response. Second, results showed that attentional control and attentional bias were not significant moderators of the relationship between anxiety and stress response. Explanation of study findings and future directions are discussed.

The current investigation examined the effects of a differential attentional training task on subsequent emotional reactivity in response to a task that was aimed to either induce positive or negative affectivity. Specifically, the study employed a dot-probe attentional training paradigm to train attention toward positive images (Attend-Positive condition), toward neutral images (Attend-Neutral condition), or to not train attention at all (Control condition). The hypothesis was that individuals whose attention was trained toward positive images would exhibit faster response times toward positive images (compared to the Attend-Neutral and Control conditions) at post assessment, individuals whose attention was trained toward neutral images would exhibit faster response times toward neutral images (compared to the Attend-Positive and Control conditions) at post assessment, and individuals in the Control condition would maintain similar response times from baseline to post assessment, aside from general practice effects. It was also hypothesized that those in the Attend-Positive condition would better regulate emotion, as measured by less negative affect in response to a stress task and more positive affect in response to a positive mood induction task, compared to individuals who have engaged in a control task involving no attentional bias training (Control condition). It was also hypothesized that those in the Attend-Neutral condition would better regulate emotion, as measured by less negative affect in response to a stress task and more positive affect in response to a positive mood induction task, compared to individuals who have engaged in a control task involving no attentional bias training (Control condition). Last, it was hypothesized that individuals in the Attend-Positive condition would report differentially less negative affect in response to the stress task (failure anagrams) than those in the Attend-Neutral condition, and that individuals in the Attend-Positive condition would report differentially more positive affect in response to the positive mood induction task (success anagrams) than those in the Attend-Neutral condition. In all conditions, the dot-probe attentional training did not effectively modify biases in the hypothesized directions. While there was differential affectivity change for individuals who underwent a Failure Anagram task versus a Success Anagram task, there is no way to definitively interpret the meaning of these changes given the failure of the attentional manipulation. The findings from the current investigation provide no evidence for single-session dot-probe attentional bias modification procedures to manipulate attentional bias toward positive stimuli or toward neutral stimuli. Possible explanations for these results, including lack of reliability of the dot-probe task, are discussed.

The purpose of this study was to determine (a) the attentional focus strategies used by triathletes during the three stages of an Olympic distance triathlon, (b) if level of experience influences the attentional focus strategies used by triathletes, and (c) whether there is a relationship between athletes finishing times and the attentional strategies used in each stage of the race. Triathletes (N = 160) completed the Triathlon Attentional Focus Inventory, which measured association and dissociation during the swim, bike, and run. One-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences between the athletes' level of experience and the attentional strategies used, as well as differences between the athletes overall race time and the attentional strategies used during each stage of the triathlon. Athletes with more experience associated more during the race, whereas athletes with less experience dissociated more throughout the race.

Many of the symptoms characteristic of PTSD such as hypervigiliance towards threat, involve attentional processes. The first part of this thesis explored the role of attentional processes in the maintenance and treatment of PTSD. Although general models of anxiety give attentional processes central prominence cognitive models of PTSD (e.g., Foa & Riggs, 1993; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) assign an important role to trauma memory and place little or no emphasis on the role of attentional processes in maintaining symptoms. Models of anxiety have suggested that attentional bias is automatic (Mathews & Macleod, 2002) or strategic (Wells & Mathews, 1994). Wells' (2000) Metacognitive Model of PTSD is one of the few models to emphasis thinking style and attention rather then memory. In this model attentional bias is thought to be strategic in nature. The evidence reviewed supports a role of attention in PTSD and suggests it may be beneficial to modify this process. Two different attention techniques based on models of bias are reviewed.The second part of the thesis described a randomized controlled evaluation of attentional training technique (ATT; Wells, 1990) on traumatic stress symptoms in a sample of 60 university students, who had previously experienced a stressful life event. ATT is a technique used in metacognitive therapy to modify the control of attention. Participants were randomly assigned to either an ATT group (n = 29) or a control group (n = 31). An emotional attention set shifting task was included as an objective measure of attention. The results supported the hypotheses, ATT reduced intrusions and negative affect, increased self-report attention flexibility and modified performance on the attention set shifting task. The results are consistent with the metacognitive model of PTSD. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed and the results add to studies suggesting positive effects of the technique across a range of disorders.The third part critically reflected on methodological and ethical issues from the above research study. The interpretation of the findings is limited by the student population. It is acknowledged that the results are preliminary in nature but it is believed that the study provides useful insights into the role of attentional processes in the development and treatment of traumatic stress symptoms and provides a basis for studies in the future.

The present study compared attentional disengagement from threat-related stimuli in socially phobic (SP) and non-anxiety-disordered (NAD) adolescents. The associations between trait anxiety and state anxiety and attentional bias in SP adolescents were assessed. Furthermore, the present study compared the attentional control abilities of SP and NAD adolescents. Twenty-eight SP participants aged 12-17 and 27 NAD controls, matched on age and IQ, were administered a computer task to measure attentional disengagement from threat-related words. Participants completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and subtests of the Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-ch). Mixed ANOVA analyses indicated that SP and NAD adolescents did not differ in their disengagement from threat-related stimuli. Correlational analyses indicated that state anxiety was associated with disengagement from threat, but only when SP participants with comorbid ADHD were excluded from analyses. Trait anxiety was not significantly associated with attentional disengagement from threat. Finally, SP participants performed more poorly than NAD participants on the TEA-ch subtests, indicating poorer attentional control in SP participants. These results suggest that SP adolescents experience a deficit in executive attentional skills. The clinical implications of these findings are discussed. / Psychology

Les recherches en psychopathologie cognitive ont montré que le biais attentionnel vers l'information menaçante contribue au développement et au maintien de l'anxiété. La difficulté rencontrée par les individus anxieux pour se désengager de l'information menaçante est l'une des principales composantes de ce biais attentionnel. Les recherches menées au cours de cette thèse ont permis, au moyen de paradigmes expérimentaux, de connaître : (1) les étapes du traitement de l'information concernées par la difficulté de désengagement attentionnel de mots menaçants et d'expressions faciales menaçantes, (2) l'importance de l'inhibition et du déplacement attentionnel dans la détérioration du désengagement attentionnel, (3) les relations entre la sous-échelle de focalisation attentionnelle de l'Attention Control Scale et le contrôle exécutif, et celle de déplacement attentionnel avec l'orientation de l'attention, et (4) la présence d'une difficulté de désengagement attentionnel des émotions négatives, non dans l'anxiété mais dans une situation stressante de menace du stéréotype de genre en mathématiques. Notre discussion reprend les résultats concernant le désengagement attentionnel et montre comment ils peuvent être étayés par des mesures telles que l'enregistrement des mouvements oculaires ou le recours à des investigations électrophysiologiques, auprès de populations cliniques et non-cliniques. Nous proposons aussi des pistes d'amélioration du dispositif d'entraînement attentionnel au désengagement, des mesures des fonctions d'inhibition et de déplacement attentionnel, ainsi que de nouvelles perspectives concernant l'évaluation du contrôle attentionnel par questionnaire et paradigmes expérimentaux. / Research in cognitive psychopathology showed that attentional bias towards threat contributes to development and maintenance of anxiety. Difficulty to disengage from threatening stimuli is one of the major components of attentional bias in anxiety. Research conducted in this thesis, using experimental paradigms, enabled to identify : (1) the stages of information processing involved in the impaired, disengagement from threatening words and threatening facial expressions, (2) the role of inhibition and attentional shifting in the impaired attentional disengagement, (3) the link between the attentional focusing subscale of Attentional Control Scale and executive control on the one hand, and betweeen the attentional shifting subscale and orientation of attention, on the other hand, and (4) attentional disengagement impairment from negative emotions in a stressful situation of mathematical gender stereotype threat. Finally, we discussed the results related to attentional disengagement and showed how they might be supported by eyes tracking or electrophysiological measures in clinical and non-clinical samples. We also put forward suggestions to improve attentional disengagement training and develop new measures of inhibition and attentional shifting functions. We also proposed new perspectives for the assessment of attentional control using questionnaire and experimental paradigms.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Alcoholics often experience difficulties ceasing drinking, potentially related to excessive behavioral inflexibility that either precedes or results from high alcohol consumption. Components of the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Task (WCST) a type of Attentional Set-Shifting (AttSS) task measuring impairments in behavioral flexibility have been modified to measure similar constructs within animals. Previous work has shown impaired AttSS in abstinent alcoholics and nonalcoholic individuals with a family history of alcoholism, as well as in mice exposed to chronic-intermittent alcohol vapor (Gierski et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2015; Oscar-Berman et al., 2009). The aim of the current study was to assess whether selectively-bred High- vs. Low- Alcohol Preferring (HAP vs LAP) mice display behavioral inflexibility as measured by an operant AttSS task, and furthermore, whether a history of voluntary drinking in cross-bred HAP (cHAP) mice further increases inflexibility. Impairments in the AttSS task are assessed by evaluating the number of trials to reach criterion, as well as the number and types of errors committed during the second experimental phase. In Experiment 1, male and female HAP and LAP mice first learned to press one of two levers signaled by a visual cue, but random with respect to spatial orientation, for a 0.1% saccharin solution reward. The following experimental phase consisted of an egocentric discrimination, such that side (left or right) now signaled correct reinforcement and the location of the visual cue was irrelevant. In Experiment 2, prior to identical operant procedures as Experiment 1, male and female cHAP mice were given free-choice access to 10% alcohol or water for seven weeks. Ethanol-exposed animals drank an average of 29.6 g/kg/day.

In everyday life, we are constantly surrounded by a huge amount of information.Since our attentional resources are limited, we need to select just the stimuli that we want to process. Despite our voluntary attempt to select a precise information, it often occurs that a salient stimulus or event automatically captures our attention, regardless its irrelevance. The fact that we are immediately and unintentionally attracted by sudden visual onsets provides a clear advantage for our survival. However, in spite of that, the possibility to counteract visual distraction is fundamental for an efficient interaction with the environment, particularly when a salient but irrelevant stimulation repeatedly affects our visual system. And then, how can we resist from being continuously distracted by irrelevant repetitive onsets? The current work is aimed to explore the mechanisms that we use to filter irrelevant information, with a focus on habituation, an ancestral form of learning that has recently been associated to the decrement of attentional capture observed in several studies. This experience-dependent learning process is defined as a behavioral response decrement that results from repeated stimulation and that does not involve sensory or motor fatigue. I will first provide the reader with a general introduction (Chapter 1) concerning the visual attention field, with a particular emphasis on attentional capture and the filtering of irrelevant information. I will then (Chapter 2) try to disentangle the two main accounts concerning the nature of the distractor filtering, the first claiming that filtering is accomplished to shield target processing from interference (top-down inhibitory control hypothesis), and the second stating that the passive exposure to a repeating visual onset is sufficient to trigger learning-dependent mechanisms to filter the unwanted stimulation (habituation hypothesis). After providing strong evidence in favor of the latter account, I will then examine (Chapter 3) to what extent the filtering of irrelevant information that we achieve through the mechanisms underlying habituation is affected by contextual cues, showing that this kind of filtering is context-dependent. Finally (Chapter 4), motivated by the existence of a strong functional and anatomical link between attention and the oculomotor system, I will explore whether habituation affects also the oculomotor capture triggered by an onset distractor, showing that the execution of reflexive saccades is subject to habituation, while the programming component is not. Taken together, the results of the present work give a strong contribution to the attentional capture field in showing that both attentional and oculomotor capture are subject to habituation, that this form of learning is context-specific and that it occurs also when we are passively exposed to a visual irrelevant stimulus.