I likhet med i andra länder har det i Sverige under vissa högkonjunkturer uppstått ett så betydande kapitalöverskott, att den finansiella marknaden fått problem att bemästra flödena. Konsekvensen har blivit att den aggregerade risknivån ökat i takt med stigande tillgångspriser. När väl en kontraktion uppstått, har det saknats kapital för att i ordnade former bemästra de nya ekonomiska förutsättningarna. Det är den utvecklingen som föregått kriserna 1878/79, 1921/22 och 1991/92. Temporära insatser har då måst ske vid sidan av det befintliga institutionella systemet. Forskningen ger för Sveriges del en kriskronologi för det finansiella området med krisåren 1763, 1817/18, 1857/58, 1878/79, 1907/08, 1921/22, 1932/33 och 1991/92. Det har vid kriserna 1878/79, 1921/22 och 1991/92 förelegat ett betydande hot om kollaps av det finansiella systemet. Vid dessa tre tillfällen har det efter förhandlingar mellan bankerna och staten kommit att skapas temporära krishanteringsorganisationer – Järnvägshypoteksfonden 1879, AB Kreditkassan 1922 samt Securum AB 1992 – vid sidan om den svenska Riksbanken. Kriserna har hävts med hjälp av de temporärt skapade krisorganisationerna, vilka samtliga har haft en Lender of Last Resort-funktion. Krishanteringstekniken vid krisen 1921/22 kan ses som en vidareutveckling av den som kommit till användning 1878/79. Även om bakgrunden till krisen 1991/92 skiljer sig åt från de två här tidigare nämnda tillfällena, kom tekniken med överflyttandet av tyngande engagemang till ett nytt bolag att likna den teknik som användes redan av AB Kreditkassan. Trots detta betydde tidigare svenska erfarenheter mindre för krisen 1991/92 i detta fall. Idéerna till Securum hämtades istället från senare tids bankkrishantering i USA med inrättandet av så kallade ”bad banks”. Syftet med denna avhandling är att med en institutionell ansats klarlägga och analysera hur de två första av dessa tre finansiella kriser har hanterats. Avhandlingen belyser i detalj det förhandlingsdrama mellan statens och marknadens aktörer som föregått inrättandet av respektive krisorganisation.

The empirical results reached in this thesis contradict the traditional theoretical view of money as being exogenously introduced into an economy as a medium of exchange intended to reduce the transactions costs associated with barter. Instead money was endogenously created in the form of credit. Thus, the long run neutrality of money also is called into question. The varying quality of different kinds of money reflects the demand for them. If legal tender was of higher quality than private promissary notes, it was because the former were in greater demand. Concisely put, the market determines the value, and therefore the quality, of various kinds of money. The principal problem addressed in this thesis is how, during the expansive nineteenth century, it was possible to satisfy the ever growing need for credit and means of payment without sacrificing the fixed exchange rate. Particular attention is paid to the private note issuing banks, the so called Enskilda banks, that dominated the Swedish banking system throughout the nineteenth century. In addition to their note issuing, the Enskilda banks were characterized by unlimited owner liability. An examination of the ongoing political process from a rational choice perspective, indicates that initially the concept of note issuing Enskilda banks enjoyed wide spread support. They were considered to be a reasonable response to the problem of establishing a commercial banking system in an illiquid economy. The distribution of political and economic power in favor of the Crown and the Nobility included their control over the issuance of bank charters. The monopolistic policy they followed in this regard, however, resulted in growing hostility towards these. As a result, starting in the middle 1860's, a more liberal attitude towards the establishment of banks began to prevail. By the end of the nineteenth century, various political interest were able to engineer the revocation of the Enskilda banks’ note issuing rights. The special characteristics of the Enskilda banks, the right to issue bank notes and the unlimited liability of their owners, have caused them to be perceived as outdated, at least once Joint Stock banks were introduced. In contrast to the Enskilda banks, these were unable to issue notes but instead provided their owners with limited liability. The thesis demonstrates that, given the initial illiquidity of the Swedish economy, the Enskilda banks actually were the more efficient alternative. Indeed, the note issuing privileges of the Enskilda banks became one of the principal factors behind the development of liquid domestic capital markets. An empirical study that includes the most basic constraints faced by the nineteenth century Swedish economy, the demands of the specie standard and the general shortages of reliable means of payment and of credit, reveals that the Enskilda bank system can not, strictly speaking, be considered an example of free banking. Instead of holding specie reserves, the Enskilda banks backed their notes with central bank (Riksbank) notes. This was not because the public preferred Enskilda bank to Riksbank notes.  Rather it was the result of a monetary adverse selection process; Gresham’s Law.  Previously utilized, lower quality, means of payment were replaced by Enskilda bank notes. By accepting some of the discount costs, the Enskilda banks made their notes circulate at par with Riksbank notes. Thus a domestic specie exchange system was created. The note issuance of the Enskilda banks paved the way for the deposit based commercial banking system that followed, and it was essential for the monetization of the economy that occurred during the late 1860's. The long run expansion of the money supply was unrelated to growth in Riksbank reserves, specie holdings or the monetary base. Other countries operating under the specie standard also experienced monetary growth, indicating that the specie standard actually was a system of credit. Money supply, as measured in terms of Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes held by the public, eventually reflected the level of output (GDP).  VAR-tests indicated that annual changes in the level of Riksbank reserves preceded changes in the money supply which, in turn, preceded changes in the level of prices, thus supporting the price quantity theory. These results are summarized in a regression model that estimates domestic price movements as a function of current changes in international prices and GDP and of lagged changes in domestic prices and the money supply. The final chapter is an empirical analysis of the support provided to the Swedish banking system during the most severe financial crises of the nineteenth century.  Maintaining the specie standard was over riding goal of the Riksbank. In times of crises, this concern prevented the Bank from supporting the banking system in accord with the classical lender of last resort recipe; to inject liquidity and briefly suspend convertibility. The thesis argues that in a transitional economy, such as that of nineteenth century Sweden, the fixed exchange rate makes it impossible in times of crisis to support the banks at all costs. Doing so might well convert a banking crisis into a currency crisis. Indeed, this is exactly what has happened in various countries on several occasions during the late twentieth century. Instead the appropriate procedure for acting as lender of last resort in a transitional economy is to initially support the banks, but only as long as central bank reserves are not exhausted. Should the seriousness of the crisis make this insufficient, the authorities should then proceed to import high powered money as a way of supplementing their reserves. The possibility that such action will be needed makes it particularly important that the country’s public finances be kept in good order. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2003. Sammanfattning på engelska</p>