Guo li zheng zhi da xue zheng zhi yan jiu suo gao ji yan jiu sheng bi ye lun wen. / Cover title. You yin ben. 880-04

Habilitationsschrift--Johannes Kepler Universität Linz, 1977. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [437]-468) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 280-294).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 183-196).

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a case-study in the making of British foreign policy by relating a substantial body of historical evidence to problems raised by a comparative and analytical perspective. The particular period between Munich and the German invasion of the Soviet Union has been chosen because of its intrinsic interest and because it allows us to observe a democracy facing up to the most fundamental question of external relations, that of war or peace. The thesis focusses on the political aspects of decision-making, at three levels: the Cabinet, at the apex of the system; the press, as the most extensive of all lobbies; and public opinion, arguably the ultimate source of legitimacy in British politics. The aim is to reveal the role of domestic factors in British foreign policy, which are usually acknowledged but not dwelt upon, and thereby to peel back some layers of the complex process of causation in history. The main hinge of the thesis is therefore the argument that neither the 'logic of events', nor some self-evident rationality, explains why the British government entered and remained in the war between 1939-41. While their importance must not be exaggerated, such decision-making factors as the operation of the Cabinet and the character of public debate, also helped to determine the British position towards Germany. The other main theme of the thesis is the relative weakness of power-based explanations of decision-making. The roles of Prime Minister and Cabinet are not best described in terms of either's dominance; the press is sufficient of an insider in policy-making circles to complicate immensely any assessment of its separate influence; public opinion can barely be distinguished from the perceptions of politicians who defer to it. Some alternative interpretations are presented for the period under review; those working in different areas may find them suggestive.

The structure of the Canadian cabinet has been taken by a variety of observers and participants in government to be an important, or at least an intriguing subject. The volume of writings about the Canadian cabinet has increased over the past decade. Civil servants have produced unpublished additional volumes of memoranda. The pace of change in cabinet structures, and prime ministerial announcements about them, suggest that they are regarded as significant policy instruments and as significant indica- tions of the character and directions of a government. Certainly it is no longer true to say, as Prime Minister Diefenbaker did in 1960, that "The means by which the Cabinet conducts its business are traditionally regarded as its own affair, and questions on the subject are normally neither asked nor answered". [Continued in text ...]

This paper examines the recruitment, characteristics, motivation and functions of "political exempt staff in Canadian government. These potentially influential individuals, free from the political restrictions on public servants, tend to operate in the shadows cast by senior elected officeholders. As a result, too little is known of their characteristics or activities, although they have been the subject of some research. An important aim of this paper is to determine whether political exempt staff, by working closely with prime ministers, premiers or cabinet ministers, have significant influence on public policy-making. Thus, researching the origins, attributes, motivations and roles of these unelected political acolytes may yield useful information concerning the operation of Canadian democracy. Since public office, elected or otherwise, forms part of our social system, a large number of questions may be raised. What are the socio-economic and educational characteristics of exempt staff? How and from where are they recruited? What is it about political life which attracts their interest and helps to fulfill their aspirations? What motivates such individuals? How do such persons influence public policy? In terms of the democratic process, what is the nature and relative importance of the function performed by political exempt staff? For example, how are their duties and responsibilities determined and delimited? To what extent are their activities partisan in orientation? Do they tend to have an appreciable influence on government policies and programs? Further, what degree of control do exempt staff exercise over access to elected officials? To what extent do they shape public office-holders' opinions and decisions? If they act as "gate-keepers" and confidants, do they constitute effective targets for professional lobbyists and others seeking to influence government action? This paper seeks to address these and other questions through analysis of data derived from interviews with 33 former exempt staff who served as political assistants and advisers, primarily in the federal government. The purpose is to gain useful operational insights into a unique position in our governmental system. The findings of this study suggest that political exempt staff play an important role in sustaining a government's "political impulse", the policy momentum it gains from an election mandate. The exempt staff also constitute a valuable point of contact for persons or organizations seeking information, support or a favourable decision from government.

This paper examines the recruitment, characteristics, motivation and functions of "political exempt staff in Canadian government. These potentially influential individuals, free from the political restrictions on public servants, tend to operate in the shadows cast by senior elected officeholders. As a result, too little is known of their characteristics or activities, although they have been the subject of some research. An important aim of this paper is to determine whether political exempt staff, by working closely with prime ministers, premiers or cabinet ministers, have significant influence on public policy-making. Thus, researching the origins, attributes, motivations and roles of these unelected political acolytes may yield useful information concerning the operation of Canadian democracy. Since public office, elected or otherwise, forms part of our social system, a large number of questions may be raised. What are the socio-economic and educational characteristics of exempt staff? How and from where are they recruited? What is it about political life which attracts their interest and helps to fulfill their aspirations? What motivates such individuals? How do such persons influence public policy? In terms of the democratic process, what is the nature and relative importance of the function performed by political exempt staff? For example, how are their duties and responsibilities determined and delimited? To what extent are their activities partisan in orientation? Do they tend to have an appreciable influence on government policies and programs? Further, what degree of control do exempt staff exercise over access to elected officials? To what extent do they shape public office-holders' opinions and decisions? If they act as "gate-keepers" and confidants, do they constitute effective targets for professional lobbyists and others seeking to influence government action? This paper seeks to address these and other questions through analysis of data derived from interviews with 33 former exempt staff who served as political assistants and advisers, primarily in the federal government. The purpose is to gain useful operational insights into a unique position in our governmental system. The findings of this study suggest that political exempt staff play an important role in sustaining a government's "political impulse", the policy momentum it gains from an election mandate. The exempt staff also constitute a valuable point of contact for persons or organizations seeking information, support or a favourable decision from government. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

During the 1968-1972 period attempts were made to introduce 'rationality' into the structures and processes of the Canadian Cabinet. It has usually been argued that these attempts by Prime Minister Trudeau provide an innovative and radically distinct departure from the 'diversified incrementalism' or 'crises management' decision-making under Prime Minister Pearson. Is the usual argument correct? This question is dealt with by examining in turn the role of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, the development of the committee system (with emphasis upon the Committee on Priorities and Planning), the place of the Treausury Board and especially of the Treasury Board Secretariat, the role of the Cabinet Secretariat, and the role of the Prime Minister's Office. The crucial difference between official actions and political actions is underscored in this examination. While the 1968-72 changes did establish , a more rational basis for decision-making, and may thus be seen as innovative, the changes did not amount to any radical departure — and, indeed, they were themselves the product of an incremental approach to change. While Prime Minister Trudeau presented the changes in terms of a philosophy of rationality, the actual changes must be seen as incremental extensions of changes which Prime Minister Pearson began. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

王航. / "2000年6月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2000. / 參考文獻 (leaves 143-147) / 附中英文摘要. / "2000 nian 6 yue" / Wang Hang. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2000. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 143-147) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 論文摘要 --- p.1 / 目錄 --- p.3 / 前言 --- p.4 / Chapter 第一章 --- 明初中央權力的變化 --- p.8 / Chapter 第一節 --- 相權的剝奪與廢除 --- p.8 / Chapter 第二節 --- 從四輔官到內閣 --- p.14 / Chapter 第三節 --- 「避宰相之名，又名內閣」 --- p.21 / Chapter 第二章 --- 憲、孝宗朝以前的閣部關係 --- p.28 / Chapter 第一節 --- 建文帝至成祖時期 --- p.28 / Chapter 第二節 --- 仁、宣時期 --- p.39 / Chapter 第三節 --- 英宗時期 --- p.46 / Chapter 第三章 --- 憲、孝宗朝閣部關係的轉變 --- p.54 / Chapter 第一節 --- 閣部地位的扭轉 --- p.54 / Chapter 第二節 --- 官遷關係的形成 --- p.61 / Chapter 第三節 --- 「實務型內閣」的出現 --- p.67 / Chapter 第四章 --- 閣部關係轉變與明朝政局發展 --- p.79 / Chapter 第一節 --- 客觀與理性機制的重建 --- p.79 / Chapter 第二節 --- 明朝的宰相與宰相觀念 --- p.87 / Chapter 第三節 --- 「勢壓六卿矣」 --- p.95 / 結論 --- p.103 / 附表一明諸帝基本資料簡表 --- p.107 / 附表二閣部臣關係簡表 --- p.108 / 附表三閣臣歷任部職比例表 --- p.128 / 附文〈票擬機制的演變與明代內閣政治〉 --- p.129 / 參考書目 --- p.143