Comment la littérature politologique relative à la réforme constitutionnelle de 1982 rend-elle compte de la condition constitutionnelle des Canadiens ? L’auteur apporte une réponse originale à cette question en proposant une typologie qui fait découler la pluralité des récits politologiques sur la réforme constitutionnelle de 1982 de la déclinaison d’un même paradigme discursif, le paradigme contractualiste, en vertu duquel la constitution du Canada est un contrat entre gouvernements souverains. Le paradigme contractualiste se décline en quatre trames explicatives distinctes : la trame institutionnaliste, qui explore l’effet paralysant du double conflit inscrit dans la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 entre une constitution des citoyens fondée sur la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et une constitution des gouvernements, fondée sur la procédure formelle de modification de la Constitution ; la trame réformiste, qui cherche à surmonter ce double-conflit sans modifier formellement la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 ; la trame organiciste, qui s’intéresse au pourvoir « constituant » des tribunaux ; et la trame idéaliste, qui propose la renégociation du contrat constitutionnel canadien à partir de nouveaux principes. L’auteur termine cet exercice d’interprétation en constatant l’épuisement du paradigme contractualiste et son remplacement prévisible par un paradigme successeur en devenir.

Comment la littérature politologique relative à la réforme constitutionnelle de 1982 rend-elle compte de la condition constitutionnelle des Canadiens ? L’auteur apporte une réponse originale à cette question en proposant une typologie qui fait découler la pluralité des récits politologiques sur la réforme constitutionnelle de 1982 de la déclinaison d’un même paradigme discursif, le paradigme contractualiste, en vertu duquel la constitution du Canada est un contrat entre gouvernements souverains. Le paradigme contractualiste se décline en quatre trames explicatives distinctes : la trame institutionnaliste, qui explore l’effet paralysant du double conflit inscrit dans la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 entre une constitution des citoyens fondée sur la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et une constitution des gouvernements, fondée sur la procédure formelle de modification de la Constitution ; la trame réformiste, qui cherche à surmonter ce double-conflit sans modifier formellement la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 ; la trame organiciste, qui s’intéresse au pourvoir « constituant » des tribunaux ; et la trame idéaliste, qui propose la renégociation du contrat constitutionnel canadien à partir de nouveaux principes. L’auteur termine cet exercice d’interprétation en constatant l’épuisement du paradigme contractualiste et son remplacement prévisible par un paradigme successeur en devenir.

Comment la littérature politologique relative à la réforme constitutionnelle de 1982 rend-elle compte de la condition constitutionnelle des Canadiens ? L’auteur apporte une réponse originale à cette question en proposant une typologie qui fait découler la pluralité des récits politologiques sur la réforme constitutionnelle de 1982 de la déclinaison d’un même paradigme discursif, le paradigme contractualiste, en vertu duquel la constitution du Canada est un contrat entre gouvernements souverains. Le paradigme contractualiste se décline en quatre trames explicatives distinctes : la trame institutionnaliste, qui explore l’effet paralysant du double conflit inscrit dans la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 entre une constitution des citoyens fondée sur la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et une constitution des gouvernements, fondée sur la procédure formelle de modification de la Constitution ; la trame réformiste, qui cherche à surmonter ce double-conflit sans modifier formellement la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 ; la trame organiciste, qui s’intéresse au pourvoir « constituant » des tribunaux ; et la trame idéaliste, qui propose la renégociation du contrat constitutionnel canadien à partir de nouveaux principes. L’auteur termine cet exercice d’interprétation en constatant l’épuisement du paradigme contractualiste et son remplacement prévisible par un paradigme successeur en devenir.

Comment la littérature politologique relative à la réforme constitutionnelle de 1982 rend-elle compte de la condition constitutionnelle des Canadiens ? L’auteur apporte une réponse originale à cette question en proposant une typologie qui fait découler la pluralité des récits politologiques sur la réforme constitutionnelle de 1982 de la déclinaison d’un même paradigme discursif, le paradigme contractualiste, en vertu duquel la constitution du Canada est un contrat entre gouvernements souverains. Le paradigme contractualiste se décline en quatre trames explicatives distinctes : la trame institutionnaliste, qui explore l’effet paralysant du double conflit inscrit dans la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 entre une constitution des citoyens fondée sur la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et une constitution des gouvernements, fondée sur la procédure formelle de modification de la Constitution ; la trame réformiste, qui cherche à surmonter ce double-conflit sans modifier formellement la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 ; la trame organiciste, qui s’intéresse au pourvoir « constituant » des tribunaux ; et la trame idéaliste, qui propose la renégociation du contrat constitutionnel canadien à partir de nouveaux principes. L’auteur termine cet exercice d’interprétation en constatant l’épuisement du paradigme contractualiste et son remplacement prévisible par un paradigme successeur en devenir.

In this study, I undertake a discourse analysis of struggles over representation as they were manifested in the Charlottetown referendum campaign. I utilize transcripts taken during the campaign derived from the CBC news programs The National, The Journal, and Sunday Report as well as from The CTV News. The issue of (im-)partiality provides the analytical focus for this study. Who can legitimately speak on behalf of whom, or, to what extent do individuals have a particular voice which places limitations on whom they can represent? On the one hand, underlying what I call the ‘universalistic’ discourse is the premise that human beings can act in an impartial manner so that all individuals have the capacity to speak or act in the interests of all other individuals regardless of the group(s) to which they belong. On the other hand, a competing discourse based on group-difference’ maintains that all representatives express partial voices depending on their group-based characteristics. I argue that the universalistic discourse was hegemonic in the transcripts but, at the same time, the group-difference discourse was successful at articulating powerful counter-hegemonic resistance. Ironically, the universalistic discourse was hegemonic despite widespread assumptions of partiality on the basis of province, region, language, and Aboriginality. This was possible because the universalistic discourse subsumed territorial notions of partiality within itself. In contrast, I argue that assumptions of Aboriginal partiality will likely diffuse themselves to other categories, beginning with gender, in the future. I also describe the strategies used by the competing discourses to undermine one another. The universalistic discourse successfully portrayed the group-difference discourse as an inversion to a dangerous apartheid-style society where individuals were forced to exist within group-based categories. The group-difference discourse used the strategy of anomaly to demonstrate that individuals were inevitably categorized in the universalistic discourse; impartiality was a facade for a highly-partial ruling class. In examining these strategies, I demonstrate that the group-difference discourse justified its own position by making assumptions about the operation of power and dominance in society. Thus, impartiality was impossible not for the post-modern reason that inherent differences make representation highly problematic, but because power relations hinder the ability of representatives to act in a truly impartial manner.

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

No description available.

This thesis was undertaken with the intention of filling four serious gaps in the vast amount of writing that has been done on the interpretation of the British North America Act by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. First of all, an effort has been made to examine all the decisions handed down by the Board, then to analyse these decisions so as to obtain an understanding of the basic principles established, and lastly to summarise these principles into a coherent picture of the way in which the Constitution of Canada has been shaped, and of the manner In which Canadian constitutional problems of today must be viewed. Secondly, a similar attempt has been made regarding the arguments which the Judicial Committee's interpretation has produced, these arguments likewise being thoroughly examined, analysed into basic components, and summarised into a coherent pattern. Thirdly, one particular point of view, badly neglected in the past, has been given special attention. Finally, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the bibliography, where the intention Is not only to bring together all the major references on this subject, but also to bring these references together in such a way as to Indicate their general character and relative importance. The body of the thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I deals with governmental forms in general and the federal form in particular, the conclusion being reached that the distinguishing feature of a federation is a distribution of legislative powers between coordinate authorities. An analysis of the Judicial Committee's interpretation of Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act is then carried out in Chapter II; two fundamental problems are isolated--the problem of residuary powers and the problem of leaky compartments--and the Judicial Committee's solution to them is discovered in the "three-compartment scheme" and the "Aspect,” "Ancillary Powers," "Cooperation," and "Unoccupied Field" doctrines. Two problems requiring special solutions are examined in Chapter III, where it is found that Section 91, subsection 2 and Section 132 have both been severely restricted in scope. Chapter IV contains a legal or textual evaluation of the Judicial Committee's interpretation, and the opinion is given that if the concluding words of Section 91 are a poor support for the "three-compartment scheme," the introductory words prove that the Judicial Committee's interpretation is legally correct. Three different historical arguments are looked into next, after which Chapter V concludes with a negative answer to the question underlying these arguments: has historical reasoning any connexion with statutory Interpretation in the first place? The purpose of Chapter VI being to determine the practical effects of the Judicial Committee's interpretation, an examination is made of the resulting difficulties; it is decided that before any change is contemplated the admittedly unfortunate consequences must be balanced against the necessity of maintaining Canadian unity—and hence of respecting the French-Canadian attitude regarding provincial autonomy. Finally, in Chapter VII a try is made at summarising the main points of the preceding chapters, and a number of recommendations are then offered with one eye on the present and the other on the future. The thesis concludes with an analytical bibliography and an appendix containing a copy of sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

In this study, I undertake a discourse analysis of struggles over representation as they were manifested in the Charlottetown referendum campaign. I utilize transcripts taken during the campaign derived from the CBC news programs The National, The Journal, and Sunday Report as well as from The CTV News. The issue of (im-)partiality provides the analytical focus for this study. Who can legitimately speak on behalf of whom, or, to what extent do individuals have a particular voice which places limitations on whom they can represent? On the one hand, underlying what I call the ‘universalistic’ discourse is the premise that human beings can act in an impartial manner so that all individuals have the capacity to speak or act in the interests of all other individuals regardless of the group(s) to which they belong. On the other hand, a competing discourse based on group-difference’ maintains that all representatives express partial voices depending on their group-based characteristics. I argue that the universalistic discourse was hegemonic in the transcripts but, at the same time, the group-difference discourse was successful at articulating powerful counter-hegemonic resistance. Ironically, the universalistic discourse was hegemonic despite widespread assumptions of partiality on the basis of province, region, language, and Aboriginality. This was possible because the universalistic discourse subsumed territorial notions of partiality within itself. In contrast, I argue that assumptions of Aboriginal partiality will likely diffuse themselves to other categories, beginning with gender, in the future. I also describe the strategies used by the competing discourses to undermine one another. The universalistic discourse successfully portrayed the group-difference discourse as an inversion to a dangerous apartheid-style society where individuals were forced to exist within group-based categories. The group-difference discourse used the strategy of anomaly to demonstrate that individuals were inevitably categorized in the universalistic discourse; impartiality was a facade for a highly-partial ruling class. In examining these strategies, I demonstrate that the group-difference discourse justified its own position by making assumptions about the operation of power and dominance in society. Thus, impartiality was impossible not for the post-modern reason that inherent differences make representation highly problematic, but because power relations hinder the ability of representatives to act in a truly impartial manner. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate