This dissertation examines reputation, the belief of the decision maker about types of advisors, in incomplete information games with multiple advisors. The decision maker believes that an advisor can be one of two types – an advisor who is biased towards suggesting any particular advice (bad advisor) or an advisor who has the same preferences as the decision maker (good advisor). I explain why it is not always beneficial for the decision maker to seek advice from two advisors simultaneously compared to seeking advice from a single advisor. It is shown that a strong concern for one’s reputation not to be perceived as a bad advisor can make the good advisor sometimes give wrong advice. Also, if each type of advisor considers his future important, the decision maker is better off having a single advisor. Then I show that, when dealing with two advisors, it is better for the decision maker to seek advice simultaneously since the possibility of obtaining information is lower in sequential cheap talk. I also examine how an individual’s perception of what he thinks of himself (self-reputation) and what others think of him regarding his ability to resist temptation (perception of reputation) affect his actions. It is shown that higher self-reputation and higher perception of reputation help in making resolutions and keeping up with them both in the short and the long run. However, this result requires that individuals find it relatively easy to resist temptation. Also, even those who find it hard to resist temptation can sustain their resolution after telling friends about the resolution in the short run if they value the future more than the present.

This dissertation consists of three research papers on cheap talk game and satisficing behaviour. The first chapter examines the potential for communication via cheap talk between an expert and a decision maker whose type (preferences) is uncertain. The expert privately observes states for each type of the decision maker and wants to persuade the decision maker to choose an action in his favour by informing her of the states. The decision maker privately observes her type and chooses an action. An optimal action for the decision maker depends upon both her type and type-specific states. In equilibrium the expert can always inform the decision maker in the form of comparative statements and the decision maker also can partially reveal her type to the expert or public. The second and third chapters build a dynamic model of satisficing behaviour in which an agent’s “expected” payoff is explicitly introduced, where this expectation is adaptively formed. If the agent receives a payoff above her satisficing level she continues with the current action, updating her valuation of the action. If she receives a payoff below her satisficing level and her valuation falls below her satisficing level she updates both her action and satisficing level. In the second chapter, we find that in the long run, all players satisfice. In individual decision problems, satisficing behaviour results in cautious, maximin choice and in normal form games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, they in the long run play either cooperative or defective outcomes conditional on past plays. In coordination games like the Battle of the Sexes, Choosing Sides and Common Interest, they in the long run coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes. In the third chapter, we find that satisficing players in the long run play subgame dominant paths, which is a refinement of subgame perfection, and identify conditions with which they ‘always cooperate’ or ‘fairly coordinate’ in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Sexes games, respectively, and truthfully communicate in sender-receiver games. Proofs and simulations are provided in appendices.

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Experimental willingness to pay (WTP) studies can be classified as hypothetical or non-hypothetical. In a hypothetical study, such as conjoint analysis, a subject does not need to make a real economic commitment. In contrast, in a non-hypothetical task such as in experimental auctions, a subject may need to actually buy the product. Subjects in hypothetical studies tend to overstate their true WTP. Consequently, researchers need to correct hypothetical values to obtain reliable WTP estimates. Recently, incentive-aligned and cheap talk approaches have been proposed as ways to correct for hypothetical bias. In a hypothetical task, a cheap talk script explicitly reminds the subject about the hypothetical nature of the task and its expected consequences. In an incentive-aligned task (non-hypothetical), subjects are randomly selected to physically buy the product. The objective of our study is to assess and compare the reduction of hypothetical bias in consumers’ willingness to pay for novel products by applying a generic, short, and neutral cheap talk script in a retail setting. To accomplish this objective, we employ non-hypothetical, hypothetical, and hypothetical with cheap talk treatments in our experimental design. We conducted our experimental retail study using conjoint analysis and open-ended elicitation mechanisms, utilizing Becker DeGroot Marshak (BDM) mechanism for the incentive-aligned treatments. Consistently in both elicitation mechanisms, using seemingly unrelated and random-effect Tobit techniques, we find that our cheap talk script is effective in eliminating the hypothetical bias. As expected, the hypothetical WTP values are significantly higher than the non-hypothetical values but the hypothetical values with cheap talk are not significantly different from incentive-aligned or non-hypothetical estimates. In addition, we find that open-ended estimates are significantly higher than conjoint analysis estimates and that emotions and familiarity can have significant impacts on WTP estimates.

My thesis will discuss British Romantic period author and philanthropist Hannah More. I aim to portray her from a perspective that demonstrates her compelling and varying nature, that includes religion and rhetoric as persuasive tools met at times with resistance and at other times compliance. Her work called for educational reform on two accounts: firstly, for a system of education for the poor, and secondly, to reeducate middle and upper class women’s philanthropy. I focus on her didactic literature, namely Cheap Repository Tracts, and the prevalence of her Evangelical zeal embedded in the tracts. I draw particular attention to the stories of The Shepherd of Salisbury Plain, Black Giles the Poacher, and Betty Brown, the St. Giles’s Orange Girl. I argue that traditional understandings of didactic narratives as a low form of literature are misleading and that More’s work exemplifies didactic fiction as a form of literature capable of empowering readers and authors alike. Furthermore, I study the social function aspects of Cheap Repository Tracts as they demonstrated a newfound accessibility to a large and varying audience.

Experimental willingness to pay (WTP) studies can be classified as hypothetical or non-hypothetical. In a hypothetical study, such as conjoint analysis, a subject does not need to make a real economic commitment. In contrast, in a non-hypothetical task such as in experimental auctions, a subject may need to actually buy the product. Subjects in hypothetical studies tend to overstate their true WTP. Consequently, researchers need to correct hypothetical values to obtain reliable WTP estimates. Recently, incentive-aligned and cheap talk approaches have been proposed as ways to correct for hypothetical bias. In a hypothetical task, a cheap talk script explicitly reminds the subject about the hypothetical nature of the task and its expected consequences. In an incentive-aligned task (non-hypothetical), subjects are randomly selected to physically buy the product. The objective of our study is to assess and compare the reduction of hypothetical bias in consumers’ willingness to pay for novel products by applying a generic, short, and neutral cheap talk script in a retail setting. To accomplish this objective, we employ non-hypothetical, hypothetical, and hypothetical with cheap talk treatments in our experimental design. We conducted our experimental retail study using conjoint analysis and open-ended elicitation mechanisms, utilizing Becker DeGroot Marshak (BDM) mechanism for the incentive-aligned treatments. Consistently in both elicitation mechanisms, using seemingly unrelated and random-effect Tobit techniques, we find that our cheap talk script is effective in eliminating the hypothetical bias. As expected, the hypothetical WTP values are significantly higher than the non-hypothetical values but the hypothetical values with cheap talk are not significantly different from incentive-aligned or non-hypothetical estimates. In addition, we find that open-ended estimates are significantly higher than conjoint analysis estimates and that emotions and familiarity can have significant impacts on WTP estimates.

This PhD in Creative Writing consists of three parts. The first part is a full-length novel, approximately 80K words, entitled Pure Mafia. It is a drama about child labour and the Pakistani “carpet mafia”. This is intertwined with the story of an unhappily married man undergoing a midlife crisis who has an affair with a younger woman; the latter is instrumental to the main plot about child labour. The book’s second main theme is British Pakistanis. An overarching theme is abuse and exploitation, both personal and global, but ultimately of redemption and renewal. The story is set in 2010/2011, mainly in London, England, with a middle section in Lahore, Pakistan. The second part is an academic thesis, approximately 20K words, entitled Cheap Labour = Child Labour, on the main theme of the novel, child labour. It attempts to show that child labour is an inevitable consequence of cheap labour generally, and that the only way to tackle child labour is to address cheap labour. The thesis has been consciously and deliberately written as an objective, third person, standalone document and for this reason does not mention the novel. It is partly designed to fulfil the general PhD criterion of demonstrating scholarship and research. The third part is a subjective, first person critical commentary, approximately 15K words, on the writing of the novel and the thesis, the connection between them, and the research context; it is entitled Pure Mafia: A critical commentary. It explains why the main thesis is on child labour, rather than on the creative process or an English Literature thesis; however, the commentary does include in some detail an insight into the creative process, as well as a discussion of influences and tradition of writing. The final section of the commentary summarises this entire PhD’s original contribution to knowledge.

My thesis will discuss British Romantic period author and philanthropist Hannah More. I aim to portray her from a perspective that demonstrates her compelling and varying nature, that includes religion and rhetoric as persuasive tools met at times with resistance and at other times compliance. Her work called for educational reform on two accounts: firstly, for a system of education for the poor, and secondly, to reeducate middle and upper class women’s philanthropy. I focus on her didactic literature, namely Cheap Repository Tracts, and the prevalence of her Evangelical zeal embedded in the tracts. I draw particular attention to the stories of The Shepherd of Salisbury Plain, Black Giles the Poacher, and Betty Brown, the St. Giles’s Orange Girl. I argue that traditional understandings of didactic narratives as a low form of literature are misleading and that More’s work exemplifies didactic fiction as a form of literature capable of empowering readers and authors alike. Furthermore, I study the social function aspects of Cheap Repository Tracts as they demonstrated a newfound accessibility to a large and varying audience.

Chapter 1: Intrafamily Bargaining and Love Popular culture and common wisdom testify that the way partners in a relationship feel for one another very much depends on how they treat each other. This paper posits the hypothesis that altruism or love in a relationship is endogenous to the actions of the partners and studies how this influences allocations and efficiency in a bargaining model of household decision-making. The main results are that agents treat their partner in a kinder way than without endogenously evolving love, this leads to more equitable allocations in household decision making and greater intertemporal efficiency. There are two mechanisms at work: agents treat their partner nicely to avoid retribution by a less loving partner in the future; and they treat the partner nicely so that the kind reciprocal behavior raises their own love towards the partner, which lets them enjoy higher utility. As to love, two interpretations emerge: love is a commitment device by which couples can implement Pareto superior allocations; and love is an investment good in the sense that costly nice behavior towards the partner today may ensure higher levels of trust and efficiency in the future. Chapter 2: Perception of Technology and Technological Progress under Extractive Institutions This paper explores the impact of different perceptions of the nature of technology - whether it may grow in an arithmetic or geometric fashion - on the choices of an elite that lives on extracting resources from the productive populace. We show that slow potential growth destroys the credibility of inclusive institutions that the elite may consider in order to foster growth whereas these can and will be implemented if populace and elite believe in fast growth. Belief in the potential of technological growth leads to growth-friendly policies under both extractive and inclusive institutions and, as history progresses, the true nature of technology reveals itself and this belief spreads. Chapter 3: A critical literature review of the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and the communication of Unprotected Information Assets This paper reviews the literature centred on the question of what kind of settings facilitate the transmission of unverifiable pieces of information that re- side with an agent whose incentives are not well aligned with an agent for whom this piece of information is useful. The question is framed within the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and its answers make extensive use of the modelling device of Cheap Talk. The main findings are that communication leads to costly distortions and the efforts to decrease bias and information loss may trigger major revisions to the structure of incentive systems and the allocation of decision-rights. The paper argues that the literature has so far failed to properly examine the question of property rights of information and is therefore focused on niche applications.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第22222号 / 経博第610号 / 新制||経||292(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 関口 格, 教授 原 千秋, 准教授 陳 珈惠 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM