This thesis seeks to identify if, in the course of the United States and NATO s democratic institution building efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States and NATO are offering a viable model of how military professionals interact with a healthy democratic society. Because the understanding of how military professionals should interact with society as a whole is often flawed in the United States and other developed democratic states, this study will research how well the United States and NATO are presenting a realistic model to professional soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This study begins with a broad look at civil-military relations theory and examines select historical examples of professional soldiers exceeding their purview in developed countries such as the United States and Britain. The Yugoslav People s Army s political history is surveyed to examine the political involvement of professional soldiers in politics in the former state of Yugoslavia. Lastly, this study will examine contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina and the West's democratic institution-building efforts.

"The end of the Cold War marked for Europe the entrance into an era of instability and violence caused by the collapse of the old communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. How the European security organizations reacted to those changes and new threats and transformed themselves for dealing with a new security environment is the focus of this thesis. In particular, it gives an overview of the transformations that occurred within NATO and OSCE in the post-Cold War period, which have created and developed new security mechanisms and policies for dealing with crises. The thesis further examines the consolidation of a new European security actor, the European Union, and the development of the military dimension through the ESDP, which is linked directly to transformations that occurred in Europe, being merely a consequence of those changes. All three organizations proved their importance as stability factors of the European security system by launching crisis management operations, acting in ceasefire and post-conflict mediation, conducting preventive diplomacy, and spreading democracy and principles of human rights."-- p. i. / Republic of Moldova Army author.

Military mutinies are occurring more frequently in the last two decades than ever before. Mutinies impact every region of the world. Given that they are occurring more frequently, impact every region, and often have disastrous implications, scholars must answer the foundational question: why do mutinies occur? What are the proximate domestic conditions that give rise to military mutinies? This project makes three contributions. First, I set out to formally define mutinies and collect a new dataset that will allow scholars to examine mutinies empirically. Second, I present a theoretical framework that explains when and why mutinies will occur. Finally, I present three novel empirical tests of the theory. The first portion of this dissertation defines mutinies and describes the data collection process. I present the Military Mutinies and Defections Databases (MMDD). Using news articles from various sources, I code 460 mutiny events from 1945 – present day. I code a number of other variables that give users details about the event, such as: whether or not violence was used, whether or not civilians were killed, and whether or not soldiers defected from the military apparatus. Next, I utilize a nested principal agent model to describe when mutinies are likely to occur. Agent models describe hierarchical relationships of delegation. A nested structure allows for multiple agents and multiple principals in a given model. I apply this nested structure to the military to generate three various nests. The first examines foot soldiers as an agent of the military leadership. In this nest, policy failures (e.g., bad strategy) secured by the military leadership will drive foot soldier mutinies. The second nest explores foot soldiers as agents of the executive, a civilian principal. In this nest, I expect that situations that place soldiers in conflict with the executive will generate shirking. The final nest considers foot soldiers and military leadership as collective agents of the executive. I theorize that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking, or mutinies, in this nested structure. The final nest presents an interesting trade-off for a coup-worried leader. I argue that while executives can utilize regime securing strategies, such strategies might actually agitate the military and drive low level military rebellions. Coup proofing, a common practice among executives that are worried they will be ousted by the military, effectively wards of coups but can generate unintended consequences. Specifically, I expect that counterbalancing measures and other coup proofing tactics should spur mutinies because the intended purpose of these measures is to create coordination challenges which likely spur military splintering. The first empirical chapter sets out to explore the relationship between civil conflict and the likelihood of mutinies. I expect that when civil wars are extremely bloody or long lasting, mutinies will be more likely as war-weary soldiers no longer want to invest in the war effort. I find evidence that indeed civil war intensity and duration contribute to the probability of a state experiencing a mutiny. The second empirical chapter explores scenarios that pit foot soldiers preferences against the executive’s. I expect that scenarios that impose steep costs on foot soldiers, yet provide some benefit to the executive are likely to spur mutinies. I find evidence that protest events and divisionary conflict spur mutinies. The final empirical chapter explores the military apparatus as a whole. I find that coup proofing measures increase the likelihood of mutinies. Additionally, I find that scenarios that are likely to spur widespread dissent among military actors will increase the likelihood of a mutiny in the context of steep coordination challenges that stifle coup activity. The final chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations. I offer recommendations for leader states (e.g., major powers and democratic leaders in the international system) and for states experiencing mutinies. I conclude by discussing the many possible extensions for this project. This section seeks to emphasis the fact that this is a young, novel research program with many promising avenues for future research.

Turkey and Pakistan share a long history of military tutelage, influence, and intervention in politics. This thesis analyzes the evolution of the political role of the military in the two countries, in order to understand the causes of the Turkish military’s diminished political influence since 2002, contrasted with the Pakistani military’s continuing grip over the country’s political system. Three factors can explain this divergence in civilian control of the military between the two countries. In Turkey, there has been a constant process of elite turnover and replacement, culminating in the gradual emergence and consolidation of counter-elite power in the 1990s and 2000s. In Pakistan, the traditional civil-military “Establishment” has remained remarkably unchanged in its constitution and structure. The role of elites in determining the course of civil-military relations has been conditioned by two other factors, (1) external influences and (2) varying patterns of civilian institutional legitimacy.

Since the independence of Indonesia in 1945, Indonesia has experienced several changes during the last sixty years and is now moving towards democratization. Of these political changes, Indonesia's civil-military relationship has always played a key role. During the era of Cold War, Indonesia¡¦s military were fighting against colonial power and facing the ideological confrontation. As political changes are going on, the military is asked to get out of political system in Indonesia. During the war of Independence, Indonesia¡¦s military played a role to save the country, they fought against the Dutch under the belief of nationalism. Indonesia's parliamentary democracy in the 1950s caused political disorder. Sukarno¡¦s leftist ideology has also caused the military unrest. With both internal and external factors, military coup happened in September 1965, which result in the region of authoritarian rule of Suharto. During the Suharto era, Indonesia's military penetrated in political, economic and social areas in Indonesia. The military became the supreme power that controlled the country. Indonesia's economic growth was claimed to be as a source of legitimacy for Suharto¡¦s regime. Indonesia¡¦s economy was almost collapsed of the financial crisis in 1997. As Mr.Suharto is losing his ruling legitimacy in Indonesia, it¡¦s made Suharto step down in May 1998. Indonesia¡¦s military then began to change. Indonesia has experienced four presidential elections, and regarded as a democratic state. But, if Indonesia wants to achieve a true civilian control over the military still, further military professionalism has to be done.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boise State University, 2009. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-112).

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. / Title from title screen (viewed Mar. 24, 2004). "March 2003." Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-72). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Systems and Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Steve J. Iatrou, Karen Guttieri. Includes bibliographical references (p. 181-189). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in International Security and Civil-Military Relations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Harold Trinkunas, Jeanne Giraldo. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in International Security and Civil-Military Relations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Donald Abenheim, Karen Guttieri. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.