Thesis (M.A.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1984. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-153). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Deerfield, Ill., 1998. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 326-329).

Marketing cooperatives play an important role in agricultural activities. Institutional support for cooperatives is based on the idea that, collectively, farmers can achieve benefits than, individually would be difficult to obtain. Head lettuce in the Lower Mainland region of British Columbia is marketed and distributed by a central selling agency which is organized as a producer cooperative. Members of the cooperative are subject to regulations, in the form of market quota allocations which control the quantity of head lettuce they can sell through their cooperative. This study describes and analyses the market structure of the head lettuce industry in British Columbia to ascertain and quantify the source of benefits to producers from cooperative marketing within a regulated marketing environment. A model of the industry is constructed to characterize the market for head lettuce in B.C. The parameters which affect consumer demand and farm supply are estimated with econometric equations. A feature of supply is that current production decisions are influenced by the producer's market quota allocation which, in turn, is determined by the producer’s past sales. The market quotas are believed to have constrained supply response and this is borne out by the empirical results which indicates a highly inelastic supply curve. The demand for head lettuce is also estimated to be inelastic. This result is not surprising since head lettuce is regarded as a basic commodity by consumers. The estimated supply and demand elasticities are used to derive linear supply and demand curves at the cooperative and wholesale levels. These are used with the observed 1990 price and quantity levels to calibrate a model of the B.C. head lettuce industry. A counterfactual model is then formulated to simulate a market with no controls on output. Given an inelastic wholesale demand, the simulation results indicate that for very small increases in cooperative output, large decreases in price occur. Consequently total revenues decline at every alternative assumption of supply increase. This result supports the hypothesis that output restrictions by the cooperative have the potential to increase members' output prices. It is concluded that while the market quotas have in the past provided positive benefits to cooperative members, the quotas may now be hindering the process of adjustment to the loss of tariff protection and changing market conditions by making producers less price responsive.

Marketing cooperatives play an important role in agricultural activities. Institutional support for cooperatives is based on the idea that, collectively, farmers can achieve benefits than, individually would be difficult to obtain. Head lettuce in the Lower Mainland region of British Columbia is marketed and distributed by a central selling agency which is organized as a producer cooperative. Members of the cooperative are subject to regulations, in the form of market quota allocations which control the quantity of head lettuce they can sell through their cooperative. This study describes and analyses the market structure of the head lettuce industry in British Columbia to ascertain and quantify the source of benefits to producers from cooperative marketing within a regulated marketing environment. A model of the industry is constructed to characterize the market for head lettuce in B.C. The parameters which affect consumer demand and farm supply are estimated with econometric equations. A feature of supply is that current production decisions are influenced by the producer's market quota allocation which, in turn, is determined by the producer’s past sales. The market quotas are believed to have constrained supply response and this is borne out by the empirical results which indicates a highly inelastic supply curve. The demand for head lettuce is also estimated to be inelastic. This result is not surprising since head lettuce is regarded as a basic commodity by consumers. The estimated supply and demand elasticities are used to derive linear supply and demand curves at the cooperative and wholesale levels. These are used with the observed 1990 price and quantity levels to calibrate a model of the B.C. head lettuce industry. A counterfactual model is then formulated to simulate a market with no controls on output. Given an inelastic wholesale demand, the simulation results indicate that for very small increases in cooperative output, large decreases in price occur. Consequently total revenues decline at every alternative assumption of supply increase. This result supports the hypothesis that output restrictions by the cooperative have the potential to increase members' output prices. It is concluded that while the market quotas have in the past provided positive benefits to cooperative members, the quotas may now be hindering the process of adjustment to the loss of tariff protection and changing market conditions by making producers less price responsive. / Land and Food Systems, Faculty of / Graduate

In an effort to answer broad, contextual questions concerning early 19th Century American industrial history, it is often necessary to supplement generally accepted premises with observations of particular instances. This study of Cloverdale Furnace constitutes such an observation. Particular attention has been paid to details of person, place and practice as gained from Botetourt County Records and the correspondence between such furnace owners as the Breckenridge, Tayloe and Anderson families. The ultimate fate of charcoal-fired iron furnaces is so well known as to require little or no comment. That Cloverdale continued into, and beyond the period of the United States Civil War, depended upon a variety of causes. It probably would have ceased operation in 1859 - 1860, but for crisis of the Union. Other causes for Cloverdale's success and perseverance included: availability of capital, labor, raw materials and managerial talent. Not all of these were distinctive, but some were enough so to deserve special note. The study is chronologic. It begins with the establishment of the furnace in 1789, and ends with the final mining activity of 1889. During this period, there were two separate furnaces located within eight miles of each other. Each was named Cloverdale and each produced high grade charcoal-smelted "gun metal." The operation of Cloverdale Number 1 was based on craft techniques and linked to a local market. The owners were largely absentee investors who utilized their existing slave force for labor. Cloverdale Number 2 was based on a regional market and incorporated a more advanced technology in furnace construction. Under the ownership of John T. Anderson, and later, Joseph R. Anderson, Cloverdale Number 2 achieved a reputation second to none in the eastern part of the United states for producing quality "gun metal" and supplied the Tredegar Works in Richmond with the same. Unfortunately, the reputation was not enough to protect the firm from collapse due to depleted timber reserves and natural resources. / Master of Arts