Quando se trata do presidencialismo existente no Brasil, nas funcionalidades das partes envolvidas no processo orçamentário do governo federal até então independentes entre si, como bem explana a Teoria da Separação dos Poderes, são observáveis diversas falhas, em decorrência da discricionariedade atribuída ao Executivo na realização de despesas não obrigatórias e do interesse do Legislativo na política clientelista em poder executar emendas que beneficiem suas principais bases eleitorais. A hipótese é de que, diante da necessidade de aprovação de projetos para aumento de governabilidade determinado volume de emendas é executado e verbas despendidas, o que caracteriza a barganha entre os poderes Executivo e Legislativo, fenômeno dessa pesquisa. Sustentado pela teoria econômica da agência e da Formação de Coalizões, o objetivo aqui foi verificar a ocorrência desse fenômeno de barganha nos anos de 2000 a 2017 e, na existência desse, caracterizar os parlamentares que mais se beneficiaram dessa relação. Por meio de dados do governo federal, para se chegar a esse objetivo foram usadas técnicas econométricas de análise em dois estágios de dados em painéis não balanceados, que caracterizaram inicialmente as emendas parlamentares e posteriormente seus autores correlacionados aos seus respectivos comportamentos em votações no Congresso Nacional, assim como os aportes na execução de suas emendas pelo poder Executivo. Os testes estatísticos aqui aplicados corroboraram para a validação da hipótese da existência da barganha entre Executivo e Legislativo, observado no âmbito desse trabalho pela maior liberação de recursos aos parlamentares que mais apoiaram propostas executivas, podendo caracterizar assim os mais beneficiados dessa relação / When it comes to the existing presidentialism in Brazil, in the functionalities of the parties involved in the budget process of the federal government hitherto independent of each other, as well as the Theory of the Separation of Powers explains, several failures, as a result of the discretion attributed to the Executive in the execution of non-compulsory expenses and the interest of the Legislature in the pork-barrel policy in being able to execute amendments that benefit its main electoral bases. The hypothesis is that, given the need for approval of projects to increase governability, a certain volume of amendments is executed and money spent, which characterizes the bargain between the Executive and Legislative branches, phenomenon of this research. Underpinned by the Economic Theory of Agency and Formation of Coalitions, the objective here was to verify the occurrence of this phenomenon of bargaining in the years 2000 to 2017 and, in its existence, to characterize the parliamentarians who have most benefited from this relationship. By means of federal government data, econometric analysis techniques were used in two stages of data in unbalanced panels, which initially characterized the parliamentary amendments and later their authors correlated to their respective behaviors in voting in the National Congress, as well as the contributions in the execution of its amendments by the Executive branch. The statistical tests applied here corroborated the validation of the hypothesis of the existence of the Executive and Legislative bargain, observed in the scope of this work by the greater liberation of resources to the parliamentarians who most supported executive proposals, thus being able to characterize the most benefited of this relationship

Den svenska skogspolitiken sammanfattas till de jämställda målen av miljö respektive produktion. När dessa mål riskerar att motverka varandra är det möjligt att motstånd inför politiska åtgärder uppstår. Syftet med denna studie har därmed varit att undersöka vilken roll idésystem har för acceptansen av skogspolitikens målsättningar med avgränsning till nyckelbiotopspolitiken, samt att pröva huruvida egenintresse har någon inverkan. För studien har det teoretiska ramverket Advocacy Coalition Framework samt Rational Choice perspektivet tillämpats. Resultatet från den kvalitativa textanalysen visar att både idésystem och egenintresse förklarar policyacceptans i lika stor utsträckning. Det antyds även att korresponderande idésystem tillsammans med egenintresset samtidigt har varit styrande hos två aktörer. Vidare tyder resultatet på att mekanismerna kompletterar varandra genom att förklara policyacceptans när den andra misslyckas. De slutsatser som dras är att vidare forskning krävs för en fördjupad förståelse av dessa mekanismer och huruvida det existerar någon bakomliggande koppling sinsemellan föreställningar och egenintresse.

Orientador: Tullo Vigevani / Banca: Marcos Cordeiro Pires / Banca: Jefferson Aparecido Dias / Resumo: Esta dissertação de mestrado estuda as coalizões de classes ou pactos políticos no Brasil durante as décadas de 1980 e 1990, e os projetos de conquista do poder e reconstrução do Estado que essas coalizões encetaram e ou executaram. Nosso escopo são os pactos políticos "popular-democrático" e "rentista financista", que segundo Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira teriam vigido, respectivamente, entre 1977-1987 e 1991-2005. Investigamos como foi possível a essas coalizões sustentarem, modificarem ou suprimirem determinadas escolhas econômicas, políticas e sociais, tais como estratégias nacionais de desenvolvimento, o tipo de Estado e a relação deste com o Mercado. Identificamos os agentes destas coalizões, seus interesses, ideologias, seus discursos, os arranjos, consensos e compromissos que firmaram, os conflitos com outros agentes, a influência da fortuna, e como esses processos impactaram a República, os cidadãos e o Estado brasileiro. Analisamos a obra de John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, para discutir o processo e os projetos de poder das duas coalizões hegemônicas do período: popular-democrática nos anos 1980 e rentista-financista nos anos 1990. Debatemos, de um lado, o projeto de nação que a coalizão popular-democrática logrou edificar através da Constituição Federal de 1988 e que Renato Lessa chamou de "programa civilizatório para toda a sociedade brasileira", e por outro lado o projeto descrito por Sallum Jr de "conquista do poder e reconstrução do Estado sob uma ótica predominantemente liberal". Dois conceitos de Oscar Vilhena Vieira são utilizados para nos ajudar a interpretar o momento Constituinte e a Constituição de 1988: o da "reserva de justiça" e o "compromisso maximizador". Sobre os anos 1990, analisamos as origens, os processos e as consequências do que Celso ... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: This dissertation studies the class coalitions or political pacts in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s, and the project of power's conquest and reconstruction of the State that these coalitions embarked and/or implemented. Our scope are the political pacts "populardemocratic" and "rentier-financier", which according to Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira would happened, respectively, between 1977-1987 and 1991-2005. We investigated how it was possible to these coalitions sustain, modify or suppress certain economic choices, political and social, such as national development strategies, the type of State and its relationship with the market. We identify the agents of these coalitions, their interests, ideologies, speeches, arrangements, consensus and commitments entered into, the conflicts with other agents, the influence of fortune, and how these processes impacted the Republic, the citizens and the Brazilian State. We analyse the book of John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, to discuss the process and the power projects of the two hegemonic coalitions in the period: populardemocratic in the 1980s and rentier-financier in the 1990s. We debated on the one hand, the project of nation that the popular-democratic coalition managed to build through the Federal Constitution of 1988 and that Renato Lessa named of "civilizatory program for the whole Brazilian society," and on the other hand the project described by Sallum Jr of "conquest of power and reconstruction of the State in a predominantly liberal perspective". Two Oscar Vilhena Vieira's concepts are used to help us interpret the Constituent time and the Constitution of 1988: the "reserve of justice" and the "maximizing commitment." About the 1990s, we analyze the origins, the processes and the consequences of what Celso Furtado wrote as being an "nation's interrupted construction", or Paulo Nogueira ... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

Sistemas multiagentes muitas vezes apresentam características que os aproximam de sociedades de agentes e, como as humanas, possuem normas e organizações com o objetivo de coordenar as interações entre os seus membros. Coalizão é um tipo de estrutura organizacional temporária, montada com objetivos específicos. A teoria dos jogos estuda formalmente o fenômeno coalizional, se detendo em demonstrações de propriedades e características dessa estrutura. A área de sistemas multiagentes, por outro lado, tem mostrado significativo interesse nas estruturas coalizionais como forma de organizar a cooperação entre os agentes, dedicando-se ao desenvolvimento de algoritmos para formação de coalizões. Esse trabalho apresenta um algoritmo de formação de coalizões para compartilhamento de recursos, denominado heurística ganha-ganha. Definimos um modelo que utiliza a abstração de recursos para representar tanto a posse de habilidades e objetos, quanto para representar os objetivos dos agentes. Um jogo de votação k-ponderado é utilizado para implementar o processo decisório de quais coalizões são válidas e o algoritmo testa iterativamente cada vizinhança de um agente na busca de associações vantajosas. Demonstramos que o algoritmo incrementa monotonicamente o bem-estar da sociedade e converge para uma estrutura coalizional. Também mostramos empiricamente que a heurística é eficiente para compartilhamento de recursos em situações de abundância de recursos, montando coalizões em poucas iterações e com uma quantidade grande de agentes. / Multiagent systems frequently show characteristics that come closer to agent societies and, like the humans ones, have norms and organizations in order to coordinate the interactions of its members. Coalition is a type of temporary organizational structure, assembled with specific goals. Game theory formally studies the coalitional phenomenon focusing in the demonstrations of properties and characteristics of this structure. The area of multiagent systems, on the other hand, has devoted significant interest in coalition structures as a way to organize cooperation between its members, and has been dedicated to the development of algorithms for coalition formation. This dissertation presents an algorithm to coalition formation named win-win heuristic. We define a model which uses the abstraction of resources to represent either, the possession of abilities and objects, or to represent the agents target. A k-weight voting game is used to implement the decision process of what coalitions are worth and an iteratively algorithm tests each agent neighborhood in the pursue of better associations. We demonstrate that the algorithm monotonically increases the society welfare and converges to a coalitional structure. We also show empirically that the heuristic is efficient for resource sharing in situations of availability of resources, building coalitions with few iterations and a large amount of agents.

Thesis advisor: Hideo Konishi / My doctoral dissertation consists of three chapters on political economy and public economics. The first chapter discusses the effect of media bias on a voting competition. The second chapter focuses on how residents respond to increasing natural disaster risks in a multi-community framework. The third chapter investigates a coalition formation game with congestion effects. In chapter 1, I present a two-party election model with media noise. The media may provide polarized messages instead of those that explain the parties' actual policies. The rational voter relies on the media as an imperfect information source regarding a party's platform. Given this framework, I show that Downsian policy convergence is not valid. Moreover, when a party's ideology is relatively strong and the media bias is significant, one-sided polarization can occur: the party with more imprecise reports may adopt a more extreme strategy, whereas its opponent is more of a centrist in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This occurs when one party is misrepresented more often, causing the voter to think that the other party has more incentive to polarize. Therefore, the voter may favor the highly misrepresented party, which gives that party more room to polarize. I also show that parties never gain from these increasing misrepresentations, and a biased media environment can negatively affect the voter's welfare. My results suggest that the public should pursue a balanced media environment. Global warming and climate change have become increasingly important. In chapter 2, I investigate a local public goods economy using a new element: location-specific risks of disasters. Agents in this economy ``vote with their feet'' by choosing their favorite location as their residential base. In each location, all residents use majority rule to decide the local wealth tax rate and the amount of local public goods provision that can reduce the loss caused by disasters. I show that the equilibrium is wealth stratified if preferences are represented by a homothetic Stone-Geary utility function. Moreover, when disaster risks at a location increase, the population usually moves away from that location and the housing rents consequently decrease. Meanwhile, the housing rents and tax rates increase at the location the residents shift to. Moreover, I use this framework to numerically evaluate two policies: foreign donation and inter-jurisdiction transfer. If developed countries provides subsidies to a location with greater risks in a developing country, wealthier agents in the recipient country may move into the said location and force poorer agents to move out. This effect makes the wealthier the direct beneficiary of the foreign subsidy. Furthermore, I find that the inter-jurisdiction transfer may harm the poorer by rising housing rents. In chapter 3, I consider a coalition-formation problem, in which there is a set of feasible alternatives for each coalition and each player's payoff is affected by the coalition she belongs to and by its chosen alternative. In this chapter, I focus on ``congestion effects'': an agent's payoff goes down as an additional player joins the coalition other things being equal. The equilibrium notion considered is ``stability": a stable allocation (pairs of coalition structure and alternatives chosen by each coalition) is an allocation such that no coalition has an incentive to deviate from it. I find quite robust counterexamples to show that stability may fail to exist even under strong preference conditions such as the intermediate preference property and single peakedness. Nevertheless, I show a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of stability: congruent-pair solvability. I also provide some results on the ``Nash-like" equilibrium notion. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Thesis advisor: Hideo Konishi / My doctoral dissertation contains three essays on menu auction and its related applications. The first chapter is a theoretical generalization of classical menu auction model, and the second and the third chapters are applications to a resource allocation problem and an industrial organization problem. Menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) is a first-price package auction with complete information. They show that every Nash equilibrium under some refinements always leads to an efficient outcome. Therefore, this becomes a natural efficiency benchmark for package auction designs (e.g., Ausubel and Milgrom 2002). Menu auction can also be viewed as a model of economic influence where the auctioneer is going to choose an action which affects bidders' payoff so that each bidder tries to influence the outcome by monetary transfer to the auctioneer. This framework is widely adopted in political lobbying models where the special interest groups lobbying the government over trade policies (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994). However, the applicability is limited by quasi-linear preferences and the absence of budget constraints. In my first chapter, ``Menu Auctions with Non-Transferable Utilities and Budget Constraints'', I extends Bernheim and Whinston's (1986) menu auction model under transferable utilities to a framework with non-transferable utilities and budget constraints. Under appropriate definitions of equilibria consistent with subgame perfection, it is shown that every truthful Nash equilibrium (TNE) is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) and that the set of TNE payoffs and the set of CPNE payoffs are equivalent, as in a transferable utility framework. The existence of a CPNE is assured in contrast with the possible non-existence of Nash equilibrium under the definition by Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997). Moreover, the set of CPNE payoffs is equivalent to the bidder-optimal weak core. The second chapter relates menu auction to a resource allocation problem. Kelso and Crawford (1982) propose a wage-adjustment mechanism resulting in a stable matching between heterogeneous firms and workers. Instead of a benevolent social planner, in ``Profit-Maximizing Matchmaker'' (w. Hideo Konishi), we consider a profit-maximizing auctioneer to solve this many-to-one assignment problem. If firms can only use individualized price, then the auctioneer can only earn zero profit in every Nash equilibrium and the sets of stable assignments and strong Nash equilibria are equivalent. Otherwise, the auctioneer might earn positive profit even in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. This reinforces Milgrom's (2010) argument on the benefit of using simplified message spaces that it not only reduces information requirement but also improves resource allocation. The third chapter applies menu auction in an industrial organization problem. In ``Choosing a Licensee from Heterogeneous Rivals'' (w. Hideo Konishi and Anthony Creane), we consider a firm licensing its production technology to rivals when firms with heterogeneous in production costs competing in a Cournot market. While Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that a complete transfer in duopoly can be joint-profit reducing, we show that it is always joint-profit improving provided that at least three firms remain in the industry after transfer. While transfers between similarly efficient firms may reduce welfare, the social welfare must increase if the licensor is the most efficient in the industry, contrast with Katz and Shapiro (1985) in the duopoly environment. This has an important implication in competition regulation. Then we investigate relative efficiency of the licensee under different licensing auction mechanisms. With natural refinement of equilibria, we show that a menu auction licensee, a standard first-price auction licensee, and a joint-profit maximizing licensee are in (weakly) descending order of efficiency. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

The thesis contains three chapters on environmental and natural resource economics and focuses on situations where agents receive private or public information. The first chapter analyses the problem of transboundary fisheries, where harvesting countries behave non-cooperatively. In addition to biological uncertainty, countries may face strategic uncertainty. A country that receives negative assessments about the current level of the fish stock, may become “pessimistic” about the assessment of the other harvesting country, which can ignite “panic-based” overfishing. In such a coordination problem, multiplicity of equilibria is a generic characteristic of the solution. Both strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection, relatively, have been given less attention in the theoretical literature of common-property natural resources. In this model, in the limit as the harvesting countries observe more and more precise information, rationality ensures the unique “global game” equilibrium, a la Carlsson and van Damme (1993). The improved predictive power of the model helps a potential intergovernmental manager of the stock understand the threshold behaviour of harvesting countries. The global game threshold coincides with the risk-dominance threshold of a precise information model, as if there was no strategic uncertainty, and implies that the countries select the corresponding risk-dominant action for any level of assessment of the stock. Gaining from the risk-dominance equivalence, I derive policy suggestions for the overfishing cost and the property rights in common-property fisheries. The second chapter develops a theoretical framework to examine the role of public information in dynamic self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) on climate change. The countries choose self-enforcing emission abatement strategies in an infinite-horizon repeated game. In a stochastic model, where the social cost of greenhouse gasses (GHG) is a random variable, a central authority, as an information sender, can control release of information about the unknown state to the countries. In the literature on stochastic IEAs, it is shown that comparison of different scenarios of learning by the countries, depends on ex-ante difference of true social cost of GHG from the prior belief of countries. Here, I try to understand, in a signalling game between the informed sender and the countries, whether the no-learning or imperfect-learning scenarios, can be an equilibrium outcome. It is shown that the equilibrium strategy of the sender, who is constrained to a specific randomisation device and tries to induce an incentive-compatible abatement level which is Pareto superior, leads to full learning of social cost of GHG of symmetric and asymmetric countries. Finally, in the third chapter, I again examine a setting, where a central authority, as an information sender, conducts research on the true social cost of climate change, and releases information to the countries. However, in this chapter, instead of restricting the sender to a specific signalling structure, the sender, who has commitment power, by designing an information mechanism (a set of signals and a probability distribution over them), maximises his payoff, which depends on the mitigation action of countries and the social cost of green-house gases(GHG). The countries, given the information policy (the probability distribution over signals) and the public signal, update their beliefs about the social cost of GHG and take a mitigation action. I derive the optimal information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games. I show that the coalition size, as a function of beliefs, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. If the sender maximises the expected payoff of either of non-signatories or signatories of the climate treaty, then full revelation is the optimal information policy, while if the sender attempts to reduce the global level of GHG, then optimal information policy leads to imperfect disclosure of the social cost. Furthermore, given any of the specifications of the sender’s payoff, the optimal information policy leads to the socially optimal mitigation and membership outcomes.

Este trabalho procura compreender como funcionam as coalizões que sustentam o Executivo no Brasil, com um olhar direcionado ao processo legislativo, ou seja, à forma como leis são processadas no interior do Poder Legislativo. Acredito que a formação de coalizões implica na divisão de poder e de responsabilidade sobre o conjunto de políticas, ou seja, implica que todos os partidos que compõem a coalizão participam e influem no resultado final do processo decisório. Pretendo, através da análise do processo de produção das leis, identificar em que moldes se dá o acordo entre os partidos no tocante a políticas específicas. Privilegio as medidas introduzidas e vetadas pelo Executivo para, por meio destas, mostrar como se dá concretamente este acordo. / This work seeks to understand the coalitions that support the Executive Power in Brazil, focusing the legislative process, which means, focusing how the laws are produced inside the Legislative Power. The assumption is that forming coalitions implies sharing power and responsibilities over the broad set of policies. In other words, it implies that the parties composing the coalition participate and influence the results of the decisionmaking process. By analyzing the legislative process, the aim is to identify the terms of the parties agreement concerning policies. The emphasis is on the bills introduced and vetoed by the Executive, assuming that they reveal this agreement.

O principal objetivo deste trabalho é mostrar que, no presidencialismo multipartidário brasileiro, as políticas públicas implementadas pelo Executivo são resultantes do processo de agregação de preferências dos diferentes atores partidários que integram o gabinete de governo. Posto que os partidos aceitam integrar coalizões de governo em função da expectativa de agregar suas preferências à agenda de políticas do Executivo, os conflitos intragabinete são derivados da não efetivação desta expectativa. Argumento que, embora sejam delegadas aos integrantes do gabinete áreas ministeriais específicas, os partidos da coalizão monitoram as áreas de policy dos seus parceiros de governo, na tentativa de diminuir a assimetria de informação e agregar suas preferências às políticas que lhes interessam. Para tanto, investigo de que forma os parlamentares utilizam as suas prerrogativas de controle horizontal - [i] Requerimentos de Informação (RIC), [ii] Propostas de Fiscalização e Controle (PFC) e [iii] Projeto de Decreto Legislativo (PDC) - para obter informações sobre a implementação de políticas nos ministérios dos partidos parceiros do gabinete. A análise compreende o período entre 1995 e 2014, nos governos Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), Luís Inácio da Silva (LULA) e Dilma Rousseff (DILMA). As evidências apresentadas neste trabalho sugerem que a taxa de controle horizontal intragabinete varia positivamente com o grau de dispersão de preferências dos partidos representados no governo. Em função da motivação policyseeking dos atores que integram o gabinete, os partidos que possuem mais recursos para a implementação de políticas públicas são também aqueles que recebem o maior volume de controle dos seus parceiros de gabinete. Como consequência, são os partidos da coalizão de governo os principais responsáveis por monitorar as ações de implementação de políticas públicas do Executivo. Ao contrário do que ocorre no momento de formulação das políticas no gabinete e no parlamento, o peso legislativo dos partidos integrantes do governo importa pouco para a capacidade destes atores agregarem suas preferências às policies. Isso explica o que ganham os partidos que aceitam integrar as coalizões de governo e revela qual o mecanismo que viabiliza a manutenção de um pacto político firmado entre atores com preferências distintas e heterogêneas. / The aim of this study is to show that public policies implemented by the executive branch in the Brazilian multiparty presidential system are the result of aggregating the preferences of different party members within the government cabinet. Parties agree to integrate into the coalition government because they expect to be able to add their preferences to the government policy agenda. However, when parties are unable to influence the policy agenda, it often results in intra-cabinet conflicts. I argue that, although the chief executive delegates specific portfolios to each cabinet member, the parties scrutinize the policies carried out by the government members in an attempt to reduce the asymmetric information and add their preferences to policies that concern them. For this purpose, I investigate how legislative membres use their horizontal control prerogative - [i] Requerimentos de Informação (RIC), [ii] Propostas de Fiscalização e Controle (PFC) e [iii] Projeto de Decreto Legislativo (PDC) - to obtain information on the policy process of policy implementation within the portfolios held by cabinet members. This study analyzes data from 1995 to 2014, in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), Luís Inácio da Silva (LULA) and Dilma Rousseff (DILMA) administrations. The evidence presented in this study suggests that the intra-cabinet horizontal control varies positively with the degree of dispersion of policy preferences in the cabinet government. As a result of the policy-seeking motivation of the actors who comprise the government coalition, parties with more resources for the implementation of public policies are also those that receive the greatest amount of control over other members of the cabinet. Thus, the government coalition parties are primarily responsible for monitoring the implementation of federal programs. Unlike what is observed at the time of policy formulation in the cabinet and in parliament, the proportion of coalition seats/votes a member contributed is of small importance to the ability of these actors to aggregate their prefered policies. This explains what the parties receive when they agree to integrate into the cabinet and reveals the mechanism that enables the maintenance of a political pact between actors with different and heterogeneous preferences.

Esta dissertação consiste na análise da evolução da política de segurança do governo colombiano entre 2008 e 2016 para lidar com as FARC, conjuntamente com a análise da evolução das preferências de atores políticos domésticos e internacionais que compuseram uma representação da sociedade colombiana e de suas relações internacionais em momentos-chave desta transição. As preferências destes atores foram agrupadas em tipos ideais: a favor da exclusividade do combate militar ou de negociações que, informalmente reunidas, formam coalizões multiníveis em prol de uma ou outra diretriz. O objetivo foi identificar qual sustentação política possibilitou uma ruptura na política de segurança colombiana antes exclusivamente voltada ao combate e que se direcionou para o início de negociações dado que, diferentemente das duas rupturas anteriores, esta não foi resultado de uma escolha direta da população nas eleições presidenciais. A hipótese sustentada na pesquisa é que mudanças contextuais ocorreram simultaneamente nos âmbitos doméstico e internacional e que ambas foram igualmente necessárias para o sucesso desta transição. Estas mudanças contextuais geraram também uma mudança de narrativa da promoção da imagem da Colômbia como um Estado frágil para a de um país em franco desenvolvimento. A contribuição a que esta pesquisa se propõe é romper a barreira de análise destes dois âmbitos tratados na literatura primordialmente de forma cindida, impondo um empecilho para a compreensão desta política que é simultaneamente doméstica e internacional, impedindo uma maior compreensão dos mecanismos causais da sua evolução. Esta análise simultânea permitiu identificar um descompasso entre o entusiasmo internacional com a negociação e um cenário doméstico polarizado com preferências conflitantes. Os elementos que a pesquisa encontra como determinantes para esta transição são que este conflito, que fora intensamente internacionalizado, ter passado por um processo de \"renacionalização\" e também de estagnação em um confronto de baixa intensidade, redistribuindo os custos e os pesos dos atores politicamente determinantes. Em relação aos atores políticos, a pesquisa identifica que foram necessários para a transição: o presidente colombiano e as FARC, o Congresso colombiano, EUA e Venezuela. O apoio direto da mídia, da opinião pública e da União Europeia não teriam sido necessários, mas são importantes para a consistência política e para o sucesso na implementação da negociação e do processo transicional. / This work is an analysis of how the Colombian security policy to deal with FARC evolved between 2008 and 2016 and an analysis of how evolved the preferences of domestic and international political actors that composed a representation of the Colombian society and its international relations around key moments of this transition. The preferences of those actors were grouped in two ideal types: in favor of the military combat versus those favoring negotiations. Informally united, those actors formed multilevel coalitions in favor of one of those preferences. The goal was to identify which was the political support that enabled a radical change in the Colombian security policy from the military combat to negotiation considering that, differently from the two preceding political changes, this was not the result of a direct popular choice through presidential elections. The hipotesis sustained in this research is that contextual changes happened both in the domestic and international spheres and that both were necessary to enable this policy transition. Those contextual evolutions also generated the change of the main Colombian political narrative, from the promotion of the Colombian image as a fragile State to the one of a country in full development. This work contributes to break the analytical barrier between the domestic and international spheres, treated mostly as separated parts in the academy, which constitutes a barrier to the comprehension of this policy that is simultaneously domestic and international, demanding a double level analysis to understand its causal mechanisms. This simultaneous analysis enabled the identification of a large imbalance among the constant international enthusiasm and many conflicting preferences at the polarized domestic sphere. The factors that the research finds as determinant to this transition were the fact that this conflict that was intensely internationalized passed by a process of \'renationalization\' and by a process of stagnation at a low intensety confrontation redistributing the operational and political costs and also the relative relevance of the intervening political actors. Regarding these political actors, the research identified that the Presidency, FARC, Colombian congress, USA and Venezuela were necessary to the policy transition. The direct support from the Colombian population, the media and the European Union were not necessary, but were important to the political consistency and will be crucial to the success of the transitional process.