This study deals with the legal system of Communist China from 1949 to 1969 with three purposes: to discuss the role of law in Communist China's political development; to discuss the patterns of Communist China's political development as reflected in the patterns of her legal development; and to discuss some aspects of development theories on the basis of the findings of this study.

David Yuk-Cheung Chan. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1980. / Bibliography: l. 245-253.

「國家統一」與「現代化」是清季以來中國人最關心的兩項議題，事實上 ，這兩項問題是互為因果。遠溯民初，國共兩黨因對中國現代化發展路線 的看法分歧，竟發展成意識型態的對立，最終且導致國家分裂迄今。國共 對峙，所付出的代價不僅是骨肉相殘，百姓流離；也阻礙了中國現代化進 一步發展的契機。由於人口、資源的對比懸殊，中共顯然是兩岸分合發展 的主導因素，故本文針對中共的統一立場與對臺策略， 行探討分析。中 共的統一策略歷經了幾個階段的演變，為因應冷戰結 國際現勢，以及追 求穩定環境發展經濟的戰略需要，現階段中共並無意急迫解決其所謂的「 臺灣問題」，而提出和平統一的口號，試圖以「一國兩制」的架構兼併臺 灣。作者首先參考了二次大戰國際現象中「分裂國家」雙方關係演變發展 的過程，以及德國和平統一的歷史經驗；觀察一九七九年以來臺海兩岸關 係的發展。諸如兩岸官方政策的互動、民間社經往來、接觸談判等各項交 流指標。其結論是：在中共採取由經濟到政治統一的迂迴策略效應下，兩 岸關係已逐漸和緩。但是，作者並不認為中共會達到其和平統一的目標， 事實上，作者認為中共一直否認臺灣為一政治實體的立場，已為中國統一 投下一個不可知的變數。

When analyzing the policies of the John F. Kennedy administration towards the People’s Republic of China, previous historians have focused on the lack of substantive change, emphasizing the continuity of action with the prior polices of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. At the same time, a number of historians have noted that it was during the years Kennedy was in office that a majority of the American people began viewing communist China as a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet Union. However, none have sought to explain this sizeable shift in public opinion, or analyze its potential impact on policy. This thesis incorporates archival materials with contemporary print and visual media to make a connection between the sources of public opinion shifts and a change in the assumptions upon which U.S. China policy was based. Almost from the moment the new president assumed office, Robert Komer at the National Security Council and Chester Bowles at the State Department began pushing for changes in China policy based on the assumptions that the communist regime was not a “passing phase,” would only become more powerful and over time constitute an inexorable greater threat to U.S. interests in Asia, and that rapprochement, rather than isolation, was the best means of ameliorating this threat. Together with James Thomson, Roger Hilsman, and eventually Walt Rostow, they pushed for the adoption of what A. Doak Barnett would later term “Containment Without Isolation.” While the Sino-Soviet split accentuated charges of Chinese anti-white racism and the Great Leap Forward reinforced the sense of Mao’s irrationality, the Sino-Indian War confirmed both rising Chinese power and their leadership’s capacity for rational calculation. Meanwhile, in the popular culture, particularly motion pictures, the Yellow Peril enjoyed a revival as Chinese villains stepped to the fore, beginning to free themselves of their Soviet masters. However, while foreign Chinese were feared as never before, Chinese in America gained new acceptance. Laying the groundwork for the next five decades of China policy and enemy images, Kennedy’s Thousand Days constituted a turning point.

The growing importance of China in Africa today makes the examination of the history of Communist China’s foreign policy towards Africa a necessary undertaking. In recent years, there has been an escalation of attention paid to China’s political and economic role in developing nations, with particular attention granted to China’s policies in African countries. However, China did not just begin to pay attention to Africa at the close of the twentieth century, and it is the purpose of this paper to look at the beginnings of these policies. Chronologically, this paper focuses on the birth and early evolution of China’s foreign policy towards Africa, namely from the years 1954 to 1964. These dates represent not only the beginning, but also a significant change in China’s foreign policies towards Africa. While many of the policies adopted and adapted by Communist China during this period were to encompass the whole of the emerging third world, this paper focuses on Africa, and in particular Zambia for more specific examples. China played an important role in the newly independent nations of Africa in the early 1960s, and it continues to play a significant, and often controversial, role there today. / text

雖則蘇聯已經解體，世界進入了後冷戰時代。在冷戰時期相互抗衡的美蘇關係，仍是學界研究的熱點之一。自1990年冷戰終結之後，蘇聯、原本在舊蘇聯中的國家及中國大陸檔案資料的陸續開放，對韓戰研究可說有了新的突破。以美國學者John Lewis Gaddis為首的冷戰國際史學派補充或批判了前面包括傳統學派、修正學派等研究的不足之處。 本文引用檔案和韓戰研究學者的論點與分析，重新梳理在韓戰前後蘇中的國家安全政策考量，並深入析論有關下列幾項當今學者尚未分析或深入研究的種種問題。 本研究嘗試結合國際關係與冷戰國際史(Cold War International History Project)兩學門之跨領域研究，藉以澄清韓戰時期國際體系成員的互動及其造成的影響。另外，也試著使用理性決策模式來分析中蘇兩國領導人的國家安全決策。 研究結果顯示中蘇兩國領導人都是以理性判斷認為自己的決策是正確的，然而事實結果卻並非如此。莫斯科對平壤所提之韓戰計畫錯誤地開放了「綠燈」，北京在多次以外交方式警告華盛頓無效之後，認為美國可能進攻中國東北，並對其新興政權造成威脅，以致最後出兵介入韓戰。戰爭的結果最後還是在38度線附近簽署了停戰協定，但南北韓仍舊尚未統一，無數人員卻因此喪失寶貴的生命。 本文結論提出在美軍進逼鴨綠江和蘇聯的雙重壓力下，中共最後決定出兵介入韓戰，主因是國家安全利益。中共軍事戰略因戰局轉變而改變其戰略：前期是「間接路線」與「殲滅戰」，後期則是「消耗戰」。不論是在軍事戰略或是外交戰略上，莫斯科扮演之角色是在背後指揮協調北京和平壤。蘇聯使中共成為「責任承擔者」(buck-catcher)，本國則扮演「離岸平衡者」(offshore balancer)的角色。中共和北韓事事都要通報莫斯科，由莫斯科做出最後決定─即使北京和平壤兩方都想停戰，莫斯科仍堅持不停戰。戰爭後期蘇聯為削弱美國和中共實力，支持中共續戰。 韓戰停戰協議之簽署是因史達林去世之後。莫斯科認為戰爭再繼續有損蘇聯國家利益，乃通知平壤和北京有關停戰的解決方針的策略。韓戰協議的簽署基本上是在莫斯科新政府的領導與調停之下，北京和平壤最後遵循了莫斯科的指示才停戰。 中蘇兩造在共同利益驅使之下為追求個別利益，在利益衝突之間尋求合作利益。兩國且於韓戰之中各自為該國的國家利益著想，盟友關係只是暫時的而非永久的。 / In this study, an attempt is made to clarify the interactions between the members of the international system during the Korean War in an interdisciplinary approach combining the International Relations and the Cold War International History. Based on the materials from opened archives in the former Soviet Union and Communist China, the considerations, objectives and national security strategies of the leaders are analyzed in the light of the rational decision-making model. The results show that although the leaders made their own judgments based on rational thinking, the outcome of the war is the armistice agreement demarcating the 38th parallel as the borderline between the two Koreas with minor changes; North and South Korea are still yet to be reunified, despite numerous soldiers and civilians losing their precious lives. The conclusion is as follows. China decided to send troops to intervene in the Korean War mainly due to national security interest to cope with the threat of the approaching US forces and the Soviet Union pressure. To cope with the varying war situation, China’s military strategy changed from the “war of annihilation” and the “indirect approach strategy” in the former phase, to the “strategy of exhaustion” in the later phase. Whether in the military or diplomatic field, Moscow played a commanding role and coordinated of Beijing and Pyongyang behind. Soviet Union made China the “buck-catcher”, meanwhile played the role as the “offshore balancer”. Soviet Union pushed for the continuation of the war to weaken the strength of United States, in spite of the reluctance of China and North Korea. It was after Joseph V. Stalin’s death than the Armistice Agreement was finally signed. The signing of the agreement was essentially under the lead of the new leadership in Moscow. Both Soviet Union and China sought their own national interest during the Korean war. The Sino- Soviet alliance was only temporary rather than permanent.

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