The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of domestic political actors in Ukraine’s transition process (2000-2005), under which it went from a competitive authoritarian regime to a democracy in the year 2005. Ukraine was chosen as a single case study since previous theories, such as Levitsky & Ways’ structural theory of linkage, leverage and organizational power and Bunce & Wolchiks’ regional diffusion-theory, have difficulties in explaining Ukraine’s democratization. These theories have focused excessively on either the regime’s or the opposition’s role in the transition but not on how they interact. The result of this study suggests that the actors in the political game, between regime (hardliners and softliners) and opposition (moderates and radicals), had a more prominent role in Ukraine’s democratic transition. It also suggests that the actor-oriented approach may be tested as a plausibility probe in other deviant cases of competitive authoritarian regimes in the theory of linkage, leverage and organizational power, such as Benin and Mali, whose regime trajectories unexpectedly led to democratization.