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Estudo de eventos e análise da rentabilidade ex post como metodologia de análise de fusões: o caso brasileiroRabello, Gabriel Gouvêa 30 August 2013 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2013-08-30 / O objetivo desta dissertação é estimar os potenciais efeitos competitivos sobre o mercado relevante das principais fusões ocorridas no Brasil após o Plano Real, avaliando a eficácia da metodologia de estimação ex ante de efeitos efetivamente observados na rentabilidade das firmas fusionadas e rivais ex post. Segundo a análise de modelo teórico proposto por Motta (2004),é possível utilizar o resultado das firmas rivais no mercado em que ocorreu a fusão como indicador da presença de ganhos em eficiência ou de poder de mercado no mercado relevante das firmas fusionadas, em que retornos positivos para as firmas rivais indicam a presença de poder de mercado e, consequentemente, uma diminuição do excedente do consumidor e do bem-estar na economia. Analogamente, retornos negativos para as firmas rivais indicariam a presença de ganhos em eficiência e aumento do bem-estar. Para estimar os efeitos das fusões sobre as firmas rivais e fusionadas, utiliza-se neste trabalho a metodologia de estudo de eventos em que são calculados os retornos anormais das ações das firmas rivais, bem como das firmas fusionadas, decorrentes do anúncio da fusão. Além disso, para verificar se a metodologia de estudo de eventos é capaz de capturar os efeitos competitivos das fusões de maneira adequada, comparam-se os resultados obtidos via metodologia de estudo de eventos com uma medida de desempenho das firmas ex post.Tal comparação foi feita por meio de uma análise de correlação e regressão. Nesse estudo, foi utilizada uma amostra de 42 grandes fusões horizontais entre firmas de capital aberto com ações cotadas na BM&FBOVESPA e suas respectivas rivais no setor, além de um detalhamento para um setor específico, o de Telecomunicações. Os resultados empíricos obtidos na metodologia de estudo de eventos apontam para uma maior presença de efeitos anticompetitivos nas fusões em geral (ganho de poder de mercado) e de ganhos de eficiência para o setor de Telecomunicações. Além disso, foi encontrada, tanto para as firmas rivais como para as firmas fusionadas,correlação positiva e significativa entre os retornos anormais e o efeito na lucratividade ex post, evidenciando a capacidade do mercado em antecipar os efeitos negativos das fusões sobre o bem-estar. Esses resultados também são corroborados pela análise de regressão, cabendo ressaltar a presença do efeito de reversão à média, evidenciando, assim, a utilidade da metodologia de estudo de eventos em capturar os efeitos potenciais das fusões ex ante. / The objective of this dissertation is to estimate the potential competitive effects on the relevant market of major mergers occurred in Brazil after the Real Plan, evaluating the effectiveness of methods used to estimate ex ante effects actually observed in the profitability of merged firms and rivals ex post. According to the analysis of the theoretical model proposed by Motta(2004), it is possible to use the result of rival firms in the market in which the merger occurred as an indicator of the presence of gains in efficiency or market power in the relevant market of the merged firms, where positive returns for rival firms indicate the presence of market power and, consequently, a decrease in consumer surplus and welfare in the economy. Similarly, negative returns for rival firms indicate the presence of efficiency gains and increased well-being. To estimate the effects of mergers on rivals and firms merged, is used in this work to study methodology in which events are calculated abnormal stock returns of rival firms as well as firms merged, resulting from the merger announcement. This comparison was made by means of a correlation analysis and regression. In this study, a sample of 42large horizontal mergers between firms with publicly traded shares listed on the BM&FBOVESPA and their respective rivals in the sector was used, and a breakdown for a specific sector, the Telecommunications. The empirical results obtained in the methodology of event studies show a higher presence of anticompetitive mergers in general (gain market power) and efficiency gains in the sector of Telecommunications effects. Furthermore, it was found for both the rival firms as for firms merged, positive and significant correlation between abnormal returns and the effect on ex post profitability, demonstrating the market's ability to anticipate the negative effects of mergers on the welfare. These results are also corroborated by regression analysis, fitting to emphasize the presence of the effect of mean reversion, thus demonstrating the usefulness of the event study methodology to capture the potential effects of ex ante mergers.
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Action antidumping et droit de la concurrence dans l’Union européenne / Anti-Dumping action and competition law in the european unionReymond, Damien 08 July 2014 (has links)
Le droit de l’Union européenne appréhende les comportements d’entreprises en matière de prix par des règles antitrust et par une législation contre le dumping. Ces deux réglementations diffèrent à de nombreux égards. Elles poursuivent des objectifs différents : défense des intérêts de certains concurrents européens versus promotion de la libre concurrence au bénéfice des consommateurs. Cependant, toutes deux contribuent à protéger la loyauté de la concurrence (i.e. promotion d’une certaine homogéniété des conditions de concurrence). Elles appréhendent des pratiques tarifaires différentes : les marchés concernés sont définis différemment (produit concerné exporté depuis un pays tiers et produit similaire fabriqué par l’industrie de l’Union versus marché de produit et marché géographique en cause) et les caractéristiques des entreprises concernées sont également différentes (aucune forme d’accord entre entreprises ou de pouvoir de marché minimum requis par la législation antidumping) ; le dumping discriminatoire n’équivaut à aucun prix discriminatoire anticoncurrentiel, et le dumping à perte n’est pas l’équivalent du prix prédateur ni de tout autre prix bas anticoncurrentiel. Nonobstant leurs différences, les deux réglementations doivent coexister paisiblement. Pourtant, les opportunités de biais protectionnistes dans la détermination du dumping préjudiciable sont toujours nombreuses dans la législation antidumping et la pratique de la Commission. En outre, la mise en oeuvre de la législation antidumping peut être néfaste pour la concurrence dans le marché intérieur via l’incidence des procédures et des mesures antidumping et les effets anticoncurrentiels de certains comportements d’entreprises dans le cadre des procédures antidumping ou environnant ces dernières. De telles incidences nocives pour la concurrence sont déjà réduites par des dispositions telles que la règle du droit moindre et la clause d’intérêt public (intérêt de l’Union), mais pourraient et devraient l’être davantage. / European Union law addresses pricing practices of undertakings through antitrust provisions and an anti-dumping legislation. These two sets of regulations differ in many respects. They pursue different aims: protection of the interest of some European competitors versus promotion of free competition for the benefit o f consumers. However, they both hept to ensure fair competition (i.e. promotion of alevel playing field). They address different pricing practices: the markets concerned are differently defined (concerned product exported from one third country andsimilar product produced by the Union industry versus relevant product and geographic markets) and the characteristics of the undertakings concerned are also different (no sort of agreement between undertakings and no minimum market power required in anti-dumping law); price discrimination dumping in not equivalent to any anti-competitive price discrimination and below cost dumping is not equivalent to predatory pricing or to any other low anti-competitive price. Not with standing their differences, both sets of regulations have to coexist peacefully. Yet, opportunities of protectionist biases in the determination of injurious dumping are still numerous in the anti-dumping legislation and Commission’s practice. Moreover, the enforcementof the anti-dumping legislation may negatively affect competition in the internal market through the impact of the anti-dumping proceedings and measures and the anti-competitive effects of some undertakings’ behaviors within the ambit of, or surrounding the anti-dumping proceedings. Such harmful effects on competition of the anti-dumping action are already reduced by provisions such as the lesser duty rule and the public interest clause (Union interest), but could and should be further reduced.
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