<p>The single market is one of the underlying ideas of the European Union. Free movement of goods and efficient competition are central for the function of the union and are therefore carefully protected by the Treaty of Rome. Exclusive rights of trademarks in the EU can be seen as a method of dividing the common market, preventing the free movement of goods and to be anti-competitive. What comes out of this is that there is a conflict between exclusive rights of trademarks and the rules of both free movement of goods and competition. The aim of this work is to see in which kind of situations the exclusive rights of trademarks can be a part of this conflict but also to study how this problem is resolved by the European Court. In conclusion, this thesis shows that an exclusive right of trademark is not by itself incompatible with the rules of free movement of goods and competition law. On the contrary; Europe needs strong industrial property rights to protect its innovations and remain competitive in the global knowledge-based economy of today. What comes out of this is the importance of finding the right balance between the protection of competition and the free movement of goods on one hand and the protection of trademark rights on the other hand. Nevertheless, trade barriers, anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position are subjects to a rigorous application of the European competitive rules. In fact, they are mostly seen as more imperative than the protection of trademarks.</p>

The single market is one of the underlying ideas of the European Union. Free movement of goods and efficient competition are central for the function of the union and are therefore carefully protected by the Treaty of Rome. Exclusive rights of trademarks in the EU can be seen as a method of dividing the common market, preventing the free movement of goods and to be anti-competitive. What comes out of this is that there is a conflict between exclusive rights of trademarks and the rules of both free movement of goods and competition. The aim of this work is to see in which kind of situations the exclusive rights of trademarks can be a part of this conflict but also to study how this problem is resolved by the European Court. In conclusion, this thesis shows that an exclusive right of trademark is not by itself incompatible with the rules of free movement of goods and competition law. On the contrary; Europe needs strong industrial property rights to protect its innovations and remain competitive in the global knowledge-based economy of today. What comes out of this is the importance of finding the right balance between the protection of competition and the free movement of goods on one hand and the protection of trademark rights on the other hand. Nevertheless, trade barriers, anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position are subjects to a rigorous application of the European competitive rules. In fact, they are mostly seen as more imperative than the protection of trademarks.

反托拉斯法所規範的層面，大致可將之歸納為結構面(marketstructure)與行為面(Conduct)。前者主要規範獨占、寡占及主要廠商(Dominant Firms)與廠商結合（合併）所形成的市場結構；後者則規範諸多廠商水平的合作行為與垂直限制交易行為。本文之目的，即在探討美國法上，如何致力於「競爭性結構」的規範制度與執行方法，以做為我國公平交易法執法及修法上的參考。研究發現以下各點：1.規模經濟的考量與廠商合併的運作，可謂美國產業結構形成的重要因素。台灣經濟發展的過程中，政府介入程度頗深，寡占與獨占事業多為法令造成。就我國實證而言，發現結構、行為、績效三者間具有高度相關，而競爭性之結構亦較能帶來整體績效最大。我國公平法目前對獨佔及寡占事業僅規範行為面，對建立公平競爭秩序成效恐屬有限；蓋就市場結構之控制而言，在我國多為中小企業之情勢下，獨佔、寡占之問題較諸結合，更為嚴重，在此特殊產業結構背景下，欲建立一真正具競爭性之環境，應自市場結構面(market structure)著手，可考慮賦予我國公平會或法院類似聯邦法院所具之衡平權，使公平會得將濫用市場力量的寡占、獨占事業解體(dissolution)或分割獨占公司之資產以建立另一與之競爭的實體等權限，以重建競爭結構，以建立競爭秩序。2.經濟理論與工具應妥善運用，以符立法本旨，美國聯邦交易委員會及司法部反托拉斯局均設有經濟分析專責單位，我國公平會亦宜指定專責單位，加強產業發展之研究並負責經濟分析事宜，俾針對業務單位進行個案所需，提供相關經濟分析協助。3.美國在規範結合行為方面，係以訂定指導準則方式為之，此法無論對執法機關或事業而言，皆有遵循之標準，避免雙方在執法及適法上產生不確定性之困擾。我國可參考之。4.近來我國貿易自由化進展迅速，企業經營環境已隨著大幅改變,競爭法的實施（如「市場」之定義等）應考量此一因素，才不會失之偏頗，造成國內產業不利損失。附錄：限制營業競爭行為與國際經濟的關係