Questa ricerca definisce il concetto di riduzione del rischio di conflitto e fornisce una strategia di gestione del rischio di conflitto. Lo scopo è quello di contribuire alla Peace Research e ai Conflict studies costruendo un approccio di prevenzione basato sul rischio. La metodologia utilizzata in questo studio è interdisciplinare. Questo aspetto ha permesso di convalidare il quadro analitico sviluppato attraverso l'analisi di un caso studio che ha incluso un lavoro sul campo con l'impiego di strumenti antropologici. Il caso libanese è stato scelto per la recente storia conflittuale e le odierne condizioni in cui versa il paese, sottoposto a innumerevoli pressioni socioeconomiche. Infatti, la crisi siriana e i massicci flussi di rifugiati hanno avuto un impatto significativo sul Libano, destabilizzando ulteriormente un paese già fragile e scatenando diverse ondate di violenza, la cui manifestazione ha avuto e ha luogo a livello micro e macro in diverse forme. La storia conflittuale e le esperienze di migrazione, le pressioni economiche e sociali e i pregiudizi derivanti dall’errata percezione reciproca tra libanesi e siriani costituiscono la base da una parte per un alto rischio di micro-conflitti, e dall’altra, a livello macro, un possibile input per una destabilizzazione socioeconomica che sfoci in una contrapposizione conflittuale che tenga conto delle dinamiche irrisolte della società libanese. Considerando l'obiettivo pratico di questo lavoro, che si concentra sull’elaborazione di una strategia di gestione dei rischi di conflitto, sarà fornita un'analisi programmatica, tenendo conto delle buone pratiche implementate da Organizzazioni Internazionali e ONG. / This research aims at defining the concept of Conflict Risk Reduction and providing a Conflict Risk Management Strategy. The purpose is to contribute to the Peace research and Conflict Studies field by offering a conflict risk-based prevention approach. The methodology used in this study is of interdisciplinary nature. This, in subsequence allowed me to apply the case study approach to validate the analytical created framework and to perform prolonged fieldwork employing anthropological tools. The Lebanese case represents a rich field for these research purposes due to its recent conflict history that crucially marked the country and its consequences that are still fathomable today in addition to the current pressure circumstances. Indeed, the Syrian crisis and the massive refugee flows have a significant impact on Lebanon leading to several waves of violence. The country’s history of conflict and migration, the economic and social grievances and the misperception among Lebanese and Syrian refugees constitute the base for a high risk of micro conflicts in Lebanon. Considering the practical aim of this work which focuses on Conflict Risk Disaster Management strategy, a programmatic analysis will be provided, taking into account the best practices implemented by International Organisations and NGOs.

In the first paper, the effects of trade openness and conflict risk on income inequality are investigated. I obtain that the effect of trade openness on inequality depends on the level of conflict risk. More precisely, there exists a threshold effect: trade openness worsens income inequality in countries where the risk of internal and external conflicts is high. Moreover, I find that countries with higher risk of conflicts are more unequal, and that more ethnically diverse countries increase income inequality. Finally, I obtain that democratic regimes decrease inequality. In the second paper, we analyze the general-equilibrium consequences of property right enforcement in the natural resource sector. Assuming that exclusion requires both private and public enforcement efforts, we compare states that differ by their ability to provide protection services. This ability is referred to as state capacity. We obtain that public protection services can effectively act as either substitutes or complements to private enforcement, and this strongly depends on state capacity. Under low state capacity, an increase in state protection services leads to a drop in national income as labor is drawn away from the directly productive activities. The opposite holds for high-capacity states. As a result, public protection services have an ambiguous effect on national income even though they can unambiguously increase resource rents. In the third paper, we argue that the right to hold dual citizenship can generate important social and economic benefits beyond its political dimension. We assemble a large panel dataset on dual citizenship. We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition increases remittance inflows by US$1.19 billion, GDP and household consumption, and improves child survival. In developed countries, however, dual citizenship recognition decreases remittance inflows by US$1.44 billion, but increases FDI by US$828 billion, raises household consumption, gross capital formation and trade, and provides incentives for skilled workers to move to other countries.

In the first paper, the effects of trade openness and conflict risk on income inequality are investigated. I obtain that the effect of trade openness on inequality depends on the level of conflict risk. More precisely, there exists a threshold effect: trade openness worsens income inequality in countries where the risk of internal and external conflicts is high. Moreover, I find that countries with higher risk of conflicts are more unequal, and that more ethnically diverse countries increase income inequality. Finally, I obtain that democratic regimes decrease inequality. In the second paper, we analyze the general-equilibrium consequences of property right enforcement in the natural resource sector. Assuming that exclusion requires both private and public enforcement efforts, we compare states that differ by their ability to provide protection services. This ability is referred to as state capacity. We obtain that public protection services can effectively act as either substitutes or complements to private enforcement, and this strongly depends on state capacity. Under low state capacity, an increase in state protection services leads to a drop in national income as labor is drawn away from the directly productive activities. The opposite holds for high-capacity states. As a result, public protection services have an ambiguous effect on national income even though they can unambiguously increase resource rents. In the third paper, we argue that the right to hold dual citizenship can generate important social and economic benefits beyond its political dimension. We assemble a large panel dataset on dual citizenship. We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition increases remittance inflows by US$1.19 billion, GDP and household consumption, and improves child survival. In developed countries, however, dual citizenship recognition decreases remittance inflows by US$1.44 billion, but increases FDI by US$828 billion, raises household consumption, gross capital formation and trade, and provides incentives for skilled workers to move to other countries.

In the first paper, the effects of trade openness and conflict risk on income inequality are investigated. I obtain that the effect of trade openness on inequality depends on the level of conflict risk. More precisely, there exists a threshold effect: trade openness worsens income inequality in countries where the risk of internal and external conflicts is high. Moreover, I find that countries with higher risk of conflicts are more unequal, and that more ethnically diverse countries increase income inequality. Finally, I obtain that democratic regimes decrease inequality. In the second paper, we analyze the general-equilibrium consequences of property right enforcement in the natural resource sector. Assuming that exclusion requires both private and public enforcement efforts, we compare states that differ by their ability to provide protection services. This ability is referred to as state capacity. We obtain that public protection services can effectively act as either substitutes or complements to private enforcement, and this strongly depends on state capacity. Under low state capacity, an increase in state protection services leads to a drop in national income as labor is drawn away from the directly productive activities. The opposite holds for high-capacity states. As a result, public protection services have an ambiguous effect on national income even though they can unambiguously increase resource rents. In the third paper, we argue that the right to hold dual citizenship can generate important social and economic benefits beyond its political dimension. We assemble a large panel dataset on dual citizenship. We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition increases remittance inflows by US$1.19 billion, GDP and household consumption, and improves child survival. In developed countries, however, dual citizenship recognition decreases remittance inflows by US$1.44 billion, but increases FDI by US$828 billion, raises household consumption, gross capital formation and trade, and provides incentives for skilled workers to move to other countries.