Corporate increase their competitive advantage by M&A. It is a recent trend over the world. It is important to make a distinctive plan for M&A. In addition, the process of M&A must follow the rules of business and corporate governance. The study analyzes the re-election of the board of the directors of China Development Financial Holding Corporation. In the perspectives of corporate governance, politics, economics, and social-culture, we study that Chinatrust Financial Holding Company acquired the control of China Development Financial Holding Corporation by the proxy contest. And we discuss some issues of government¡¦s role, ¡§Chinatrust rule¡¨, and other investor¡¦s role.

This dissertation consists of three essays studying the theory of dynamic contest. This analysis mainly focuses on how the outcome and the optimal design in a dynamic contest varies on contest technology, heterogeneous players, contest architecture, and bias instruments. The first chapter outlines the dissertation by briefly discussing the motivations, methods, and main findings in the following chapters. Chapter 2 considers a situation in which two groups compete in a series of battles with complete information. Each group has multiple heterogeneous players. The group who first wins a predetermined number of battles wins a prize which is a public good for the winning group. A discriminatory state-dependent contest success function will be employed in each battle. We found that in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (equilibria), the lower valuation players can only exert effort in earlier battles, while the higher valuation players may exert effort throughout the entire series of battles. The typical discouragement effect in a multi-battle contest is mitigated when players compete as a group. We also provide two types of optimal contest designs that can fully resolve the free-rider problem in group contests. Chapter 3 investigates optimal contest design with multiple heterogeneous players. We allow the contest designer to have one or multiple/mixed objectives, which includes the following parts: the total effort; the winner's effort; the maximal effort; and the winning probability of the strongest player. We provide a one-size-fits-all contest design that is optimal given any objective function. In the optimal contest, the designer will have one of the weaker players exhaust the strongest in the contest with infinite battles. We obtain the required conditions on different contest frameworks (e.g., all-pay auctions and lottery contests) and bias instruments (e.g., head starts and multiplicative bias). This means the contest designer has multiple alternatives to design the optimal contest. The last chapter investigates a situation where two players compete in a series of sequential battles to win a prize. A player can obtain certain points by winning a single battle, and the available points may vary across the battles. The player who first obtains predetermined points wins the prize. We fully characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by describing the indifference continuation value interval. We found that when two players are symmetric, they only compete in the separating battle. In the general case, we found that winning a battle may not create any momentum when the weight of the battle is small. A small enough adjustment of a battle's weight will not change both players' incentive to win the battle. Increasing (or decreasing) a battle's weight weakly increases (or weakly decreases) both players' incentive to win. / Doctor of Philosophy / A contest in economics is defined as a situation in which players exert positive effort to win a prize. The effort can be money, time, energy, or any resource that is used in a competition. The prize can be monetary or other perks from winning a competition. In this dissertation, we explore dynamic multi-battle contests where the winner is not decided by one single competition but by a series of sequential competitions. For example, the US presidential primary begins sometime in January or February and ends about mid-June and candidates will compete in different states during the time. In NBA finals, the winner is decided by a best-of-seven contest. The team that first wins four games becomes the champion. In the second chapter, we explore multi-battle group contest in which each group has multiple heterogeneous players. The group who first wins a certain number of battles wins a prize. The prize is a public good within the winning group so players in the winning group can enjoy the prize regardless their effort. We found that players with high prize valuation will be discouraged in earlier battles due to high expected effort in later battles. This may make high-value players only exert effort in later and more decisive battles. The low-value players will exert effort in earlier battles and will free rider on high-value players in later battles. We also provide the optimal contest design that can fully resolve the free-rider problem. In the optimal contest design, the designer should completely balance two groups in every battle. In the third chapter, we explore the optimal contest design in the multi-battle contests with multiple heterogeneous players. The contest designer can have one or multiple/mixed objectives. We found a "one size fits all" multi-battle contest design that is optimal for various objective functions. In the optimal contest design, the designer should give different advantages to the strongest player and one of the weaker players. More specifically, the weaker player is easier to win each battle, while the strongest player needs to win fewer battles. This overturns the conventional wisdom that the advantage should be only given to the weaker players. In the fourth quarter, we explore the multi-battle contest that in which each battle has a different weight, that is, some battles may more or less important than others. We found that when a battle's weight is small, players may feel indifference between winning or losing the battle. Therefore, winning such battles will not create any momentum, and players tend to give up those battles by exerting no effort. We also found that when we increase or decrease a battle's weight, if the adjustment is small, it will not change players' incentive to win a battle. However, if the adjustment is large enough, it will increase or decrease players' incentive to win in the same direction.

This dissertation looks at several issues in designing an optimal skill-based consumer contest (SBCC). Consumer product (or service) companies, such as online entertainment providers, often use SBCCs to promote the consumption of their products (or services). The main objective of a SBCC is to maximize the profit from the enhanced consumption by consumers rather than their outcome in the contest. This research is the first to investigate design issues in contests of this kind. The first part of the dissertation explores the role of SBCCs in online entertainment area by focusing on the status-seeking behavior of human beings. Drawing from psychology literature, I argue that the desire for status provides a strong motive for consumers to compete with each other in online entertainment communities. In the second part of the dissertation, I build a game-theoretical model to study a handful of design issues arising from the SBCCs. In this framework, a monopoly firm faces n consumers who may differ in skill levels. The firm offers a set of prizes to consumers in a SBCC that requires two inputs: skill and consumption. One of the main findings in this research is that a Winner-Take-All prize structure is often optimal (but not always) for the SBCCs. Another finding is that consumers will compete more aggressively when their skill levels are closer to each other. As a result, the firm may be better off by segmenting consumers based on their skill levels. In addition, in some cases, the firm is better off by charging an entry fee to exclude low-skilled consumers. These findings contribute to existing literature on contest designs and provide practical guidelines for structuring a SBCC. The last part of the dissertation empirically analyzes two individual-level datasets from a wireless game to verify the insights obtained from the theoretical model. / text

To overcome constrained resources, firms can actively seek innovative opportunities from the external world. This innovation approach, called open innovation (Chesbrough 2003; Hippel 2005; Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009; Terwiesch and Xu 2008), is receiving more and more attention. Facilitated by the global Internet and emerging forms of information technology, it has become very easy for companies to generate large numbers of innovative solutions through the use of online open innovation contests or crowdsourcing contests (Archak and Sundararajan 2009; Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009; Terwiesch and Xu 2008; Yang et al. 2009).For an innovation project to succeed, it is necessary to generate not only a large number of good ideas or solutions, but also to identify those that are "exceptional" (Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). This dissertation contains three studies that aim to improve our understanding of how best to use contests as a tool to aggregate external resources (collective intelligence) in the generation and evaluation of solutions. The first study views an innovation contest from the innovation seeker's perspective and provides insights on how to improve contest performance. The second study views an innovation contest from the innovation solver's perspective examining the characteristics and strategies of winners and solvers. Finally, in the third study, a new approach to the solution evaluation process is introduced, which is referred to as open evaluation. In this approach, a prediction market is used as an aggregation mechanism to coordinate the crowd in the evaluation of proposed solutions. These three studies make a number of contributions to the literature, addressing core issues in the area of online innovation contests. The analyses, which leverage large-scale empirical data, produce a number of profound results, which can help people to understand how best to use and design innovation contests in an online environment, for idea generation. Further, these studies present a variety of managerial implications associated with the aggregation of individual effort (collective intelligence) to evaluate the ideas that are generated by an innovation contest. We hope that our studies can help open innovation pioneers, such as Google, to systematically generate and identify exceptionally good ideas at much lower costs. By utilizing our findings, we expect that more firms will be able to adopt an open innovation strategy, both systematically and easily. / Business Administration/Management Information Systems

This research is about planning and governance relating to people in place and the challenges for local government in reconciling differing community interests in contests over land use. Victorian state government policy imperatives require local government to encourage community participation and cohesion and to promote urban consolidation by supporting medium density and affordable housing. Paradoxically, resident backlash to the urban consolidation agenda is increasing community division. The research explores these themes through a case study of the governance processes in a collaborative effort to develop Woodstock community housing in Balaclava, a gentrifying neighbourhood in inner-urban Melbourne, Australia. The development is typical of projects which ignite community opposition and challenge local government’s role in dealing with contested land uses. The analysis of the governance process was undertaken using qualitative research methods which included in depth interviews with project proponents and objectors and the analysis of secondary data including council and local media reports and policy documents. The collaborative planning theory of Patsy Healey provided an assessment framework for the Woodstock governance process focussing on the stakeholders, planning discourses and planning practices. / The research demonstrates the limitations of governance theories in addressing competing interests by providing insights into the nature and dynamics of community conflict and NIMBY reactions around planning issues. The research findings show that the regulatory governance processes adopted for the development of Woodstock were not conducive to reconciling conflicting interests. The fixed rules for engagement mandated by state legislation left no room for genuine dialogue and mutual learning. The processes assumed that objectors would respond in a rational way to issues about which they felt passionate such as irrational threats to their homes and neighbourhood. In conclusion other means of engaging with objectors and their issues are elaborated. It is also shown that deliberative and inclusive governance processes will not necessarily produce outcomes compatible with the principles of social justice.

none

Les attentats du 7 juillet 2005, commis par quatre musulmans britanniques, placent la « radicalisation endogène », processus menant des Britanniques à apporter leur soutien au terrorisme, au centre des préoccupations du gouvernement. Cette recherche s’intéresse au paradoxe que constitue le programme de prévention de l’extrémisme violent (Prevent) formulé après ces attentats : supposé remédier au « manque d’intégration » des communautés musulmanes britanniques dans l’ethos national, il encourage de fait le financement d’initiatives portées par ou pour les musulmans. D’autre part, il prétend œuvrer à la construction de relations de confiance entre musulmans et institutions britanniques, mais place ces relations sous le prisme du contre-terrorisme. Le programme Prevent se place donc sous le signe d’une double ambivalence : renforcement d’une identité exclusive musulmane au lieu de faire primer une identité civique britannique, et « sécuritarisation » des rapports entre musulmans et institutions plutôt que construction d’une relation de confiance. Ce travail postule que ce décalage s’explique par la résurgence d’un cadre différentialiste propre à la Grande-Bretagne, où la société est vue comme composée de groupes ethno-culturels distincts. Ce cadre de pensée, qui a constitué la base des politiques de gestion de la diversité, a été réinvesti par les politiques de contre-terrorisme après 2005 pour « gagner les cœurs et les esprits » des populations dont se réclament les terroristes, et remobilisé par les acteurs de la mise en œuvre de Prevent à l’échelon local. Ce sont les apories de Prevent que sonde ce travail de thèse, en inscrivant cette stratégie dans la filiation des politiques de sécurité et de gestion de la diversité britanniques, et en la confrontant à sa mise en œuvre sur le terrain. / In the wake of the July 7, 2005 London bombings, perpetrated by four British Muslims, the British government devised a policy, Prevent, aimed at preventing “home-grown radicalisation”, that is to say the process by which young Britons come to support and possibly engage in acts of terrorism. This work focusses on two contradictions embedded in Prevent. First, this policy is meant to facilitate the cultural integration of Muslims into the national community, but works in practice as a new mono-ethnic funding stream for which only associations headed by or working with Muslims can apply. Second, it aims at enhancing institutional engagement with Muslims but narrows down such engagement to counter-terrorism purposes. Therefore, Prevent reinforces exclusive forms of identification to a Muslim communal identity instead of favouring inclusion in a wider civic community, and it securitises institutional relations with Muslims rather than fostering trust. It is argued here that such contradictions arise from the legacy of previous approaches of ethnic diversity management in Britain, which are based on the assumption that society is made of distinct groups (communities) defined by their ethnicity. This culturalist pattern, which has been key in the building of anti-discrimination legislation and measures to support cultural diversity, has been reinvested lately by counter-terrorism policies aimed at “winning the hearts and minds” of the populations whose support is sought by the terrorists. It has then been reinforced by the practice of fieldworkers involved in the implementation of Prevent at the local level. This work discusses the implications of the paradoxical nature of the Prevent strategy, tracing it back to the legacy of previous policies and contrasting it with its implementation on the ground.

In a multi-stage contest known as a two-player race, players display two fundamental behaviors: (1) The laggard will make a last stand in order to avoid the cost of losing; and (2) the player who is ahead will defend his lead if it is threatened. Last stand behavior, in particular, contrasts with previous research where the underdog simply gives up. The distinctive results are achieved by introducing losing penalties and discounting into the racing environment. This framework permits the momentum effect, typically ascribed to the winner of early stages, to be more thoroughly examined. I study the likelihood that the underdog will catch up. I find that neck-and-neck races are common when the losing penalty is large relative to the winning prize, while landslide victories occur when the prize is relatively large. Closed-form solutions are given for the case where players have a common winning prize and losing penalty. Chapter 2 then experimentally examines the prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing penalty, as well as the contrasting prediction of surrendering in the corresponding contest with no penalty. We find varied evidence in support of these hypotheses in the aggregated data, but more conclusive evidence when scrutinizing individual player behavior. Players tend to adopt one of several strategies. We develop a taxonomy to classify player types and study how the different strategies interact. The last stand and surrendering behaviors have implications for winning margins and the likelihood of an upset, which we investigate. Behaviorally, players are typically more aggressive when they reach a state in the contest by winning rather than by losing. The third and final chapter is a distinct departure from the study of multi-battle contests. Using comprehensive census data for Cornwall County, England, I create a panel dataset that spans six censuses (1841--1891)—possibly the largest panel dataset for Victorian England at present. I present the methodology for linking individuals and families across these censuses. This methodology incorporates recent advances in census linking (including the use of machine learning) and introduces new methods for tracking migration and changes in household composition. I achieve a forward matching rate of 43%. The additional inclusion of marriage and death records could allow for well over 60% of the population to be accounted for from one census to the next. Using this new panel, I investigate the frequency with which sons pursue the same occupations that they observed their fathers doing while growing up. For sons that did not follow in their father's footsteps, I identify some correlates that may have contributed to the change.

La taille moyenne des équipes de recherche n’a cessé d’augmenter depuis plusieurs décennies pour l’ensemble des disciplines et quel que soit le pays considéré. Par exemple, l’étude d’Adams (2004) sur les articles publiés par au moins une université américaine entre 1981 et 1999 montre que le nombre d’auteurs moyen par publication a été constamment croissant passant de 2,8 à plus de 4,2. Les chercheurs ont tenté d’apporter des explications à cette observation. La complexité de plus en plus importante de la science a été une des premières idées développées : en effet, on a assisté à une augmentation du stock de connaissances et de nouveaux domaines de recherche, notamment multidisciplinaires, sont apparus. Mais cette hausse de la taille moyenne des équipes pourrait avoir d’autres origines : une concurrence plus forte entre les scientifiques les conduirait à se regrouper pour échapper à la compétition. Ce débat s’est peu à peu porté sur les causes, les avantages, les inconvénients et les conséquences de la collaboration scientifique. Les chercheurs ont essayé d’évaluer l’impact de cette dernière sur plusieurs variables comme leur productivité, la qualité de leurs articles ou encore leur nombre de publications, avec des résultats souvent différents d’une étude à l’autre. Dans cette thèse, deux questions majeures seront abordées : comment se forment les équipes de recherche et comment fonctionnent-elles ? Pour y répondre, nous formulerons tout d’abord une modélisation microéconomique sous la forme d’un jeu en deux étapes visant à expliquer les conséquences de la coopération sur la production scientifique et la constitution des groupes de recherche. Nous essaierons ensuite de déterminer de manière empirique les différents facteurs expliquant la formation des équipes en exploitant une base de données de l’OST portant sur l’ensemble des articles de toutes les institutions académiques mondiales depuis plusieurs décennies. Nous analyserons également les publications des universités de Bordeaux pour tenter de comprendre à tous les niveaux la formation et le fonctionnement des équipes notamment à l’échelle de chaque chercheur et de chaque laboratoire. / This thesis aims at understanding the increasing complexity of research projects as one of the possible explanations for the fall in researchers’ productivity observed over decades. We conceptualize a research project as an idea and a team of researchers. Each idea is associated to a given knowledge production function that we suppose of the CES-form. Production factors are sub-team efforts, each one in a distinct field of expertise. We theoretically show that, at equilibrium, team outcome depends negatively on a synthetic index which characterizes its knowledge production function that we call disciplinary complexity of the research project. Though this index and its components are typically not observable in the data, we show that it is tied to the Hill index of factor contributions to the output, a standard interdisciplinary measurement in our application. This offers an opportunity to test empirically the increasing disciplinary complexity over time of research as an explanation of its decreasing productivity. We confirm those predictions on an original dataset of nearly four hundred thousand research projects over the period 1999-2013.

In the literature on contests, punishments have received much less attention than prizes. One possible reason is that punishing the bottom player(s) in a contest where all contestants are not allowed to quit, while effective in increasing contestants' total effort, often violates individual rationality constraints. But what will happen in an open contest where all potential contestants can choose whether or not to participate? In chapter 1, we study a model of this type and allow the contest designer to punish the bottom participant according to their performances. We conclude that punishment is often not desirable (optimal punishment is zero) when the contest designer wants to maximize the expected total effort, while punishment is often desirable (optimal punishment is strictly positive) when the contest designer wants to maximize the expected highest individual effort. In the literature on imperfectly discriminating contests, researchers normally assume that the contest designer has a certain level of accuracy in choosing the winner, which can be represented by the discriminatory power r in the Power Contest Success Function (the Power CSF, proposed by Tullock in 1980). With symmetric contestants, it is well known that increasing accuracy (r) always increases total effort when the pure-strategy equilibrium exists. In chapter 2, we look at the cases where the contestants are heterogeneous in ability. We construct an equilibrium set on r > 0, where a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists for any r below a critical value and a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists for any r above this critical value. We find that if the contestants are sufficiently different in ability, there always exists an optimal accuracy level for the contest designer. Additionally, as we increase the difference in their abilities, the optimal accuracy level decreases. The above conclusions provide an explanation to many phenomena in the real world and may give guidance in some applications. In chapter 3, we propose the Power Contest Defeat Function (the Power CDF)which eliminates one player out at a time over successive rounds. We show that the Power CDF has the same good qualities as the Power Contest Success Function (the Power CSF) and is more realistic in some cases. We look at both the Power CSF mechanism (selecting winners in sequence) and the Power CDF mechanism (selecting losers in sequence) and show that punishments increase expected total e¤orts signi cantly. More interestingly, we also find that when the contestants' effort levels are different, the Power CDF mechanism is more accurate in finding the correct winner (the one who makes the greatest effort) and the Power CSF mechanism is more accurate in finding the correct loser (the one who makes the smallest effort).