<p>Unfortunately I have had bit of difficulty with setting up the page numbers appropriately. I have been unable to figure out how to make the preliminary part of document in Roman numerals while at the same time separating this from the main body of the text using Arabic numbers. My apologies, but I sincerely do not know how to resolve this frustrating problem. I can resolve this problem if I send you the preliminary part and main body as separate documents, but just not as one continuous document. Please contact me if this latter method is the way to go.</p> / <p>This thesis provides an expository account and critical analysis of Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical position on cruelty. Its primary engagement is with Nietzsche’s <em>On The Genealogy of Morals</em>, however, other works by this author are discussed when relevant. The general import of this thesis is threefold. First, it demonstrates Nietzsche’s genealogical account of cruelty, detailing its complex evolutionary progression and its various facets of influence. Second, this work identifies some authors who are critical of Nietzsche position on cruelty. These criticisms are identified and are then largely refuted on various grounds. Third, this thesis argues that an appropriate critical analysis of Nietzsche’s genealogical theorizing will be based on a cross-examination of his positions with current palaeoanthropological findings. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that there is insufficient empirical evidence to substantiate Nietzsche’s accounts and his methodical approach to genealogical theorizing is, furthermore, untenable.</p>

This thesis explores the intersection of phenomenological, bio-political and ethical facets of spectatorship in relation to female suffering and gendered violence in contemporary film produced in Europe (mainly drawing on examples from France) and the United States. I argue that the visceral and affective cinematic embodiment of female pain plays a vital role in determining the political and ethical relationships of spectators to the images onscreen. Drawing on phenomenological theory, feminist ontology and ethics (primarily the work of Hélène Cixous), as well as the ethical philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Luc Nancy, I establish the bio-political and ethical positions and responsibilities of spectators who encounter female suffering in film. In doing so, I highlight the ways in which adopting a phenomenological approach to theorizing and practicing spectatorial perception can open up new areas of ethical engagement with (and fields of vision within) controversial modes of filmmaking such as European New Extremism and body horror. I analyze how suffering female bodies embody contemporary corporeal, socio-political and ethical problematics in what I define as the “cinema of exposure.” I argue that through processes of psychosomatic disturbance, films within the cinema of exposure encourage spectators to employ a haptic, corporeally situated vision when watching women experience pain and trauma onscreen. I explore how encounters with these suffering female bodies impact spectators as political and ethical subjects, contributing a crucial bio-political dimension to existing work on spectatorial engagement with cinematic affect. The goal of this thesis is to highlight the continued importance of feminist critiques of gendered and sexualized violence in film by attending to the emotional, physical, political and ethical resonances of mediated female suffering. This thesis contributes productively to those areas of film and media studies, women's studies and feminist philosophy that explore the construction of female subjectivity within contemporary culture.

In this project I outline the current discourse within feminist epistemology and elucidated its limitations of feminist epistemology particularly its lack of formal attention to the modes of theorization and, in complementarity, the generative potential of an analysis foregrounding materiality. The first chapter explores the theories that constitute the field of study and the relationships between both feminist empiricism and standpoint theory illuminate the conceptual concerns of feminist epistemology. Building from this, I present an analysis that examines the rhetorical and disciplinary structures that determine the kinds of arguments and methodologies that are possible within these frameworks. This argument simultaneously presents an analysis of theoretical formation as well as a critique of the lack of attention given to the rhetorical and formal scaffolds which render additional epistemic limitations perceivable. Lastly, I demonstrate a mode of knowledge production that centers materiality and body which exerts pressure on the very frameworks utilized in the analysis of materiality and embodiment. If materiality has the capacity to articulate relationships between knower and knowledges formed by the knower and formal elements of research has the capacity to render the limits of knowledges created from the research, then feminist epistemology should account for the formal and the material in its attempts to explicate the possibilities and limitations of epistemology.

In this thesis I present a strong and universally compelling case for the importance of Heidegger’s question, namely, the question of the meaning of being. I show how the being-question has been obscured and forgotten over the past two millennia of western philosophy. I attempt to raise this question again, and elucidate why it is an important one to examine, not only for philosophy as a discipline, but for any human endeavor. My aim is to reach those of you who would normally not come across, or might even dismiss, Heidegger’s work. I hope the arguments I make will convince you, hard though it may be, that reawakening ourselves to the question of being is a task that we must undertake.

In the late 1980s, references to postmodernism, post-structuralism, and Michel Foucault started to appear in nursing journals. Since that time, hundreds of journal articles and dozens of books in the discipline of nursing have cited these continental-philosophical ideas—in substantial or minor ways—in nurses’ analyses of topics in nursing practice, education, and research. Key postmodern and post-structural notions including power/knowledge, discourse, the clinical gaze, disciplinary power, de-centering of the human subject as the originator of “meaning,” and the challenge to grand narratives and binary thinking—all found their place on the pages of journals such as the Journal of Advanced Nursing, Nursing Inquiry, and Nursing Philosophy and in a predominantly American journal Advances in Nursing Science among a few other periodicals. In my dissertation, I assemble this voluminous body of publications into a “field of study.” Taking a comparative approach to this field, I argue that we can understand postmodern/post-structural scholarship in nursing as characterized by a marked difference between its non-American (in this case, Australian and New Zealand, British and Irish, and Canadian) and American domains. While each domain is heterogeneous, peculiar features distinguish American postmodern/post-structural nursing literature from its non-American counterparts. I build on a recent systematic critique of so-called American “unique nursing science” and (meta)theory by Mark Risjord (2010), who surfaced the unacknowledged legacy of the logical positivist philosophy of science on contemporary American nursing conceptions of science and theory. These influences, according to Risjord, have had profound and lasting intellectual impact on nursing theoretical work manifesting in the notions of “unique science,” a caution toward “borrowed theory,” a hierarchical model of theory, the language of metaparadigms, incommensurable paradigms, and so on. These ideas and related practices of theorizing have culminated in what I call the American disciplinary nursing matrices that shape the visibility and intelligibility of alternative practices of theorizing in the discipline of nursing. I show the ways in which these matrices are consequential for how postmodern and post-structural philosophical ideas are understood, discussed, and deployed (or not) in American nursing literature; indeed, I argue that these continental ideas, vital for nurses’ ability to critically reflect on the discipline and the profession—are unintelligible as a form of nursing knowledge within the American nursing theoretical matrices. / Graduate / 2017-09-29 / 0569 / 0344

The fact-value distinction has structured and still structures ongoing debates in metaethics, and all of the major positions in the field (expressivism, cognitivist realism, and moral error theory) subscribe to it. In contrast, I claim that the fact-value distinction is a contingent product of our intellectual history and a prime object for questioning. The most forceful reason for rejecting the distinction is that it presupposes a problematic understanding of the subject-object divide whereby one tends to view humans as the sole source of normativity in the world. My dissertation aims to disclose the background against which human ethical praxis is widely seen as a unique and special phenomenon among other phenomena. I show that ethical norms, as delimited by utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc., derive from an originary proto-ethical normativity at the heart of the real itself. Every object, human and nonhuman, presents itself as a bottomless series of cues or conditions of appropriateness that determine adequate and inadequate ways of relating to it. That is, objects demand something from other objects if they are to be related to; they condition other objects by soliciting a change in disposition, perception, or sense, and for this reason are sources of normativity in and unto themselves. Ethical norms, or values, are the human expression of the adequacy conditions with which all objects show themselves. In the post-Kantian landscape it is widely thought that human finitude constitutes the origin of ethical norms. Consequently, the world is divided up into morally relevant agents (humans) on one side, and everything else on the other. Adopting a deflationary view of agency, I argue that human-human and human-world relations differ from other relations in degree rather than kind. Thus, instead of a fact-value distinction, value is inextricably bound up with the factual itself. The critical upshot of my project is that traditional subject-oriented ethical theories have served to conceal the real demands of non-human objects (such as animals, plants, microorganisms, and artificially intelligent machines) in favor of specifically human interests. Such theories have also been leveraged frequently in exclusionary practices with respect to different groups within the human community (e.g. women and those of non-European descent) based on arbitrary criteria or principles.

This dissertation examines humor as a situated practice of reappropriation and transformation undertaken by a subject within a social world. I bring together insights from humor studies, philosophy of humor, and feminist philosophy (especially feminist continental philosophy) to introduce the concept of humorwork as an unstable political practice of reappropriating and transforming existing images, speech, and situations. I argue that humorwork is an unstable politics because the practice of reappropriation and transformation often exceeds the intentions of the subject practicing humor, taking on a continued life beyond the humorist’s intentions. By focusing on the practice of humor, the subject who produces it, their social and political world, the affects circulated through political humor, and the politics of popular and scholarly discourse about humor, I push against a reductive, depoliticized concept of humor and the trivializing gesture of “it’s just a joke.” Instead, I argue that humorists are responsible and connected to (if not always blameable) for the social and political life of their humorwork, despite the unstable and unpredictable uptake of humor against a humorist’s intentions.

Emmanuel Levinas views the phenomenological tradition as being predicated on an asymmetrical relationship between the self and the other in which the self possesses the power to dominate and represent the other. This leads to the reduction of the other to the same. Instead, he wants to flip this relationship in favor of the other by showing how the very qualities of alterity and infinity enable the other to resist the self’s attempts at representation. Furthermore, he conceives of an ethics in which the self is compelled to listen to the other’s command and respond accordingly. The inherent issue in such an ethics as Levinas’s is that the self is held responsible for responding to a command which it cannot represent in some meaningful way. Thus, either Levinas contradicts himself or there must be some way to respond to the other’s command prior to representation. Levinas himself says that the transcendent relationship itself involves the convergence of the self and the other through language. Language occurs prior to representation and involves the putting in common of both the self and the other’s worlds. It is an ethical donation to the Other. As well, Levinas’s idea of paternity suggests the dialogical nature of the self in the ethical relationship. Using theories of self-consciousness by Hegel, Sartre, and Meade, I show how the dialogical nature of the social self enables it to enter into a transcendent relationship without committing an act of violence.

“Spaces of Visibility and Identity” is an exploration on how being immersed in constant visibility has an effect on an individual’s identity. Visibility is not a narrow term meant to signify solely observation; rather, visibility is the state of existing within a world that does not allow for total isolation. To exist within the world is to be visible to others, and this visibility is inescapable. Visibility can be seen as a presentation or a disclosure of oneself to other beings. Existing within the world inevitably implies that one is presenting oneself to others, whether or not the presentation is deliberate. I will be going over two different spaces of visibility throughout this paper: “space of surveillance” and “space of appearance.” The “space of surveillance,” discussed by Michel Foucault, is the space where normative standards of identity are created through discursive acts. This space is meant to control, coerce, and normalize. The “space of surveillance” is important for an exploration of identity formation, because it cannot be ignored that each individual is disclosing themselves in the context of a pre-existing world. This ‘pre-existing world’ is full of normative standards that affect identity formation, but it does not have to ultimately determine an identity. The “space of appearance,” as articulated by Hannah Arendt, is meant to be a supplement to the dogmatic normative standards created within a “space of surveillance.” The “space of appearance” gives those that do not, or do not want to, adhere to the normative standards created by the “space of surveillance” a space to disclose an identity that can challenge and rearticulate what is consider normal or culturally intelligible in the first place. The “space of appearance” is not meant to replace the “space of surveillance;” rather, it has the “space of surveillance” as a contextual background that can be challenged. I have found that both spaces of visibility are necessary for an exploration on identity formation, and I have used gender identity as a concrete example to exemplify both spaces.

In my thesis, I examine the relationship between modern technology and human autonomy from the philosophical perspective of Martin Heidegger. He argues that the essence of modern technology is the Gestell. Often translated as ‘enframing,’ the Gestell is a mode of revealing, or understanding, being, in which all beings are revealed as, or understood as, raw materials. By revealing all beings as raw materials, we eventually understand ourselves as raw materials. I argue that this undermines human autonomy, but, unlike Andrew Feenberg, I do not believe this process is irreversible from Heidegger’s perspective. I articulate the meaning of the Gestell as an historical claim and how it challenges human autonomy, but may never absolutely eradicate it. Contra Feenberg’s interpretation, I argue that Heidegger’s ontology, including the Gestell, provides a crucial ground for understanding how we might salvage autonomy in a culture increasingly dominated by modern technology. Specifically, by drawing on Heidegger’s conception of Gelassenheit, I suggest that salvaging human autonomy requires a calm acceptance and opening up to the challenge of modern technology. This is not, as Feenberg suggests, a passive acceptance of the eradication of human autonomy. Rather, this is the ontological ground that provides us with the possibility of salvaging autonomy. By opening us up to the essence of modern technology, we understand the contingency of the Gestell, its essentially ambiguous nature, and are granted with the freedom to subordinate its reign to other human values and modes of understanding being.