Abstract in Zulu, English and Afrikaans / This study examined the consequences of Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance interactions within South Africa’s FTSE/JSE Top40 listed companies from 2008 to 2016. The study’s objectives were to examine the prevalence of Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems, to ascertain potential costs of these problems, to establish their socio-economic consequences, and evaluate the effectiveness of the governance codes. The study is anchored in Principal-Agent theory. Mixed methods methodology was employed, specifically Concurrent and Exploratory Sequential Mixed Methods design logics. The main findings include that, 23.91% of sample companies experienced Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems- significantly exceeding the study’s expectations that negligible governance problems exist and reveals the pervasiveness of these problems; executive compensation plays a bigger role in exacerbating Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems than expected and often considered in governance mechanisms; multi-billion rands potential costs are ascribed to Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance problems incurred by principals; unjustifiable salary inequalities resulting in other inequalities that build social mistrust; and there is limited conviction that current governance codes are effective. This study’s contributions include; proposing an executive remuneration model that considers governance of the company in determining executive compensation; formulating a governance index calculated based on King III and King IV recommendations to standardise the measurement of the quality of governance in companies; the salary Gini was used to establish compensation gaps and red-flag potential Principal-Agent problems and flaws in governance systems; and used value at risk procedures to quantify potential Principal-Agent and Corporate Governance costs. The main theoretical implications of the study’s findings are; agency theory needs extension to capture socio-economic costs and not only focus on the principal; remuneration models should consider the executive’s company governance and social and economic egalitarianism; flexibility of ‘comply or explain’ should subordinate socio-economic consequences, suggesting a hybrid approach which makes certain governance code provisions compulsory; and finally, behavioural finance theories should be used in governance research for better insights. / Lolu cwaningo lwacubungula futhi lwahlolisisa imiphumela yokuxhumana phakathi kwesimo seNhloko ne-Ejenti, i-Principal-Agent, (lapho umuntu eqoka omunye ukuba athathe izinqumo kanye/noma izinyathelo egameni lakhe) nokuPhathwa nokuLawulwa Kwenkampani, ezinkampanini ezingama-40 ebezikleliswe phezulu ohlwini lwe-FTSE/JSE eNingizimu Afrika kusukela ngowezi-2008 kuya kowezi-2016. Izinhloso zalolu cwaningo kwabe kuwukubheka ukuthi zivamise kangakanani futhi zisabalele kangakanani izinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani ukuze kutholakale ukuthi zingakanani izindleko ezibangelwa yilezi zinkinga, nokuthola umthelela walokhu kwinhlalomnotho, kanye nokuhlola ukuthi zisebenza kahle kangakanani izinkambiso zokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwezinkampani. Lolu cwaningo lwakhelwe phezu kwethiyori yeNhloko ne-Ejenti. Kwasetshenziswa izindlela zocwaningo ezixubile, ikakhulukazi izindlela ezixubile zokuhlola kusetshenziswa izinyathelo ezenziwa kanyekanye noma ngesikhathi esisodwa kanye nezinyathelo ezilandelanayo. Okusemqoka okwatholakala ocwaningweni kubandakanya nokuthi izinkampani okwenziwa kuzona ucwaningo ezingama-23.91% zahlangabezana nezinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani – okuyinani elingaphezulu kakhulu kwalokho obekulindelekile ocwaningweni, ngoba phela kwakulindeleke ukuthi zibe yingcosana kakhulu izinkinga ezikhona eziphathelene nalokhu, kepha-ke ucwaningo lwaveza ukuthi lezi zinkinga zixhaphakile impela; imiholo yabaphathi abakhulu bezinkampani idlala indima enkulu ekubhebhethekiseni izinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani kunalokho obekulindelekile futhi esikhathini esiningi lokhu akuyona neze into evamise ukubhekisiswa uma kwenziwa izinqubo zokuphatha nokulawula; zibalelwa kwizigidigidi zamarandi izindleko ezingena kuzona izinhloko zezinkampani okucatshangwa ukuthi zibangelwa yizinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani; ukungalingani ngokwemiholo, ngaphandle kwesizathu esizwakalayo salokhu, okuyinto eholela kokunye futhi ukungalingani, okudala ukungathembani emphakathini; futhi kuncane kakhulu ukuqiniseka nokukholelwa ekutheni zisebenza kahle izinkambiso zokuphatha nokulawula ezikhona njengamanje. Igalelo lalolu cwaningo libandakanya isiphakamiso semodeli yemiholo yabaphathi abakhulu ebhekisisa nodaba lokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwenkampani ngenkathi kucutshungulwa udaba lwemiholo yabaphathi abakhulu; ukuhlanganiswa kwenkomba yokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwenkampani ebalwa ngokususela kwizincomo ze-King III kanye ne-King IV zokusetshenziswa kwesikali esifanayo sokukala ikhwalithi yokuphathwa nokulawulwa kwezinkampani; isikali semiholo se-Gini sasetshenziswa ukuhlonza amagebe akhona phakathi kwemiholo kanye nokuxwayisa ngezinkinga ezingahle zivele eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani kanye namaphutha nobuthakathaka obukhona ezinhlelweni zokuphatha nokulawula; futhi kwasetshenziswa izinqubo zezikali zobungozi bokulahlekelwa kwenkampani ukubala inani lezindleko okungenzeka kungenwe kuzona ngenxa yezinkinga eziphathelene neNhloko ne-Ejenti kanye nokuPhathwa Nokulawulwa Kwenkampani. Imibonongqangi evele kulokho okutholakale ocwaningweni yilena elandelayo; ithiyori echaza ubudlelwano phakathi kwenhloko ne-ejenti kumele yelulwe ukuze ifake phakathi nezindleko eziphathelene nenhlalomnotho futhi lokhu kungagcini nje kuphela kwinhloko; amamodeli omholo kumele abhekisise nendlela ephethwe ngayo inkampani ngabaphathi abakhulu kanye nemfundiso yokulingana kwabantu bonke ngokwenhlalo nangokomnotho; ukuguquguquka ‘kokuthobela umthetho noma ukuchaza’ (‘comply or explain’) kumele kube ngaphansi uma kuqhathaniswa nemiphumela yenhlalomnotho, ukuze kuqhanyukwe nendlela exubile ephoqelela ukusetshenziswa kwezinkambiso zokuphatha nokulawula ezithile; kanti futhi, okokugcina, ocwaningweni lokuphatha nokulawula kumele kusetshenziswe amathiyori aphathelene nesimo somqondo sabaphathi ngenkathi bethatha izinqumo nezinyathelo eziphathelene nokuphathwa nokusetshenziswa kwezimali ukuze kuqondakale kangcono konke okuphathelene nalokhu. / Hierdie studie het van 2008 tot 2016 die gevolge van die wisselwerking tussen hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering in Suid-Afrikaanse FTSE/JSE Top 40- genoteerde maatskappye bestudeer. Die oogmerke was om die voorkoms van probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering te ondersoek; die moontlike koste en die sosio-ekonomiese gevolge daarvan te bepaal; en die doeltreffendheid van die regeerkodes te evalueer. Hierdie studie berus op die hoofagentteorie. Gemengde metodes is as metodologie gebruik, in die besonder gelyklopende en verkennende, opeenvolgende metodes. Die belangrikste bevindings is dat 23,91% van steekproefmaatskappye probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering ondervind. Dit is beduidend hoër as die persentasie wat verwag is, en ʼn aanduiding van hoe diepgaande hierdie probleme is. Die vergoeding van uitvoerende beamptes is ʼn groter oorsaak van die probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering as wat verwag is en waarvoor in regeermeganismes voorsiening gemaak word. Die potensiële koste, wat miljarde rande beloop, word gewyt aan die probleme met hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering wat prinsipale hulle op die hals haal. Onregverdigbare salarisverskille lei tot ongelykheid wat sosiale wantroue wek. Hierbenewens is daar bedenkinge oor die doeltreffendheid van die huidige regeerkodes. Die bydrae van hierdie studie behels ʼn vergoedingsmodel vir uitvoerende beamptes wat korporatiewe regering in ag neem. Hierdie studie formuleer ʼn regeerindeks wat op King III- en King IV-aanbevelings berus, en die meting van die gehalte van korporatiewe regering standaardiseer. Verskille in vergoeding, potensiële rooivlag-hoofagentprobleme en gebreke in regeerstelsels is met behulp van die salaris-gini bepaal. Waarde-op-risikoprosedures is gebruik om die potensiële koste van hoofagent- en korporatiewe regering te kwantifiseer. Die belangrikste teoretiese implikasie van die bevindings is dat die agentskapsteorie uitgebrei moet word sodat die sosio-ekonomiese koste vasgestel word, en daar nie alleen op die hoofsom gekonsentreer word nie. Afgesien hiervan moet vergoedingsmodelle rekening hou met ʼn uitvoerende beampte se korporatiewe regering en met maatskaplike en ekonomiese egalitarisme. Voorts moet die sosio-ekonomiese gevolge ondergeskik wees aan die buigsaamheid van “voldoen of verduidelik”. Dit impliseer ʼn hibridiese benadering wat die bepalings van sekere regeerkodes verpligtend maak. Ten slotte behoort finansieringsgedragteorieë in regeernavorsing aangewend te word om groter insig te verkry. / Business Management / D. Phil. (Management Studies (Finance))