<p>De konflikter som finns idag skiljer sig markant från dem som står att läsa om i historieböckerna. Det är numera ovanligt med stater som krigar mot varandra. Istället är det de små organisationerna med ambition om att förändra världen som idag utgör det största hotet mot vårt samhälle. Fienden är annorlunda men i många fall används fortfarande samma militära medel och strategi idag som i de mellanstatliga krigen. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka till vilken grad strategiskt bombflyg kan användas i COIN-operationer eller om det är ett militärt medel som endast är applicerbart på mellanstatliga konflikter. Detta avser jag uppnå genom att först undersöka vad som är unikt för en insurgency, sedan vilka förmågor som det strategiska bombflyget har och till sist koppla detta till en känd teoretisk modell om det strategiska bombflyget i konventionell krigföring. Resultatet visar att det är mycket svårt att använda strategiskt bombflyg i COIN-operationer på etteffektivt sätt. Terrorist- och rebellorganisationer skiljer sig markant från hur stater är uppbygda och fungerar. De strategiska målen är färre och dessutom mycket svåra att definera och komma åt. Dessa små organisationer är rörliga och smälter in i den omgivning de opererar i. För att strategiskt bombflyg skall vara effektivt måste det finnas ett brett och uppdaterat informationsunderlag och antalet civila offer måste hållas till ett minimum.</p> / <p>The conflicts of today differ markedly from those which are depicted in history books. It is now rare that states wage war with each other. Instead, it is the small organizations with ambitions to change the world which today constitute the biggest threat to our society. The enemy is different but in many cases the military forces and strategy used in inter-state wars remain the same. The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extent strategic bombers can be used in COIN operations, or if they are a military instrument only applicable on intergovernmental conflicts. This I intend to achieve by first examining what is unique about an insurgency, then what abilities the strategic bomber aircraft possess and eventually connect it to a known theoretical model of the use of strategic bomber aircraft in conventional warfare. The result shows that it is very difficult to use strategic bombers in COIN operations in an effective way. A terrorist or insurgent organization is markedly different from the way states are built-up and functioning. The strategic targets are fewer, and very difficult to define and access. These small organizations are mobile and blend in with the environment they operate in. For Strategic bombers to be effective there must be a broad and updated information base and the number of civiliancasualties must be kept to a minimum.</p>

De konflikter som finns idag skiljer sig markant från dem som står att läsa om i historieböckerna. Det är numera ovanligt med stater som krigar mot varandra. Istället är det de små organisationerna med ambition om att förändra världen som idag utgör det största hotet mot vårt samhälle. Fienden är annorlunda men i många fall används fortfarande samma militära medel och strategi idag som i de mellanstatliga krigen. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka till vilken grad strategiskt bombflyg kan användas i COIN-operationer eller om det är ett militärt medel som endast är applicerbart på mellanstatliga konflikter. Detta avser jag uppnå genom att först undersöka vad som är unikt för en insurgency, sedan vilka förmågor som det strategiska bombflyget har och till sist koppla detta till en känd teoretisk modell om det strategiska bombflyget i konventionell krigföring. Resultatet visar att det är mycket svårt att använda strategiskt bombflyg i COIN-operationer på etteffektivt sätt. Terrorist- och rebellorganisationer skiljer sig markant från hur stater är uppbygda och fungerar. De strategiska målen är färre och dessutom mycket svåra att definera och komma åt. Dessa små organisationer är rörliga och smälter in i den omgivning de opererar i. För att strategiskt bombflyg skall vara effektivt måste det finnas ett brett och uppdaterat informationsunderlag och antalet civila offer måste hållas till ett minimum. / The conflicts of today differ markedly from those which are depicted in history books. It is now rare that states wage war with each other. Instead, it is the small organizations with ambitions to change the world which today constitute the biggest threat to our society. The enemy is different but in many cases the military forces and strategy used in inter-state wars remain the same. The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extent strategic bombers can be used in COIN operations, or if they are a military instrument only applicable on intergovernmental conflicts. This I intend to achieve by first examining what is unique about an insurgency, then what abilities the strategic bomber aircraft possess and eventually connect it to a known theoretical model of the use of strategic bomber aircraft in conventional warfare. The result shows that it is very difficult to use strategic bombers in COIN operations in an effective way. A terrorist or insurgent organization is markedly different from the way states are built-up and functioning. The strategic targets are fewer, and very difficult to define and access. These small organizations are mobile and blend in with the environment they operate in. For Strategic bombers to be effective there must be a broad and updated information base and the number of civiliancasualties must be kept to a minimum.

Bakgrund Sedan början av nittonhundratalet har Storbritannien varit delaktig i flertalet COIN-operationer.Deras erfarenheter har bidragit till att de numera räknas som en framstående nation inom justCOIN. Undersökningen handlar om Irland 1916-1922 och Storbritanniens agerade i förhållande tillden nuvarande brittiska COIN-doktrinen. Syfte Undersökningen skall klargöra, utifrån den nuvarande brittiska doktrinen, vilka skillnader ochmisstag Storbritannien begick under början av nittonhundratalet på Irland i förhållande till dennuvarande COIN-doktrinen. Metod Undersökningen är teorikonsumerande och delar upp teorin i variablerna mål, medel och metod.Dessa jämförs mot analysenheter som utgörs av tre tidsepoker från det anglo-iriska kriget. Slutsatser Undersökningen påvisar att Storbritanniens agerande på Irland i början av nittonhundratalet skildesig markant mot vad den nuvarande doktrinen förespråkar. Framförallt i mängden våld somnyttjades. / Background Since the early twentieth century Britain has been active in many COIN operations. Theirexperiences have contributed to UK counts as a qualified COIN nation. The investigation is about1916-1922 Ireland, and how Britain acted in relation to the current UK COIN doctrine. Purpose The essay should clarify, based on current British doctrine, which differences and mistakes GreatBritain committed during the early twentieth century in Ireland in contrast to the present COINdoctrine. Method The study is theory-consuming and divides the theory in variables: goals, means and method.These are compared against analytical unit consisting of three eras from the Anglo-Irish War. Conclusions The survey reveals that Britain's actions in Ireland in the early twentieth century was verydifferent from what the current doctrine advocates. In particular, the amount of violence whichwere used.

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Text in Afrikaans / Tydens teeninsurgensie is daar 'n duidelik waarneembare intensivering van die burokratiese wedywering tussen die polisie en die militere, wat in wese om kwessies soos prestige, uitbreiding en modernisering sentreer. In die onderhawige studie is die problematiek rondom die rolverdeling van die polisie en die militere in teeninsurgensie aan die hand van die rewolusionere oorlog in Namibig, as 'n gevallestudie en met besondere verwysing na die rol van die polisie, ondersoek. In die studie word 'n aantal algemene bevindinge, sowel as 'n aantal primere en sekondere bevindinge gemaak. Die kern van die bevindinge bestaan uit 'n drieledige gevolgtrekking: eerstens dat die rolle van die polisie en die militere in teeninsurgensie komplementer is; tweedens dat daar 'n tydige en duidelike rolverdeling moet wees; en derdens dat, alhoewel die polisie 'n beperkte militere rol het, die swaartepunt van die polisie-teeninsurgensierol buite die militere dimensie geleg is. / During counterinsurgency there is a clearly perceptible intensification of the bureaucratic competition between the police and the military which, in essence, revolves around questions such as prestige, expansion and modernisation. In this study the problems surrounding the role division of the police and the military in counterinsurgency, as manifested in the revolutionary war in Namibia and with specific reference to the role of the police, were investigated as a case study. The study concludes with a number of general findings, as well as a number of primary and secondary findings. The nucleus of the findings consist of a threefold conclusion: Firstly, that the police and military roles in counterinsurgency are complementary; secondly, that there must be a timeous and clear role division; and thirdly, that although the police have a limited military role, the centre of gravity of the police counterinsurgency role lies outside the military dimension. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Strategiese Studies)

Peruvian civilian and military authorities were trapped on a dead-end road in the counterinsurgency struggle against the terrorist movement Shining Path until the capture of the organization's top leader on September 12, 1992. The episode led to the eventual demise of the terrorist organization. This thesis argues that the successful operation was a consequence of the particular organization and working processes of the intelligence unit assigned to this sensitive case, and describes the extent to which the capture contributed to the defeat of the insurgency. Given the characteristics of the Shining Path terrorist organization, it was necessary to design a Special Intelligence Group with specific characteristics that made the group strong enough to overcome the obstacles of the reality it faced in Peru. Several other units with the same mission were unsuccessful in the twelve years of open struggle against the Shining Path. During its 22 years of activity, the Shining Path had built a solidly impenetrable organization, which allowed the police and military to hit the organizations' military apparatus, but not the political one. In Maoist organizations like the Shining Path, the political apparatus controls the organization. A study of the tactics, techniques and procedures developed by the Special Intelligence Group and the exchange between the intelligence and the operations components, as well as the decision making process within the group itself, demonstrates the organizational necessity of secrecy, isolation, motivation and delegation of authority for this type of mission.

There has been a resurgence of indigenous Maoist insurgencies in the South/South East Asia region in the recent past. Left unchecked, these developments can have significant implications for the Global War on Terror. Third World countries have inherited many attributes from their colonial past which make them susceptible to insurgency. These factors, which are typical of the Third World, limit even the capacity of democratic states to mitigate divisive tendencies. This paper analyzes the susceptibility of Third World countries to insurgency and develops a theoretical perspective to illuminate some of the factors contributing to insurgency in these countries. A simple linear model for India is developed, based on the hypothesis that the degree of inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social identity of its population, and the amount of external unifying influence on the area determine the propensity of that area for insurgency. The model is empirically verified for the entire country by comparing data from India's 528 parliamentary constituencies. The implications of the Indian model for some competing ideas about appropriate counterinsurgency strategy for the Third World countries are discussed.

The Kingdom of Thailand currently faces internal and transnational Islamic insurgent threats that have the potential to disrupt Southeast Asian regional stability. As a Major Non-NATO Ally and the signatory of several bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with the US, Thailand has solidified itself as a security alliance partner whose stability and influence in Southeast Asia has become increasingly more important to the US and its War on Terror. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a history and analysis of the Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorist operations that exist in Thailand today. Secondly, this thesis will highlight current Thai, US, and regional security initiatives and underscore policy deficiencies. Finally, this thesis will recommend a solution strategy necessary for the purge of radical Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand. By accepting current policy deficiencies and implementing the courses of action recommended in this thesis, the US and Thailand will both contribute to a greater Southeast Asian security.

Since 2001, the Kingdom of Thailand has seen a resurgence of ethno-religious (Malay-Muslim) violence that has killed approximately 800 people, causing obvious disruption within the nation and instability in the region. As one of the US' staunchest allies in Southeast Asia and with the potential for this violence to intensify further, it behooves the US government to offer solutions to help mitigate or reduce the violence in southern Thailand. This thesis examines the history of southern Thailand, analyzing the political factors behind the Malay-Muslim rebellions of the past, tracing the roots of their rebellion back to the era of Patani Raya and the "Siamization" of the south. It explores the various trends and actors and other antecedent conditions (external influences) during the recent violence. Information on the various separatist groups operating in southern Thailand is provided along with an analysis of the porous Thai-Malay border and the role of PAS in southern Thailand. Lastly, this thesis examines an NPS field experimentation program entitled "Coalition Operation Area Surveillance and Targeting System" (COASTS). COASTS provides tactical, actionable information to remote and local decision-makers by integrating commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), lighter than air vehicles (LTA), and unattended air and ground sensors, and wireless meshed networks technologies. If deployed to problematic areas, systems like COASTS can assist the Royal Thai government in reducing the violence in the south.

As modern warfare moves towards the lower end of the intensity spectrum, conventional forces are placed in unconventional roles outside their traditional high intensity military specialty. By showing that there are analogies between organized crime and insurgencies, further studies can be conducted on the applicability of modern law enforcement tactics to military operations. This thesis shows that there are organizational and conceptual analogies between organized crime families and insurgencies. They both organize themselves as secret societies with similar hierarchical command structures for both survival and operational needs. Both organized crime families and insurgencies must remain hidden from authorities, whether from law enforcement agencies such as the FBI or the military. The similarity between organized crime and insurgent organizations provides a broad basis for further study in other areas. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been combating organized crime families for decades and have used proven techniques of infiltration, informants, wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping to expose organized crimeâ s largely invisible network. Based on the similarities between organized crime families and insurgent organizations, law enforcement tactics and their applicability to modern counterinsurgency doctrine are an area for further study.