När en bank gör en kreditbedömning av ett företag så krävs det en stor del av riskmedvetenhet från bankens sida när det gäller att använda och undersöka företagens årsredovisningar, men även andra faktorer. Anledningen till att banker idag fokuserar på ett brett spektrum av faktorer har med 1990-talets generösa utlåningsstruktur att göra, och att banken efter negativa känningar av krisen ökat riskmedvetenheten. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om det är ett företags årsredovisning eller alternativt andra faktorer som kreditchefer på ett flertal fristående Sparbanker undersöker vid en kreditbedömning, samt vilken av dessa två delar som väger tyngst vid bedömningen. Uppsatsen har utförts på fristående Sparbanker från i huvudsak två landskap, det vill säga Bohuslän och Dalsland, samt en tredjedel av Västergötland. Vi har med en kvalitativ metod i form av intervjuer sammanlagt intervjuat sju kreditchefer från olika fristående Sparbanker. Den frågeställning som vi ville ha svar på från våra intervjupersoner var: Vilken betydelse har årsredovisningar i jämförelse med andra faktorer vid en kreditbedömning av ett företag? Med utgångspunkt från denna forskningsfråga formade vi våra intervjufrågor. Det huvudsakliga resultatet och den slutsats som vi kunde dra efter att vi undersökt området både teoretiskt och empiriskt var, att banker använder sig ungefär till lika stora delar av årsredovisningar kontra övriga faktorer. Övriga faktorer är exempelvis företagets styrelse, dess ledning, revisorsutlåtande och säkerheter. Båda dessa delar behövs enligt banken för att möjliggöra en så rättvis, säker och riskfri kreditbedömning som möjligt av ett företag. Detta betyder i sin tur att det system som banker förr i tiden använde, dvs. att till allra störst del undersöka de hårda värdena vilka är siffrorna i ett företags årsredovisning, inte är tillämpbar i vår nutid. En riskbedömning ska istället ske med fokus på även övriga faktorer, detta är ett måste. Den avgränsning som vi gjort är att inte undersöka lagstiftningen bakom en kreditbedömning, utan den benämns i princip endast. Vi har inte heller lagt fokus på att undersöka exakt vilka siffror kreditchefer på banker ser på vid en kreditbedömning i ett företags årsredovisningar, utan endast på om de undersöker vissa faktorer i årsredovisningarna. / When a bank makes a credit assessment of a company, it takes a great deal of awareness of risks from the bank when it comes to use and examine the company's financial statements, but also other factors. The reason that banks today are focusing on a wide range of factors, has to do with 1990's generous lending structure, and that after the negative stresses of the crisis banks increased the risk awareness. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether it is a company's financial statements or, alternatively, other factors that credit managers at several savings banks examines at a credit assessment and which of these two components that weigh heavily in the assessment. The thesis has been done in independent savings banks from two main landscapes, that is, Bohuslän and Dalsland, and a third of Västergötland. We have a qualitative approach in the form of interviews with total interviews with about seven credit managers from various independent savings banks. The question we wanted an answer to from our interviewees was: How important are financial statements in comparison with other factors in a credit assessment of a company? Based on this research question we formed our interview questions. The main result and the conclusion we could draw after we explored the area both theoretically and empirically was that banks use equal shares of annual versus other factors. Other factors being, e.g., the company's Board of Directors, its management, auditor's report and collateral. Both of these elements are needed by the bank to allow such a fair, safe and secure credit assessment as possible of a company. This in turn means that the system that banks in the old days used, which to the greatest extent examined the hard values, the numbers in a company's annual report, is not applicable in the present. A risk assessment should instead be focused on other factors as well. This is absolutely necessary. The distinction we made is not to examine the legislation behind a credit, it is only referred to in principle. We have not put the focus on investigating the exact numbers credit managers at banks look on at a credit assessment of a company's financial statements, but only if they examine some factors in the financial statements.

This paper argues that credit ratings have contributed to the current financial crisis. In United States, the previous “reputational model” as well as the current proposals aimed at reducing reliance on rating agencies, enhancing competition and increasing transparency is not sufficient to improve the integrity of rating agencies. This paper suggests that imposing stricter liability on rating agencies is necessary. The proposal to eliminate the exemption of NRSROs under Section 11 of the Securities Act is necessary but not sufficient for holding rating agencies accountable. The first amendment defense always shields rating agencies from legal liability, while the absence of a common standard make it hard to impose liability for negligent ratings. Finally, this paper suggests that the courts should not award the rating agencies First Amendment protection and consider the distinguished characteristics of rating agencies, when examining the professional liability of the agencies.

This paper argues that credit ratings have contributed to the current financial crisis. In United States, the previous “reputational model” as well as the current proposals aimed at reducing reliance on rating agencies, enhancing competition and increasing transparency is not sufficient to improve the integrity of rating agencies. This paper suggests that imposing stricter liability on rating agencies is necessary. The proposal to eliminate the exemption of NRSROs under Section 11 of the Securities Act is necessary but not sufficient for holding rating agencies accountable. The first amendment defense always shields rating agencies from legal liability, while the absence of a common standard make it hard to impose liability for negligent ratings. Finally, this paper suggests that the courts should not award the rating agencies First Amendment protection and consider the distinguished characteristics of rating agencies, when examining the professional liability of the agencies.

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In recent years, issues about credit risk attract more and more attentions. This thesis provides some empirical evidence for the behavior of credit spreads in Taiwan based on a Markov model proposed by Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997). Although the estimated risk premium adjustments increases as the credit rating level goes downward, it does not exist robust relations between credit yield spreads and credit ratings. Apparently, the model does not fit the real condition well because of some structural factors and limitations. I try to suggest some possible explanations for this phenomenon. Despites some poor performances of this model, these results still offer some directions to reconsider the valuation of straight corporate bonds in Taiwan.

The thesis examines whether the role of credit rating prior to the announcement of credit rating change is the neglected factor explaining in large extent the paradox investigated in prior papers that downgrades influence the stock prices of company but upgrades not. It is motivated by the notion that credit rating changes from low credit rating classes influence the stock price of company more distinctively than changes from higher credit rating classes and there is proportionally more downgrades from low credit rating classes than upgrades. The large sample of credit rating changes including proportionally more upgrades from low credit rating classes than downgrades is collected and the results suggesting the influence of downgrades on stock prices of company and any influence of upgrades persist. Furthermore when controlled for credit rating prior to the announcement of credit rating change, magnitude of credit rating change, crossing the investment-speculative barrier, credit rating changes within and across credit rating categories, consecutive credit rating changes in the same direction and industry sector of issuer all the results are consistent with the original conclusions proposing significant stock price reaction to announcements of credit rating downgrades and no stock price response to...

Committee Chair: Dr. Shaun Wang Major Department: Risk Management and Insurance In this thesis I employ regime switching models on a unique dataset of bond downgrades to examine the information value of timely downgrades. I use ratings from a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) and a non-NRSRO as proxies for the arrival of public and private information. Regime switching models allow us to identify the time at which a discrete shift in the underlying stock return process takes place, estimate the distribution of returns in each regime and also observe the duration of each regime associated with the day of the downgrade. The first contribution is proposing an alternative way to perform an event study. First I define a regime switching model with two regimes: one of low and high volatility. The probabilistic nature of regime switching models allows us to identify the exact day on which stock returns switch to a high volatility regime. This is directly observed through the estimated daily conditional probability of being in one of the two regimes. In summary, I find that stocks switch from a low-volatility regime (1.92%) to a high-volatility regime (6.10%) on the day of the downgrade. The high-volatility regime lasts for about three days and it is mainly driven by downgrades of the smaller bond rating company (non-NRSRO). The second contribution is to propose a method to quantify stock return distress costs associated with downgrades. This measure is based on the capital asset pricing model, uses the parameters of the regime switching model and the estimated daily conditional probabilities of being in each regime. I find that distress costs on stock returns range from 9.49% to 12.91% for the 10 days prior to the day of the downgrade when assuming unity for the market price of risk. The magnitude and direction (sign) of my estimates are consistent with prior literature on the information value of bond ratings. The third contribution is to propose an extension to regime switching models to the bivariate case with a common shock. I show through a state-contingent model how shocks to the economy may cause a one time loss that affects a portfolio of stocks. I derive the frequency and severity implications of such exogenous shocks on regime switching models.

In order to reduce the risks, banks has two ways to evaluate the loan exposure. One is credit rating, and the other one is pledge collaterals. Many literatures and financial regulations are emphasizing on the importance of credit rating. However, with the illustration of a plenty of empirical study, the pledging collaterals are the popular way which was using by “lazy” banks. Credit rating or pledging with collaterals is the gap between theories and practices.  The aim of this thesis is to figure the factors which make the gap between the theories and practices. At last, the front-line employees are paid attention on. Since front-line employees are the first and direct one who contact customers. Reliability and responsiveness has a space to develop by training first-line employees, moral hazard controlling, and sectoral specialization the credit inspection.

This paper attempts to find the relationship between momentum and firm¡¦s credit rating. According to Avramov¡¦s (2007) finding, there is a strong link between momentum and firm credit rating in US. In this paper, the similar phenomenon is proven existing in Taiwan stock market. Momentum profitability is large among low-grade firms, but it is insignificant among high-grade firms. The source of momentum profits is from operating performance, financial performance, volatility and illiquidity. For loser (winner) stocks in the low rating category, profit margins, sales growth, operating cash flows, and interest coverage decrease (increase) over the formation and holding periods, while illiquidity and volatility increase (decrease). As the market observes the deteriorating (improving) conditions, there is a pressure to sell (buy) losers (winners), which enhances gains among high risk winners and losses among high risk losers.

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