The purpose of this research was to investigate the relationship between college students knowledge of contraceptive devices and techniques and their attitudes tovra.rd premarital sexual permissiveness. This study also examined background variables of the respondents to determine if they might innuence the relationship between knowledge of contraceptive devices and techniques and attitudes toward premarital sexual permissiveness. The sample was composed of 392 students currently enrolled in two colleges in Virginia. A questionnaire was developed using Reiss' (1964) premarital sexual permissiveness scale, items measuring knowledge of contraceptive devices and techniques devised by the investigator, and items gathering information on background variables. The relationship between knowledge of contraceptive devices and techniques and attitudes toward premarital sexual permissiveness was influenced by each of the following background variables: race, sex, religious denomination, and college major. Also males were found to be more permissive than females while knowledge of contraception was highest among white females followed by white males, black females and black males respectively. / M.S.

We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms' bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders' construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 percentage points. We also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger. These two pieces of evidence point to pro-cyclical markups. (authors' abstract)

In many procurement auctions, entrants determine whether to participate in auctions accounting for their roles of intermediaries who search for the best (or the cheapest) input suppliers. We build on a procurement auction model with entry, combining with intermediary search for suppliers. The novel feature is that costs of bidders are endogenously determined by suppliers who strategically charge input prices. We show the existence of an equilibrium with price dispersion for inputs, generating cost heterogeneity among bidders. Interestingly, the procurement cost may rise as the number of potential bidders increases. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

We experimentally study the effects of allotment - the division of an item into homogeneous units - in independent private value auctions. We compare a single-item, first-price auction with two equivalent treatments with allotment: a two-unit discriminatory auction and two simultaneous single-unit first-price auctions. We find that allotment mitigates overbidding, with this effect being stronger in the discriminatory auction. In the allotment treatments, we observe large and persistent bid spreading. Across treatments, the discriminatory auction is the least efficient and generates the lowest revenue.